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Abstract  
The Quest for Humanity in a Dehumanised State: Afghan Refugees and Devalued 
Citizens in Urban Pakistan, 1979-2012. 
 
This thesis asks two questions. Firstly, how do refugees exert political agency in Pakistan? And 
secondly, does legal citizenship affect the expression of political agency in Pakistan? It examines 
how Afghans (non-citizens) and Pakistanis (citizens - specifically the urban poor) occupy a 
shared reality in Pakistan. It pays attention to urban spaces, and it looks at this shared space 
through a framework of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation” as informed by the oral 
narratives and ethnography collected during fieldwork in Karachi and Peshawar. 
 
In everyday urban Pakistan differences at the level of political agency between the citizen and the 
non-citizen are slim. This is because official institutions do not deliver the material and non-
material resources to which both groups are legally entitled. In practice, therefore, both Afghans 
and Pakistanis use a similar repertoire of “hybrid” formal/informal structures and strategies to 
redistribute everyday material and non-material goods in their push for a humanised existence. 
Through these shared experiences of dehumanisation and self-humanisation, an alternative space 
of “belonging” occurs, which goes beyond traditional demarcations between “refugees”, 
“citizens”, and “non-citizens”. 
  
These formal/informal ways of being are tolerated and encouraged by official actors because 
they represent an alternative way of managing urban populations and maintaining the state. 
However, specific benefits withstanding, this sphere of formal/informal political agency 
inadvertently chips away at the Pakistani state, in physical and non-physical ways, creating long-
term changes to the city and the political legitimacy of the state. 
  
This thesis concludes by showing that “citizenship” matters only in the domain of state 
“security”. The post-2001 climate of (in)security in Pakistan has created deeply penetrative forms 
of enumeration and surveillance. This combines with negative constructions of the Afghan 
“Other” to create an everyday reality of humiliation (police harassment, verbal and physical 
abuse, and arbitrary detention) which is specifically reserved for Afghan bodies. 
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A Note on Confidentiality  
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permission to use their names. For officials that requested confidentiality this has been respected. 
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in which case the name of the area has remained as the original, but names of all individuals have 
been changed. This is a decision that has been made in consultation with various residents of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Shared Lives of Afghans and Pakistanis in Urban Pakistan 
Introduction  
Refugees, we are told, are not a part of the state. In the modern nation-state system refugees, it is 
assumed, are simply anomalies, or temporary guests, waiting to “return home”. The Afghan 
refugee “issue” has been a significant feature of Central and South Asian regional politics since 
the 1978 Saur Revolution in Afghanistan and subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union in 1979. It is one of the world’s largest and longest “protracted refugee displacements”.1 
At the peak of displacement during the 1990s 7-8 million 2  Afghan refugees were recorded, 
primarily in Pakistan and Iran. In 2013, thirty-five years on, the United States military occupies 
Afghanistan and many Afghans have still not returned “home”. Neighbouring Pakistan has been 
the largest “host” state of Afghan refugees, followed by Iran. Currently it is estimated that 
approximately 3-4 million3 Afghans live in Pakistan with the majority having lived in Pakistan for 
over 20-34 years. Dominant constructions of “refugeedom” outline that there is a distinction 
between refugees and citizens and that refugees, as anomalies and temporary guests, have limited 
political agency and impact in the states that they live in. This research challenges these 
assumptions. Through a comparative analysis of refugees and Pakistani citizens, specifically the 
urban poor, in two urban centres in Pakistan  - Peshawar and Karachi  -, this research illuminates 
that in urban Pakistan, despite languages of legal distinction, Afghan refugees and Pakistani 
citizens live in similar everyday realities. Assumptions that refugees, as guests, have limited 
political agency are inadequate. However, through this comparison this research also illuminates 
key findings about the significance, or rather insignificance, of citizenship in Pakistan. 
                                                          
1 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) defines a protracted refugee situation as, 
“One in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer 
in a given asylum country” (UNHCR 2011:14). 
2 4.2 million Afghans in Pakistan were recorded in Pakistan during the 1990s (CAR-KPK 2012) and 2.9 
million in Iran – with Iran’s numbers not including unregistered migrations (Jalal et al., 2005:4; see also 
Monsutti and Stitger 2005; Saito 2009). 
3 UNHCR records (2012) 1.7 million Afghans refugees in Pakistan. This figure, however, does not include 
unregistered Afghans which number approximately 0.45-2.2 million (Befare 2009:54). 
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Assumptions that citizens, as natives of the soil, enjoy enforceable rights and access to public 
goods more than non-citizens are also revealed to be inadequate. The domination of the military 
in the geostrategic security state of Pakistan and the significant impact of the structural 
adjustment programmes of the 1990s and economic liberalisation of the 2000s has meant that 
the state simply does not have the capacity to deliver the goods and rights that citizens are due. 
Citizenship in Pakistan it appears is a devalued possession. Thus, whilst debates within the 
forced migration discipline ponder the future of Afghans in Pakistan (and of other refugees 
elsewhere) through the lens of legal “naturalisation” / “integration” (or lack of) – as well as 
repatriation and resettlement to a third country – this appears to miss the point. Rather the more 
relevant questions to analyse are: How do Afghans, the majority of whom have been in Pakistan 
for 20-34 years, exert political agency in Pakistan? And, when and how is this political agency 
similar to Pakistanis and what does this reveal about citizenship in Pakistan? Further, what are 
the impacts of a shared Afghan and Pakistani political agency on the Pakistani state? 
 
This research is based on the collection of interviews, oral narratives, and ethnographic research 
conducted during 2010-2011, and parts of 2012. Through the analysis of interviews, oral 
narratives, and detailed cases studies collected during fieldwork this research explores the 
similarities and differences of Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens in everyday urban life and 
focuses on access to housing, utilities, and social security. It illuminates that, in many cases, 
official structures are unable to provide access to basic material goods to both Afghan refugees 
and citizens. Only in the context of state “security” and “check-posts” do the lines of distinction 
between Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens have some significance, and even then 
citizenship does not result in a delivery of rights or welfare and instead only acts as a safeguard 
against some forms of state violence. This research demonstrates that, despite facing legal and 
structural restraints (refugee status and state shortcomings), Afghans and Pakistanis exert 
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political agency in Pakistan in similar ways through the use of informal political structures and 
strategies – including social solidarity networks. These structures and strategies enable a 
redistribution of the material goods denied by official structures. In order to understand political 
patterns in Pakistan, it is these informal spaces – spaces that do not distinguish between citizens 
and non-citizens -, which require analysis. Through these shared experiences, of being let down 
by the state and then subsequently engaging in redistributive actions, Afghans and Pakistanis 
create an alternative space of “belonging” which transcend traditional demarcations between the 
“refugee”, “citizen”, and “non-citizen”. In addition, this research uses the daily language, oral 
narratives, discussions, stories, and ethnographic observations collected during fieldwork to 
reveal that the failures of officialdom are not just understood as a material failure of service 
delivery, they are also understood and explicitly expressed through a language of 
“dehumanisation”. Similarly, informal solidarity networks and their accompanying strategies are 
expressed, remembered, and acted through a language of “self-humanisation” – of insaniyat 
(humanity), izzat (respect), and azmat (dignity). Thus, this research also reveals that informal 
political action is not just about material redistribution, it is also non-material redistribution and a 
quest for a “humanised” existence in what is understood to be a dehumanising Pakistani state. 
Moreover, this research illuminates important findings about the state in Pakistan. Informal 
political action is revealed to be an important, albeit implicitly recognised, part of the state in 
Pakistan, which is often encouraged by officials as an alternative means of maintaining the state. 
This research, however, shows that, specific benefits withstanding, the informal political agency 
Afghans and Pakistanis practice inadvertently undermines the state by changing urban ecologies, 
challenging the state’s legitimacy, and exposing its incompetence.  
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Chapter Outline 
This introductory chapter first provides an overall outline of the different chapters of this thesis. 
It then explores the historical development of Afghan migration into Pakistan. It then introduces 
how Afghans exert agency in Pakistan. Following this, this chapter details the shortcomings of 
the Pakistani state which create the conditions for a shared Afghan and Pakistani position in 
urban Pakistan. This is followed by a literature review on informal politics. Finally, this chapter 
ends by discussing the wider theme of this thesis: the quest for a humanised life and explores the 
importance and meanings of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation” as understood in this 
research.  
 
Thesis Outline: Overview of Chapters  
Following on from this chapter, Chapter 2 explains the objectives of this research, the research 
methods used, and details of sampling sizes. The chapter also attempts to locate my position as a 
researcher and details my relationship to this body of work. Following on from that are two 
conceptual chapters. Chapter 3 outlines the moral, political, and legal responsibilities and 
expectations for enabling and safeguarding Afghan and Pakistani lives that lie with the state and 
(for refugees and internally displaced citizens) can also include international institutions, 
primarily the UN and its sub-bodies. It also details where and how the state and international 
institutions fail to meet these responsibilities and expectations. The chapter illuminates that 
official failures are not simply the consequence of structural shortcomings but they are also the 
result of a number of official “ways of seeing”. These ways of seeing include forms of national 
and ethnic discrimination, which in urban settings result in “urban ethnocracy” (Yiftachel and 
Yakobi 2004; Yiftachel 2006) and “ghettoisation” (Ron 2003) that significantly impact Afghans, 
and, in the context of ethnic tensions in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtuns. It also includes both 
Afghan and Pakistani lives being dehumanised through objectification for bureaucratic 
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management processes or political instrumentalism – the latter of which is explored using 
interviews which focus on how Afghans were “used” in the war against the Soviet Union and 
quickly dispensed with once the war ended, as well as cases of Pakistanis being used as one-
dimensional “electoral votes”. It concludes by exploring how both Afghans and Pakistanis have 
their agency denied to them through dominant constructions of “exemplary suffering”, which 
are reserved for the “helpless” refugee or urban poor.   
 
Chapter 4 provides a conceptual framework that goes on to show how the dehumanising 
implications of officialdom do not lead to victimisation. Instead, Afghan refugees and devalued 
citizens - the urban poor - use alternative, informal, structures and strategies in order to 
redistribute material and non-material goods that are not provided by the state. Here Afghans 
and Pakistanis “self-humanise” their lives via solidarity networks (structures) and navigation 
practices (strategies). Social capital is revealed as a crucial lifeline for Afghans and Pakistanis in 
urban Pakistan, again reflecting an inclusive space shared by Afghans and urban poor Pakistanis 
that cuts across lines of legal distinction. However, the navigation strategies that Afghans and 
Pakistanis use are explained as being contingent on the role of state actors, acting in informal and 
illegal ways, and other power sources: middlemen, landholders, and other patrons. Thus, the 
chapter also reveals that solidarity networks, navigation practices, informality, and patrons are 
implicitly promoted and encouraged by the state as an alternative way of maintaining the state: 
informality is a central part of the state. The chapter then, however, analyses the implications of 
informal/illegal state actors and the presence of these patrons and shows that far from 
maintaining the state, the long-term consequences actually undermine it. Repeated time and time 
again small informal acts challenge the state. They change the physical nature of the urban cities 
in haphazard and dangerous ways and create/reinforce alternative power-bases, which directly 
impacts the lived experiences of Afghans and Pakistanis. More crucially, these acts also bite back 
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at the state itself: the state and state laws appears incompetent, irrelevant, comical, and even 
inhumane. Informality may be a part of the state, but it is, ultimately, also revealed as a 
contradiction. 
 
Chapter 5, 6, and 7 are all based on interviews and detailed case studies collected during 
fieldwork. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 bring together the conceptual frameworks of Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 and explores them through an analysis of these case studies and interviews. The 
chapters analyse the similarities of Afghan and Pakistani lives and show the following: how both 
experience “dehumanisation”; how both engage in processes of “self-humanisation” using 
solidarity networks and navigation practices; how challenges for both citizens and non-citizens 
continue; and, finally, what the political impact of these alternative structures and strategies on 
official structures is. Chapter 5 explores how solidarity networks, specifically surrounding the 
urban neighbourhood and informed by altruistic motives, enable forms of everyday basic 
survival in informal residential areas paying attention to the redistribution of water and other 
utilities, food, housing, and other infrastructures. It goes first to Karachi and analyses an Afghan 
quest for water, a Pakistani battle to save an informal housing settlement from being bulldozed, 
and a Pakistani Pashtun area’s feelings of neglect (not  unlike Afghan feelings of neglect) because 
of the “ethnic” politics of Karachi. It then moves to informal housing areas in Peshawar to show 
how the state functions in different ways in the two cities but is still, ultimately, incompetent and 
also heavily dependent on local patrons: middlemen, dallals, and landholders.  
 
Chapter 6 starts off with a continuation of urban stories of survival. However, this time it 
explores intimate solidarity networks (friendship and kin). The chapter shows how family and 
friendship networks enable micro-level, personalised action, which are also central in 
20 
 
understanding how Afghans and Pakistanis engage in material and non-material distribution. The 
chapter pays particular attention to case studies of pooled resources, specifically social security, 
remittances, and loans, which also directly challenge constructions of “exemplary suffering” 
(Chapter 3). The chapter then explores cases of friendship solidarities that cut across the lines of 
legal distinction between citizens and non-citizens and to enable Afghans to secure beyond-
survival gains in Pakistan: formal property ownership in regulated residential areas. It asks, when 
the state cannot decide who can own property in Pakistan and informal contracts are considered 
more valid, is the state still a relevant actor? The chapter closes the section on cases studies and 
the similarities of Afghan and Pakistani lives by highlighting that, throughout the processes of 
informal political actions, the trust of the state and its laws is lost. Again, one of the deepest 
impacts of Afghan and Pakistani political agency in Pakistan is of the state being delegitimized 
and considered irrelevant.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes with an account of the limits to the shared spaces that Afghans and 
Pakistanis occupy in Pakistan, focusing on the climate of “security concerns” that dominate the 
urban landscape. The chapter first, however, continues with a story of similarities. It first 
explains how both Afghans and Pakistanis are quantified and surveilled in new ways at an 
interacting local, regional, and global level because of the counterinsurgency tactics in “Global 
War on Terror” and a racialised global migration system defined by “Northern” hostility towards 
“Southern” migration (Rana 2011; Richmond 1994; Sadiq 2009:131). However, the chapter then 
highlights that within Pakistan Afghans are more intensely enumerated than Pakistanis. It then 
examines how Afghans in Pakistan face specific practices of dehumanisation via harassment and 
humiliation tactics used by state actors, which includes: physical and verbal abuse, daily stop and 
searches, arbitrary detention (individual and mass), and even deportations. These are acts that do 
not impact most Pakistanis to the same in the same way or to the same degree. It concludes by 
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showing how the dehumanising actions of state actors actually result in the trust of the state 
being further eroded by populations who, although not legal citizens, are an important part of 
the state. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the wider implications of this study.  It shows that lines of legal distinction in 
Pakistan appear to only to matter when it comes to issues of state “security”. It reinforces 
arguments made elsewhere about Pakistan being a “security state” and reveals that Pakistan is a 
state that is more concerned about state security than the social security of its own citizens. The 
chapter also discusses the fact that Afghans, legal or not, are an integral part of the Pakistani 
state – a state struggling with alternatives sources of power such as urban mafias, middlemen, or 
landholders who are ready to step in for the state and redistribute and protect material and non-
material goods. It concludes by showing that informal political action leads to self-humanisation 
for the urban poor (Afghan and Pakistani) but at exactly the same time these actions are 
contradictory delegitimizing for the state making it appear as a disconnected and inhumane 
structure.  
 
Historical Background: Afghans in Pakistan 
Cross-border migration between Afghanistan and Pakistan is not a new phenomenon. Many 
people, as individuals and as groups, have moved across the region in short-term, temporary, 
seasonal, or long-term movements because of kinship ties, trade, employment, educational links, 
and political reasons (Centlivres and Centlivres-Demont 1983; Monsutti 2005:4). However, 
colonial4 and post-colonial encounters in Afghanistan, British India and post-Partition Pakistan 
                                                          
4 In 1893 the Durand Line Agreement separated Afghanistan from British India with the Tribal Areas (now 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]), being created to form a “buffer zone” (Haroon 2007:13-
25). This gained permanency through negotiations after the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), which were 
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have meant that the norms of the migrations above have been reversed and are now constructed 
as anomalous acts. Today national spaces are believed to represent distinct realms of belonging, 
one Afghan and one Pakistani, in which it is assumed that individuals can belong only to one. 
The modern international state system is predicated through constructions of a “national order of 
things” (Malkki 1995b),5 in which the ultimate system of political organisation is the sovereign 
territorial nation-state – indeed, any challenge to this “naturalised” border is seen as a 
pathological (Malkki 1992:34), anomalous, and dangerous act.  
 
For Pakistan’s post-1947 leaders, the project of constructing and negotiating the nation was a 
volatile exercise conducted in an environment of immense regional suspicion, paranoia, intrigue, 
and confusion (Jalal 1990, 1995; Lamb 1991). “Moth-eaten” Pakistan (Jalal 1985) was not 
expected to survive. Monitoring who belonged to the state was of crucial importance because of 
the processes of Partition and its accompanying forms of mass population transfers in Indian 
and Pakistani Punjab, and Muslim migrations from India to Karachi and Hyderabad (Zamindar 
2007). This was also reinforced with the huge displacements from the 1971 secession of East 
Pakistan (Bangladesh).6  Yet despite a movement for a Greater Pashtunistan within Pakistan 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
secured in 1923 under the rule of Amanullah Khan (1919-29) (Haroon 2007:111-3). This combined with 
the Sistan Agreement of 1872 regarding the Perso-Afghan border (Hopkins 2007; Hopkins and Marsden 
2010:33-7) to form the territorial boundaries of the modern Afghan state. In 1947, Afghanistan’s eastern 
neighbour, British India - including the “buffer zone” of the Tribal Areas - was partitioned and given 
independence, forming Pakistan - Afghanistan’s “new” immediate neighbour - and India. However, the 
Afghan state never formally ratified the Durand Line Agreement and its eastern border with Pakistan, which 
has led to intermittent tensions between the two states after Partition (Haroon 2007:186-196; Hewitt 1996; 
Tarzi 2012).  
5 The “motto of a state for everyone and everyone in a state” (Aleinikoff 2001) assumes everyone has the 
security of belonging to one state, with the UDHR stating that “everyone has the right to a nationality” 
(Article 15.1 UDHR 1948). 
6 Limited academic to the significance of Bengalis remaining in Pakistan has been completed. Recent 
work on illegal immigrants in Pakistan by Kamal Sadiq (2009) and recent reports by Mehdi (2010), Azam 
(2009), and Befare (2009) provide some detail of the issue of Bengali Pakistanis (Bengalis who were 
present in Pakistan before the 1971 War) and Bangladeshi illegal immigrants (Bangladeshis who migrated 
to Pakistan after the 1971 War). Sadiq (2009:161) outlines that Bengalis (approximately 40,000) who 
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(Banerjee 2000; Qureshi 1966), 7  which was supported by the Afghan government (Haroon 
2007:189-196; Hewitt 1996; Qureshi 1966; Tarzi 2012), 8  the surveillance of the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border was initially minimal, especially when compared to the surveillance of the 
Pakistan-India border (Zamindar 2007). Similarly for the Afghan government, routine seasonal, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“came to Pakistan before 1971 are legal citizens of Pakistan” but Bangladeshis who came after 1971 are 
considered illegal immigrants (ibid). The amended Citizenship Act of 1978 required all Bangladeshis, 
including Bengalis who came before 1971 to legally apply for citizenship (ibid). It is clear, however, that 
the issue of Bengalis/Bangladeshis in Pakistan is unresolved. In November 2012 Pakistani Bengalis and 
Bangladeshis staged a protest in Karachi against the Government of Pakistan (GOP) failure to recognise 
all Bengalis/Bangladeshis, with one resident stating: “I was born in PIB Colony [Karachi] in 1954 and 
have a Computerised National Identity Card (CNIC), but my children have been given the run around by 
government agencies” (Express 4 Nov 2012). 
7 Pashtunistan literally means “Land of the Pashtuns”. The majority of Pashtuns originate from FATA 
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (previously North West Frontier Province [NWFP]), areas of current 
Balochistan in Pakistan, and Afghanistan, particularly Eastern and Southern provinces. The Pashtunistan 
movement was historically concentrated in NWFP and the Tribal Areas and not Afghanistan. The Afghan 
state had consolidated its hold on Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and considered the Tribal Areas difficult 
to control, although the Pashtun-led Afghan state was keen to have the Tribal Areas areas incorporated 
into Afghanistan to strengthen the “Pashtun” identity of the mixed Afghan State (Haroon 2007; Hanifi 
2012; 2012b). In Pakistan the Khudai Khidmatgars are considered a central organisation to the 
Pashtunistan movement (Banerjee 2000). The Khudai Khidmatgars was established in 1927 as a Pashtun 
nationalist party in British India that aimed to lobby the provincial issues of NWFP in British India, and 
was incorporated as a branch of the All India National Congress Party in 1930. Although the party 
advocated the need to keep the “tribes” separate from the administered NWFP (Haroon 2007:156-7, 194), 
after Partition calls for a Pashtun ethno-national homeland included the Tribal Areas and were voiced 
across NWFP. This was justified on the grounds that the Khudai Khidmatgars (the dominant party in 
NWFP) had boycotted the pre-Partition referendum on joining India or Pakistan (with the Muslim 
League securing the vote). The Pakistani state somewhat quelled calls for separate national Pashtun 
homeland during the 1950s and 1960s as a sizeable number of Pakistan’s army (the Pakistani state’s 
dominant institution) were recruited from NWFP, including high ranking officials (indeed Ayub Khan 
was a Pashtun from the Hazara district). 
8 After Partition the GOA consistently questioned the validity of the Durand Line and critiqued the GOP 
actions in the Tribal Areas (Haroon 2007:188-9; Hewitt 1996; Tarzi 2012:21). Haroon (2007:189) outlines 
that after Partition in 1947 Zahir Shah’s special envoy to Karachi went to negotiate a treaty with the GOP, 
which included “an Afghan request to grant complete autonomy to NWFP and rename it Afghania or 
Pathanistan”. Tarzi (2012:21-2) outlines that at the UN General Assembly on the question of Pakistan’s 
admission to the UN, Afghanistan (eventually) supported Pakistan’s entry but also stated that, “Afghan 
policy was to “wholeheartedly” support the “principles on which the claim for an independent 
Pashtunistan is based””. The 1949 Afghan national assembly also repudiated all agreements with British 
India (now Pakistan), and also rejected the 1955 inclusion of Pashtun areas in the One Unit Scheme 
(Tarzi 2012:22). Further, Haroon (2007:1919) and Tarzi (2012:21-2, fn12) show that pro-Pashtunistan 
propaganda literature was published and distributed by the Afghan Information Ministry and GOA. Tarzi 
adds that throughout the 1970s Afghan policies towards Pakistan included mutual border attacks. Thus, 
clearly until 1978, “the Pashtunistan issue formed a major component of Afghan foreign policy” (ibid). 
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entrepreneurial, and/or kin-based migration across the Durand Line was of minor political and 
strategic significance (Dupree 1975).9 
 
However, after the mass migrations of Afghans into Pakistan from the 1970s onwards, 
particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the language and technology of 
national distinction was methodologically, and strategically, used by the Government of Pakistan 
(GOP),10 the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), and key international actors in Pakistan such 
as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Starting even in the early 
1970s many Afghan academics, intellectuals, and political parties migrated to Pakistan (CAR-
KPK 2012)11 seeking political asylum because of the 1973 coup d’état by Daoud Khan (1973-1978), 
which overthrew the Afghan monarchy of Zahir Shah (1933-1973) and resulted in aggressive 
government centralisation and socialist inspired modernisation (Roy 1986; Rubin 2002). 12 
Migration from Afghanistan was not explicitly prohibited by the leaders of Pakistan, Prime 
Minister/President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP) (1973-77) and, 
later, by General/President Zia ul Haq (1978-88). With the 1978 Saur Revolution, which brought 
into power the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and the Soviet 
Union’s invasion in December 1979 unprecedented migrations took place from Afghanistan into 
                                                          
9 Even though the Afghan state drove the Pashtunistan issue in its foreign policy its real impact in terms 
of becoming a full-fledged political movement was stifled.  
10 In this thesis the “GOP” and “Pakistani state” are used interchangeably to describe the Pakistani state.  
11 The CAR-KPK (2012) website states that in 1973 109,900 Afghans were present in Pakistan. (The exact 
number appears as 109,9000 which appears to be a typing error as the next figure available for 1979 states 
402,100 Afghans being present). No official registration system was in place during the 1970s – I assume 
that these numbers are based on intelligence and/or estimated numbers. I was told in an interview with 
Hajji Khairuddin, a graduate of Kabul University during the 1970s who was forced to migrate from 
Afghanistan as he was considered an intellectual threat due to his association with Jamiat e Islami, that he 
knew of a few thousand people (3,000-4000 migrating in pockets during the mid-late 1970s), which was 
replicated across the Afghanistan (Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71). 
12 For earlier discussions regarding highly centrist state-led development in Afghanistan see Cullather 
(2002), see also Scott (1998). 
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Pakistan and Iran.13 Millions fled to escape the violence of the Soviet invasion and occupation 
(HRW 1984, 1985). Early CAR and UNHCR documentation show the sudden rise in Afghans 
entering Pakistan with 402,000 Afghans recorded in December 1979 (CAR-KPK 2012); 1.42 
million in December 1980; 1.85 million in March 1981; and 2.08 million in May 1981 (UNHCR 
1981:1a). Official figures from the GOP state that 3.23 million Afghan refugees were present in 
Pakistan in the 1980s (CCAR 1987) and figures from the 1990s, which include unregistered 
Afghans, total 4.2 million Afghans in Pakistan (CAR-KPK 2012). It is also estimated that the 
number of Afghan refugees in Iran peaked at 2.9 million (this, however, does not include 
unregistered migrations) (Jalal et al., 2005:4; see also Monsutti and Stitger 2005; Saito 2009). 
 
After 1979 Afghans in Pakistan were categorised as “refugees”, which, despite appealing to 
broader religious and cultural codes of asylum (Abou El-Wafa 2009; Edwards 1986; Marsden 
1998 Abu-Sahlieh 1996 and response by Karpat 1996), was framed by the hegemonic state-based 
Westphalian international order. Although not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the main United Nations 
instruments for the protection and rehabilitation of refugees, Pakistan “conformed to” them 
(SAFRON and CCAR 1981:1). 14  Starting in 1980 the GOP also worked with UNHCR via 
Material Assistance Agreements to support its “refugees”. 
 
During this time the official discourse on the Afghan position in Pakistan was versed in 
exclusionary languages, technologies, and practices by the state that made a distinction between 
the non-national non-citizen and the national citizen. The refugee, the ration pass, and the 
                                                          
13 Rubin (1996:3) outlines that 600,000 Afghans were in Iran at the time of the April 1978 Coup. 
14 Article A2 of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol (UN 1951, 1967), defines refugees as individuals who 
are, “outside of the country of his nationality”, for a “wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion”. 
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refugee tented village (RTV) all symbolised the temporary Afghan position in Pakistan. Unlike 
earlier refugees in Pakistan, i.e. Muslims from British India’s Muslim minority provinces or the 
Punjab, whose bodies, narratives, and political and financial capital were used to construct the 
Pakistani state, Afghan refugees were not seen in the same light. However, given the need to 
defeat the Soviet Union (Baitenmann 1990; Marsden 2009; Rashid 2000; Weinbaum 1994), a 
wider geo-strategic desire to gain strength against a hostile India (Grare 2003), and a desire to 
silence the Afghan state’s demands for a revision of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which had 
dominated Afghanistan-Pakistani relations since 1947 (see fn8), Afghans in Pakistan were 
“welcomed” by the Pakistan state as useful bodies. It was, however, most significantly the 
Soviet-Afghan war that proved to dominate the Afghan position in Pakistan. Here, Afghan 
bodies were useful as they acted as a vital resource pool for the militarised and political efforts to 
defeat the Soviet “menace” - also supported by the USA, its allies, and other regional actors. In 
an interview I conducted with an Afghan and former fighter with Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb e 
Islami party who migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan in 1979, Engineer Aziz, he recalled how, 
in the 1980s, “People used to give up their seats for us on the bus. That is how much we were 
honoured” (Engineer Aziz, PXA59). This was a reciprocated sentiment as Afghans in refugee 
camps in Pakistan adorned household walls with pictures of Zia ul Haq and named camp roads 
and even sons after him.15 
 
However, after the defeat of the Soviet Union, the usefulness of Afghan bodies waned, 
becoming even more acute after the Afghan state was blamed for sheltering the perpetrators of 
the New York and Washington DC September 2001 attacks. Afghan bodies in Pakistan then 
became a liability. The positive imaginings of Afghanis in popular discourse, which had 
previously been concentrated around constructions of the “heroic mujahid” (fighter), quickly 
                                                          
15 Information taken from field interviews and observations in RTVs “street” names in Peshawar. 
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dissipated and even more exclusionary frameworks were used by the GOP (Chapters 3 and 7). 
The Pakistani state and officials were keen on making clear the distinction between the Afghan 
and Pakistani state (including its people), which was reflected by Pakistan’s decision under 
President Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) to join the US-led “Global War on Terror” (hereafter, 
GWOT). The implications of this shift in foreign policy had a direct impact on Afghan lives in 
Pakistan. In legal terms, whilst during the 1980s all Afghans in Pakistan were given prima facie (on 
first encounter) refugee status, by the 1990s prima facie recognition was disbanded (B.Khan 
2012:4-7), i.e. once the Soviet “menace” had been defeated, and instead Afghans were recognised 
as having been given “temporary protection.”16 However, this was most strongly (re)enforced 
after 2001. During the 2000s routine Afghan migration into Pakistan was halted and greater legal 
clarification and technological control was exerted (Chapter 7). Currently, only the 1.7 million 
(UNHCR 2012) Afghans registered with a valid Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration (POR)17 
card are considered legal persons in Pakistan. The remaining unregistered Afghans 
(approximately 0.45-2.2 million) are considered illegal (Befare 2009:54). 
 
In combination with shifts in foreign policy objectives, Afghans as non-nationals are increasingly 
constructed as “anomalies”, “undesirables”, the “remnants” of society (Agier 2011), and a 
pathological threat to the naturalised nation-state (Malkki 1992:34). Afghans are also morally 
excluded as a dangerous “sub-human Other”. This includes being subjected to negative 
                                                          
16  Archived UNHCR Pakistan Information Sheets and Fact Sheets from 1982-85 refer to Afghans as 
“refugees”.  However, 1987 Fact Sheets start using the terminology “temporary asylum”: “Afghan refugees 
are allowed temporary asylum” and are under “temporary protection” (UNHCR-PK 1982-7). 
17 The POR card is an Afghan identity card that was introduced in 2006-07 under the 2006 Registration 
Agreement and 2007 Tripartite Agreement. Only Afghans that were able to give evidence for having lived in 
Pakistan using earlier documents, such as ration pass or immunisation cards, distributed by the World 
Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNHCR, or one of the registered 
seven Afghan mujahidin parties, were eligible to register. Those who arrived after 2001 are now assessed 
through the Refugee Determination Status (RSD) process through UNHCR. The 2006-07 card was 
designed to last until 31 December 2009 but was extended to 31 December 2012 and then June 2013. 
28 
 
stereotyping and being blanket-blamed for issues of drug-trafficking, suicide bombings, and 
criminality in Pakistan.  
 
Rather than reflecting concerns of a genuine threat, the “Othering” process mirrors a number of 
debates surrounding migration and minorities, identity politics, political mobilisation and 
scapegoating (Chatterjee 1994; Gilroy 1987; Jaffrelot 1996; Le Bas 2006; Malloch and Stanley 
2005; McAllister 2006; Pappe 2003; Shlaim 2000). In Pakistan, Afghan “risk” metaphors are 
convenient tools for political mobilisation tactics by political actors such as the Muttahida Quami 
Movement (MQM) in Karachi who rally around the “Afghan threat” (which is incorporated 
within the MQM’s wider concern regarding the “Pashtunisation” of Karachi in order to secure 
votes) or is used by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government departments to explain 
service delivery failures (see Dawn 1 Aug 2005 and Appendix 10). In 2011 the Pakistani Foreign 
Minister Hinna Khar blamed the killing of the former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
which is suspected to involve Pakistani intelligence actors, on “Afghan refugees” (Dawn 14 Dec 
2011). In addition, this Othering of Afghans reflects the ways in which Afghans are used to 
consolidate a fragile Pakistani national identity (Rahman 1998; Samad 1995, 1995b; Wright 1991), 
or to consolidate its claim to the unconfirmed border with Afghanistan (Tarzi 2012), and also to 
reinforce a limited tolerance for transnational forms of existence (Malkki 1992; 1995; 1995b; 
Monsutti 2005; 2010; Monsutti and Stitger 2005). Finally, it also reflects how global discourses 
surrounding the “dangerous” Muslim body, which have proliferated since 9/11 (Mamdani 2004; 
Rana 2011), are reproduced within Pakistan - this time targeting Afghans via specific intra-
Muslim forms of Othering. These themes are discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 7.  
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Afghan Agency in Pakistan 
The various forms of Othering which Afghans undergo in Pakistan combines with 
understandings of “refugeedom” or illegal migrants to construct and reinforce assumptions that 
Afghans have limited types of political agency and significance in Pakistan. In the vast literature 
on forced migration, refugees appear to be “waiting” to return home (Kibreab 1996) to a 
“normal” sedentarised life. In physical terms, refugees are understood as being positioned in 
spaces that have limited political influence on the state and local politics: the cordoned-off 
refugee tented village (RTV), or the “desert city” (Agier 2008; Arendt 1943). In addition, illegal 
immigrants, which many Afghans are now classified as being, are constructed simply as 
criminalised entities that threaten the norms of the nation-state system (Dauvergne 2008; 
Khosravi 2010:27). Afghans, either as refugees or illegal immigrants, are assumed to have 
limited political significance because they are not a legal part of the Pakistani state.  
 
However, the assumption that that refugees are simply “waiting to return home” or “cordoned-
off” has been challenged by the increasing literature on refugees, migrants, and transnational 
lives (Malkki 1992, 1995, 1995b; Monsutti 2005).  Liisa Malkki’s body of work (1992, 1995, 
1995b) challenges current norms of sedentarisation in human history, outlining that the norm of 
a sedentarised life is a modern phenomenon rooted in the development of the territorial 
(absolute) sovereign nation-state. In his body of work on Afghan migration, anthropologist 
Alessandro Monsutti, influenced by Malkki’s work, demonstrates that for many Afghans 
migration is not an anomalous act but a “way of life” (Monsutti and Stitger 2005), and 
increasingly for young Afghan men a “rite of passage” towards manhood (Monsutti 2007; see 
also Monsutti 2005, 2008, 2010). Moreover, this thesis shows that whilst a physical segregation 
of Afghan refugees was initially attempted during the “emergency phase” of Afghan migration 
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to Pakistan18 it has never been fully enforced.19 Afghans in Pakistan are not legally confined to 
live in RTVs. The 2005 Census of Afghans in Pakistan stated that 57.7% of Afghans lived outside 
of RTVs (SAFRON et al., 2005:21) - a percentage that is likely to have risen since then. Many 
Afghans live in mixed Afghan-Pakistani areas, which mean that urban residents, Afghan and 
Pakistani, live in shared cities and undergo shared experiences - which in this thesis include the 
shortcomings that dominate everyday urban life in Karachi and Peshawar.  
 
Whilst many Afghans have repatriated to Afghanistan, with 2012 UNHCR figures recording 
3.77 million returnees to Afghanistan between 2002-2012 (UNHCR-PK 2012b), the continued 
conflicts in and against Afghanistan, and thus the challenges of “return”, have meant that many 
individuals, families and groups have not returned to Afghanistan in a permanent capacity, or 
live transnational lives, or have re-migrated back to Pakistan (Jalal et al., 2005; Kamal 2010; 
Saito 2009; Schmeidl 2002, 2009). The 2005 Census revealed that the majority of Afghans in 
Pakistan migrated to Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989) and post-war years of 
the pro-Communist government of Najeebullah (ending in 1992), and the initial years of contest 
between Mujahidin parties (1992-1995) (SAFRON et al., 2005:14), and in this research the 
majority of interviews were with Afghans who had migrated to Pakistan during 1979-1989.20  
                                                          
18 In 1981 during this emergency phase, the Official Handbook on Refugee Management (SAFRON 1981: 
Chapter 1:8) outlines that, “As far as possible refugees must be lodge[d] in camps, which for the purposes 
of their security should not be close proximity of the border” (i.e. because of attack), but that the 
“movement of refugees outside of their camps should be controlled without in anyway giving the 
impression of being held as prisoners”.  
19 Early circulars by the UNHCR-PK (1982, 1982b) and interviews conducted in this thesis show many 
Afghans had settled in non-RTV areas immediately after migration in the 1970s and 1980s (i.e. Karachi). 
20 In summary, there have seven been waves of Afghan migration to Pakistan since the 1970s: (1) 1973-
1978. Under the government of Daoud Khan, Afghan intelligentsia migrated into Iran and Pakistan, and 
elite classes migrated to "Northern" states. (2) 1978 -1979. After the Saur Revolution and entry of PDPA 
into power many Afghans migrated to Pakistan and Iran, with elites continuing migration to Western 
states. (3) 1979-1989. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan millions fled to Pakistan 
and Iran. (4) 1989-1992. After 1989 many Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan, but as 
conditions of security were not stable, many re-entered Pakistan. In addition, new refugees continued to 
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Thus Afghans have negotiated a political space for themselves in urban Pakistan, including those 
who do not have a “registered” status. In fact their experiences in the urban city powerfully 
illuminate local politics in Pakistan. Afghans are an integral part of the urban fabric - even if this 
is not reflected in legal spheres and in dominant Pakistani public discourse. This is not to say 
that Afghans desire to become “Pakistani” in terms of national identity and affinity (although 
Kamal Sadiq [2009] shows how some Afghans do “become Pakistani” by informally/illegally 
securing Pakistani identity cards, which I also explore in Chapter 7).  Pakistani nationalism, as 
indeed is the case with many other nationalisms and other constructed concepts of “identity”, is 
in itself a contested term, as numerous studies have shown (Ahmed 1998; Jaffrelot 2002; 
Harrison 1986; Hewitt 1996; HRW 2011; Samad 1995b; Titus 1996, 2000; Verkaaik 1994, 2004; 
Wright 1991). For many Afghans in Pakistan there has also not been a complete 
“deterritorialization” (Kibreab 1999) of identity - affinities to ancestral villages, cities, and ideas 
of “Afghanness” remain. (However, it may be possible to speak of a “new” ethnic group/s 
emerging in Pakistan, i.e. Pakistani Afghans.) In addition, nor is it to say that Afghans represent 
an alternative form of “citizenship” in Pakistan. Indeed, as this thesis shows, citizenship in the 
orthodox sense in Pakistan is a devalued concept that only has significance in certain 
circumstances, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.  Thus, Afghans do not demonstrate an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
migrate to Pakistan. (5) 1992-1995. After the fall of Najeebullah (1992) various mujahidin groups violently 
contested for power in a civil war conflict in Afghanistan. Some Afghans (many mujahidin/resistance 
groups) returned from Pakistan but Afghans that had remained in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan 
War and occupied government or military jobs were persecuted. (6) 1995-2001, with the rise of the 
Taliban significant displacements of Afghan Hazaras also took places, and many migrated to Balochistan 
and Karachi in Pakistan (particularly during 1996-1999) – smaller populations can be found in Rawalpindi. 
Other migrations of government workers and others continued. (7) 2001-present. After the 2001 US-led 
invasion of Afghanistan new refugees were created. However, Pakistani laws did not recognise these 
Afghans as refugees but instead as illegal migrants. In addition, international organisations such as 
UNHCR (under the influence of the US) primarily focused on repatriating Afghans from Pakistan. It is 
also important to note that throughout this process many millions of Afghans remained in Afghanistan 
and others have had transnational lives, i.e. living between the Afghanistan and Pakistan, and even other 
states (Monsutti and Stitger 2005). In this thesis interviews were conducted with Afghans who had 
migrated across all phases, however the majority of interviewees were from the 1979-1989 phase of 
migrations.  
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alternative type of “national identity” or “citizenship” per se; they simply display an alternative 
form of belonging or community within the fabric of urban Pakistan. This sense of belonging is 
shaped by everyday informal structures - such as social solidarity networks - and actions, which 
work to transcend traditional understandings of refugeeness and citizenship and include acts 
that push for material and non-material redistribution in the quest for a more humanised life. 
And, these structures and acts translate to an expression of political agency by inadvertently, yet 
deeply, transforming the state.  
 
Shared Afghan and Pakistani Lives: Devalued Citizens  
Many Pakistanis see “citizenship” as a devalued concept, and this thesis compares the similarities 
of the lives of urban poor Pakistanis with Afghan refugees in Pakistan to examine this. Whilst 
dominant discourses juxtapose the Afghan non-national “Other” against the Pakistani national 
“Self”, more often than not nationality, citizenship, and refugeedom do not differentiate the lives 
of the urban poor. 21  Whist Afghan refugees and illegal immigrants are subject to legal 
exclusionary practices, which results in less access to material goods, many citizens, i.e. the urban 
poor, also face similar challenges in accessing material goods. This is because for Pakistani 
citizens the state is simply unable to deliver the goods that citizens are legally due, which occurs, 
at the macro level, for two main reasons. First, the military dominates Pakistan, a factor which 
has been shaped by Pakistan’s conditions of birth as a state, the bloody secession of East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and a sensitive regional geostrategic position next to rivals India and 
Afghanistan. This domination has also been the result of Pakistan’s position as a peripheral but 
                                                          
21  This also applies at the global level where the “poverty” of Afghan and Pakistani states in the 
international political and economic system means that both states are subject to hegemony of dominant 
actors, which is reflected in the US-led military occupation of Afghanistan and US drone bombings in 
FATA (Stanford-NYU 2012). It is also reflected through the construction of both states and populations 
as sources of “terror” under a global “Muslim” banner (Rana 2011). 
33 
 
key geostrategic state in the international system. 22  These factors – state perceptions of 
geostrategic insecurity and the interests of global hegemons for a strong Pakistani military – have 
encouraged state leaders to be more concerned with concepts of state security rather than social 
security and the delivery of rights to citizens. This preoccupation is reflected in the massive 
allocation of government budgets on defence, or what Ayesha Jalal (1990) calls Pakistan’s 
“economic policy of defense” (Jalal 1990; also Siddiqa 2007). Here, government money is 
diverted away from investment in other domestic sectors, “which might directly or indirectly 
improve [the] conditions of the poor” (Toor 2011:189). Second, the impact of structural 
adjustment programmes, which took place in Pakistan in the late 1980s and 1990s, and economic 
liberalisation, which was especially encouraged under General/President Pervez Musharraf and 
currently continues under President Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP (2008-2013), have also resulted 
in reduced government spending on the public sector – the impacts of which are analysed in 
greater depth in Chapter 3.  In combination with the reinforced dominance of the military in the 
context of the GWOT, the 2000s, Saadia Toor (2011) argues, have been the years of the “neo-
liberal [Pakistani] security state” (Toor 2011). Pakistan’s geostrategic importance, its peripheral 
position in the international political and economic system, alongside Pakistani leadership 
decisions, means that for many Pakistanis there is a marked difference between the de jure and de 
facto experience of citizenship. Thus, for many Pakistanis their experience of “citizenship” is a 
devalued one as the state lacks the capacity to deliver to citizens. Many Afghans and Pakistanis 
find each other living in similar positions in Pakistan. In addition, this thesis also explores how 
for some Pakistani citizens the failure of state delivery is sometimes worse because of ethnic 
lenses of exclusion. This is analysed through the position of Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi (see 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5).  
                                                          
22 During the Cold War, in popular discourse, Pakistan was referred to as the “frontline” state in the fight 
against Communism and an essential ally of the USA and other states. After 2001 once again the strength 
of the military was reinforced by US-led war in Afghanistan and FATA in which Pakistani is a central 
partner. 
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Crucially, however, neither Afghans nor Pakistanis (and in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtuns in 
particular) silently accept their exclusions from the state or state failings. Instead Afghans and 
Pakistanis create an alternative space of belonging and being via informal political structures, 
actions, and rhetoric. By using informal political structures (such as solidarity networks) and 
practices, Afghans and Pakistanis “silently” redistribute and protect the material goods and rights 
withheld by official actors and structures in order to push for a more humanised existence.   
 
Informal Political Action and Everyday Politics: The Literature 
What are the sites of political action in urban Pakistan? Dissatisfied with the assumption that a 
“neutralised, repressed, co-opted, apathetic, and acquiescent” sector of society (the poor and the 
marginalised) has been “socialised into accepting an elite domination” (Singerman 1995:3), 
studies of informal politics have aimed to shift the sites of power and politics from areas of 
“high politics”, such as formal institutions, politicians, inter-governmental treaties, to include 
areas of “low politics”. This has been analysed in a number of ways, including studies on the 
informal economy (Bromley 1978; Hart 1972; ILO 1973; Peattie 1987), informal political 
institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Nelson - forthcoming), urban housing studies (Castells 
1983; Perlman 1976; Portes and Castells 1989), and studies of “everyday” politics (Abu-Lughod 
1993; Bayat 1997, 2010; Brown 1990; Scott 1985; Singerman 1995). 
 
Informality is a key lens through which to understand the experience of Afghans and Pakistanis. 
Informality refers to “activities in the production of legal goods and services which are not 
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regulated or protected by the state” (OECD 2009:11).23 Analysing informal institutions, Helmke 
and Levitsky (2006) add another layer to understanding the informal by defining it as “socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created communicated and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006:726-7). 
 
During the 1970s studies of the informal economy by Keith Hart (Hart 1973) and the ILO (ILO 
1972) showed the economy (usually in developing countries) as dualistic and separated into two 
distinct spheres: the formal and the informal. In this approach the informal was a “pre-modern” 
structure, which would eventually dissolve as modernity (the formal economy) caught up (Moser 
1978). Structuralists, however, challenged this, arguing that the formal and the informal are 
interconnected, albeit with the informal economy subservient to the formal (Portes and Castells 
1989; Rogerson and Preston-Whyte 1991).24 And, the much debated (Bromley 1990, 2004) work 
of Hernando De Soto (1989, 1994, 2000) added a different perspective by emphasising the 
dynamic nature of the informal (not its subservience to the formal economy). According to De 
Soto, by escaping the bureaucratic excess of the state, micro-entrepreneurs, traders, people in 
search of housing, and so on were able to flourish. Formal activity was simply too costly, in both 
time and money,25 leading De Soto to advocate reforms designed to reduce such official costs. 
Whilst the earlier studies by Hart (1973) and the ILO (1972) point to a need for the state to 
support small entrepreneurs and small industries as a route to development, De Soto (1989, 2000) 
                                                          
23 J.J. Thomas (1992) adds that output of informal processes is legal, although some degrees of illegality in 
the process are possible, which may be “irregular” but not criminal. This provides a useful way of 
distinguishing between the informal and the criminal, in which both the processes and outputs are illegal. 
A house then is not an illegal output, whereas drugs or prostitution are, which points to the “ordinary” 
and “morally accepted” nature of informal actions (ibid). 
24 Eleanor Preston-Whyte (1991) shows how black South African women, employed formally in domestic 
labour generated informal economic activity by providing tailoring services or by running illegal bars 
(shebeens). In this view, opportunities for informal activity are possible because of formal employment and 
they are subservient to formal employment (ibid).   
25 In one example, De Soto takes the case of informal housing settlements in Peru. His work shows that it 
takes 159 steps to legalise the housing settlements, whereas informal processes are much quicker (De 
Soto 1989:24, 132-4). 
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emphasises that it is the failure of the state which forced individuals to act in the informal 
economy, but once individuals are active in the informal economy, free from state intervention 
and excesses, they are able to experience true “freedom” (albeit with certain costs, namely 
severely elevated costs of credit, owing to the lack of access to formalised types of collateral) (De 
Soto 1989, 2000). 
 
In addition, political scientists such as Partha Chatterjee (2004), through an analysis of informal 
political activity in Calcutta, argue that informality is the site of “true” democracy, and an 
alternative site of “citizenship”. For Chatterjee, citizenship in the orthodox sense is practically 
confined to a limited elite, “the new bourgeoisie” (Chatterjee 2004:37-8). The sites of richer 
political action are not in “civil society”, which only serves the interest of a few who are closely 
vested in the state (the new bourgeoisie). Instead, emancipatory political activity occurs in 
“political society” where people (for example, residents of railway tracks) organise themselves 
and engage in informal activity (such as tapping electricity and travelling without tickets). Here, 
residents push for the prevention of law from being implemented, to reflect some of what 
people really want – “just not what is necessarily envisioned by the constitution” (Chatterjee 
2004). However, Matthew J. Nelson (forthcoming) asks, can “democracy” exist without law? Is 
stepping beyond the constitution a form of “democratic action”? The answer is no. Democracy 
that contravenes state law is not really democracy but something else – something that may 
include justice or material improvements, but not democracy (ibid).  
 
Further, academics influenced by James C. Scott’s Weapons of the Weak (1985) explain informal 
action via theories of “everyday” and “ordinary” politics. According to Scott (1985), the sites of 
political expression and change are not simply situated in conscious political movements, but 
also in small, mundane, everyday actions, which aim to redistribute social goods. “Foot-dragging, 
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dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage and so 
forth… [are] the weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985:29). In urban settings this includes siphoning 
electricity, avoiding tax and surveillance, “quietly claiming state/public lands on the outskirts of 
the cities or taking over cemeteries, rooftops, and other urban spaces creating vibrant 
spontaneous communities” (Bayat 2010:57; see also Singerman 1995). Through “ordinary” acts, 
such as informally accessing public utilities (Bayat 2010; Singerman 1995), individuals and groups 
counteract official constraints, redistribute goods, and challenge the label of passivity attached to 
the marginalised groups (the urban poor, refugees, illegal immigrants, women) to provide a more 
complex picture of power distribution in society (albeit, again, following Nelson [forthcoming], 
neither “democracy” nor “citizenship”).  
 
Asef Bayat (2010), however, goes on to address some of the “theories of the resisting poor” 
(Bayat 2010:51-5). The “politics of the ordinary”, he writes, do not intend to create an upheaval of 
the state or local politics by their ordinary actions (Bayat 1997; 2010:52-3). They are not what 
some authors of “resistance studies” call forms of resistance, where “awareness about oppression 
[motivates]... acts of resistance against it” (Bayat 2010:53) - a link between the two (awareness and 
the act) is needed for an act to constitute “resistance” proper (see also Scott 1985:27-35). For 
Bayat, informal actions are not simply reactionary (thus defensive) acts of survival, which, in 
effect, deny agency (Bayat 2010:48-9, 56). Rather, these actions are understood as “quiet 
encroachments of the ordinary” (Bayat 1997, 2010), which is the “silent, protracted, but 
pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or the public, in order 
to improve their lives” (Bayat 2010:56). This is not resistance per se, or citizenship, or democracy. 
However, it is shaped by a conscious objective of “redistributing social goods” in their (i.e. the 
urban poor’s) favour in a form of offensive survival (Bayat 1997, 2010). 
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The literature on various informal practices shows that informal activities are often strategically 
tolerated by official actors as they help maintain the state. Indeed, “governments often encourage 
self-help and local initiatives as long as they do not turn oppositional” (Bayat 2010:55). In 
addition, in their analysis of informal political institutions, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) go 
beyond traditional “informal politics” (looking at the “functional” role of informal political 
activity) to show where informal actions/structures are actually substitutive or competing – i.e. 
informal activity directly replaces the state. De Soto (1989, 2000) and Chatterjee (2004) see these 
as alternative sites of economic and political dynamism. However, I distinguish between these 
understandings to show how both substitutive and competing informalities are actually (for the 
state) in the long run deeply delegitimizing (Chapter 4). 
 
This research places importance on the presence of a hybrid formal-informal space of action, 
which enables material redistribution that cannot be managed by official channels alone. 
However, this research does not view informal political action as a panacea to the state (or, 
where relevant, the migration regime). Nor is it understood as a new form of citizenship, or a 
spaces for “true” democracy (Chatterjee 2004 and response by Nelson [forthcoming]). John 
Friedmann (1992:7) shows that in the current political context the “state continues to be a major 
player” and “local empowering action requires a strong state”. Thus whilst informal political 
action produces spaces of agency and “empowerment”, without regulatory mechanisms cases of 
exploitation can and do emerge. Arif Hasan’s work (1999, 2008; with Raza 2011) and Jan van der 
Linden (1992) show how dallals (middlemen) dominate the urban periphery in Karachi and A. 
Ercelawn and M. Nauman (2001, 2004) also show how people end up in bonded labour in 
Pakistan’s brick kilns after taking out “informal” loans at high interest rates from kiln owners. In 
Chapter 3, this thesis examines how Afghan and Pakistani lives are exploited by informal 
property developers and human traffickers. In addition, a number of works show the physical 
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outputs that are produced via informal activity are often sub-standard, unhygienic, and 
dangerous. For example, Javier Auyero and Debora Alejandra Swistun’s Flammable Lives (2009) 
provide detailed analysis of the “toxic lives” of an Argentine shantytown, which includes 
poisoning, physical, and physiological implications. Mike Davis’s chapter on Slum Ecology in Planet 
of the Slums (2006:121-50) also shows how informal settlements are built on ecologically unstable 
land that is prone to earthquakes and landslides and severe health risks, contaminated drinking 
water, and human excremental surplus. Further, this research also provides examples of the 
challenges of poor informal water supply and poorly constructed houses, which are discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Thus, whilst informal actions may appear, in the short-term, as substitutive 
and dynamic, very often they are riddled with difficulties. And, in the long-term, they create 
lasting changes to the physical and non-physical composition of political spaces which, ultimately, 
undermine the legitimacy of the state in its classical desired sense. 
 
Further, unlike other studies on informal politics - including the work of Chatterjee (2004), Bayat 
(1997, 2010), and Singerman (1995) - this thesis looks in depth at the political implications of 
non-nationals being a part of informal political sites of action. Informal action is changing 
political patterns and expressions of political agency, which are now moving in the direction of a 
shared reality and importance with non-citizens. The fact that non-nationals are central to these 
informal spheres (empirically and analytically) fundamentally challenges the state’s imagining of 
itself, and questions the very logic of nationally segregated ways of being. Informal political 
activity reveals the fallacy of constructed boundaries of citizens versus non-citizen as Afghans 
and Pakistanis exist in a space that is outside of the traditional realm of the citizen versus non-
citizen boundaries.  
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In addition, the norms of informality also mean that official laws and institutions are undermined 
as the informal is normalised. Alternative sources of and routes to power and action are 
understood as more effective than formal legal channels. Material redistribution, property, 
documentary and financial exchanges all take place away from formal and legal channels 
(Chapter 5 and 6). Moreover, the legitimacy of the state is deeply eroded as informal activity does 
not take place in a total absence from the state and instead relies on the illegal and/or corrupt 
presence of officials turning a blind eye or encouraging informal activity and/or local patrons 
(landholders and middlemen). Herein lie the macro-political costs of a shared Afghan and 
Pakistani hybrid formal-informal political repertoire - they dismantle the state. Formal-informal 
political action erodes the sovereignty, legitimacy, and moral status of the state, and even 
challenge the norms of the “national order of things” as delineations between citizenship and 
refugeedom appear inadequate in understanding local political patterns. A dialectical process that 
bites back at official actors is in effect. At the exact moment of getting what they (officials) want 
(i.e. a quick-solution to maintaining the state), they contribute towards their own delegitimization. 
Indeed, it is similar to the principle that Dostoevsky brings to light in Crime and Punishment that 
the greatest harm done by a criminal, in this case, ironically, the state, is not to the victim but to 
himself (Dostoevsky 2003[1886]; see Yusuf 2004).  
 
The Quest for a Humanised Existence 
Critically, in this thesis, unlike the literature on informal politics, the processes of redistribution 
and protection are not simply about “material” goods and rights for Afghans and Pakistanis. 
Whilst authors such as Asef Bayat show that the redistribution of goods in the face of official 
shortcomings is a “natural and moral response to[wards] a dignified life” (Bayat 1997b:61), this 
thesis pushes further. The quest for a humanised existence shapes practices of interconnected 
material and non-material redistribution and is a central (not a background) driver of political 
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activity. This was captured in the daily language, oral narratives, discussions, stories, and 
ethnographic observations collected throughout this research where the failures of officialdom 
are explicitly expressed and understood through the language of “dehumanisation” and not just a 
material failure of service delivery. Similarly, informal solidarity networks and their 
accompanying practices of navigation are expressed, remembered, and acted through a non-
material language of self-humanisation – of insaniyat (humanity), izzat (respect), and azmat 
(dignity).  
 
This thesis understands that all human beings possess, to a degree, an inherent value within them, 
described either as humanness, a humanised life, or human dignity. This value is shaped by an 
equal vulnerability of life and a reality of death that touches all human life. In part the “worth” of 
human life is also possible simply by virtue of being human. Whether from a “theological 
[Kamali 2010], metaphysical [Kateb 2011], anthropological or even biological argument” it is 
agreed that “every human being has dignity [worth or “humanness”] from the very beginning 
and in exactly the same way – just by being human” (Pollman 2010: 250). In addition, this value 
is shaped by the specific characteristics that a “human” possesses. The characteristics that a 
human possesses, unlike the animal, include a body that has an intellectual capacity for thought, 
autonomy and moral rationality,26 an ability to express and experience emotion, engender self-
                                                          
26  Ideas of human beings possessing moral autonomy and rationality are rooted in a number of 
philosophical perspectives. In Enlightenment and Kantian thought, human individuals are differentiated 
from animals in their capacity to form independent decisions (or in Kantian terms, making the law for 
itself) - free from external influences - and the capacity to establish moral frames of right and wrong 
(Kant 2007[1785]; Kerstein 2012; Kaufmann et al., 2012). In addition, in Islamic thought, each individual 
is considered accountable for his or her own actions through his or her possession of ‘aql (reason). In his 
analysis of Islamic texts Mohammad Kamali (2010) outlines that the moral autonomy of the individual is 
evident through teachings that outline, “Every one of you is a guardian and is responsible for what is his 
custody” (Sahih al-Bukhari IX:256 in Kamali 2010:44). Other authors add that, “rationality was central to 
the philosophy of Ibn Sina (980-1037), Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Abu Nasr Farabi (d.950)” (Adib-
Moghaddam 2010:72). Whilst in the latter example moral autonomy and rationality are interconnected 
with attributes conferred to individuals through an existential being, in the former this moral autonomy 
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respect in the context of larger groups and “within” oneself, as well as personal agency. Thus, 
rather than arguing that some humans have human dignity and others do not – indeed, all 
humans have a human value within them –, this thesis focuses on exploring the role of 
recognition, or misrecognition, and understanding how certain human lives are not recognised as 
being fully human and as a result being denied the conditions in which the potentials of a human life 
can be exercised. In other words, it seeks to explore forms of devaluation and dehumanisation 
that some human beings face, with a particular focus on the role of state actors in Pakistan, how 
this leads to differences in the distribution of goods, and how these human beings - Afghans and 
Pakistanis – seek to overcome this through expressions and practices of personal agency and 
practices of “self-humanisation”.  
 
In The Human Condition (1958), Hannah Arendt outlines that “man”, can “experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk and make sense to each other and themselves” 
(Arendt 1958:8). Self-realisation and self-respect, how individuals view and value themselves, is 
dependent on the establishment of relationships of mutual recognition,27and thus for a human 
life to be conferred with value, forms of recognition are important – although it is certainly not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and rationality emerge from within the human constitution alone (Kant 2007[1775]). Yet despite this 
difference in both cases to be human is to be able to think through moral and ethical frameworks using 
rational deductive practices and thought. However, basing ideas of “humanness” solely on concepts of 
“moral autonomy and rationality” are not without issue. For example, what can be said in cases of 
individuals with mental disabilities? Are these persons less human? Or what of those who are unable 
given circumstances of oppression (Freire 1974) or false consciousness (Gramsci 2001) to embody and 
practice moral autonomy and rational decision making? A need to push further in understanding what it 
means to “be human” is required.   
27 Indeed Hegel’s “struggle to death” (“where two subjects meet and each is willing to kill the other, 
thereby risking to be killed himself” [Kuch 2012:39]) is analysed by some as a deep reflection of the 
human desire for recognition. Further, Judith Butler (1997) highlights that the longing for recognition 
even forces people to accept conditions of humiliation and insult. “Sometimes we cling to the terms that 
pain us, because, at a minimum, they offer us some form of social and discursive existence” (Butler 
1997:26 in Kuch 2010:76). In Precarious Lives (2004) and Frames of War (2010), Butler goes on to argue that 
human life cannot be anything but social given the interdependency on other human (and non-human) 
life (Butler 2010:20). In fact, Butler goes as far as saying that, “the boundary of who I am is the boundary 
of the body but the boundary of the body never fully belongs to me” (Butler 2010:76). 
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the only factor, as self-recognition and personal responsibility also have an important role 
(Pollman 2010). In this study, recognition is conferred on Afghans and Pakistanis in Pakistan via 
various social groups: friendships (Ring 1990), kin, and clan (CSSR 2005, 2005b, 2006; Monsutti 
2005; Chapters 4-6 in this thesis), as well as through personal agency (Pollman 2010). However, 
in the age of the modern state, recognition is also conferred by the state and other official 
structures. Political structures are also significant in the recognition - or misrecognition - of these 
Afghans and Pakistani groups, which is explored in Chapter 3. 
 
When humans are misrecognised and morally excluded (Herman 2010), for example, where 
individuals or groups are constructed as scapegoats or assumed to possess morally “wrong” 
characteristics, either because of instrumentalist political manoeuvrings, routes for identity 
construction, or as a result of the production of fear28, types of dehumanisation and devaluation 
occur. Dehumanisation also occurs when a person is not recognised as belonging to the “family 
of man” (Margalit 1996; Neuhauser 2010; Kuch 2010) via animalisation, or if they are 
constructed as an objectified machine (Haslam 2006) with characteristics that make up 
humanness, i.e. being autonomous and morally rational agents, possessing self-worth and agency, 
not being acknowledged.  
 
In the case of animalisation this is not to argue that animal life has no worth,29 but it is to look at 
how the figure of the animal is contextually constructed as possessing a lower value than that of 
the human, making acts of violence or state apathy easier. For example, when prisoners of Abu 
                                                          
28 For example, in this study Afghans in Pakistan are constructed by official discourse in Pakistan as 
“criminals”, “drug-traffickers”, “terrorists”, or “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2004; Rana 2011) that possess a 
morally dangerous character, and these are explored in greater depth in Chapter 3. 
29 Indeed, in some contexts animalisation is a sign of veneration, and as Butler (2010) outlines, the 
interconnectedness of all organic life challenges the logic of anthropomorphic lenses. 
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Ghraib (Iraq 2006) were made to crawl on all fours or led on leashes, “by treating the bodies of 
their victims as if they were animals, perpetrators reinforce[d] the belief in their non-humanity” 
(Oliver 2010:88). Indeed, in this study, various interviewees referred to themselves or poorer 
neighbours as living like “animals”, or were referred to as such by others, because of extremely 
low incomes. 
In the poorest area here people live like animals (janwar). No 
water, no cleaning, nothing... like animals! (Zareena, KH40). 
 
Have you ever seen a Pakistani jail? They are just trapped rotting 
(sarrahe hain) there… stuck in their own filth. Only God can save 
them (Abu Zakariya, PXA53). 
 
Again, this is not to say that Afghans or Pakistanis in jails are not human and without human 
dignity – this is not a judgement that this thesis is seeking to make. However, it is seeking to 
explore how dehumanisation is constructed and understood through the rhetoric of people 
interviewed. 
 
In addition, being perceived as an object, or “automaton-like”, as simply data, numbers, or 
machines (Haslam 2006:58), also means key features of “human nature”, such as rationality and 
agency, are ignored. Instead, human beings are treated as a means rather than an end,30 which again 
make acts of violence easier.  Precedents of this type of dehumanisation are seen in examples of 
                                                          
30 In Kantian frames this instrumentalism is cautioned against: “So act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a 
means” (Kant 1997[1775]:4:429). 
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colonial exploitation (Taussig 2002[1984]), black Atlantic slavery, concentration camps (Bauman 
1989, Oliver 2010:58-9) and forms of state and colonial torture (Lazreg 2008, Maran 1989; 
Mosher and Hooks 2005; Rejali 1994; Taussig 2002[1984]). In this thesis such examples include 
forms of state harassment: verbal and physical abuse; arbitrary detentions; mass arrests; and 
deportation, as Afghan lives are reduced to simply being barcodes or identity cards they are more 
easily devalued (Chapter 7). Crucially, however, objectification, alongside animalisation and 
moral exclusion, also enables other forms of violence, namely structural and indirect violence. 
This includes forms of violence by urban state’s efforts to “improve” human nature via the 
“unitisation” of people and scientific processes (Scott 1998) to meet the “higher goal” of 
modernity, such as bulldozing houses for profit, or to rationally and bureaucratically manage 
“populations” (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). 
 
From a normative position, this thesis argues that all humans should be given access to 
conditions for survival and flourishing, however, this research shows that whether human lives 
are provided with the conditions needed to “persist and flourish” is contingent on how lives are 
understood by the political and social circumstances they inhabit (Butler 2010; Nussbaum and 
Sen 1993). Judith Butler (2010) explains this by exploring which lives are considered worthy of 
grieving. Lives that are not considered to be worthy of grief, such as those understood as 
possessing a lower value via animalisation or objectification (Haslam 2006), are not considered as 
lives - they may be living but they are something other than human life (Butler 2010). Here, the 
construction of values by external actors, or what this thesis describes as “ways of seeing” 
(Chapter 3) by official structures and actors, are crucial in determining the possibilities and 
restraints of a human life. Suicides from urban poverty (Appendix 11), injuries and deaths from 
the collapses of informal houses or bulldozing of informal settlements (HRC 2012:246-250; 
Chapter 5), deaths of Afghans at border crossings (Chapter 7) or in detention cells (Chapter 7) 
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are unfortunate, but not worthy of grief – for these occur on lives that are not recognised as 
being fully human in official discourses. 
What do they care if our homes are knocked over? We are poor 
and it is always the poor that die (Group interview with Pakistani 
residents, Ishtiaq Goth). 
 
No-one cares about Afghan Camp... it’s full of Afghans that’s 
why there is no water, nothing decent... nothing (Habibullah, 
KHP13).   
 
In more tangible terms Martha Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s positive capabilities approach, 
informed by moral philosophy and developmental economics, outlines that all humans should be 
able to exercise some basic capabilities in order to live a “human” life (Nussbaum and Sen 1993; 
Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1981, 2005). Nussbaum lists a number of basic “capabilities” that all 
humans should be entitled to exercise “central human functional capabilities” (Nussbaum 
2001:78-80).  The list includes:  
Life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and 
thought; emotions; practical reason, affiliation (being able to live 
with and towards others and having the social bases of self-
respect and non-humiliation) [and so on] (Nussbaum 2001:78-
80).31 
                                                          
31 In addition, Nussbaum adds that the role of the “lawgiver” is to “create a context in which a person 
might live and, in other words, might choose a flourishing life” (1987:7).   
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Sen, does not produce a list, concerned that having a “pre-determined canonical list of 
capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning” is 
dangerous (Sen 2004:77; Nussbaum 2000:11-14), but he does outline that some basic capabilities 
are essential for a good human life, which includes things such as being well nourished or being 
able to escape avoidable or premature mortality, as well as more complex things such as 
achieving self-respect or being socially integrated (Sen 1993:30-3).32 In the cases discussed in this 
thesis these basic human rights were understood as important factors in enabling persons to 
practice the potentials of human life.  
 
Importantly, however, these discussions also illuminate that “humanness” (human dignity and a 
humanised life) must be considered as a potential rather than an inviolable fact. This is made clear 
by the very fact that a human life can be denied the conditions for “flourishing and persistence” 
or by the fact that a human life can be dehumanised. Or, in the very least it can be said that 
different levels of humanisation are possible (given that all humans possess an inherent value 
within them). In this study, one interview with an Afghan resident, Hajji Hayyat, who lives in an 
informal refugee camp in Karachi, spoke about conditions in which water was not available for 
the people who live in the camp (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71). He spoke of the vulnerability of his 
humanity by, rhetorically asking, “Are we not human?” In another case in Peshawar, interviewees 
discussed the degrading condition of police harassment and noted, “We [Afghans] are no longer 
considered as humans” (Abu Haider, PXA51; Naseeb Khan, PXA52; Raheemullah, PXA53). 
                                                          
32 For Sen, “the capability approach to a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it in terms of his 
or her actual ability to achieve various functionings as a part of living” (Sen 1993:30-1). “Functionings” 
represents the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life (including basic things 
such as being well nourished or being able escape avoidable mortality or premature mortality as well as 
more complex things such as achieving self-respect or being socially integrated) (Sen 1993:30-3). The 
“capability” of a person reflects the alternative combination of functionings the person can achieve and 
from which he or she can chose one collection, and each persons “capacity set” is contingent upon a 
different contextual factors, including personal characteristics and social arrangements (ibid).  
48 
 
Thus for Hajji Hayyat and the group discussion led by Abu Haider, by speaking about having 
“lost” their humanity they indicate that a humanised existence is not an inviolable and 
transcendent fact (Oliver 2010). Whilst the living human body constitutes as one level of “life”, 
to “be human” or “live a humanised life” is a vulnerable value subject to changes. The worth and 
constitution of a humanised existence, whether understood through forms of human dignity, or 
humanness, is a continual process. Thus whilst all humans do have an inherent value within them 
(human dignity) it is not simply “a natural gift that everyone has and cannot lose” (Pollman 
2010:258), rather, it is a “fragile possibility, a possibility of human flourishing” (Pollman 
2010:258). As Judith Butler outlines: 
Let us think of the human as a value and a morphology that is 
allocated and retracted, aggrandized, personified, degraded and 
disavowed, elevated and affirmed…When we proclaim some 
group of beings who have not been considered to be human, we 
admit that humanness is a shifting prerogative (Butler 2010:76).  
 
The question of whether individuals are ever fully able to unfold this potential or capability is 
contingent upon the concrete circumstances of our life, which again relate back to the earlier 
discussion of recognition. “The question is not whether a given being is living or not, nor 
whether the being in question has the same status of a “person””, rather it is whether the “social 
conditions of persistence and flourishing are or are not possible” (Butler 2007:20). This is, again, 
supported by Amartya Sen’s (1980, 1993, 2000) and Martha Nussbaum’s (1987, 1993, 2001) basic 
capability approaches, which outline that in order to be able to meet the potential of human 
flourishing some basic conditions are necessary – and, in this thesis for the people interviewed 
these conditions include things such as water, housing (Chapter 5), and the safety and integrity of 
the body (Chapter 5-7). What people then choose to do with these basic conditions form various 
49 
 
understandings of a “humanised life” – some may choose to accumulate wealth and material 
possessions and large families, others may choose an esoteric life – however, a minimal set of 
conditions are important in ensuring the (vast and various) potentials of human life can at least 
be striven towards.  
 
Further, the idea of “flourishing” points to the importance of progress - at the individual and 
species level.  The teleological advancement of “the human” - or of “humanity” as a species - on 
a linear trajectory towards a utopian end goal, or towards consistent “improvement” is easily 
criticised (El-Ojeili et al., 2009). However, it is clear that human life has the capacity for 
epistemological and ontological progress in a way that other living organisms do not (evolution 
aside). This may not always be positive – modern scientific progress has also ensured that 
humans are the only life form that has developed the capacity for the destruction of all matter on 
earth (Baumann 1989, 2000, 2004; Scott 1998).  But, human life, and to “be human”, is not just 
about a right to life and a concern for survival. It is also the about the ability to live and strive for 
an enriched form of life and to push for the advancement of life. “If not then the spirit within 
him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter” (Iqbal 1968[1930]:12). This 
perspective can be viewed as a drive towards an improvement of the human episteme and 
condition. It is also, in part, related to a human desire for gain, flourishing, and improvement – 
with each of these terms, again, taking multiple forms and meaning (material and non-material). 
Indeed, in this thesis, in the sphere of informal urban politics, both Afghans and Pakistanis 
reflected a concern not only with mere survival, they are also concerned with the ability to secure 
gains and improve their conditions, which was reflected in daily language, expressions, and 
actions. 
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Finally, in the modern international political order two entities lay claim to a monopoly over the 
distribution of rights and goods to provide the conditions for a humanised existence: the modern 
state, and, increasingly, the international human rights regime, which includes numerous sub-
regimes such as the international refugee regime (Chapter 3). Both are expected to and lay claim 
to offering a protection of rights, rights which are paths for the potentials of humanness to be 
embodied and practiced.  However, when these structures and actors are not effective, both 
Afghans and Pakistanis turn to other non-state and non-official structures and strategies in their 
quest for humanity and progress. Personal agency and responsibility, self-respect, formulations 
of self-worth, and “self-humanisation” are important (Pollman 2010). Even in circumstances in 
which the value of a human life is attacked, under threat, or humiliated it is possible to assume 
personal responsibility and contextualise actions to maintain a humanised life. 
Whether we keep or lose our dignity is – at least also – due to 
our ability and power to preserve it (Pollman 2010:258).  
Pollman concedes that this may not always be possible. However, in this thesis instances of 
Afghan and Pakistani agency do take place. Afghans and Pakistanis do not (fully) accept the (in 
their words) “oppressive”, “devaluing”, and “dehumanising” acts of official actors and 
institutions. Indeed, even when Afghans and Pakistanis are morally excluded or relegated from 
the “family of man” by official actors, both Afghans and Pakistanis question these processes - as 
well as the legitimacy of official actors - in a quest to reassert their agency and thus humanity – 
both at the level of belief and of action (Bayat 1997, 2010; Scott 1985). The agency of material 
and non-material redistribution and its accompanying (non-material) rhetoric of “self-
humanisation” reflect the continued quest for, and actions of, “humanised lives”. 
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Chapter 2: A Counter-Narrative - Objectives, Methodology, and Self-Reflections 
 
Objectives 
This thesis was researched and is written in order to provide a counter-narrative to the dominant 
imaginings of Afghans in Pakistan and at a global level as either the “exemplary victim”, i.e. 
“helpless” refugees with limited agency, or as one-dimensional sources of “terror” in the context 
of the current “GWOT”. It is also written with the aim of recording political and historical 
processes that have been side-lined or typecast in recent history, including a near silence on the 
cases of large scale police harassment of Afghans (2007-2012; see Chapter 7). Simultaneously, 
through its analysis of the shared lives that urban poor Pakistanis share with Afghans, this thesis 
is equally about providing a counter-narrative against imaginings of urban poor Pakistanis as 
one-dimensional sites of “criminality”, “danger”, or “helplessness”. By using voices that are side-
lined in dominant narratives in and outside of Pakistan, this thesis aims to provide a fuller picture 
of how the Pakistani state, global migration regimes, and citizens and non-citizens “function” (or 
do not) in urban Pakistan, and also discuss why constructions of “danger” are used in the first 
place (Chapter 3 and 7). By doing so I hope to question the way in which hegemonic political 
actors work – the state and international institutions - triggering a much needed debate for 
possible alternatives to current forms of governance (both in and beyond Pakistan), i.e. a less 
mechanised, objectifying, and dehumanising form of governance which is inclusive of refugees, 
illegal immigrants, and the urban poor.  
 
A Note on the Cities: Choosing Karachi and Peshawar 
This study is not a comparative study of two cities. It is a comparative study of citizens and non-
citizens. Nevertheless, two cities in Pakistan were used as sites of study, Karachi and Peshawar. 
These two cities were chosen for a number of reasons. First, both cities have historically been 
home to sizeable Afghan populations, although Peshawar has had a much larger Afghan 
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population (Connor 1987; CSSRb).33 Second, both cities are home to spaces of informality, 
including a large number of informal housing settlements (Hasan 1992, 2006; Hasan and 
Mansoor 2012; Linden and Selier 1991), informal utility access (N.Ahmed 2008; Hasan 2006), 
informal migration networks (Azam 2009; Befare 2009; Mehdi 2010; Sadiq 2009), and informal 
financial and trade practices (Hasan et al., 2002; Irfan et al., 1999). Thirdly, Karachi and 
Peshawar were chosen to question dominant narratives within Pakistan. The first is that Afghans 
are “at home” in Peshawar. Peshawar is the “world’s largest and oldest Pashtun city”, as such it 
holds significance in both Afghan Pashtun and Pakistani Pashtun ethno-nationalist discourse. 
Certainly shared historic, ethno-linguistic and cultural affinities across the boundaries of the 
modern Afghan and Pakistani states are expressed by many Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns, as 
well as non-Pashtuns. However, to say that Afghans are “at home” in the city is to obfuscate the 
impact that the modern Afghan and Pakistani states have had on shifting conceptions of 
“Pashtun-ness”; “Afghan-ness”; and “Pakistani-ness”. Colonial and post-colonial encounters in 
Afghanistan, British India and post-Partition Pakistan have made borders, territory, and 
sedentarised identities more rigid, which the Afghan and Pakistani state seek to uphold. Thus, 
whilst some commentators assume that Afghans in Peshawar are, effectively, at “home” this 
thesis shows that in some cases, specifically that of “security” (Chapter 7) this is not the case. In 
fact, to be an Afghan in Peshawar is to be susceptible to specific forms of state violence. In 
                                                          
33 At its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s figures show that there were 61-2 RTVs in Peshawar alone 
with an Afghan population of over 460,000 registered refugees in the city’s RTVs. However, this figure 
did not include Afghans living outside of RTVs (CCAR 1987). Currently there are 15 RTVs in Peshawar 
and a population of 272,239 in these RTVs, although again this statistic does not include Afghans living 
outside of the RTV (Befare 2011). In addition many Afghans were and are living across the wider Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province. In Karachi, official documents from the 1980s show that there was one RTV 
(CCAR 1987) with a population fluctuating between 18,000-to-19,000 (CCAR 1987). However, this low 
figure is explainable by the fact that historically little attention has been provided to Karachi’s Afghans. 
Later figures in the 2000s officially stated that Karachi was home to over 100,000 Afghans (SAFRON et 
al., 2005), which was not inclusive of unregistered Afghans in Karachi. In a 2009 study the numbers of 
illegal Afghans are quoted as 1 million (Befare 2009:54). Whilst this figure appears to be a high estimate, I 
was told in interviews and discussions with residents and officials that over there are anything from 
100,000-400,000 illegal Afghan migrants living in Karachi.  
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Pakistan’s case the state is concerned about reasserting the legitimacy of the territorial boundary 
of the Durand Line, which is why it is so keen on excluding Afghans in Peshawar, i.e. to 
eliminate the threat of Pashtun nationalism that dominated Pakistani security concerns until the 
1970s (Banerjee 2000; Haroon 2007; Hewitt 1996; Tarzi 2012). Interconnected with this, it is also 
concerned about maintaining its own fragile internal ethnic balance, which Afghan Pashtuns - 
who are understood as automatic allies of Pakistani Pashtuns – threaten. Further, the state is 
concerned with ensuring that it, the Pakistani state, is understood as being distinct from Afghans 
and Afghanistan because of the US-led military occupation of Afghanistan. Whilst individuals are 
able to transcend boundaries citizenship the state, in light of local, regional, and global power 
politics, is less willing to do so. Moreover, the interchangeable use of Afghan and Pashtun as 
being the same - which is what forms the basis for assumptions that all Afghans are at home in 
Peshawar - is itself problematic as it obfuscates the significance of non-Pashtun Afghans to 
constructions of “Afghan-ness”, which in this thesis include: Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, 
Mughals, and others. This also reinforces what Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (2012; 2012b) refers to as 
an oversimplification of Afghan history and society, which Hanifi relates to colonial influences 
of standardization, as well as a “post-colonial” project of Afghan nation-building, which have 
tended to be overly “Pashtunised” and ignored the significance of a “Persianate” character and 
influence. 34 
 
Further, I also wish to reemphasise the historical presence and position of Afghans in Karachi 
(see Chapter 5).  Whilst some media reports and visits by political actors (Bhutto 2011) have 
                                                          
34 In an article discussing “The Quandaries of the Afghan Nation”, Shah Mahmoud Hanifi (2012:100) 
states, “It has long been common intellectual practice to lump together the categories Afghan, Pashtun, 
and Pathan. However, once data-driven, historically, and theoretically informed questions about the 
relationships among Afghan, Pashtuns, and Pathans are asked, the house of cards that is their unison 
begins to collapse”. Although Hanifi’s focus is mainly analysing this conundrum in relation to the modern 
Afghan state, his questioning also applies across the border and in the transnational spaces of 
“Pashtun”/“Pathan”/ “Afghan” identity between the Afghan and Pakistani states.  
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taken place in Karachi’s Afghan areas (specifically Afghan Camp), the presence of Afghans in 
Karachi has been almost completely side-lined in any political analysis of the Afghan refugee 
presence in Pakistan, which has instead focused on large Afghan demographics in Baluchistan, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). An exception to 
this is a CCSR report on Afghan migration in Karachi (CSSR 2005b).  
 
Finally, I aim to bring to the discussions of Karachi’s politics Pakistani Pashtun voices. The 
majority of recent scholarship on Karachi has produced rich academic work on the Muttahida 
Quami Movement (MQM) (N.Khan 2010; Siddiqi 2012; Verkaaik 1994; - in Hyderabad see: 
Verkaaik 2004), Karachi’s “Muhajir” history (Jalal 1990; Zamindar 2007; Wright 1991), urban 
affairs (Hasan 2002, 2006, 2010; Ring 1990), and “ethnic violence” (Yusuf 2012). This also 
applies to other dominant/public media and literature productions, such as the Citizens Archive 
Project (CAP) in Karachi, which is a local oral history project geared around remembering, 
recording and, it can be argued, constructing ideas of shanakht (identity), based on a dominant 
Muhajir-Punjabi discourses. These academic and public spaces of knowledge production have 
contributed to their fields, but they also act as discursive vehicles that reproduce dominant 
discourses that are not inclusive of Pakistani Pashtun voices, amongst others, reducing them to 
mere background vignettes. This “backgrounding” of political Pashtun voices cannot be 
separated from the political and cultural context of Karachi.  It reflects the fact that Pakistani 
Pashtun areas in Karachi which, it must be added, are never purely Pashtun areas, are 
contextually stereotyped as “dangerous” sites for ethnographic fieldwork (as well as government 
initiatives – see Chapter 3), and less socio-economically developed. This means that many 
“Pashtun” areas receive less attention in academic and political discourse. Secondly, much of the 
academic scholarship on the MQM, Karachi’s experience of Partition, or even projects such as 
CAP are produced by people who are Indian migrants to Pakistan, or their children, or often 
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socio-economically better placed Punjabis. This helps to explain why the “Pashtun” voice in 
Karachi appears “quieter” in academic and civil-society projects.35 This includes either being a 
part of academia, media, political or civil society organisations or having the social, economic 
and cultural networks (Bourdieu 1981, 1985) that could attract the attention of researchers, the 
media and so on.36 Thus, for a more holistic, reflexive, and inclusive understanding of “Pakistani” 
history the voices of Pashtuns, Balochis, Sindhis, Kashmiris, Chitralis, Bangladeshis, Somalis, 
Afghans, women, the urban poor, religious minorities, or sexual minorities, and so on, I argue, 
must be given space. This study cannot cover all of these angles, but it makes an attempt to 
understand the position of Afghans, urban poor Pakistanis, and within this Pakistani Pashtuns as 
a minor effort to address existing gaps. 
 
Methodology 
Where positivistic approaches to state-making, political science, and historical “truths” give 
significance to the archival document, maps, statistics, policy papers, and quantifiable and 
measurable facts, what is left of the lives beyond these categorisations of knowledge? What of 
those who do not appear on these maps, statistics, and policy papers - do their lives count? 
Moreover, in a study of informality, which is undocumented by officialdom, how are sites of 
“knowing” illuminated? Feminist, post-colonial, and Marxist literature has gone a long way in 
questioning dominant narratives of “truth production”, showing how the claims to “truth” 
cannot be separated from forms of power and political control (Adib-Moghaddam 2010; Butler 
1993; Cohn 1987, 1996; Fanon 1963; Guha 1997; Hobsbawm 1974; Said 1978). Influenced by 
these approaches, this thesis uses oral interviews and narratives and a multi-sited ethnographic 
                                                          
35 For example, a recent CAP project is collecting with the oral narratives of the experience of Punjabi 
and Indian migrants during Partition. However, it offers no space for alternative voices, of Pakistani 
Pashtuns, Afghans, Bangladeshis, and others.  
36 This can be compared with other areas in Pakistan where a vast, rich, and detailed analysis of “Pashtun” 
political, ethnographic, and historical analysis has taken place as a result of stronger social, economic and 
cultural capital: See Akbar (2004); A. Ahmed (2006); Barth (1965); Lindholm (1996); Marsden (2005). 
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approach to engage with voices that have previously been ignored to question the dominant 
“ways of knowing”, which have led to the marginalisation of an Afghan and a Pakistani urban 
poor presence in Pakistan.  
 
During 2010, 2011, and part of 2012, I collected oral interviews in Peshawar and Karachi – other 
locations, including Attock, Nowshera, Khyber Agency, and Islamabad were also used, however, 
the prime locations for this thesis are Peshawar and Karachi. Oral history interviews were 
conducted with Afghan and Pakistani candidates in official urban refugee tented villages (RTVs), 
unofficial RTVs, urban regulated residential areas, urban informal residential areas (squatter 
settlements/katchi abadis), and in some cases the urban bazaar. Interviews took place in a semi-
structured format, which meant that I had a set range of questions I covered (Appendix 4), but 
the format and style of questioning and discussion varied in each interview. In the majority of 
cases the interview style was not completed as a formal questionnaire. From my own experiences 
of having been surveyed as an “ethnic minority” in the UK and in a climate of suspicion 
surrounding state and non-state surveys in Pakistan, I was aware that being overly directive and 
formal in my approach could lead to “performed” interviews and responses, with me seeking 
what I wanted to hear and interviewees telling me what they thought I wanted to hear. Instead, I 
learnt the questions and topics I wanted to ask by heart and would ask questions as interviews 
progressed, adding questions when needed or just letting the conversation run its course – this 
was important as I also wanted to be informed of some of the issues that interviewees 
understood as being important. For example, when I started field work I had no inclination that 
the issue of police and security force harassment would be such a dominant issue in Afghan lives. 
However, after a period of fieldwork it became apparent that that this was one of the biggest 
issues Afghans faced - motivating amendments in my research questions.  
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Further, interviews were either conducted as one-on-one, family, or group37 interviews. Some 
interviews were brief (15-30 minutes). Others were longer ranging from 30-60 minutes, 2-3 
hours, and 4-6 hours (completed with breaks). Some interviews, usually the longer ones, were 
also repeated a number of times, either over a period of hours, days, weeks, and months – 
eventually becoming interlinked with my ethnographic approach. Whilst the shorter interviews 
did not reveal as much detail as the longer interviews, they still proved useful in verifying, 
confirming, or disputing findings from longer interviews and ethnographic observations.  
 
In total 385 interviews were completed. 59.74% interviews were with Afghans (41.04% Afghan 
male and 18.70% Afghan female) and 40.26% were with Pakistanis (23.64% male and 16.62% 
female), with a roughly equal number of interviews completed in Karachi and Peshawar (191 in 
Karachi and 194 in Peshawar). And, in Karachi 39.74% of all Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi 
were (Pakistani) Pashtun. Further details can be found in Appendix 1-4. The samples used were 
not controlled and as such the samples are not equal to each other, and nor are they 
proportionately representative of various Afghan and Pakistani groups in both cities - especially 
by ethnicity or gender. Given the qualitative nature of this study, which also combined 
ethnographic observations, this shortcoming was, however, somewhat unavoidable and should 
not take away from findings.  
 
As mentioned, a multi-sited ethnography was also important to this study. This involved me 
living, spending time and working in various residential areas (regulated and unregulated), RTVs, 
completing household interactions, speaking to various “community leaders”, travelling across 
both the cities, surveying neighbourhoods, observing government and UNHCR enumeration 
                                                          
37 Group interviews were interviews with two or more people, either friends, colleagues, and/or some 
family members. 
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techniques, and observing, and occasionally experiencing, Pakistani policing techniques. Both 
interviews and ethnographic observations were possible through contacts in social networks 
(friendship and family) or by engaging with relevant governmental and nongovernmental 
organisations, all of whom had prior knowledge of the areas and communities from which 
participants were selected.  
 
Where possible, interviews and narratives were recorded using a Dictaphone and later 
transcribed and translated into English. However, given the sensitivity of some topics i.e. security 
or violence, and in cases where I felt the interviewee was cautious of my position as a researcher, 
I did not use the Dictaphone.38 In many cases, I wrote the answers for interviews by hand during 
the interview process and would write up the interview in greater detail once I had returned to 
my accommodation in Karachi or Peshawar.39 This technique of on-the-day writing was also 
used for my field notes and ethnographic observations as much as possible. Urdu and Pashto, 
and occasionally English and Farsi were used - interlocutors were used if and when necessary. In 
most cases interviews with Afghans were conducted in Urdu with my use of Pashto being mainly 
reserved for introductions and general ice-breaking. This use of Urdu was possible as most 
Afghans have lived in Pakistan for over 20 years40 and can speak Urdu; however, variations in the 
ability to speak Urdu because of gender, “ethnicity”, and “wealth” were apparent. This use of 
Urdu was even completed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where Pashto is the lingua franca. The Urdu 
used was not “classical” Urdu, however, once interviewees were comfortable with my position (I 
would say, “I am not Urdu-speaking” myself), they would feel less conscious and more confident 
                                                          
38 For example, in one case I conducted interviews in an informal housing area in Peshawar that had faced 
a number of police raids. Only after return visits, were those who had been initially sceptical, satisfied (to 
a degree) that I was not a member of the intelligence services – and even after this I was not comfortable 
using the Dictaphone.  
39 Some of the interviews that were recorded on tape were only translated once I returned from fieldwork. 
40 The majority of my interviews were with Afghans who had lived in Pakistan between 20-34 years. 
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of speaking. In some cases the support of a translator, either someone from the family I was 
interviewing, the local area, or a companion proved useful. However, problems of translation 
and expression must be accounted for. More crucially, as much of the postcolonial literature 
informs us (Said 1978; Abu-Lughod 1993[1986]), this issue of “translation” was not just related 
to an issue of language. My own position - how I was perceived, and how I perceived – also 
influenced the information which was shared with me, or not, and what I recorded, or not. 
 
I also completed interviews with official Pakistani and Afghan government representatives and 
institutions, former leaders and members of Afghan political parties - mainly former anti-Soviet 
resistance members in Pakistan -, representatives of international bodies working for Afghans – 
such as UNHCR -, and lawyers in Pakistan. In addition, I used an archival and documentary 
approach, which included accessing archives and/or current government and refugee regime 
documents. This included: handbooks; policy papers; reports; internal memos; government 
treaties; official local housing maps; archived newspaper reports from the 1980s and 1990s and 
online newspaper reports from the 2000s; legal court rulings from provincial high courts and 
local magistrate courts; legal aid cases; and human rights reports (see Bibliography and 
Appendices). 
 
Self-Reflections 
My own position and objectives framed the responses I was given (or not given) as well as how I 
absorbed and analysed (or not) interviews and observations. Questions over when exactly my 
ethnographic observations started are ones that I, as a quasi-insider/quasi-outsider, continually 
asked myself. Did they start during my childhood experiences in Pakistan, with Afghan family 
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friends and neighbours? 41  Are they informed/motivated by my own family’s “urban poor 
informal life” in Pakistan (by my mother’s recollections of living on “hand outs” - when the 
neighbours would give them pakoras, yogurt, and wheat for roti or when they took my Kashmiri 
grandmother in, after she had  - and has -  no means of supporting herself)? Are my research 
concerns regarding police harassment and immigration also informed by an “outsider” 
environment of racial42 politics in London? Or are my research concerns shaped by my lens as a 
member of a “third world” diaspora in the “developed” world? I am sure these factors have 
influence, in their own complex way. Yet these statements are not made to take away from this 
work and its academic validity. Rather, in the spirit of transparency, they tie me to my work and 
allow the reader to understand more fully the position from which I write.  
 
Turning to my position during the actual time of fieldwork, a woman in her mid-20s, unmarried, 
raised in the UK, Muslim, half-Pakistani (Kashmiri-Punjabi), and half East African-Indian-
Yemeni, dressed in purdah43 speaking Urdu, occasionally Pashto, coming from a higher education 
institution in London, conducting research alone, working in RTVs or katchi abadis, praying salah 
and eating in people’s homes, provides an interesting assault on the purity of the “insider-
outsider” predicament that has been raised by a number of anthropologists (Abu-Lughod 
1993[1986]). It also outlines the possibilities of possessing multiple locations and sites of affinity 
and “identity”, which appear to be increasing with the norms of transnationalism and 
globalisation (Koser et al., 2002; Monsutti 2005). 
                                                          
41 Indeed in some case I conducted interviews with people that my family has known since the late 1980s. 
42 In this context race includes religion. 
43 Usually I wore shalwar kamiz as I normally would in Pakistan, but usually with a bigger chadar that could 
cover my face and hair, or, I would wear a headscarf and niqab in-one as some women do (a trend which 
has increased in middle-upper class “religious” families).  I do not wear a headscarf outside of the UK, 
and would explain this to people if they asked – in case people assumed I was performing religious piety 
through my dress. This was generally however, understood as a cultural difference and not understood as 
a question-mark on my “piety”. 
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Throughout my fieldwork, I tried to remain, as much as possible, transparent in my position, 
background, and the objectives of my research. The ethical pressures of being responsible for the 
production of a form of knowledge and history continually forced me, and force me, to clarify 
and conceptualise the purpose of my work, which I shared with interviewees as I conducted my 
research, and am attempting to share with the readers of this thesis now. During fieldwork this 
included being open, as much as possible, about my “ethnicity/(ies)”, “religion”, “class”, and 
education and background. I tried, as much as possible to avoid “performing” in certain ways as 
a short cut to trust as much as I could. Thus even in highly politicised contexts, where being 
“Pakistani” and/or a “foreigner”, depending on which identity “dominated”, could be perceived 
negatively, I felt an ethical imperative to be clear about my background if this information was 
asked; and I would usually share this information even if not prompted.44 This was because I felt 
that I was asking to be privileged with quite personal details of people’s personal lives and did 
not want to have an unfair “advantage” so to speak. As much as I was asking and observing, I 
understood the need for others to ask and observe my own position.  And, perhaps from an 
idealist’s lens, i.e. to produce a more inclusive narrative, I felt that the objectives of this work 
would be able to transcend forms of compartmentalisation and categorisation in which 
predicaments of being an “insider”, “outsider” along lines of nationality, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, or class predominate. 
 
Importantly, as mentioned above, my background and the multi-sited nature of my fieldwork 
challenge the “insider-outsider” predicament and simultaneously show how multiple sites of 
                                                          
44 Only in certain circumstances when I, and/or the friends of colleagues I was with were conscious or 
privy to information regarding security did I withhold information. For example, in one instance I had 
started conducting fieldwork in an area that was rumoured to be involved in kidnappings, when a threat 
of violence was made against me. Only once I had built up enough trust and spent enough time in the 
area did I reveal fuller details about myself.  
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affinity and “identity” can be occupied.  This was also influenced by me introducing my family to 
people during fieldwork – at a few junctures this was in person or on the phone, but usually it 
was through mentioning them in conversation. Working in an environment in which family 
matters I was conscious of making people aware of where I was staying, i.e. with family and with 
the consent of my parents and the family networks I had in Pakistan. This was important 
because as an unmarried Muslim woman, a “quasi-insider”, my reputation and whether I was 
considered trustworthy or not was influenced by the security my family network provided. (It 
was also an important way of me maintaining my own security45). In addition, it was my own way 
of humanising myself to avoid appearing as an “automaton like” researcher (Haslam 2006). 
These different factors, as well as the multi-sited approach of my work, meant that during 
fieldwork at many times I was an “insider” and “outsider” at exactly the same moment (Abu-
Lughod 1993[1986]), and sometimes neither. During interviews with Afghan households I could 
be an “insider” despite not being Afghan because I was Muslim, non-(full) Pakistani46 and/or a 
non-“Westerner”. Because of this I was given access to information regarding Pakistani police 
harassment and/or activities of the former mujahidin during the Soviet War, and/or criticism of 
US-led military action in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the significance of religious ethics in 
shaping people’s lives - indeed on some occasions I was explicitly told it did. But at the exact 
same moment because I was an “outsider”, i.e. a non-Afghan women, the rules of gender did not 
always apply. Often I was able to sit in the male section of a household and interview senior 
community leaders being the only woman in a room with a number of senior (in age) men. 
 
                                                          
45 This applied particularly in the case of Pakistani security officials. In Peshawar, for example, I was 
accosted (as is often the case) by Pakistani intelligence officials. Only once they had realised I was staying 
with a “good” family (the “Uncle”, i.e. family friend I was staying with is a doctor), from a good 
neighbourhood (which they saw after “visiting” our home a few times), were they satisfied and did not 
monitor me any longer.  
46  In some cases, particularly through patrilineal lenses, my father’s heritage was held in greater 
significance than my mother’s. 
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In other cases, the “insider” or “outsider” role appeared more dominant and played either a 
restrictive or facilitating role. As an “insider” and an unmarried woman I would usually leave 
field work at/before maghrib prayers, and would not stay overnight in people’s homes. Instead 
throughout fieldwork I stayed in the homes of family and/or family friends. Once, I took my 
mother with me to the house of a family I had been interviewing in an informal housing area 
after the family had formally invited me to their home after long periods of time interviewing 
them. However, after having met my mother and having been a guest in their house, I became a 
“family member” and was discouraged from talking to many men of the household as I had 
previously been doing. In other cases, “Angraizi marna” (“hitting some English”  or “speaking 
English with an English accent”), put me in the position of an “outsider” to facilitate access to 
bureaucratic systems and appointments with senior officials or I/NGO workers, highlighting the 
continued subtleties of a “Developed vs. Developing World” hierarchy that operate in 
bureaucratic Pakistan. Yet on another occasions it acted as a restrictive tool as I was questioned 
as being an intelligence agent.  
 
Each set of interviews and observations in this multi-sited and multi-method process of 
fieldwork, thus, varied, and I have tried to provide vignettes that reflect this throughout the 
thesis. Any researcher will face their own set of challenges, be it of an “insider”, “outsider”, 
“quasi-insider”, or anything else. The challenge lies in trying to see and be seen to accept these 
positions while also seeing and beyond these categories. Whilst affinities and attachments remain, 
an effort to transcend these and hear (and be a part of) human stories must be pursued. 
 
Finally, the challenges of finding the “right” candidate to interview, choosing what to include (or 
not) in the body of this thesis must be accounted for. During fieldwork I found myself asking, 
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“Does he/she/they understand my questions and what I am trying to investigate?”; “Do I 
understand what is being said and why”; and, perhaps from a more challenging perspective for 
myself: “Am I asking the right questions?”; “Is my thesis missing the point?”; “How will I 
“translate” these lives into a meaningful thesis?” Whilst observations about what is happening 
can be made, the scenes described, and a surface level analysis completed, is a full understanding 
possible?  
 
From my own work, the example of an interview completed with an Afghan female doctor 
compared to an Afghan male daily labourer is informative. I understood the doctor’s interview at 
the time to be “better” than the daily labourer’s, at least on the surface. But why was this? 
Because the doctor, as a woman, as someone from a shared educational background, and as 
someone who understood my questions and agreed with my perspective of a voice needing to be 
heard, spoke from a position and in a language that I could understand –  more than the daily 
labourer? Thus I find myself asking, can you really understand unless you are speaking the same 
language, which is not just restricted to language per se, but also includes the language of symbols, 
and social, economic, and cultural capital? Perhaps not. But that should not prevent needed 
political analysis. Instead, it remains crucial to be responsible and reflective on my own positions 
and the lives I have been let into during fieldwork; to accept the shortcomings of my research, to 
be conscious in the field and during this writing process of my shortcomings. And, with this, to 
still push, to the best of my abilities, for the production of a political analysis that, it is hoped, 
can lead to a more humanised existence - for all of us. 
 
  
66 
 
Chapter 3: A Dehumanising State: Afghans and Devalued Pakistanis in Karachi and 
Peshawar 
 
We fought the war funded and supported 
by the USA. But they used us – we were 
not treated as human beings, just as a tissue 
paper. Something that could be picked up 
and thrown away in an instant. 
Son of Afghan mujahidin party 
leader, Jamaat ud Dawa (interview: 
Maulana Jamil ur Rehman, 2011). 
 
Government official: Last year [2010] it is 
estimated that 108,000 Afghans were 
repatriated. But recycling47 remains an issue.  
Interviewer: Recycling? In terms of [waste 
collection] jobs? 
Government official: No, of them. 
Recycling of Afghans across the border is a 
big issue, because they cross over the 
border [into Afghanistan] but they return. 
CCAR official, Islamabad.  
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter first details the legal responsibilities and the moral and political expectations related 
to enabling and safeguarding a humanised existence that lie with the state and, increasingly, with 
international institutions (primarily the UN and its sub-bodies). Next it shows how structural 
shortcomings and the incompetence of officialdom mean that official actors cannot deliver to 
refugees, illegal immigrants, and citizens the goods they are due, which results in a denial of the 
conditions needed for human flourishing. However, it then shows how these shortcomings are 
                                                          
47 “Recycling” (in English) is also used in official Pakistani government documents for Afghans in 
Pakistan, as an example, the 2010-2012 Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy (SAFRON 2010).  
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informed by the ways in which Afghans and Pakistanis are seen and understood by official actors. 
These “ways of seeing”, essentially different forms of recognition, exclusion, or misrecognition, 
are assessed on three levels: (1) lenses of national and ethnic exclusion; (2) the objectification of 
Afghan and Pakistani bodies as “units” or “tools” - either for bureaucratic and modernisation 
plans or forms of political instrumentalism -, and (3) constructions of “exemplary suffering”. 
Afghans and Pakistanis are, thus, similarly devalued by officialdom, which creates a shared space 
of existence between the two. 
 
Responsibilities, Expectations and Failings of the State and International Institutions in 
Karachi and Peshawar 
In the modern international political order two main entities claim responsibility and are 
expected to distribute and protect the rights and goods for humanised conditions of existence: 
the modern state and, increasingly, the international human rights regime, which includes 
numerous sub-regimes such as the migration and refugee regime.  
 
International Regimes and the State’s Relationship with Refugees 
Realist scholars argue that international law and institutions do not work (Mearshiemer 1994/5) 
and others argue they reflect new forms of imperialism (Bhagwati 2002; Paris 2002). However, it 
is clear that international norms (Bull 1977), laws, and institutions (Keohane and Nye 1989) have 
a presence in modern politics. International human rights laws via the United Nations (UN) 
Charter (1945) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), intergovernmental 
organisations (such as the UN and its sub-bodies) have influence. Their presence has constructed 
new norms in international politics and they themselves implement political, social, and 
economic programmes. For some scholars this is explained in the language of “civil society” – at 
a local and/or a global level, which is evident through the proliferation of international and 
national nongovernmental organisations (I/NGOs) (Cohen and Arato 1992). In these processes 
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the state remains the ultimate sovereign, but international institutions and I/NGOs legitimise 
their existence through a space of moral politics which means they assume responsibility and 
create expectations to safeguard basic rights48 for all humans irrespective of citizenship. The UN 
Charter contains a number of human rights provisions, including: 
Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion (UN Charter, Article 1:3). 
And of course Pakistan is a signatory to a number of international human rights agreements49 
making the Pakistani state responsible to dispense and safeguard basic human rights to all people 
– citizens and non-citizens - within its territorial borders.  
 
For Afghans in Pakistan, the emergence of an international refugee/migration regime has been 
particularly crucial. Refugees operate outside of the modern state system50 but are offered some 
protection via UNHCR and the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  Pakistan is not a signatory 
to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, however, the GOP “conforms” to their “universally 
accepted principles and practices” (SAFRON and CCAR 1984:1). In 1979 the Commissionerate 
for Afghan Refugees (CAR) in Pakistan was established51 (prior to this Afghan refugees were 
                                                          
48 This is either by directly humanitarian intervention, via aid programmes, or pressures on government 
actors, and includes support programmes for refugees and “excluded” or “vulnerable” citizens, such as 
internally displaced people (IDPs). 
49 This includes being a signatory to: UDHR (although the UDHR is not considered legally enforceable), 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) (B Khan 2012:23-4), and United Nations Habitat Istanbul Declaration for Adequate 
Housing (UNHABITAT 2012). 
50 UNHCR (2011) outlines that it protects 33.9 million people, which includes “10.55 million refugees; 
837,500 asylum seekers; 197,600 [repatriating] refugees[…]; 14.7 million IDPs; 2.9 million IDPs 
[returnees]; 3.5 million stateless persons; and 1.3 million others of concern”. 
51 “Due to the particularity of the situation and the varying numbers of registered Afghans in different 
parts of Pakistan, the activities of CAR differ in each province” (B. Khan 2012:106). However, CAR has 
offices in each of the four provinces of Pakistan, and the federal-level Chief Commissionerate for Afghan 
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managed under the Home Department in the GOP) and in 1980 a federal ministry for the States 
and Frontiers Regions (SAFRON) also assumed a presence via policy setting and control over 
CAR. In a thorough piece of legal analysis regarding Afghans in Pakistan, Mohammad Bhehzad 
Khan (2012:107-8) summarises that CAR is the main government body responsible for 
contributing to policy formulation for registered Afghans. 
[CAR is responsible for the] implementation of such polices, 
including management and coordination of voluntary repatriation 
activities with UNHCR, supervision of district-level 
administration, establishment and administration of Afghan self-
help organizations, and coordination with different government 
departments, UN agencies and I/NGOs. [CAR also] oversees 
and monitors the provision of a range of goods and services – 
including, but not limited to, health care, education, shelter, 
livelihoods, vocational training, and legal aid – to registered 
Afghans by UN agencies and I/NGO’s (ibid).  
 
CAR is a government department with the status of a department attached to SAFRON and is 
funded by both UNHCR and the GOP to advance the responsibilities the GOP has accepted 
towards Afghans in Pakistan in line with the international migration framework. The GOP, 
influenced by international norms has accepted a legal, as well as moral and political, 
responsibility towards Afghans. Importantly, this responsibility was heavily encouraged during 
the 1980s when Afghan bodies were a useful tool in efforts to defeat the Soviet Union, at which 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Refugees (CCAR) is based in Islamabad, with CCAR coordinating policy at the national level. CAR’s 
provincial offices in KPK (Peshawar) and Balochistan (Quetta) were established in 1979, along with the 
CCAR (B. Khan 2012:106-7). The Punjab (Lahore) office was set up in 1982, and Sindh (Karachi) in 2003 
(B. Khan 2012:107-8). All C/CAR offices work under the policy direction of Ministry of SAFRON and in 
collaboration with UNHCR. Given the size of the registered Afghan population in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
CAR’s office in Peshawar is a large bureaucratic structure compared to CAR Sindh. CAR Sindh was 
established in 2003 (ibid), however, CAR Sindh’s administrative structure is unique in comparison to 
other CAR bodies because it works with the Afghan Refugees Repatriation Cell (ARRC), a government 
entity that is charged with overseeing the affairs of registered Afghans in Sindh alongside CAR. 
Interviews were conducted with CAR in Sindh, ARRC, CAR Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and CCAR 
Islamabad.  
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point the GOP promoted itself as the “ansar” (helpers) and guardians of Afghans (Baitenmann 
1990). 
 
UNHCR is the other major actor,52 with supporting implementing partners, that works alongside 
CAR and is institutionally present in Pakistan. UNHCR has been present in Pakistan since 1980 
and, as mentioned, remains a major source of funding for CAR. UNHCR sees itself as 
                                                          
52  Other Afghan institutional actors based in Pakistan responsible to Afghans, include the GOA as 
represented by the Afghan Consulate in all four provinces of Pakistan and the federal capital, Islamabad, 
as well as the Ministry of Afghan Refugee Repatriation (MORR). However, the role of both organisations 
is primarily diplomatic, consular, or bureaucratic, i.e. attesting documents (the consulate), or overseeing 
the renewal processes for identity cards via refugee repatriation programmes (MORR). In addition, during 
the Soviet-Afghan War, the Unity of Islamic Resistance was also recognised as the legitimate government 
of Afghanistan in exile by the GOP, USA, Government of Saudi Arabia, Government of Kuwait, and 
other anti-Soviet states. Seven main parties in Pakistan were recognised by these states, Hizb e Islami, 
Gulbudin Hekmatyar; Hizb e Islami, Younis Khalis; Jamiat e Islami, Burhan Rabbani (and Ahmed Shah 
Massoud); Ittehad al Islami, Abdul Rasul Sayaaf; Harakat e Inqilab e Islami, Maulana Mohammadi; Mahaz 
e Milli Islami ye Afghanistan, Sayyid Ahmed Gilani; (Shia Hazara Hezb i Wahdat, Abdul Ali Mazari were 
backed by Iran). Other “smaller” resistance parties were present in Pakistan, and as interviewees 
explained much of the strength of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union was based on highly 
localised armed resistance at the town and village level within Afghanistan (interviews with: Hajji 
Khairuddin, PXA71; Engineer Aziz, PXA59; Abu Zakariya, PXA54; Ismail Ibrahimi, PXA55; Hajji 
Farukh, PXA56; Jamshed Ali, PXA57; Abu Haider PXA51; Nawar Saleh, PXA99; Hajji Saroush, KHA72; 
Yahya Din, PXA101. See also interview: Rehman (2011). However, these seven parties were given 
importance for strategic reasons by the GOP, USA, and other allies; and it was usually these parties that 
coordinated the smaller parties and actors when it came to external funding. Some interviewees also said 
the multiple party organisation (i.e. the seven resistance parties) was purposefully promoted to keep 
Afghan nationalism divided (ibid). See also Abou Zahab and Roy (2004); Grare (2003) Guzzini (2009b:44). 
The seven resistance parties had their own schools and published a school curriculum separate to those 
produced by international NGOs and UNHCR affiliated schools (some of these are included in the 
bibliography), and even universities were present until the 2000s – such as Hekmatyar’s University Dawat 
ul Jihad in Hayatabad, Peshawar. In an interview with former mujahid with Hizb e Islami (Khalis faction) 
in Peshawar, I was told, “I used to get basic things, bread, soap, some food. These would be given to us 
by an elder of the tanzeem, the tanzeem head. But it was usually for the poorest people and for those who 
had been fighting” (Nowroz Beg, PXA35). In another interview in Peshawar with a group of men who 
had fought for different parties during the war I was told, “They only worked directly like this with a few 
selected houses. People would get soap, and dates from the arties but it was usually typical only for party 
people to get things directly. You had priority to receive things if you were from the party. For the 
Mujahidin it was a difficult time and of course for those that were actively involved they got most support” 
(Abu Haider, PXA51). Thus, despite offering some relief the resistance parties were not consistent or 
fully effective. Institutions such as UNHCR remained important in the Afghan experience in Pakistan, 
and not all Afghan were registered with the seven parties.  
71 
 
“imparting ‘protection by presence’ in Pakistan, i.e. a strategy whereby an international 
humanitarian presence provides assistance while at the same time contributing to the deterrence 
of human rights abuses” (B Khan 2012:104). UNHCR’s presence in Pakistan for Afghans is to 
protect “registered Afghans in Pakistan through advocating for and facilitating durable solutions 
i.e. voluntary repatriation to Afghanistan, resettlement to third countries, or local integration” 
(UNHCR 2012). UNHCR’s current activities in Pakistan include “registration of Afghans and 
provision of Proof of Registration (POR) cards and birth certificates” as well as “encouraging 
empowerment and self-reliance”, “distribute[ing] relief and assistance to disaster affected 
registered Afghans alongside Pakistani citizens” and the “provision of basic needs and essential 
services – in collaboration with CAR and I/NGO partners – in the areas of water and sanitation, 
shelter, primary health care, and education” (B Khan 2012:104-5). UNHCR is thus expected to 
defend rights and deliver goods and protection (to some degree) to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 
It is meant to fill in for the absent Afghan state, and alongside the GOP, is expected to protect 
Afghans in Pakistan. During interviews this expectation of UNHCR support was reflected by 
many Afghans with statements such as: 
This idhara (organisation [i.e. UNHCR]) says it is here for 
Afghans in Pakistan;  
 
They [UNHCR] promise us support and are meant to be 
supporting us. 
 
However, GOP institutions (CAR) working with UNHCR and international law are not effective 
in safeguarding and distributing rights and goods to Afghan refugees. The “refugee” remains an 
unresolved and undesired anomaly for the nation-state (Agier 2011) for whom resources are 
grudgingly spared. Further, funding for UNHCR projects in Pakistan for grassroots programmes, 
including Basic Health Units (BHU), education initiatives and (previously) ration programmes is 
contingent upon voluntary donations by international states and, “to a lesser degree from private 
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donors, and a small portion from the United Nations Regular Budget" (B Khan 2012:103). The 
CAR budget is provided by SAFRON, yet it too is impacted by international aid donations.53 
Without regular funding, projects are not fully implemented or forced to close. In interviews 
completed with officials from CAR (Karachi, Peshawar, and CCAR Islamabad) and SAFRON, 
reduced funds, especially from the peak of the 1980s compared to the ebb of the 2000s, was 
repeatedly given as the reason why the projects had to close, as well other projects (interviews: 
Maroof  2011; Wazir 2011; Zeb 2011).  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s there were well over 30054 RTVs in Pakistan, with 152-153 in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (excluding FATA) including 60-2 RTVs specifically in Peshawar, and 1 RTV in 
Karachi55 (CCAR 1987; CAR-KPK 2012). Yet currently there are only 42 camps in Pakistan - 29 
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (15 in Peshawar), 12 in Balochistan, and 1 in Punjab (GO04 2011; 
Befare 2011). There is also an RTV in Karachi but it is an informal one.56  The 2000s also 
witnessed further reductions in health and education initiatives, including university-level ones.57 
Data collected from Befare (2003, 2006-2011), the main provider of primary-level education to 
                                                          
53 For example contributions from international donors during the Soviet-Afghan war included donations 
that went straight to the GOP (not UNHCR) for project implementations. In 1983 the Federal Republic 
of Germany provided 136 trucks to the GOP; in 1984-5 Italy gave the GOP $2,213,000 of aid; between 
1981-5 the EEC gave the GOP $2,610,039; and, in 1986 China provided the GOP with 90 metric tonnes 
of tea, 135 medical cases (UNHCR 1987). 
54 The CAR-KPK (2012) website states that as of 15 July 1990, there were 334 RTVs across Pakistan. 
Archival data from CCAR regarding month by month RTV and population data shows that throughout 
1986-7 the total number of RTVs varied from 318 (15-08-1986)–345 (28-02-1989) (CCAR 1987). 
55 The RTV in Karachi was established in the 1985-6. CCAR (1987) data shows one RTV in Karachi 
being present in 1986 and 1987 under two names of Bijar Buti (15-2-1987) and Deh Tasir (15-12-1986); 
although in two months in between it is not listed at all. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
56 Key RTVs that closed down in the 2000s in Peshawar include: Kacha Gari and Nasir Bagh (2008), 
Jalozai (July 2007-May 2008). Population figures for each camp were recorded as: Kacha Gari and Nasir 
Bagh 51,014; Jalozai 119, 964 (SAFRON et al., 2005: 31), although at the time of closure a press release 
by UNHCR outlined different population numbers of 82,000 (UNHCR News 29 Jun 2007).  
57 A number of Afghan universities were present in Peshawar and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but closed down 
in the 2000s. Notably Arayana University and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Islamic University in Hayatabad 
(University Dawat ul Jihad) closed down in the 2000s. 
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Afghans in Pakistan since 1989,58 shows that in 2001 the numbers of students enrolled in Befare 
schools was 99,566 and the number of Befare schools was 301. In 2010 this number, however, 
was reduced to 48,535 students in just 129 schools.59  In addition, archival documents from the 
1980s (UNHCR 1987) show that there were 51 mainly international NGOs working only for 
Afghan refugees in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, covering immediate relief, including milk distribution, 
food rations, health, and education. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Refugees 
(ACBAR) listed 31 offices of I/NGOs aside from UN bodies and other independent actors in 
Peshawar alone (ACBAR 1992, 1993). Currently in Peshawar the main I/NGO bodies active for 
Afghan Refugees are Befare and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) (alongside the main UN 
bodies, i.e. UNHCR, UNICEF).60 
 
These closures are in part a result of large repatriations of Afghans to Afghanistan in the past ten 
years (UNHCR-PK 2012), however, they are also the result of shifts in funding and policies that 
are attempting to encourage repatriation by removing support. Thus it is clear that UNHCR, UN 
sub-bodies and implementing partners, including various I/NGOs, are reliant on and heavily 
shaped by the state and the wider geopolitical interests of global powers for funding61 to reveal 
an on-going tension between state sovereignty and the effectiveness of international law and 
institutions. 
                                                          
58 Education for Afghans is either provided through Befare, GOP schools, or private Afghan schools 
whose curriculum matches the GOA (interviews: Amin 2011; Education Attaché 2011; Wazir  2011). 
59 For Peshawar specifically in 2003 the numbers of schools was 62 and the numbers of students was 
29,202 and in 2011 there were 27 schools and 16,328 students enrolled. Additional data from the GOA 
Education Attaché (2011), lists 104 schools and 189,528 students in 2011. This includes private Afghan 
schools at a primary and secondary level.   
60 UNHCR continues to have a large presence in Pakistan and is involved in a large number of projects in 
Pakistan, which now include many Pakistani IDPs, however, a shift from the 1980s to the 1990s and then 
the 2000s is clear. 
61 The listed states funding the 1980s relief efforts included: Australia, Canada, China (important for its 
Soviet rivalry), Egypt, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, USA, other multilateral organisations, the European Economic Community, and 
organisations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (UNHCR-PK 1987). 
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After 2001, the “illegalization” (B.Khan 2012:9) of many Afghans refugees in Pakistan62 has also 
meant that many Afghans have no protection or recognition from the GOP and international 
institutions (B. Khan 2012:2-9). In Pakistan, shifts in the definitions of what it means to be a 
refugee, when a refugee stops being a refugee, and the line between “voluntary” and “forced” 
migration have taken place, with discussions showing that Afghan migratory movements are 
influenced by numerous social, political, and economic factors that go beyond traditional 
categories of “refugeedom” (B.Khan 2012; Kronenfeld 2008).  
 
The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) has recently gained significance as an 
organisation working for the protection of illegal migrants. However, despite the IOM’s presence 
there remains limited space for illegal migrants in international humanitarian and migration law. 
The IOM is present in Pakistan, and interviews with GOP officials during fieldwork revealed 
negotiations were taking place between the GOP (CAR and SAFRON) and UNHCR to include 
the IOM in managing illegal migration in Pakistan (interview: Maroof 2011). However, no 
agreements were made, and interviews revealed that the proposed remit of IOM involvement 
was to establish similar economic incentives to UNHCR’s repatriation programme – and 
therefore to simply encourage Afghan migrants to leave Pakistan and reduce the state’s 
responsibility towards Afghans (ibid). This onus, on getting illegal immigrants to leave states and 
other acts of the refugee regime (i.e. UNHCR’s mandate of resettlement, repatriation, or 
naturalisation within the framework of “the state”), have lead some commentators to argue that 
international law and international institutions such as the IOM and UNHCR do not in practice 
                                                          
62  On November 9, 2000, Pakistan closed its borders with Afghanistan (contributing towards the 
illegalisation of Afghan asylum seekers), and, “on February 2, 2001, a circular was issued wherein it was 
declared that all Afghan nationals without refugee cards/permits or valid visas would be considered 
‘illegal’ migrants and would be treated as per the laws applicable to Foreigner Laws” (B Khan 2012:2-7). 
This is analysed in greater depth in Chapter 7. 
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work for “all humans” (Agier 2011). Instead it is argued that they are instead primarily loyal to 
upholding the sanctity of the current nation-state system (ibid). Thinking beyond the nation-state 
system is not encouraged, which explains why transnational lives and especially illegal migrants – 
who unlike refugees are not associated with practices of “return” - are so deeply criminalised. 
 
Illegal migrants are criminalised entities that occupy a space of lawlessness deserving of 
punishment (Khosravi 2010:3) because, unlike “genuine refugees” who are forced to migrate, 
illegal migrants are constructed as calculating, greedy, and able to “choose” migration rather than 
“reacting” to forced conditions (Richards 1993, 1994). This is despite the fact that the lines 
between “illegal migrants” and “refugees” are often blurred (Turton 2003; Khosravi 2010) and 
that compelling numbers of illegal populations currently visible worldwide (Dauvergne 2008:12). 
In Pakistan, it is also despite the fact that the switch from being a “refugee” to and “illegal 
migrant” was so rapid and clearly politicised, again to emphasise the blurred lines between 
refugees and illegal migrants. For illegal migrants a devalued reality is more visceral and blatant 
because illegal migrants occupy a tenuous and vulnerable position as they conflict with dominant 
international norms more intensely than refugees. Illegal migrants are a direct challenge to the 
sanctity of the nation-state (Khosravi 2010:27). The conceptualisation of refugees assumes that 
refugees will eventually “return home”, but the same cannot be said of illegal migrants. Further, 
Saskia Sassen’s work (1996) indicates that the distinction between those with some form of legal 
migration status and those without it counts. In Pakistan this is seen as illegal migrants can be 
criminally prosecuted for breaking the Foreigners Law, which carries a maximum sentence of ten 
years (interviews: Mehmood 2011; Siddiqi 2011).  In one case, Gulzar Amin, an Afghan with an 
extremely low income (if he has one), was living with his immediate family on the outskirts of 
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Karachi in a tented shelter - he could not afford to build a katcha63 house (Gulzar Amin, KHA56). 
Gulzar escaped prison in Afghanistan in 2008 after being found to be a member of Gulbudin 
Hekmatyar’s Hezb e Islami and involved in petty political corruption, which he denies.  As he 
lives in Karachi illegally and without documentation he is scared to leave his local area. He told 
me, “I do not have a POR card. I worry they might imprison me” (Gulzar Amin, KHA56).  
 
In an interview I conducted with the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Sindh the 
Commissioner said, “They [illegal Afghans] are not our responsibility” (interview: Akhtar 2010), 
and similarly UNHCR officials mentioned that they can only exercise authority for registered 
Afghans in Pakistan. I was told by UNHCR officials, “We can only be concerned with registered 
Afghans”. Consistently during observations when illegal Afghans were subjected to violations by 
police and security forces they were turned away by UNHCR’s implementing partners for legal 
support. I was told, “They are illegal immigrants. They are not genuine refugees”. Thus some 
persons are left without access to basic material resources – the resources required by all humans 
- because they are not “readable units” that official actors, such as the GOP or UNHCR can see. 
They are not recognised as full human entities, nor even “exemplary human victims” eligible for 
rights and protection.  
 
                                                          
63 Katcha (s) refers to a housing structure that is made from mud and not bricks. I use the term katcha 
house in this thesis, katcha makkan (house) or katcha ghar (house), can also be used.  For more than one 
house, katche (pl) is used. A whole informal settlement is referred to as a katchi abadi. 
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Modern States 
Quaid e Azam, 
Baani e Millat; 
Fatima Jinnah, 
Maader e Millat; 
Liaqat Ali,  
Shaheed e Millat. 
 
Zardari Uncle, 
Aate ki Qilat, 
Chini ki Qilat, 
Bjli ki Qilat. 
Zilat hi Zilat. 
Quaid e Azam, 
Founder of the Nation; 
Fatima Jinnah, 
Mother of the Nation; 
Liaqat Ali, 
Martyr of the Nation. 
 
Zardari Uncle, 
Paucity of Flour, 
Paucity of Sugar, 
Paucity of Electricity. 
Humiliation upon Humiliation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rhyming joke in Pakistan, 2011. 
 
 
 
The “state” in a Weberian sense exercises absolute sovereignty over a specific territory and 
population and has a monopoly over violence. The state is represented via government 
institutions, laws, and official representatives – who are embodiments of the state. State 
sovereignty is contingent upon external and internal forms of recognition and legitimacy. 
Internally, it is contingent on performances of violence and a will to rule (Blom Hansen 2005) 
and in the quasi-democracy of Pakistan it is also contingent on the state meeting its legal 
responsibility to people identified as belonging to the state, i.e. citizens, by providing them with 
the human, social, economic, and political rights they are due. These responsibilities are outlined 
in state laws and constitute “citizenship”, the process by which “people (or subjects) are 
identified, disciplined, and ordered so that they can be ruled [and used] by the state” (Sadiq 
2009:9).  
 
In Pakistan, citizenship is attained through jus sanguinis (right of blood), jus soli (right of soil, i.e. 
birth right), or naturalization (Sadiq 2009:9). In the current norms of the Westphalian state 
model the Pakistani state has a legal, moral, and political interest to deliver and protect rights 
goods (and to thus legitimise its rule). These rights and responsibilities are outlined in the 
Pakistani constitution and Pakistani law, and it is the responsibility of federal, provincial, and 
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local government actors64  (i.e. people, who are embodiments of the state), and institutions (as 
structures of sovereignty) to maintain these rights in coordination with specific government 
departments, and thus also perform – and uphold - state sovereignty. In this study this includes 
                                                          
64 The following summary is taken in whole or part from Arif Hasan (2010:3-4): Pakistan is a federation 
of four provinces and each province has an elected provincial assembly and at the centre there is a 
national assembly in which every province is represented in proportion to its population. There is also a 
senate in which each province is represented equally. At the provincial level each province is divided into 
zilas (districts) and districts are divided into urban and rural tehsils (sub-districts). Tehsils are divided into 
union councils (UCs). Larger cities, including the provincial capitals are run as city districts and divided 
into tehsils (towns) and the towns into union councils. The zilas, tehsils, and the UCs are headed by elected 
nazims and naib nazims (mayors and deputy mayors) who are elected directly and indirectly by elected 
councillors. The 2001 Devolution Plan enhanced the autonomy of all three levels of local government, 
who can raise funds and implement development independently; the bureaucracy is subservient to them. 
The zila nazim is responsible for the district administration as a whole and is assisted by a senior 
bureaucrat who is the District Coordinating Officer DCO who coordinates the functioning of all 
government departments in the district. These departments included District Coordination, Human 
Resource Management and Civil Defence, Finance and Planning, Works and Services, Agriculture, Health, 
Education (apart from universities), Community Development, Information Technology, Revenue, Law 
and Magistracy.  As Arif Hassan summarises, “Before this devolution to the district level, all planning and 
implementation was controlled by the provincial government and its departments” (ibid). However, some 
changes have taken place during 2012 (for example in Karachi). 
 
A similar city organisation, though of a smaller scale, is visible in Peshawar. Peshawar is divided into four 
towns: Town I, Town II, Town III, Town IV and 92 UCs. However, here there is no separate Peshawar 
City District Government as there was in Karachi. Currently, town nazims and naib nazims report to the 
provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is most likely related to population sizes. Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa has an approximate population of 23 million (GOKPK 2010), which is comparable to 
Karachi’s approximate 19 million for the city alone (and not Sindh as a whole province). 
 
Until 2011 Karachi had the status of district as enacted (under the Devolution Plan 2001) by the Local 
(City) Government Ordinance (LCGO) 2001. At the time of fieldwork Karachi was governed by the City 
District Government Karachi (CDGK) headed by a city nazim and naib nazim (mayor and deputy mayor). 
Karachi was also divided into 18 Towns, which were further divided into 178 UCs. After the enactment 
of LCGO in 2001 the development and operation and maintenance related agencies, which were set up 
under the provincial government, devolved to become a part of the city government set up. Primary 
education, basic health and transport were also city government functions. “Thus, all planning, 
implementation and organisation and management was centralised with the city government, or allocated 
to towns and UC. The police however remained with the provincial government for political reasons and 
a strong presence of federal and government institutions and actors were evident” (Hasan 2010:15-6). But 
since November 2011 Karachi’s 18 towns have demerged into its five original constituent districts (the 
Sindh Local Government Ordinance 1979 was revived): Karachi East, Karachi West, Karachi Central, 
Karachi South, and Malir, which now form the Karachi Division (Karachi Municipal Corporation) and 
headed by a Municipals Commissioner (KMC 2012). This shift is perhaps related to the fact that the 
organisation of 18 towns gave local level actors too much authority, which in the climate of inter-city 
violence was not being managed effectively by the federal government.  
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GOP representatives and structures at the level of union councils, towns, city government, and 
each provincial government.65 
 
Pakistan’s responsibilities towards citizens are also outlined in the state’s social welfare promise, 
which historically shaped the state’s development and ideological vision, most notably under the 
founder of the state, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1947-8), and later Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s slogan of 
“roti, kapra, makan” (“food, clothes, housing”), and has also included recent programmes such as 
the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), which was introduced in 2008 by the PPP 
administration under Asif Ali Zardari.66 However, the ability to execute this social welfare model 
has always been challenged by domination of the military in Pakistan – a domination resulting 
from Pakistan’s conditions of birth as a state, the bloody secession of East Pakistan, and a 
sensitive regional geostrategic position next to rivals India and Afghanistan, all of which were 
reinforced by Pakistan’s position as a peripheral but key geostrategic state in the international 
system, seen most recently with its alliance with the USA in the context of  military conflict in 
Afghanistan and FATA. In recent years the social welfare promise to citizens has also faced 
attack from the influence of neo-Liberalism, which place emphasis on the reduction of 
government responsibility towards social needs (Hasan 2004, 2010; Toor 2011), despite the 
presence of programmes, such as BISP - which in this study was actually explained to me as 
being a “tool” for Asif Ali Zardari, a deeply polarising figure, to gain a legitimacy as he came into 
power in controversial terms after the assassination of his wife Benazir Bhutto in December 
2007 (former Prime Minister 1988-90; 1993-96). 
                                                          
65 See fn10.  
66 The BISP was introduced in October 2008 as cash assistance programme for urban poor families, and 
is closely aligned with the (current) PPP administration. During fieldwork in both Peshawar and Karachi 
it was evident that the government had been engaged with household surveys in order to identify eligible 
families. However, during interviews and discussions with Pakistanis, the number of cases that said they 
had received help from the BISP programme totalled 2 cases (out of 191).  
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Under a neo-Liberal reading of citizenship, citizenship is also enhanced by contributing to and 
participating in civic initiatives and civil society. Under this reading the onus for the distribution of 
goods also lies with the state’s people (who are understood as being connected and loyal to the 
state), and not just state institutions, as well as other private organisations. Indeed the Musharraf 
era saw a rise in civil society organisations and philanthropic activity in Pakistan (Zaidi 2011; 
PCP 2010), and this thesis pays attention to how urban poor Pakistanis are active in hybrid 
formal-informal spheres. However, neither neo-Liberal “civil society” and  citizenship, nor 
informal political activities (as an alternative space for belonging) replace the state, indeed their 
alternative forms of “being” and “belonging” are not without their own shortcomings 
(Friedmann 1992; Chapter 4). For a strong civil society to be able to deliver even laissez-faire 
forms of citizenship strong state capacity and an ability to regulate these organisations is still a 
requirement, which is not the case in Pakistan.  
 
Dominant understandings of the state and citizenship assume that in the current system of 
modern states, state institutions can manage the resources and capital within their territorial 
borders in order to provide and distribute rights, resources, and services to citizens, but in 
Pakistan this is not how things work. In Pakistan, as in many other states, the state and its 
institutions do not meet these idealised - and indeed idolised – norms that are constructed as 
“fact” for post-Westphalian states. Thus whilst refugees and illegal immigrants are left without 
access to basic rights and resources because of issues of legality and funding, many Pakistanis also 
exist in shared realities with Afghans as they are let down by “their” state. 
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On a macro-level, Pakistan’s peripheral position in the international economy and international 
pressures for economic reform has had significant impact on state capacity. Pakistan underwent 
a number of structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s (Zaidi 2005), and in the 
2000s economic liberalisation was heavily pursued under the Musharraf era and continued under 
Asif Ali Zardari’s PPP administration (Toor 2011).  In the rapidly urbanising and expanding 
urban landscapes of Peshawar and Karachi the shortcomings of the state have become more 
intense as a result of economic liberalisation, meaning that “in Pakistan’s urban areas, 21 million 
out of 56 million people are now food-insecure” (Toor 2012:99). In fact, suicides from poverty 
and food stampedes now read as routine features of daily newspapers (Appendix 11). During 
fieldwork one woman, Nargis, shared how her husband committed suicide as a result of a lack 
food, amongst other reasons. Nargis is employed as a domestic servant, but in 2011 her wages 
and her husband’s were unable to cover costs of rent and food for them and their two children, 
which contributed towards his suicide. Nargis said:   
He poisoned himself – he took some liquids. We did not have 
enough money coming, we could not even eat, and we still can’t. 
Think... our stomachs were empty. He was getting depressed. He 
would go away [mentally] and not talk for long times. It was 
difficult. It is now difficult. The children have no father, I have 
no husband (field notes: Nargis). 
 
In Karachi, economic liberalisation has also meant that “government investment in per capita 
terms has declined in education and health with the result that an increasing number of people 
have to rely on expensive private sector facilities” (Toor 2012:99).  In Karachi the privatisation 
of utility companies has also meant a steep rise in monthly energy bills. Charges have increased 
“by over 100% in the last decade”, and have mostly affected urban poor residents in “low 
income settlement areas” (Hasan 2010:24-5), which include poor populations, refugees, and 
illegal migrants.  
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Whilst privatisation, such as that of Karachi Electrical Supply Company (KESC), was supposed 
to overcome the energy crisis in the city, privatisation has actually meant that “conditions have 
deteriorated considerably” (Hasan 2010:25-7; see also Bashir 2007). The same is true in Peshawar 
where electricity is now supplied by the privatised Peshawar Electric Supply Company, part of 
the Power Information Technology Company. Poor delivery of electricity services, high costs, 
and now load-shedding are one of the biggest crises that Pakistan faces. Load-shedding severely 
impacts daily life and is responsible for lost livelihoods, illnesses, and lives. A 2012 (Mills 2012:5-
6) report outlines that areas in Pakistan (including urban areas) faced, “14-18 hours without 
power per day by October 2011, with this figure rising to 22 hours in some areas”. The report 
attributes this problem to “circular debt and a lack of investment” amongst other issues (ibid). In 
order to combat electricity shortages people who can afford it have generators fitted (fuelled by 
petrol) or uninterruptible power supply (UPS). However, most urban poor Pakistanis cannot 
afford a generator or UPS, which means when the electricity cuts, the discomfort of illness, 
dehydration, and water shortages is a routine experience.  
 
In Karachi and Peshawar housing shortages, which form a key site of discussion in Chapters 5 
and 6, are also a pressing issue.  A World Bank (Nenova 2010:217) report states that in Pakistan, 
“National and local master [housing] plans are either inadequate or poorly enforced”. The report 
shows that “Pakistan is facing unprecedented challenges of acute housing shortages, unhealthy 
living conditions, and non-existent or dilapidated infrastructure across the country. More than 50 
percent of the urban population lives in slum areas”. Citing an engineering firm report from 
2006 (Engineering Pvt 2006), Arif Hasan (2010:7) outlines that Karachi requires, “570,000 
housing units per year”, and “about 50 per cent” of this is for urban areas. However, “only 
300,000 units per year are being built” and the housing backlog has increased from “4.3 million 
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in 1998 to 6 million in 2005” (ibid). In Peshawar the government is involved in a number of 
housing expansion programmes in Hayatabad and Regi Town (GOKPK 2010; Dawn 25 Feb 
2010). However, these programmes do not cater to the needs of the urban poor who cannot 
afford to rent and/or buy property in this expensive area. 
 
In order to bridge this gap, both cities are the sites of informal expansions on the “rural-urban 
interfaces” (Roy and Alsayyad, 2004:21; Chapter 5).67  These informal expansions offer some 
alleviation to the challenges that official development and planning projects cannot cope with. 
However, these outer rural-urban lands, which are expanding the boundaries of Karachi and 
Peshawar, are at great distances from government facilities (hospitals, schools, transport links, 
and electricity and waterline), which have not been constructed at the same rate as these organic 
and informal processes.  Consequently, a dangerous quality of life is experienced in these areas. 
Life, bodily health, and bodily integrity (Nussbaum 2001:78-80) are at risk as basic material and 
non-material goods are absent, and instead half-baked physical outputs are produced via 
“substitutive” and “competing” informal processes, and these are analysed in greater depth in 
Chapters 4-6 via case studies.  
 
Structural weaknesses mean that the official channels, institutions, and laws do not meet 
expectations of citizens. For the Pakistanis interviewed in this study, primarily the urban poor, their 
                                                          
67 Arif Hasan outlines that in cities, such as Karachi, government land is fully saturated as older informal 
settlements have already occupied this space. Housing settlements that are present on these government 
land Hasan refers to as katchi abadis. He juxtaposes this with the development of un-serviced housing 
settlements on privately owned land by landholders and middlemen in what Hasan refers to as the, 
“Informal Subdivision of Agricultural Land (ISAL)”, i.e. many houses at the rural-urban interface (Hasan 
2010:7). This thesis looks at both katchi abadis and ISAL settlements but refers to them both as informal 
housing/residential areas. 
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experience of citizenship is a devalued one. In repeated interviews the understanding of an 
unaffected government formed the basis of expressions of discontent in daily language: 
Hukumat ko kya parwa  
The state does not care; 
 
Woh kehte hai ke wo hukumat hai, leikin kuch bhi nahi karti 
They say they are the state, but they do not do anything.  
 
For citizens, basic rights and safeguards to allow the potentials of “human life” to be practiced 
are not provided. Access to shelter, utilities, and food are difficult to attain through purely 
official channels. Indeed, citizenship in the orthodox sense, is practically confined to a limited 
elite, or, in the words of Partha Chatterjee, “the new bourgeoisie” (Chatterjee 2004:37). However, 
where Chatterjee proposes that most people (landless people, day labourers, the homeless, and 
the urban poor) become a part of “political society”, which is an alternative space for true 
citizenship and a “richer” democratic activity (Chatterjee 2004), this thesis does not jump to the 
same conclusions. Most are members of something akin to an informal political community, but 
this community does not foster an “other” form of democracy (Nelson - forthcoming), and 
whilst some attempts for a more humanised life are made, deep challenges remain. 
 
The Middle Ground: RTVs and Afghan and Pakistani Housing 
The KESC spares none of us, Afghan or 
Pakistani!  
Interview with Yusuf Khan, KHP50.B, 
and Abdul Mateen, KHA69. 
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Critically, RTVs are not spaces of UNHCR sovereignty. They are built on Pakistani land and 
subject to the same urban shortcomings as Pakistani areas – in some cases more so by virtue of 
being Afghan areas, with even less government incentives to develop the areas. (This is returned 
to shortly with attention to forms of “urban ethnocracy.”) This also reveals that the Pakistani 
state is held responsible for the delivery, and failures, that shape Afghan lives – often much more 
so than institutions like UNHCR. 
 
RTVs are supplied or not supplied with water, gas, and electricity by Pakistani government and 
private companies. RTVs are equally impacted by load shedding, price hikes, and shortages, 
which is especially the case given that UNHCR and CAR do not pay for electricity, and in a 
number of cases for water, which is a marked difference from the 1980s as UNHCR funding and 
policies have changed. The head teacher of a school in an RTV in Peshawar explained in an 
interview how electricity supplies were sporadic with rocketing prices.  
We cannot afford to run this school without asking for more 
money from the students68 (Mohammad Imran, PXA76). 
 
More importantly it should be remembered that Afghans are not legally confined to RTVs. In 
fact the majority live outside of RTVs (SAFRON et al., 2005). Thus both Afghans and Pakistanis 
live in shared spaces and housing areas partaking in the shared struggles of everyday urban life. 
Both Afghans and Pakistanis experience the shared shortcomings (food-shortages, load-shedding, 
and housing crises) that dominate everyday urban life in Karachi and Peshawar. Whilst Afghans 
cannot buy property, they can rent property, but with limited cheap rentable property available 
they too seek cheaper, quicker, informal alternatives – either to rent or informally purchase. 
Further, Pakistani newspaper archives repeatedly show numbers of Afghan and Pakistani deaths 
                                                          
68 Electricity is paid for by the school and students. 
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in the summer heat with no effective electricity for fans or winter cold (e.g. Dawn 1 May 2001; 27 
March 2012). “The KESC spares none of us, Afghan or Pakistani!” two friends joked one day in 
the heat in Karachi (Yusuf Khan, KHA50.B and Abdul Mateen, KHA69).  
 
Dehumanisation via Official Ways of Seeing 
The structural and contextual factors discussed above, however, require further examination. 
They cannot be fully understood without appreciating that their occurrence is deeply intertwined 
with the lenses through which official actors view and understand citizens and non-citizens. It is 
not just a case that funds are unavailable or that there are structurally inherited shortcomings. It 
must also be asked: What shapes the decisions that lead to these “structural” shortcomings? 
What are the decisions that govern actual shifts in funding? Why is it that some areas are worse 
off than other areas? These decisions are shaped by the frames (Butler 2010) and “ways of seeing” 
that official actors use – forms that dehumanise and devalue some lives over others, which 
results in a denial of the conditions in which the potentials of human flourishing can be practiced.  
In the remainder of this chapter three “ways of seeing” are analysed. These are (1) lenses of 
exclusion; (2) objectified ways of seeing; (3) constructions of “exemplary suffering”. 
 
National and Ethnic Practices of Exclusion in Urban Spaces 
Discrepancies in the worth of human life are also the result of “national” and “ethnic” frames 
that recognise, misrecognise, and exclude (Hermann 2010). This section pays attention to how 
frames of exclusion based on “national” and “ethnic” are practiced in urban housing areas 
building on the idea of “urban ethnocracy” developed by Yiftachel and Yakobi (2004; Yiftachel 
2006) and “ghettoes and frontiers” developed by James Ron (2004).  
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In Control, Resistance, and Informality: Urban Ethnocracy in Beer-Sheva, Israel, Oren Yiftachel and Haim 
Yakobi (2004) describe the actions of the Israeli state in Beer-Sheva (inside Israel proper). Here, 
the Israeli state enforces difference in the way that Arab and Jewish localities are officially 
administered, with the Arab towns being classified as “illegal”, “unrecognised”, or “spontaneous” 
by the region’s planning authorities (see also Yiftachel 2006).  
 
Whilst the political contexts of Peshawar and Karachi are very different to the housing 
settlements in Beer-Sheva, the rubric of an “urban ethnocracy” offers an insightful way of 
understanding the factors that shape the patterns of urban formal and informal activity. Pakistani 
state institutions and actors deliberately do not recognise the Afghan presence in “everyday” 
Pakistan in an attempt to maintain the “purity” of the Pakistani nation-state. Afghan dominant 
areas are not legally absorbed as part of the formal infrastructure and resources are delivered 
intermittently (if at all). However, this type of exclusion also extends to certain citizens. And, in 
this study the Pakistani Pashtun experience in Karachi provides an important example that links 
Pakistani Pashtun citizens and Afghan non-citizens in the city.  
 
As non-nationals there is limited space for Afghans in Pakistani law – they are “anomalies”, 
“undesirables”, and the “remnants” of society (Agier 2011; Khosravi 2010). Afghan-dominated 
urban spaces are ordered and technologically managed in “non-permanent” ways. RTVs are 
based on temporary leases of GOP or private land and the RTV itself acts as scientific process of 
“order making” (Malkki 2002), which combines with a “national order of things” (Malkki 1995) 
to isolate and separate the “remnants” of society into quarantined spaces that are separate from 
the “ordinary social and political world” (Agier 2008:39-40). During fieldwork an informal 
Afghan RTV (Chapter 5) was positioned on the extreme outskirts of Karachi by the GOP in the 
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1980s. Basic utilities such as water and electricity were not efficiently delivered to this low 
priority area. “No-one cares about Afghan Camp”, one resident noted, “it’s full of Afghans that’s 
why there is no water, nothing decent... nothing” (Habibullah, KHA13).   
 
However, despite this urban ethnocratic placement, in Pakistan, RTVs remain connected to the 
Pakistani state via CAR, SAFRON, and/or UNHCR. For the urban RTV in particular total 
isolation is difficult. Having existed since the late 1970s-1980s most urban RTVs have become a 
part of the city. In Peshawar residents explained, “Most of the time you cannot tell where an 
“Afghan area” starts and where a Pakistani area finishes”. It was true, you could not.69  (Indeed 
following violence in FATA and floods in 2010-11 many Pakistanis live in RTVs with Afghans). 
Similarly in informal housing areas that house large numbers of Afghans the state is not 
completely absent, especially as other Pakistanis live in these areas as well. Thus, instead of 
understanding the RTV or informal housing areas as completely invisible to the state, it is useful 
to turn to the work of James Ron’s Frontiers and Ghettoes (2003) for further elaboration to 
understand why these areas appear worse-off than other areas in the cities. 
 
Ron’s work (2003) analyses the reasons for different types of state violence in different 
geographic spaces, showing that the state shares a sense of legal responsibility towards 
geographic spaces that are territorially well within the state, such as ghettoes (unlike national 
frontiers). For Ron, ghettoes and ghetto residents are “incorporated into the dominant polity, 
                                                          
69 Indeed in a number of RTVs now many Pakistani families are also present. During fieldwork in 
Peshawar and RTV that was built on private Pakistani land also leased out land to Pakistanis, to make the 
area a highly mixed settlement. “The middle of the camp is full of Pakistani housing now – it’s not a part 
of the RTV, but you see how the camp is split by a Pakistani area” (Abu Haider PXA54). Finally, many 
Afghans also live in mixed Afghan and Pakistani regulated and unregulated housing areas. In Pakistan 
spatial segregation has never been total. However, this means that efforts to encourage segregation and 
forms of nationalistic “Othering” are also potentially very dangerous. 
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albeit with ambivalence and disdain”, and as such whilst they may be “segregated and repressed” 
they are “rarely liquidated outright”, which Ron argues does take place at the frontier (2003:16). 
Legal agreements and norms within the state, Ron argues, matter. Thus the state in Karachi and 
Peshawar maintains a grudging responsibility towards the “despised members of society” (i.e. 
Afghans) (2003:16). As urban areas that house Afghans (RTVs or informal housing areas) are 
territorially well within the state (and also house many Pakistanis), the state is not absent - even 
though it will act in a different way when compared to formal/regulated areas, to reflect the 
“ambiguities of unequal inclusion” (Ron 2003:24). This ambiguity of unequal inclusion helps to 
illuminate why, during fieldwork, areas with high Afghan demographics had reduced access to 
utilities (water, gas, electricity) health care, and opportunities for flourishing when compared to 
Pakistani settlements that had existed for similar amounts of time.70 This ambiguity also explains 
why different treatment was possible, including Afghan areas being used as sites for informal 
profits by official actors acting in illegal ways, as well by intermediaries and non-state power 
holders: residents living in these ghettoised areas are not recognised as fully human lives, but 
“despised members of society”. In addition, these objectified lives also represented a resource 
pool that could be used by official actors acting in informal and illegal ways to generate income 
and profit and to act in corrupted ways. This further helps illuminate why these areas and its 
                                                          
70 The ghetto versus frontier framework could potentially be extended further and applied to internal state 
boundaries such as that of the city (Ron 2003). Although here, within the national boundaries of the city, 
it is unlikely that urban government politics will result in ethnic cleansing - which is the case in Ron’s 
study Serbian ethnic cleansing of Bosnia (Ron 2003) - the city is an integral part of national space and a 
sense of responsibility remains to it. In the field work completed in this thesis there is variance within 
ghettoised informal urban areas in relation to their geographic position within the city, which also creates 
different types of state presence. Interviews and observations were completed in informal urban areas that 
are deep within/next to “formal” Peshawar and Karachi, for example in Peshawar’s Old City and 
Hayatabad or Karachi’s Defence or Gulshan e Iqbal. Interviews and observations were also completed in 
informal urban areas that are on the frontiers of these cities, situated on the geographic peripheries, such 
as rural-urban settlements around Ring Road in Peshawar or the various goths along Super Highway in 
Karachi. Both areas see the state present, albeit in “resentful” ways but the urban frontier settlements 
appear to experience a more tempestuous relationship with officialdom – although they certainly do not 
witness ethnic cleansing as is the case in Ron’s national frontier. 
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residents are not totally and violently removed/encouraged to leave, which will be further 
explored shortly.  
 
Segregating lenses are, however, also practiced on Pakistanis. This section will now illuminate 
how Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are also subject to forms of urban ethnocracy and 
ghettoisation (see also Chapter 5). Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are not the only example of 
“marginalised” Pakistanis, however, fieldwork in Karachi was influenced by cases of Pakistani 
Pashtuns being subjected to “ethnicised ways of seeing”, to reinforce patterns of urban 
ethnocracy (Yiftachel and Oren 2006) and ghettoisation (Ron 2003). Pakistani Pashtuns are full 
legal members of the Pakistani state. However, when I asked the question, “Does citizenship 
matter”, in the Pakistani Pashtun case, the answer was a stronger “No” than it was for other 
Pakistanis.  
 
Karachi is a microcosm of Pakistan and South Asia. It is a mega-city, home to an estimated 19 
million people from a number of linguistic, ethnic, religious, sectarian, professional, and national 
backgrounds. It has been the site in which various affinities of “ethnicity” have been constructed, 
changed, and debated, particularly since Independence and Partition (N.Khan 2010; Verkaaik 
1994; Yusuf 2012; Zamindar 2007). At various junctures tensions have flared between Sindhis 
(and to a degree Balochis) - the “natives of the soil”  and Muhajirs; between Muhajirs and 
Pashtuns; and so on (Bremen 2012; Haq 1995; N.Khan 2010; Moonis 1996; Shaheed 1995; 
Siddiqi 2012; Verkaaik 1994; Yusuf 2012). Currently, the city continues to boil. In 2010 over 
“1,000 people were killed in target killings—tit-for-tat assassinations aimed at members of rival 
political parties and their corresponding ethnic groups—followed by 1,891 in 2011 and more 
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than 740 in the first five months of 2012” (Yusuf 2012:8). Karachi is now known as the city of 
targeted killings, violence, and strikes.  
 
Pakistani Pashtun migration to Karachi from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA 71  has deep 
historic roots. Since the 1960s the Pashtun presence in Karachi has steadily increased as a result 
of rural-urban migration, education and income generation opportunities, and natural population 
growth. Migration has further increased since 2001 as a result of military campaigns and drones 
in FATA. During fieldwork I was told proudly by Pakistani Pashtun residents that “Karachi is 
the largest Pashtun city in the world”, and although the numbers of Pashtuns in Karachi is 
unknown (Pakistan has been stalling on a census, with its last one being completed in 1998), and 
it is more likely that Peshawar is the largest Pashtun city in the world (Chapter 2), it is clear that 
the Pashtun presence in Karachi has significantly grown.72 However, Karachi’s tense multi-ethnic 
balance has meant “Pathan” 73 migration has been jealously and violently resisted, particularly by 
the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a predominantly urban political party that claims to 
represent Muhajirs (Indian migrants from Partition who settled, mainly in Karachi and 
Hyderabad). The MQM’s political significance in Karachi74 has historically been accompanied by 
                                                          
71 Official numbers of these IDP population shifts are not available but during field work completed from 
this study many Pashtun interviewees had settled in Karachi and rented apartments and informal katcha 
houses in Al Asif Square and newly emerging goths around Super Highway. 
72 The 2012 Conflict Dynamics in Karachi (Yusuf 2012:8) report states that 300,000 Pashtuns migrated to 
Karachi since military operations in FATA began, and that, “the ANP claims to represent Karachi’s 
Pashtun population, which it estimates to be 22 percent of the total, up from about 12 percent in 1998” 
but does not provide a source for where/who this claim was made by.  
73 “Pathan” is the word used by non-Pashtun speakers to describe a Pashtun/Pakhtun. Its use also, then, 
symbolises that the person who is using the word “Pathan” is not themselves Pashtun/Pakhtun but 
belong to another “identity group” – or it simply reflects a conversation not taking place in Pashto. The 
word “Pathan” is significant and politicised in the context of ethnic conflict in Karachi because it signifies 
which ethnic group a person belongs to, and it can be used in a derogatory way, particularly my MQM 
affiliated actors.   
74 The MQM’s rise to power took place during the 1980s and 1990s after feeling side-lined in Pakistani 
politics after Partition and Independence via the increasing “Punjabisation” (Samad 1995) of Pakistani 
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deeply anti-Pashtun rhetoric and actions. Pakistani Pashtun migrants (and Afghan refugees75) are 
constructed as national/urban “destroyers” by MQM affiliated discourse when juxtaposed 
against the “original” and “genuine” state-building migrants of Partition, the Muhajir.76  Parallel 
to the Afghan case, Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are morally excluded as they are constructed as 
a dangerous “sub-human Other”, subjected to negative stereotyping, and frequently blamed for 
issues of drug-trafficking, criminality, and “Islamist”/ethnic tensions in the city. Again, however, 
rather than reflecting concerns of a genuine threat, the “Othering” process reflects an 
instrumentalist way in which Pakistani Pashtuns are used for political mobilisation by the MQM 
to consolidate the MQM and “Muhajir” identity in a “Self” vs. “Other” process.  
 
The MQM is a dominant player in the politics of Karachi. Since it entered formal politics in the 
1980s it has captured the majority of the city’s electoral votes, mainly from Muhajirs, as well as 
jobs in the city’s bureaucratic apparatus via the City District Government Karachi (CDGK) (now 
KMC) in Gulshan e Iqbal (see fn63). The CDGK building’s outer walls were covered in MQM 
images, with the figure of Altaf Hussain ever-present when I visited the offices during 2010-11. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
politics and provincial reforms that strengthened the position of Karachi’s (and Hyderabad’s) native 
Sindhis (Verkaaik 2004; Wright 1991). 
75 Within this intra Pakistani conflict, Afghans in Pakistan are subsumed under a “Pashtun” label by non-
Pashtun Pakistanis. This is despite the many ethnic variations of Afghans living in Karachi, which unlike 
Peshawar has a higher mix of Afghan Tajiks, Afghan Hazaras, and Afghan Uzbeks (SAFRON et al., 2005). 
76 In Urdu, Pashto, Dari, and Arabic the word muhajir means “migrant” (taken from hijrat, which means 
“to migrate”). In Karachi “muhajir” can be applied to migrants from India during the time of Partition in 
Karachi, which was promulgated by the MQM as a process of identity formation (Verkaaik 1994; 2004). 
The MQM’s ethno-political objectives and interactions with the state helped to transform the word into 
representing/constructing an ethnic group – i.e. it underwent being a noun (muhajir) to a proper noun 
(Muhajir) (Verkaaik 2004). Pakistani Pashtuns may refer to those of Indian origins as “Muhajirs” but will 
more usually use “MQM”/”Urdu-speaking”, i.e. identity is given by the official language of the Pakistani 
state and MQM. The word “muhajir” is also used to describe Afghans in Pakistan but with the term 
“Afghan” prefixed to it, i.e. “Afghan muhajir”, if the conversation is taking place in Karachi non-
Pashto/Afghan discussions. However, more often than not non-Pashto speakers simply refer to all 
Afghans as “Pathans”, even if they are not Pashtun. If the discussion is taking place in Pashto or Dari the 
prefix “Afghan” is not used. It remains to be seen if Afghan muhajirs will transform into Afghan Muhajirs 
within Pakistan. Finally, within Karachi, the MQM claims that only the MQM and “Indian” Muhajirs 
have the right to be considered “genuine” migrants/refugees who helped to construct the Pakistani state. 
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The MQM’s demand for Karachi to be accepted as the “native province” for the Muhajirs also 
continues to be painted in graffiti and street art with the question:  
Sab ka Sooba, hamara kyoo nahi – Muhajir Sooba zaroori hai. 
Everyone has a province, why do we not have a province? A 
Muhajir province is needed. 
 
Huge billboards of Altaf Hussain - the exiled party leader and founder of the MQM - and street 
graffiti bearing his name dominate the city’s aesthetic space. Indeed I suspect the slogans, “Jiye 
Altaf Hussain!” ([Long] live Altaf Hussain!) and “Siraf Altaf” (Only Altaf) occupy more wall space 
than all of the city’s commercial advertisements combined (see also Dadi 2007).  Further, the 
MQM, alongside other groups, is understood as being responsible for armed violence in the city, 
which often targets Pashtuns - or Afghans mistaken as Pashtuns.77 In one week during fieldwork, 
the death of a Pakistani Pashtun male who was shot by two men on a motorbike, apparently 
from the MQM, was spoken about by a number of interviewees near an unregulated Pashtun 
area in Karachi (Zmaray Khan, KHA61.B; Jalaluddin, KHA62.C; Fereydoun, KHA57 and 
Rafique, KHA58), and in another area a well-known street vendor was also shot by virtue of 
being “Pathan”. For the MQM Karachi is “their” city. The MQM is attempting to construct its 
public authority through a capacity for violence on human bodies (Blom Hansen 2005) and the 
lives of Karachi’s residents. The MQMs involvement in politics, extra-judicial violence, targeted 
and indiscriminate killings, billboards, and graffiti is a performance of sovereignty and claim to 
Karachi.  Yet as MQM’s “hold” on Karachi is not fully consolidated, its performances of 
                                                          
77 I was told in an interview. “They just shot this Afghan because they thought he was a Pashtun, but he 
was not!” (Sohrab Din, KHA67). 
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sovereignty stem from a position of insecurity, which are more akin to a “claim making” (state 
formation) process.78 
 
Recently the Awami National Party (ANP), claiming to represent the Pashtun vote, has increased 
in strength in Karachi. It positions itself in the same “oppressed” role that the MQM claims as 
their reality (and only theirs), as if “victimhood” it seems can only be claimed by one party. A 
2012 report, Conflict Dynamics in Karachi, shows that in 2008 the ANP increased their political 
strength. “For the first time the party won 2 seats out of 42 from Karachi in the Sindh provincial 
assembly; the MQM won 34 while the PPP secured 6” (Yusuf 2012:8).  The report highlights 
how all of Karachi’s major political parties, “the MQM, PPP, and ANP, are the main 
perpetrators of urban violence. The parties clash over city resources and funds generated 
through extortion” (Yusuf 2012:2). It also shows that whilst historically, “Karachi’s 
ethnopolitical violence has pitted Urdu-speaking mohajirs (migrants) of the MQM against 
Pashtuns represented by the ANP […] clashes between the rural, Sindh-based PPP and Karachi-
centric MQM are increasing as part of a broader power struggle between the city- and provincial-
level governments” (Yusuf 2012:3).  
 
                                                          
78 The MQM’s vote bank is concentrated in the urban centers, namely Karachi and Hyderabad. It does 
not have significance in the Sindh province in rural areas, which means it has historically been vulnerable 
to federal political clamp downs. Examples of this include military crackdown operations in the 1990s. 
Under the military government of Musharraf, who was himself of Indian origin from Delhi and not 
associated with any of the major political parties (such as the PPP or PML-N) a working alliance with the 
MQM and centre was achieved. This was also the result of the LGCO of 2001, which gave more power 
to local governments. However, this has been overturned with the return to civilian government (2008) 
which has returned power to the centre. With the return to civilian administration and PPP victory at the 
provincial level, the MQM has felt vulnerable. However, the MQM has remained a major winner in 
Karachi and electoral politics, which means both major parties have a reliance on each other. A semi-
functioning balance is in effect. 
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In mainly Pakistani Pashtun areas, some of which have formed on the city’s outskirts, less access 
to government facilities such as schools and hospitals is witnessed (with these areas being less 
likely to be “upgraded”79 from informal to formal status by the state). In a series of interview 
with Hussain Ali, a Pakistani (Afghan) Pashtun80 who lives in a mainly Pakistani Pashtun area, he 
said:  
In the area behind us, [where] you have mainly Sindhis living the 
land is [officially] leased... If you go ahead of us the land is leased 
in the Urdu speaking area. You have the Sindhi and Urdu speaking 
communities behind us and ahead of us and we are in the middle. 
So the area behind us gets leased and the area ahead of us gets 
leased... what can you say to this? 
 
For Hussain Ali his frustration with the conditions of the development and non-formalisation of 
his area in Karachi is clear, reflecting grades of dehumanisation within the urban poor in 
Pakistan. Who is the lowest of the low in Karachi? For Hussain it is the “ethnicised” Pakistani 
Pashtuns.  
 
In another series of interviews with two Pakistani Pashtun brothers, Yusuf Khan (KHA50.B) 
and Anwar Khan (KHA50), originally from Swabi and now living in Karachi and working as 
fabric wholesalers, the brothers spoke of the negative stereotyping and reductionist ways in 
which they, as Pashtun men, are viewed. A series of repeat interviews were conducted with the 
brothers during 2010-12, and in one interview the elder brother, Anwar, said: 
                                                          
79 This is the process by which unregulated housing areas are accepted into the formal state institutions. 
This process was started in Karachi in order to cope with the explosion of informal housing settlements 
that the city has seen (Hasan 2006).  
80 Hussain Ali’s family migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan in the 1960s and he was born and raised in 
Karachi. Legally, he is Pakistani as he has a Pakistani CNIC and other documents. Hussain Ali reflects a 
new type of “ethnicity” in Karachi: the Pakistani Afghan (and, within Pashtuns, the Pashtun Afghan) 
where he is aware of his “Afghan” heritage but also positions himself as “Pakistani”. See Chapter 5 for 
more details. 
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The issue is the MQM. They create the conditions which are bad. 
Anyone who comes from Peshawar [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] is 
automatically turned into an ANP member. He may never even 
have heard of the work that they are doing here... Really they [the 
ANP] do not have that many members in their ranks as it is 
made out – and not many people associate themselves with the 
ANP. But again we are not trusted here by virtue of being Pathan 
(Anwar Khan, KHP50). 
For Anwar, he is reduced to possessing only one dimension that is without reputation and 
dignity – he is simply a negative “Pathan” (see fn67 and fn69) caricature and political threat via 
the ANP. For Anwar Khan these external constructions do not recognise the value of his human 
life in all its complexities and nuances. In addition, another interviewee, Abu Dawud, a Pashtun 
who migrated from Swat to Karachi in 1961, said: 
I will tell you the actual matter; it is that we are not even able to 
earn our daily wage without a problem. [The MQM] will not let 
me earn my bread… They say we are the ones that are fighting. 
But we don’t do anything. I came here as a young boy in 1961 
and I am now an old man, and yet they still treat me in the same 
way. But we are human beings (Abu Dawud, Karachi, KHA4). 
 
Like Afghans, urban poor Pakistani citizens are also devalued by the state and accompanying 
dominant discourses. However, here, the situation is worse for some Pakistanis more than others. 
Grades of devaluation at the level of popular “frames” are evident. The lower of the low within 
Karachi’s ethnicised ways of seeing appears to be Pakistani Pashtuns. 
 
“Official” examples of the same phenomena were also seen in fieldwork that was facilitated 
through CDGK offices and the various grassroots projects that the CDGK has implemented in 
Karachi’s katchi abadis. For CDGK fieldworkers certain areas were no go zones: specifically the 
new and older Pashtun dominated settlements around Sohrab Goth and Gadap Town. Indeed, 
in one case when I was a passenger with a CDGK worker in a car he accelerated speedily 
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through a main road near a Pashtun neighbourhood. He told me, “These Pathan areas are 
dangerous. If they know I am a Muhajir there will be trouble” (CDGK01 2010). (I had travelled 
on this road multiple times - with Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns - and questioned this fear, but he 
assured me that feelings of insecurity went both ways.) He and other CDGK workers added that 
the lack of CDGK involvement in Pashtun-heavy areas was because of “security” concerns, but 
critically, this “security” concern is indicative of the ethnicised understanding of security – as the 
Pashtun areas are understood (and promoted) by MQM-affiliated CDGK workers as belonging 
to a dangerous “Other”. Subsequently in these areas there is less incentive to development 
activities. Pashtun votes, support, and incorporation into Karachi are not pursued by the MQM-
dominated CDGK. This also extends to other actors like the PPP, who often pursue more 
“desired” vote-banks - usually Sindhis, and sometimes Baloch and Punjabi.  
 
In an unregulated residential area near Liaquatabad, which is home to a mix of Punjabi, Baloch, 
Sindhi, Pashtun, Kashmiri and Muhajir communities, a scattered presence of actors like the 
CDGK is visible, unlike many Pashtun-dominated areas. “Here, the people from the government 
came in and put in this water tank”, residents told me. This is in contrast with the example of 
Hussain Ali who usually laughed when I asked him if he had any support from the PPP and/or 
CDGK when the area is in need of anything (Husain Ali, KHP51). “They do not come to our 
area”, he said. Hussain Ali said that when the local residents of the area realised that they needed 
to upgrade a road to enter in and out of the growing settlement safely, they received no support.  
We did everything ourselves. We gathered the money (taksim 
karkeh) – got together and took night and days shifts and built 
the road together (Hussain Ali, KHP51). 
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Critically, however, areas with high Afghan and Pashtun demographics do not see a total absence 
of the state. MQM affiliated actors (formal and semi-formal) and other are still visible (federal 
actors including the GOS or military actors such as the Rangers or Naval Officers), as they must 
be within the urban city. In addition, the MQM has not fully consolidated its position in Karachi 
as the dominant hegemon. Thus, these areas are still “well-within” (Ron 2003) the Pakistani state, 
and responsibility, however grudging it may be, is still expressed toward the geographic areas 
which comprise the urban state. Indeed, these areas also provide a space of informal profit for 
official actors as well as forms of intermediaries and non-state power holders. They are a vital 
resource that can be used by official actors acting in illegal ways to generate income. Indeed as 
some commentators have mentioned, Karachi, its land, and informal activities – including 
informal utilities lines, trade and construction contracts - offer a big opportunity for profit for 
everyone (T.Khan 2012:47). Everyone (Pashtun, Muhajir, Sindhi, Baloch, Afghan) wants a piece 
of Karachi, however, everyone is reliant on each other for it, even if the political rhetoric 
suggests otherwise. This means that whilst discrimination may occur, totalising forms of violence, 
for now, are not an option.  
 
Objectified Ways of Seeing Afghans and Pakistani Bodies 
The oppressor transforms everything around it 
[them] into an object of its domination... 
everything is reduced to the status of objects at 
its disposal.  
Paolo Freire (1996[1974]:40). 
 
Dehumanisation is also a result of the different mechanical and objectified ways in which the 
state and the international migration regime view Afghan and Pakistani bodies. Two forms of 
objectification are analysed in this section. They include the rational and bureaucratic goals of 
refugee regime or state “modernisation” plans, and forms political instrumentalism.  
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Rational and Bureaucratically Managing Afghans and Pakistanis 
Rationalisation and standardisation to make society “legible” are seen as necessary for the 
refugee regime and state to manage populations, meet modernising and bureaucratic objectives, 
and improve the conditions of human life (Scott 1998; Ferguson 1990). In James C. Scott’s Seeing 
Like a State (1998), high modernist state plans understand that standardisation removes 
uncertainties of the natural world so that the state can control the population, nature, and spaces 
within its territory. (In Chapter 7, this thesis highlights how identity cards that “manage” 
populations have emerged at the centre of efforts to make Afghans and Pakistanis legible). 
Standardisation is also important for states concerned with improving sanitation, health, and 
education. However, Scott outlines that the techniques used by officials for measuring are 
“removed from the society they are charged with governing” (1998:76). This means that 
assessments of social life are “made by a series of typifications that are always some distance 
from the full reality these abstractions are meant to capture” (ibid). Standardisation then also 
makes both Afghans and Pakistanis appear automaton-like (Haslam 2006) which reduces 
Afghans and Pakistanis to instruments that can be used, removed, or exploited for electoral 
votes, geopolitical/political strategies, modern urban management, or other instrumentalist 
purposes. Human lives are analysed in simple frameworks of cost-benefit analysis and the 
complex position of humans as possessing moral and rational autonomy, self-respect, social 
relationships, and intellect is ignored.  In addition, forms of rule and ordering are not just related 
to improving the human condition. They are also interlinked with improving the state’s control 
and power. 
 
Bureaucratic ways of understanding and acting shape the refugee regime (including CAR, 
UNHCR, and other I/NGOs) and determine both policy decisions and funding decisions. These 
organisations are working for a humanitarian purpose; however, the methods used often 
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objectify human lives as non-human entities: “targets”, “policy goals”, and “working issues”. 
Saadia Toor (2011:193) highlights that the “priorities of international donors” are tied to a 
“preoccupation with the funding cycle and bureaucratisation” rather than the needs of a 
particular area and of people. In an interview with a Pakistani official working for CCAR in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa the official said: 
They stopped the WFP in 1994-1995, which was a great set back. 
Someone at UNHCR had a bright idea and thought that what 
Afghans needed was to be independent and that by cutting of 
rations they would go back to Afghanistan. The same with 
closing down RTVs and the reduced funding Afghan initiatives 
faced. Of course what in reality happened is that people left the 
camp and moved into settled areas (interview: Maroof 2011).81 
 
The official’s comments indicate that decisions regarding the needs of Afghans are also the result 
of (perhaps well-intending) ordering and policy goals. However, these actions failed to account 
for the human needs of the people on the ground. In an interview with Hamza Noor, a former 
resident of Nasir Bagh Camp, he said that once the camp closed down he and his family still 
needed somewhere to stay, “They closed the camp, but we were not going back to Afghanistan. 
We had nowhere to go” (Hamza Noor, PXA65). Instead Hamza and his family built a katcha 
house on nearby Pakistani land with permission from a local Pakistani landowner to whom they 
pay rent for the land they occupy. Here, the route for redistribution and social security is not 
provided by the law maker and guardian but are instead provided by an Afghan refugee using his 
family solidarity and negotiation with a non-state power holder (Chapter 5).  
 
                                                          
81 Kacha Gari was one of Pakistan’s largest RTVs. The state manoeuvres for closure started in 2005 
(alongside Nasir Bagh) when the Pakistani Army claimed ownership to the land. 
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In Karachi and Peshawar the urban governance and development plans are “rationalised” in neo-
Liberal profit-based language, in which residents are viewed through the lenses of funds, finances, 
targets, and interest areas, rather than fully human lives. In Karachi, Arif Hasan notes that the 
fallout from economic liberalisation is considered “worth the human cost” (Hasan 2010:11) by 
the GOP because, as a result of these policies, “Pakistan has had an average growth rate of 7 per 
cent between 2003-06 and its international trade is growing at more than 15 per cent per year 
and government revenue has been growing at more than 20 per cent per year” (ibid). This is, 
according to the government, “a sign of prosperity and development” (ibid). Hasan also shows 
how official modernising plans in Karachi, such as KDP 2000 and KSDP 2020 (Hasan 2010:25-6; 
KSDP 2006) are aiming to make Karachi a “world class city” with “investment friendly 
infrastructure”. Similar language can also be found in Khyber Pakhtunkwa’s Comprehensive 
Development Strategy 2010-2017 which is pushing to introduce a “modern economy” to the area 
(GOKPK 2010). In both cities this has meant that informal housing settlements, which are 
satisfying a real basic need (shelter) by providing housing and some level of a humanised 
existence, challenge the state’s “rational” way of seeing. This means that when circumstances 
dictate, informal housing areas are often simply torn down or ignored completely (Chapter 5). 
Moreover, these lives are able to be torn down because they are not recognised as fully human 
lives, but units of “cost”. Statistics taken from the Urban Resource Centre (URC) in Karachi 
shows that over a period of 10 years 1270 homes were bulldozed (URC 1999 in Hasan 2010:50-
1), and in 2012 Hasan notes that in the “past decade over 30,000 families have been displaced 
from within the city to the periphery” (Hasan 2012).  The human lives that inhabit these 
bulldozed areas are neither recognised as valuable nor significant. Indeed they are not fully 
human but units to be managed. Thousands are made homeless and lives are disoriented and lost 
in order to meet the “rational” route to modernity and “improve” the human condition.  
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During fieldwork many Afghans and Pakistanis spoke of a need for improved basic human 
conditions (i.e. shelter, utilities, education, and healthcare), and welcomed possibilities of state 
projects, but often these projects were inaccessible and too costly or if they were versed in 
frameworks that constructed their lives, as the urban poor, as sub-human, which adds another 
dimension to “unitisation”, i.e. of an “anti-poor bias” (Hasan 2012) in Pakistan’s urban-
development circles. Arif Hasan highlights that whilst Pakistan has “spent billions of rupees on 
‘capacity-building’ in the last two decades alone”, with “some of the finest community 
development projects in the world” (Hasan 2012), these projects are only reserved for certain 
areas and people, i.e. wealthy areas/people. Schemes for affordable housing for the urban poor 
are not effectively planned or executed. Similarly in the planning and delivery of infrastructure 
projects in poorer areas there is low investment. 
Per capita investment in them [infrastructure] is much lower in 
poorer than in rich areas. Again, in poor areas, projects are 
seldom completed. Even if they are completed, they are not 
maintained. If they are road projects, they are washed out in the 
first rains. If they are sewage projects, they stop functioning 
within a year. The contractors who build them, unlike in the rich 
areas, are inexperienced and their workmen have poor skills 
(Hasan 2012).  
Thus, the lives of the urban poor are understood as insignificant units and/or also as “despised 
members of society” (Ron 2003:16). These are “tools” or not-fully human lives” that can be 
moved and lost in order to fulfil the state’s “rational” and modernising agenda, or simply 
neglected. 
 
Crucially, the migration regime’s shortcomings and the GOP’s response to Afghans in Pakistan 
are also related to the ways in which Afghan human lives are understood as objectified bodies or 
possessions, which are open to manipulation in order to fulfil “rational” political objectives: the 
defeat of the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War (Baitenmann 1990); control over the 
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Taliban for influence in Afghanistan (Grare 2003; Schmeidl 2003); or more recently to exert 
influence over the Afghan government. Fredric Grare (2003) shows that Afghan refugees were 
welcomed in the Cold War as a way of strengthening Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan to 
counter balance Indian influence. Susan Schmeidl (2003) also shows how Afghan “refugee 
warrior communities” have been formed as a result of geopolitical objectives of regional power 
politics, i.e. the Soviet War and the Pakistani state’s use of the Taliban. Further, Helga 
Baitenmann (1990) analyses the use of refugees and I/NGOs in Pakistan during the Cold War. 
Citing a US Department of State airgram from 1981 Baitenmann shows that the US government 
believed that without international assistance, tensions would arise between Pakistanis and 
refugees, “increasing the chances that Pakistan might abandon its stalwart opposition to the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in favor of a policy of accommodation with the USSR”. So, 
with congressional encouragement, Pakistan saw a massive increase in funding for Afghan-based 
I/NGOS via the US (Baitenmann 1990). 
 
There is debate within aid discourse regarding conflict zones, and whether aid should be used as 
a tool for “peacebuilding” (Goodhand 2003:840). “Maximalists” argue it should be, whilst 
“humanitarian minimalists” argue that this “leads to the distortion of humanitarian mandates, 
particularly those of neutrality and impartiality” (Goodhand 2003:840). Yet it is clear that 
proliferation of I/NGOs in Pakistan cannot be separated from value-laden political objectives. 
During the Soviet-Afghan War UNHCR and other I/NGOs received significant funding from 
the USA and other states that wanted to defeat the Soviet Union and/or exert influence in 
Afghanistan. Here, seemingly neutral institutions were tools for wider geopolitical goals 
(Baitenmann 1990; Goodhand 2003; Paris 2002). This funding was not maintained after the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the fall of the Afghan communist-led 
government in 1993 (Donini 2011), despite the fact that continued conflict in Afghanistan, 
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meant many Afghans could not return to Afghanistan and many new waves of refugees were 
entering Pakistan.82  
 
The non-national Afghan presence in Pakistan was accepted when Afghan bodies were useful for 
geopolitical objectives (as a militarised resistance in exile or propaganda for the public relations 
war against the Soviet Union). Indeed, the GOP 1981 Handbook for Afghan Refugees refers to 
Afghans in Pakistan as refugees as related to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to Refugees and 1967 
Protocol but specifically adds: 
The definition of the term “Refugee”, according to Pakistan also 
includes a person who is obliged to leave the state of which he is 
a national under the pressure of illegal acts or as a result of 
invasion of such state, wholly or partially, by an alien with a view 
to occupying the state (SAFRON 1981:3).  
 
As this usefulness of Afghans in Pakistan waned the Afghan presence in Pakistan, however, was 
no longer viewed in such a positive light. Once the heroic “mujahid” (fighter) and brave “muhajir” 
(refugee)83  and an object of veneration, Afghans are now the “dangerous Talib” or “burdensome 
migrant”. This “bad” Afghan narrative has been used to justify the state’s sudden shift in its 
foreign policy and support of the US-led war in Afghanistan and its own military actions in 
Pakistan. In an interview with the son of a former mujahidin leader for Jamaat ud Dawa, Maulana 
Jamil ur Rehman, Maulana Jamil said: 
                                                          
82 After the fall of Najeebullah when some Afghans (many mujahidin/resistance groups) returned from 
exile Afghans that had remained in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan War and occupied government 
or military jobs were persecuted. With the rise of the Taliban significant displacements of Afghan Hazaras 
also took places, and many migrated to Balochistan and Karachi in Pakistan (particularly during 1996-
1999) – smaller populations can be found in Rawalpindi. 1993-1995 included heavy migrations of former 
government workers and residents of Kabul as well as former Afghan returnees who had previously lived 
in Pakistan; 1996-1999 saw large scale Afghan Hazara migrations. See also fn20. 
83 Even migration and refugeedom was valorised as a religious and pious act of migration, i.e. similar to 
early Muslim migrations during the formative years of Islam.  
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I was greeted by the State Department and thanked by the 
government for our efforts in the war - this was in 1995. After 
that they left us under the open sky to do what we could. During 
the Jihad everyone was united but the relationship is now severed. 
There is nothing left any longer – it is purely an interest-based 
relationship, never a friendship... The Cold War shaped how they 
dealt with us Afghans, and how they took advantage of us. We 
are the ones who are paying the price for this war, and for this 
conflict. We cannot escape the consequences (interview: Jamil ur 
Rehman 2011). 
In the case of Maulana Jamil ur Rehman, the ease in which Afghan lives are ended demonstrate 
the subhuman way Afghan lives were understood by the US state and its allies. Afghan lives were 
only objects to be used in foreign policy goals. Humanised relationships, built on trust, respect, 
and mutual recognition were never really experienced.  
 
In another series of interviews, with the former mujahid of Hizb e Islami in Peshawar, Engineer 
Aziz (introduced in Chapter 1), Engineer Aziz (PXA59) recalled how Pakistani sponsored 
announcements on local Afghan radio promised, “free land in Pakistan for Afghans to settle on”. 
He said, “At that point, it was a big deal to be an Afghan refugee. We had recognition - we had 
the attention of the world on us”. However, he explained that now the situation is starkly 
different.  
Why is it that then we were recognized as refugees and now we 
are not? Why? At that time there was a war against the Russians. 
Now what, there is no legitimacy to our status because the war is 
directed by the US (and their partners)?  
Sitting in his katcha house, in the now-silent refugee camp (“it used to be so busy here”), he 
continued speaking about how during the 1980s his RTV had assistance but now got nothing. 
He said: 
Are we human or are we not worth anything? We are nothing... 
The rations were there from 1985-1996… Initially there was a 
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budget for Afghans, [many] things were available for Afghans. 
Education and Higher Education was better supported. The 
INGOs here used to give students everything from uniforms, to 
books. People got tents, camp spaces were given, people were 
given a fee to support them... ghee [clarified butter], oil, flour... all 
these things were there. In fact, you know some Pakistanis 
enrolled themselves in Afghan schools because of the benefits 
(ibid). 
 
In an interview with Nawar Saleh, who has lived and worked in Pakistan as a school teacher and 
educationist since 1980, Nawar said that I/NGOs used to distribute many material goods. 
[They distributed] Milk, dates, oil, biscuits, pens, pencil 
sharpeners, ink… every single little thing was given for free. In 
Akora Khattak the milk used to come in a tanker the size of an 
oil tanker! And do you know how much meat there was on Eid?!” 
(Nawar Saleh, PXA99).  
In the quest to defeat the Soviet menace no detail was spared. Not even pencil sharpeners.   
 
Similar parallels, but of a shorter time scale (so far) and lesser funds, can be found with Pakistani 
IDPs from Swat, Waziristan and other FATA areas. Here, IDPs are viewed as an important 
resource in the “fight against militancy”, as repeated in Pakistani newspapers, television 
programmes, and official public statements. During fieldwork, Asmat Afridi, a Pakistani from 
Khyber Agency who had moved to Peshawar in a more permanent capacity (he is still connected 
to his ancestral village in Khyber Agency) noted that many people did not trust the government 
agencies and their supporting I/NGO actors.  
They just want us to be on their side. You do not know who is 
working for whom. They do not care”, he said (Asmat Afridi, 
PXP27).  
Here the Pakistani state and military, as well as I/NGOs that support them, are seen as wanting 
to win the “hearts and minds” of IDPs in order to facilitate access for military strategies in 
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FATA.84 The scale is not the same as the GOP’s examples of Afghans during the Soviet era, 
which had massive international backing and funding, but the theme of using people for 
instrumentalist political agendas is clear.  
 
In other cases Pakistanis find attention suddenly being heaped on them during elections.85 For 
Pakistani citizens, when election time comes local political parties “miraculously” appear on the 
scene to distribute material goods. But this distribution is considered deceitful and not genuine. 
A material debt is in circulation (Lomintz 2009).  By distributing material resources repayment is 
expected via an electoral vote. In an interview with a Pakistani resident in an informal housing 
settlement in Peshawar, I heard of the “sudden descent” of Pakistani political parties during 
election campaigns. Here, political parties do not see in residents a capacity for relationships of 
trust and mutual and equal interdependence. Instead residents are an electoral vote to be 
possessed. In an interview with a Hassan Bilal, a Pakistani Baluch who works as a driver, in an 
informal residential area in Karachi I heard that most of the time, “We do not get any help”, but 
that “when the elections take place someone from a party will come along and distribute basic 
things here - food, ration packs - but then nothing” (Hassan Bilal, KHP7). He said, “They say 
they are here to help us, but trust me, if I went to see them at any other time they would not 
even give me a glass of water”. In another case in Karachi, Sameena Haroon (KHP18), a 
Pakistani Sindhi woman had opened a local school in an unregulated housing area in Karachi 
with low school fees so the local residents, urban poor families, could send their children to the 
                                                          
84 Other international examples of “soft” narratives being produced as a broader strategy of winning 
“hearts and minds” can be seen with literature such as Greg Mortenson’s (now critiqued for falsification) 
Three Cups of Tea (2003). 
85 Registered Afghan refugees or illegal Afghans are unable to vote in Pakistani elections, which results in 
Afghans not being targeted by political parties. Aesthetically it is interesting to compare Afghan dominant 
areas vis a vis Pakistani areas, with the former being visually devoid of the political pamphlets, graffiti, and 
paraphernalia calling to support Pakistani political parties as well as having less investment by local 
officials and Pakistani political parties. 
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school. Sameena explained in an interview that during election time political parties, such as the 
PPP, were eager to support her organisation but after the elections gave her little attention. 
They know I know a lot of people in the area and that being 
associated with me is good for them. I even campaigned for 
them during the elections because they would give me money for 
the school. But, if I ever need something when they do not need 
me... well, they have slammed the door straight in my face! They 
are so good to me when they need me - otherwise I am nothing 
(Sameena Haroon, KHP18).   
Here, for Hassan Bilal and Sameena Haroon, their status and needs are only considered when 
they fit the political objectives of the political parties. Otherwise they are neither recognised nor 
worthy of attention and silenced.  
 
Constructions of Exemplary Suffering: The Helpless Refugee and the Helpless Poor 
Finally, dehumanisation also occurs when Afghans and Pakistanis are stripped of their moral 
autonomy and rationality and other human characteristics, and only recognised as one 
dimensional “victims”. The “helpless refugee”, the “noble poor man”, and the “exemplary victim” 
are caricatures which have been heavenly romanticised in public and academic discourse and 
contribute towards a type of dehumanisation (see Boltanski 1999).  
 
Barbara Harrell-Bond (1986) criticises the international refugee relief system and highlights that 
the sweeping generalisations made by “western” aid agencies regarding the “helpless” refugee 
promote a negative approach to dealing with refugees. Harrell-Bond was writing in 1986 before 
the proliferation the figure of the “IDP”, but this way of seeing can also be extended to include 
IDPs and the expanding range of “deserving” persons that form the focus of humanitarian 
assistance programmes today (i.e. the urban poor and women in certain societies). For Harrell-
Bond, assumptions of “helplessness” create policies which “impose aid” (Harrell-Bond 1986).  
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In practise, however, Harrell-Bond argues that these assumptions do not best serve the interests 
of all refugees. Many do not accept that the solution of camps is best. In fact, many “actively 
reject aid” (ibid). Certainly, for many Afghans in Pakistan (as well as IDPs) this is the case, and 
the majority of Afghans do not live in RTVs (SAFRON et al., 2005). In a discussion with an 
Afghan family in Peshawar, the mother said, “We did not want to stay in an RTV, where 
everyone is a stranger, and the conditions are bare. You cannot even work, eat, or clean 
properly… We rented straight away” (field notes: Fakhr Jan and family). Similarly, in interviews 
with victims of militarised conflict in FATA, many FATA residents chose to circumvent IDP 
tents all together. One family that was forced to migrate out of Mohmand was renting a house in 
inner Peshawar. The father of the house explained:  
Why would we stay in an IDP Camp. God forbid. We have 
family in the city and the conditions are better here [regulated 
housing area]. Both of my daughters are starting university now 
as well and I wanted the younger one [son] to be in a good 
school (Muzaffar Malikyar, PXP61). 
 
Liisa Malkki (1995, 2009) discusses the imposition of “refugeeness” and shows that the word 
“refugee” itself produces: “homogenising, humanitarian images of refugees [that] works to 
obscure their actual socio-political circumstances – erasing the specific, historical, local politics of 
particular refugees, and retreating instead to the depoliticizing, dehistoricizing registering of a 
more abstract and universal suffering” (Malkki 1995:13). These images of the helpless refugee in 
“western” discourse are said to be primarily rooted in Christian religious iconography (Terence 
Wright 2000) and, in campaigns for aid, images of suffering and helplessness are dominant. Only 
images of naked and raw suffering suffice. Otherwise the picture becomes too messy and unclear 
(Malkki 2009). The idealisation of the refugee as a “passive” object, which is common amongst 
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“western” interventionist discourse, shows that the refugee regime accepts only a particular type 
of humanity. Only the “exemplary victim” counts. As Shahram Khosravi states in his auto-
ethnography: 
To have a chance of getting refugee status, one must have the 
ability to translate one’s life story into Eurocentric juridical 
language and to perform the role expected of a refugee. Like 
other newcomers to Cantt Station, I was advised to wear dirty 
clothes when going to the UNHCR for the interview and to look 
‘sad’ and ‘profound’ (Khosravi 2010:33).  
Further, in Chapter 6, the attempts of two young Afghan brothers to get refugee status are 
stalled as they are unable to explain their vulnerability in the language that the refugee regime 
wants (and needs) to hear. 
 
Poverty is also constructed using similar frames, this time of the “deserving poor” by 
bureaucratic organisational structures. If not criminalised, the urban poor are “helpless” and in 
need of “help” and “charity”, or they are stuck in a “cycle of poverty” (Lewis 1958). However, 
constructions of poverty - absolute and relative - create dependency mechanisms and a loss of 
human autonomy and voice (Schaber 2010; Muller and Neuhauser 2010). With a reduction of 
control over oneself and a dependency on aid, and with constructions of the dependent victim - 
the urban poor, the refugee, the IDP are constructed as sub-human “helpless beings”. Here, 
another form of dehumanisation is in effect; one that constructs a controlling discipline, which in 
its “benevolence” silences and obfuscates important voices and nuances. 
 
However, this thesis shows that there is a space for alternative forms of power and political 
agency. Difficulties and challenges are present, but the quest for a humanised existence that is 
quite different to the bare naked “victim” of aid agencies is pursued. Despite the protracted 
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conflict in Afghanistan and protracted displacement outside of Afghanistan, most Afghans are 
not simply “waiting to go home”. Neither are Afghans and urban Pakistanis dependent on aid 
and I/NGOs. The majority of Afghans have been in Pakistan for over 20-34 years and have 
continued with their lives - albeit in new ways and in new circumstances - and the majority of 
Pakistanis are stubbornly self-reliant (as they have to be). More often than not Afghans and 
Pakistanis question the current bureaucratic and instrumentalist ways of workings of these very 
I/NGOs. It is not that support mechanisms are not needed. They are. But a different mode of 
operation is necessary, which does not promote a loss of autonomy and frames which result only 
in or limited types of conditions being provided, which stunt the potentials of human flourishing. 
 
During fieldwork in an informal refugee camp in Karachi, an Afghan resident, Yaqoob Gul, 
shunned the patronising tones of a local INGO worker (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). The worker had 
pointed to residents and in front of them said, “These poor fellows… look at them... We are the 
only ones us who help them”. Later, away from the INGO worker, Yaqoob Gul said: 
What help do they [the INGO] give us? [W]hat type of help is it 
that you get a ticket and they say they are treating you, but what 
are they doing? We don’t want someone giving us little pills or 
pieces of paper. We need more than a half-functioning box 
[clinic]... and we will do it for ourselves. We need a school that is 
beyond teaching basic reading... our daughters can be doctors as 
well; we too are intelligent and desire education. My nieces all go 
to colleges in the city, because they want to go beyond what they 
have here (ibid). 
 
Similarly an interview was conducted with a Pakistani family living in the inner city of Peshawar. 
Eleven family members were living in a two-room ground floor quasi regulated house and the 
family spoke about the times that government workers conducted “needs” assessments.  
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People come around and ask questions and pretend to care and 
looking [down] on us. But what do they do? Instead my father 
finds what work he can and we continue on. The children are all 
going to a school close by. They will still get an education 
(Hafsah Jan, PXP70).  
Here alternative constructions and possibilities of a “human” life are expressed, which are 
pushing for fuller forms of recognition than what is offered by constructions of “exemplary 
suffering”.  
 
Conclusion 
In Karachi and Peshawar the lenses through which officials view the urban poor citizens, 
refugees, and “illegals” construct “dehumanised” lives. These factors combine with structural 
shortcomings (i.e. Pakistan’s peripheral position in the economy or reduced funds for UNHCR) 
and result in a failure for basic material goods to be distributed, which create conditions in which 
the potentials for a humanised existence cannot effectively be practiced. The languages and 
technologies of state/refugee-regime rule over-simplify human lives. And in some cases these 
one-dimensional units are viewed in even lower terms because of national and ethnic ways of seeing. 
There are multiple consequences of these processes of devaluation and constructions of “less-
human” beings. However, at this juncture, what is most significant is that they do not lead to 
“victimisation”. Instead Afghans and Pakistanis use alternative structures and strategies to 
redistribute material and non-material goods and redress these dehumanising constructions and 
devaluing conditions. This is conceptually analysed in the following chapter and then via case 
studies in Chapters 5 and 6. These dehumanising processes and self-humanising processes, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter, are examples of the shared experiences and realities 
that both Afghans and Pakistanis face in urban Pakistan. The processes of self-humanisation 
point to new ways of being and belonging within a state (although this is not the same as 
citizenship) and reflect a quest for humanity that official channels fail to provide. Critically, 
during this process Afghans and Pakistanis juxtapose their humanity against the incompetent, 
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“rational”, and impervious state. As official institutions and actors are held responsible for 
dehumanising Afghans and Pakistanis the state itself undergoes a process of political 
delegitimization and is constructed as an inhumane entity.  
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Chapter 4: Self-Humanisation: Informal Political Action and the Impact on Officialdom 
 
While competition and self-interest prevail at 
times, individuals are connected to kin, 
neighbours, and colleagues in more 
interdependent relationships than in the 
industrialised West. People who utilize 
networks to fulfil individual and collective 
needs, and to influence the distribution of 
public and private goods and services, engage 
other people in their efforts. Although far 
from altruistic, the system allows people who 
have access to different types of resources to 
contribute to and prosper within the 
community, despite vast difference in status, 
wealth, education, piety, or property. 
   Dianne Singerman (1995:1367).  
 
It seems that all people, regardless of culture, 
rely less on social networks when there are 
professional agencies that can support them. 
  Kristen B. Harpviken (2009:28). 
 
A man standing in a long queue for bread tells 
the guy behind him that he is leaving to go to 
shoot the president. He returns after a few 
hours and re-joins the line. 
“Did you manage to kill him?” Ask the people 
in the bread line. 
“No. That queue is longer than this one”.  
 Common joke circulating in Pakistan, 2011. 
  
Introduction 
This chapter provides a conceptual framework to show how Afghans and Pakistanis “self-
humanise” their lives through the redistribution material and non-material goods using solidarity 
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networks (structures) and navigation practices (strategies). It shows that these solidarity networks 
and navigation practices take place in hybrid formal/informal spaces, with solidarity networks 
being more “informal” and navigation practices being more hybrid “formal/informal”. It shows 
that despite these alternative political structures and strategies not being a total panacea they are 
still able to offer a more viable route for improving the lives of urban citizens and non-citizens in 
Pakistan than official structures. They also reflect a shared space of belonging that is inclusive of 
Afghans and the urban poor Pakistanis and transcends the barriers of citizenship.  Further, by 
looking at the shared lives, structures, and strategies that Afghan and Pakistanis use this chapter 
also reveals how the state functions in Pakistan. Informal structures and strategies are tolerated 
and encouraged by the state as an alternative way of maintaining the state. However, this chapter 
shows that the actions that these structures and strategies enable, repeated time and time again, 
create significant physical and non-physical challenges to the state - the most significant of which 
is a sharply weakened legitimacy.  
 
Structures: Solidarity Networks 
The state, and in some cases refugee regime, is not fully absent in Pakistan but people must rely 
primarily on social networks because the professional agencies that can offer an avenue for 
material redistribution are ineffective (Harpviken 2009:28). 86  Observations and interviews 
conducted during fieldwork demonstrated that many Afghans and Pakistanis were reliant on a 
number of solidarity networks, and, as will be shown shortly, two different types of navigation 
                                                          
86 A vast body of literature focuses on social networks and social capital, including works on revolutions 
(Skocpol 1979, 1994), social movements (Tilly 1978, 2003), informal urban politics (Castells 1983, 
Perlman 1976, Bayat, 1997, 2010; Ismail 2006; Singerman 2004), patterns of migration (Monsutti 2005; 
Harpviken 2009; Dorai 2003; Massey 1987), shared affinities of kinship and clan (Alavi 1995; Ahmed 
2006; Lindholm 1990), ethnicity (Monsutti 2004, 2005; Verkaaik 1994, 2004), friendship (Bozolli 1991; 
Ring 1990), patronage (Gellner  and Waterbury 1977; Scott 1977), and democracy (Putnam 1995) to name 
a few. In this thesis solidarity networks and the social capital they produce are analysed in the context of 
everyday (informal) urban life, or what Asef Bayat calls “social nonmovements” or the “quiet 
encroachments of the ordinary” (Bayat 2010:14). 
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practices. However, three main solidarity networks, bringing actors together for differing reasons 
(or “foci” [Feld 1981]) and in different contexts, appeared to be the most significant: fellowships 
of space & charity, bonds of friendship, and solidarities of kin (and/or clan). Here the “foci” – 
anonymous, friends, and family - are the different modes that organise a network and affect how 
it functions and what its aims are. However, these networks appeared not to be exclusive from 
each other and often overlapped. And, in some cases networks were not present at all or very 
weak, which, as will be shown, lead to a dependence on exploitative navigation practices.  
 
The social networks analysed during fieldwork reflect types of social “structures” that are not 
controlled by “political institutions or the political elite” (Singerman 1994:133). These structures 
appeared central to producing forms of social capital which enabled material and non-material 
redistribution. This analysis of social networks is informed by Durkheimien approaches and 
structural traditions within sociology and social anthropology (Harpviken 2009:15; see also 
Durkheim 1984[1893]). This analysis encourages an understanding of political actors as 
interdependent and interconnecting rather than autonomous and detached, with linkages acting 
as channels for the transfer of resources and the production of social capital (Wassermann and 
Faust 1994:4 in Harpviken 2009:14-5; Bourdieu 1981, 1985; Portes 2000). In addition, it 
understands social capital as the “sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of [more or] less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1994:119, see also Portes 2000).  
 
Afghan and Pakistani solidarity networks appeared to be motivated by interacting altruistic and 
instrumentalist (mutual insurance87) factors.  Here, there is “no contradiction in the rational and 
                                                          
87  Under “mutual insurance” the person receiving assistance is not expected to “give” something 
equivalent to the donor, but “what is expected from the recipient is simply to help others in return” 
(Fafchamps 1992:148). 
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moral economy” (Fafchamps 1992:148); instead, a combination of material and non-material 
motivations appeared to shape the cohesion of these networks. Interlinked to this, Alejandro 
Portes (2000:533-4) has produced a model that shows that motivations of donors are being 
“altruistic” or “instrumentalist”. Altruistic motives are where motives are formed around “value 
introjections”, which includes morals for alms giving, or “bounded solidarity”, where belonging 
to a community, such as an ethnic group, creates bonds of support (ibid). Instrumentalist 
motives are based on either “simple reciprocity”, or “enforceable trust”, i.e. community controls 
guarantying repayment (ibid).  Whilst I do not take an approach of a dichotomised model as 
Portes (2000) does, his framework acts as a useful tool in understanding what motivated the 
formation of Afghan and Pakistani solidarity networks.  
 
A Fellowship of Space & Charity: Enabling Macro-Forms of Action & Everyday Basic 
Needs 
During fieldwork fellowships of space & charity functioned by connecting anonymous actors in 
shared local spaces – the urban neighbourhood - and by moral frameworks of charity. Localised 
spaces matter and intertwine with moral concepts associated with religion, culture, and personal 
experiences. These solidarity networks are examples of what analysts of social networks identify 
as weak ties (Granovetter 1985),88 which Granovetter (1973) has suggested are important at a 
macro level as they enable “bridging”/“brokering” actions in anonymous environment (see also 
Harpviken 2009:32). This allows actions that can transcend inward-looking cliques or 
                                                          
88 Analysts of social networks identify network “strength” as based on either strong ties (Coleman 1998; 
Loury 1977; Granovetter 1973) or weak ones (Granovetter 1985). Granovetter (1973:1361), for instance, 
argues that the “strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional 
intensity, the intimacy... and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie”, with each being 
“somewhat independent” but obviously highly interrelated”. Others add that strong ties are contingent on 
meeting two out of three possible criteria, including “(1) perception of close intimacy; (2) voluntary 
interaction between ego and alter (not interaction because of, for example membership in the same 
organisation); and (3) interaction between ego and alter in multiple social contexts” (Wellman and 
Wortley 1990:564-5 in Harpviken 2009:26-7). In this study, friendship and family networks are examples 
of strong ties. Fellowships of space & charity involve weaker ties because the network is anonymous and 
repeated interaction is involuntary (Granovetter 1973; Wellman and Wortley 1990). 
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concentrated networks such as kin and clan, which are examples of strong ties (Granovetter 
1973).  
 
During fieldwork these “weaker ties” of the fellowship of space & charity were important in 
allowing macro-level/neighbourhood action to take place. Actors were not just looking inward 
towards immediate kin or clan, but were working with a wider network of anonymous actors. In 
local areas a shared embodied “neighbourhood” experience was often recognised among 
residents. As neighbours and residents saw each other living a shared dehumanised experience in 
daily interactions, a shared need for material resources was often silently understood. Whilst 
some commentators have pointed to the anonymous and individualising nature of urban cities 
(Sutherland 1992[1924]; Park et al., 1926), or the importance of anonymous networks (Bayat 
2010:20-22), in this study, at the very local level in dense urban spaces in unregulated residential 
areas - katchi abadis, goths,89 informal and/or formal refugee camps - anonymity does not capture 
urban life. 
 
In the informal refugee camp in Karachi residents see each other daily (sometimes multiple times) 
as they fill up cartons with water informally supplied by state and non-state actors (Chapter 5). In 
this area the water cartons and pumps symbolically capture the shared human struggle of 
residents. These are not imagined communities (Anderson 1991) but local, shared, and lived 
ones, 90  through which localised anonymous actors pool resources, such as social contacts, 
financial capital, and so on, to sustain the urban neighbourhood – in the example above, 
residents pool various forms of capital to push for better water supplies (Chapter 5). On other 
                                                          
89 Goths are informal housing settlements usually built on the rural-urban interface, whereas katchi abadis 
are informal housing settlements usually built on government land within the city on private land closer to 
the main city. 
90 Alejandro Portes (2000) criticises the literature that proposes social capital can be translated to the level 
of the “nation”. For Portes for social capital to be effective human interaction is essential, which 
distinguishes local solidarities from wider imagined communities, which as ethnic or national groups. 
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occasions, residents work together to provide “ration packs” (sugar, wheat, oil) to the “poorest 
members” - often strangers - of the area. In another unregulated residential area in Karachi, 
Ishtiaq Goth (Chapter 5), women regularly share food with other households even when food 
was scarce (see also Ring 1990). And, in another area, Saeed Goth (Chapter 5), residents work 
together to improve the area’s infrastructure.  
 
In addition, in this study, interviewees repeatedly spoke of the significance of the moral 
imperatives of charity, which was informed by the acknowledged vulnerability of all human life 
in a specific local area, and a human obligation to act in order to safeguard life. This moral base 
came from existential frameworks, such as learned religious or cultural practices, or lived 
experiences. Often, intercommunity zakat (“obligatory” religious charity) and sadaqah (“voluntary” 
religious charity) was cited as guiding their actions and practices. In one interview in Karachi I 
asked an Afghan refugee who manages a food rations, an orphanage, and a housing quarter for 
widows in his local area why he was engaged in these practices. His reply was simple, “This is 
our zakat, our sadaqah” (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70). 
 
In Islamic discourse generosity is one of the highest virtues, and the Quran and Islamic 
jurisprudence codifies the obligation of almsgiving by all of those who are able to do so. 
“Philanthropy is not solely the practice of the privileged classes or pious persons; it applies to 
almost all of the faithful” (Kochuyt 2009:102). It permeates daily life and is reinforced by the 
image of the spiritual faqir (beggar/mendicant) that has historically held significance in Afghan 
and Pakistani lives. Thus, some actors display a dual orientation - one rooted in material and 
“worldly” affairs and the other in non-material and metaphysical “otherworldly affairs” (Adib-
Moghaddam 2010:254). Whilst some commentators understand network-based relationships as 
based on reciprocity (Portes 2000; Lomintz 1988; Mauss 2000[1954]), here the reciprocity and 
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gains that shape solidarity practices are not just material; they are also metaphysical, cosmological, 
and non-material related to imaginings of the after-life. For many, giving via “charity” is also a 
route to living a more “humanised” life as understood through existential, moral, and ethical 
paradigms. In order to live a humanised life, both in terms of inner worth and in terms of social 
recognition, acts of giving and support reflect a contextually located “human” way of being that 
is deeply intertwined with local practices of Islam. Sharing food, for example is practicing sunnah 
and helping to “improve the heart” (Hussain Ali, KHP51), or “our sadaqah” (Maulana Abdul 
Qais KHA70). For others, being able to pray and complete wudu (ablutions) or ghusl (cleaning) is 
essential to living a humanised life. In one case when residents of an area were denied access to 
water – therefore unable to do wudu or ghusl – their sense of being “not fully human” was 
connected to Islamic ideas of a humanised life. Thus, this solidarity network is moulded by an 
interconnectedness of morals, a bounded relationship (in a localised space), and rational 
concerns for material access to basic goods that also lead to expressions of “self-humanisation”. 
 
Bonds of Friendship: Enabling Micro-Forms of Personalised Action I 
In Afghan and Pakistani lives, bonds of friendship are “strong ties” (Granovetter 1973; 1985) 
and are crucial in basic and beyond-basic forms of survival. They are socially and emotionally 
constructed human relationships based on trust built up over time between unrelated individuals 
and the actors in this relationship are not necessarily linked through kin or clan. These personal 
relationships produce a form of social capital grounded in intimate ties of emotion, trust, 
experience and affection (Bozolli 1991; Gambetta 1988; Ring 1990; F. Lyon 2000). Human 
relationships matter. They stand in contrast to the individualising, mechanistic, and anonymous 
nature of the state and the official – and their shortcomings - (Haslam 2006; Scott 1998) to offer 
a more “human” way of being, as well as delivering goods in which the necessary conditions of a 
more human life are possible.  
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The social structure of friendship is itself humanising, providing space for expressions of 
affiliation (Nusssbaum 2000:78-80) and social recognition. It also provides the connections 
through which basic and beyond-basic material and non-material redistribution can occur. 
Indeed, friendships are “strong” bonds in which there is a greater willingness to “invest” in 
riskier enterprises (Harpviken 2009:27). During fieldwork cross-cutting Afghan and Pakistani 
friendships, as well as intra-Afghan and intra-Pakistani friendships, were important structures 
that allowed Afghans and Pakistanis to redistribute material and non-material goods. These 
included basic material redistribution, such as foodstuffs and shelter, as well as “bigger” gains, 
such as property purchases and large loans (Chapter 6).  
 
The Attachments of Kin: Enabling Micro-Forms of Personalised Action II 
Whilst the structure of the family is different across different contexts (Singerman 1994:41), in 
the research I completed, most Afghan and Pakistani households kin and clan91  ties matter 
(positively or negatively). For both Afghans and Pakistanis the family unit is usually shaped by 
genetic relationships, although some cases of neighbours or communities adopting unrelated 
persons into the family were recorded in times of violence and poverty. Family structures, 
comprised of parents, spouses, children, siblings, and elders (i.e. grandparents), and are socially 
constructed sites of value, offering both material income and non-material security. This 
                                                          
91 Kin networks should be understood on two interacting levels: one, the immediate nuclear family; and 
two, members of the extended family. Other authors also include “non-genetic” relationships in their 
understanding of a family unit, i.e. that a family unit can be understood “more as an economic unit more 
than a mere association of closely related kin” (Singerman 1995:42). And, C. Wood (1982) places 
emphasis on the family unit as “a group that ensures its maintenance and reproducing by generating and 
disposing income (Wood 1982:339 in Singerman 1995:42). Further, many Afghans and Pakistanis 
understandings of family also extend to include clan, which is essentially a bigger kin network linked 
together by perceptions of historical relationships to a common ancestor (detailed examples of various 
kin and clan networks are provided in Ahmed [2006]; Monsutti [2005]). An analysis of wider clan 
networks was not possible in this study. 
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continues to be the case in urban settings. Indeed, the family continues to produce a high sense 
of “cohesion”, responsibility, or what Portes calls “enforceable trust”, i.e. obligations that are 
enforceable via community pressure (Portes 2000:533). Further, as the attachments of kin are 
also types of strong ties, which are often denser than bonds of friendship,92 this means that 
attachments of kin are used for substantial material redistributions, such as pooled incomes, 
shared food, housing and accommodation, migratory pulls, business loans, investments, or 
“borrowing”.  
 
In some literature ties of kin are argued to contain a destructive or negative element (Portes 2000; 
Clifford Geertz 1961). Moreover, it is argued that strong kinship networks also lead to the 
“exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, 
and downward levelling” (Portes 2000:533). In Pakistan (and Afghanistan), intra-family and 
intra-clan conflicts over land, territory, marriages, and businesses often lead to substantial 
material losses (Nelson 2011). In this study, a number of interviewees spoke of the fact that 
family feuds and rivalries were restricting access to material and non-material goods. In an 
interview with an Afghan family in Peshawar, the father of the house said, “I cannot return to 
Afghanistan. I have dushmani (enmity) with my brother. He has taken over my land and said he 
will kill me if I return” (Burhanuddin, PX28).93 Further, in a discussion with a Pakistani family in 
Karachi who recently migrated from interior Sindh, the family said they had been forced to leave 
                                                          
92 Numerous studies, implicitly and explicitly look at the role of kin and/or clan. Some usefully examples 
for this study include Alavi 1995; Ahmed 2006; Dorai 2003; Monsutti 2004, 2005; Lindholm 1990.  
93 Discussion on family feuds in Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically amongst Pashtun families have 
historically been debated under ideas of “Pashtunwali”, which has recently proliferated in the Afghan and 
FATA war contexts. The excerpt from the interview above should not be inferred as a statement about 
“Pashtunwali”. This clarification is made because it appears that the current debates about “customary” law 
are leading to types of neo-colonial reifications. This is not to deny the significance of “Pashtunwali”, 
“badal”; and “dushmani”; but it is to place emphasis on the possibilities of social interactions, constructions, 
deconstructions, and reconstructions, that can and do shape the historical development of law, politics, 
and society. For ethnographic discussion of Pashtunwali see Ahmed (1980, 2004); Barth ([19851965]); 
Hopkins (2007); for neo-colonial uses: US Army (2012). 
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after the father’s uncles and siblings had threatened his life over a financial dispute (field notes: 
Masood Sumro, Karachi).  
 
In this thesis, family networks are understood as both a constructive and destructive unit, 
however, reliance on them, despite their shortcomings, is crucial as family networks facilitate the 
redistribution of goods more than official actors can. In addition, whilst the effective modern 
state is meant to fill in for roles that have historically been in the domain of the nuclear family 
and wider kin and clan networks, during interviews state bureaucracy and state-forms of 
development were understood as creating forms of existence without emotional attachments, the 
right to love, and social relations, i.e. objectified lives. For many Afghans and Pakistani the 
breakup of the family is, to a degree, resisted by choice. In one interview with Orzala a Pakistani 
Pashtun IDP from Waziristan spoke of how important the family was to her understanding of 
self (Orzala, KHP12). In another case Maulana Abdul Qais, the earlier mentioned Afghan 
refugee in Karachi, spoke of having no desire to move out of the area despite having enough 
forms of capital to leave the camp (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA71). Maulana Abdul Qais 
explained this as being the result of the significance in which he viewed the maintenance of his 
kin and clan structure, for him this structure has greater value. Here, these actions are not a 
rejection of “modernity”, but a reflection of the multiple, and contested, definitions of 
modernity possible (Appadurai 1996). However, as mentioned, for many the continued primary 
reliance on the family is also dictated by necessity. “There is no-one else who will help us. If we 
do not take care of my family nobody else will”, Maulana Abdul Qais said (KHA71). The state is 
present but not necessarily competent. With no effective professional agencies in hand, kin 
networks become essential - whilst they may not always be constructive they do offer one 
possible option for both survival and gains.  
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Strategies: Navigation Practices - Formal/Informal Sites of Action 
Importantly, solidarity networks are only one dimension of understanding how informal political 
action works in Pakistan. These networks must be placed alongside specific micro-level local 
strategies in order to fully understand material and non-material redistribution. These strategies 
require some interaction with official actors and other power sources to create a hybrid 
formal/informal site of action. And, in cases where solidarity networks are weak or absent, there 
is an even more direct reliance on navigation practices, which can also be often exploitative. 
During fieldwork two types of micro-level acts or navigation practices were evident: (a) practices 
of presence (both conscious defiance and camouflage) and (b) practices of protection & access. 
These two types are not exclusive and, often, both are used at the same time.  
 
Practices of Presence 
The practices of presence are acts carried out by Afghans and Pakistanis, either individually or via 
solidarity networks, in order to avoid direct engagement with official actors and legal rules 
(conscious defiance) and hide informal activities (camouflage). Here, human life continues, 
despite official actors not recognising it worth living, i.e. by ignoring or neglecting it. 
 
Conscious and open defiance is more likely when the full glare of officialdom is weak and the 
likelihood of formal repercussions and policing is low or worth the risk. This is enabled by two 
factors outlined in Chapter 3. Firstly, conscious and open defiance occurs when state 
infrastructure cannot deliver what it is meant to Afghans and marginalised Pakistanis because of 
the state weaknesses, which are the result of macro-level factors such as economic liberalisation, 
(Hasan 2004; Toor 2011) underdevelopment, and a “political economy of defence” (Jalal 1990; 
Siddiqa 2007).  Secondly, conscious and open defiance occurs when Pakistani state institutions 
and actors engage in forms of urban ethnocracy (Yiftachel and Yakobi 2004; Yiftachel 2006).  
Here the state deliberately fails to recognise the Afghan presence in Pakistan in an attempt to 
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maintain the “purity” of the Pakistani nation-state, or it fails to recognise Pakistani Pashtuns in 
Karachi in order to maintain the MQM’s vision of an “ethnic” “order” in Karachi. As a result 
Afghans and Pakistanis are neglected and left to rely on more heavily on solidarity networks, or 
other strategies, to establish informal housing settlements and access to other material goods. 
 
The placement of RTVs or unregulated residential area in peripheral areas is one example of how 
a different (and lower) presence of the state creates space for the defiance of rules. In an 
interview with Hussain Ali who was introduced in the previous chapter, Hussain Ali recalled how 
individuals, families, friends, and groups worked together in Saeed Goth to build a needed road 
(Hussain Ali, KHP51). When I asked him if he needed to get official planning permission he said, 
“No one says anything to us, we just did it” (ibid). This can be compared with urban spaces that 
are “full” parts of the state, such as the affluent neighbourhoods of Defence in Karachi or 
Hayatabad in Peshawar. Housing inspectors regularly traverse the different phases of Hayatabad, 
from Phases 1-6, ensuring that the housing structures meet the city’s regulations, but in Saeed 
Goth the area and residents are not recognised as full parts of the state, which is the result of the 
state’s “ethnicised” way of seeing. Here the area and its residents are not worthy of state 
investment. However, as Chapter 3 outlines, the state is never fully absent, even in informal 
settings. A sense of responsibility towards areas that are territorially “well within the state” (Ron 
2003:16) remains, although state actors act in a different way to formal and regulated areas 
(2003:24). This different way of acting includes demanding bribes, engaging in physical and 
verbally against residents, and charging high rents. Thus in some cases Hussain Ali does have to 
deal with local officials and inspectors. As a result Hussain Ali said, “Sometime we hide our 
activities from them”, to reflect the practice of camouflage, to which I will return shortly.  
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Afghans and Pakistanis, however, do challenge the logic of exclusionary practices and neglect. 
Whilst the imagined and physical urban and national space has no room for non-nationals (and 
some nationals) to declare their presence, they simply defy the rules and, as such, use this to 
articulate a new way of belonging to the urban city. Hussain Ali recalled that it was their own 
efforts that enabled gains (i.e. building the road) to be secured and that, “We are continuing to 
build our houses and run our businesses; there are many Pashtuns here” (ibid). I asked him if the 
local government officials or government schemes had invested in the area. He replied, simply, 
“The government does not do anything for us, we do things for ourselves”. On different 
occasions he reflected on Karachi being his city, despite the hostility towards him as a Pashtun 
“migrant”. “I have lived in Karachi all my life. I am of Karachi, from within it… This is my land”, 
he said (ibid). 
 
In other instances, physical camouflage and evasion amount to a second sub-practice of presence: 
hiding the informal gains made by Afghans and Pakistanis. Here, Afghans and Pakistanis avoid 
the material and non-material costs of interacting with officials - legal and illegal - in their area. 
These costs include: (legal) taxes, (illegal) bribes, and cases of discrimination and violence 
(Chapter 7). In The Art of Not Being Governed, James C. Scott shows how in the hill regions in 
Southeast Asia (Zomia) individuals and groups strategically chose to avoid the centralising force 
of the state in what he calls  “zones of cultural refusal” (Scott 2009:20).  In Scott’s work 
individuals and groups consciously avoid the state because they have seen the implications of 
“modernity” and do not want to be a part of this expensive enterprise (Scott 2009:20). Asef 
Bayat’s studies on the urban poor in Egypt and Iran (1997, 2010) speak of atomised actors 
seeking cultural and political “autonomy” from the state (Bayat 1997, 1997b, 2010). For Bayat 
these atomised actors have a “desire to live an informal life”, which stems from a deep “distrust 
of the modern state”, which is largely the result of expensive state practices of taxation and 
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bureaucracy (Bayat 1997, 1997b 2010). For Bayat, the rich can afford to act in accordance to the 
law – indeed the law is often in place to maintain the interest of a class-based status quo – but 
the urban poor cannot.  
 
Certainly, in this study, parallel to the authors above, the robotic Pakistani state (and occasionally 
the international refugee regime) that quantifies, enumerates, and “manages” both Afghans and 
Pakistanis is perceived negatively. It is avoided, berated, and distrusted. But while Bayat and 
Scott are correct that the state is an expensive enterprise, some elements do not fit Karachi’s and 
Peshawar’s cases and they miss an important point of emphasis. In this study, it is not the aim of 
Afghans and devalued Pakistanis to permanently escape the presence of the state because of a 
disdain of the costs of officialdom, i.e. bureaucracy and taxation (Nelson – forthcoming). Rather 
in this study in Karachi and Peshawar it is also the informal, illegal, and corrupt ways in which 
the state functions, as well as intermediaries or other power holders, which are avoided. At the 
local level, this is the more costly enterprise. Without regulatory mechanisms, sites of 
exploitation are practiced, which is why practices of camouflage are used. If a political order that 
functioned in a more effective, non-corrupt, and humanising way was present, “autonomy” and 
the “desire to live an informal life” would not be so energetically pursued. 
Ye logh, police wale, hukumat ke logh, sab chor hai. 
Kaun loot ta hai? Humari khud ki hukumat. 
The people, the police, the officials, they’re all thieves. Who is 
robbing us? Our own government (Fahmeeda Qazmi, KHP42). 
 
I conducted detailed interviews and ethnography in a neighbourhood on the outskirt of Karachi. 
The neighbourhood is home to Afghan Pashtuns, Afghan Tajiks, Pakistani Pashtuns, and 
Pakistani Punjabis. Interestingly, the spatial and visual organisation of the area is camouflaged 
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and hidden from outside areas and the main highway. It is not a settlement that has been 
penetrated by formal commercial companies or state actors. Formal commercial shops, schools, 
hospitals, and roads are lacking. Rather, it is a settlement built in a way that avoids attention. 
The housing structures on the outskirts of the settlement are physically camouflaged - covered 
by bushes and recyclable materials to trick the naked eye. An area known for its rag pickers and 
its recycling industry, often the houses are camouflaged by this very recyclable material (see 
image). 
 
 
Figure 1: Camouflage covering a housing area. 
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Figure 2: A katcha house camouflaged using rubbish from the local rubbish industry. 
 
In this settlement camouflage was pursued for the following reasons. First, the area is home to 
non-nationals and “contested nationals” - Pakistani Pashtuns - who frequently face violence 
from semi-regular state actors, such as the MQM’s political “gangs”. In one case during 
fieldwork it was reported that a young Pakistani Pashtun man was shot and killed by “two men 
from the MQM” who had entered the outskirts of the area on their motorbike and shot 
“whichever Pashtun they could find” (Fereydoun, KHA57 and Rafique, KHA58). Camouflage 
provides security in the face of ethnicised ways of seeing by politically armed units (MQM), 
weakly enforced security, and fears of petty and major crime. Secondly, in this housing area 
camouflage is pursued in the event of law enforcement manoeuvres against informal activities, 
such as building housing structures without legal permission. But thirdly, and most importantly, 
camouflage is pursued to avoid the unofficial, illegal, and corrupted ways in which official actors 
act in the area, demanding bribes in order to provide “protection” for the informal activities that 
residents were engaged in, which included building homes without legal and formal permission.  
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Practices of Protection & Access 
Everything is possible in Pakistan for the right 
price. 
Hussain Ali, PXA51. 
 
The practices of camouflage reveal practical considerations of the state - particularly of how the 
state acts in unofficial ways.  Indeed, it is rare that Afghans and devalued Pakistanis complete the 
practices of presence (even camouflage) in a “pure” form. Recourse to the state, officialdom, and 
various intermediaries is needed, and often it is these actors that shape the scope of local action 
for both survival and gains. Practices of protection & access, in other words, are critical when it 
comes to material and non-material redistribution. When no solidarity networks are in place or 
effective94 practices of protection & access are often the first port of call - even before the state 
(or refugee regime). This gives importance to official actors, or other power holders, acting 
informally or illegally in Pakistan. Informality is thus revealed as an important part of how the 
Pakistani state functions, which requires further explanation through a brief digression.  
 
Informal responses reflect either a simple attempt to follow procedures by informally 
enacting/enforcing rules (albeit with accompanying cases of petty corruption); actors enabling 
the prevention and/or violation of rules; or a reaction to the fact that there are no clear rules. My 
own ethnographic work leaves open these three (interacting) possibilities. However, in the case 
studies I examine in Chapters 5 and 6 often there was limited clarity over legal processes and 
rules, which created an ambiguity and arbitrariness that left the urban poor – Afghan and 
Pakistani – liable to exploitation by the state or local intermediaries.  During fieldwork it often 
became impossible to answer questions over legality of landholding or land leases (Chapter 5) or 
even the legal status of Afghans in Pakistan (Chapter 7), at which point Afghan and Pakistani 
                                                          
94 For example, strong social capital may be present (i.e. a large family) but without interacting economic 
and cultural capital this social capital does not count for much (Bourdieu 1985; Portes 2000). 
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lives became vulnerable to violations by the state and/or informal actors or cases of neglect. No 
rules often means that anything goes. Afghan and Pakistani lives are punished by an unlimited 
arbitrariness. In an interview with Engineer Aziz he reflected on the ambiguity of the Afghan 
position in Pakistan (focusing on education and security) and said:  
In all of these things... we keep getting conflicting messages. We 
get one message from the Government of Pakistan, we get 
another message from the Government of Afghanistan; we get 
lots of different messages. And the officials do not know what 
they are doing then either! The first thing that needs to happen is 
that policies and [ways of working] must be defined – they must 
be clarified and understood by those carrying them out. Who is 
saying what and when, and why?... Now, as it stands we do not 
know what our position will be and what the future holds for us 
(Engineer Aziz PXA59). 
 
In other cases questions of land ownership were unclear, such as Afghan Camp, Saeed Goth, and 
Ishtiaq Goth, which are all analysed in Chapter 5. Further, an example from a local news source 
in July 2010 is also illuminating. The source highlights that Pakistani Rangers were engaged in 
“illegal constructions” in Karachi and involved in a contest with two Sindh government 
departments, which was taken to the Pakistani legal courts (URC 2010).  Cases like this appear 
routinely in Pakistan (Akhtar 2002; Hull 2008).  
 
My own ethnographic work is, on its own, inadequate at precisely answering the questions of 
contested legality. Although my work has attempted to investigate the gaps, even those who have 
completed detailed legal ethnographies in Pakistan have found this challenging (Hull 2008). Legal 
and official rights and the responsibilities of the distribution and protection of these rights are 
revealed to be contested and/or unclear. However, the delegitimization of the state occurs 
precisely because of this ambiguity, as well as the two factors mentioned of informally following 
rules and the prevention/violation of rules. Without clarity over legal rules and regulations the 
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state’s writ appears insignificant, incompetent, or complicit in the exploitation that Afghans and 
Pakistanis face in urban Pakistan. And, as will be discussed shortly, all three factors create longer-
term implications for the state. 
 
Returning to practices of protection & access, these are actions based on payments. These are 
often referred to in everyday dialogue as rishwat (bribes), sifarish (corruption) and bhatta 
(extortion), which are paid by Afghans and Pakistanis to a local official actor or a local 
intermediary - i.e., a non-official “entrepreneur” or “middleman” who holds influence and power 
either through political, landed, industrial, or religious capital (Baken and Linden 1992; Hasan 
and Mansoor 2012:68, 2010, 2006). Payments occur in the form of money, an electoral vote, 
physical labour/activity, or adherence to a set of rules and norms. In return, either the official 
actor turns a blind eye to Afghan and Pakistani informal practices of presence, and thus protects 
the survival and gains made, or the intermediary safeguards activities from regulation and 
protects them also. Alternatively, in return for payments, “speedy” access to material resources, 
which are not available in formal channels, is provided by official actors or intermediaries.95 
 
In Peshawar’s University Town, an example of a protection payment was visible during 
fieldwork. In the town there is an Afghan butcher’s store (one of many informal shops) that does 
not meet regulatory standards. Yet the store is still open on most days (running successfully). A 
                                                          
95 Some authors have identified types of protection & access payments as social networks of an 
asymmetrical nature, i.e. as patronage networks (Gellner & Waterbury 1977). Using connections with 
official and unofficial power holders is understood an effective way of creating enabling material 
redistribution (Granovetter 1973; Harpviken 2009:32-88). However, this thesis does not use the term 
“networks” here – even if they could be seen as an “exploitation network” rather than a “solidarity 
network”. This is because they are based on explicitly instrumentalist and objectifying relationships, and 
not on trust and reciprocity, which is why a more mechanised and objectified term (“strategy”) is used.  
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resident told me how local shopkeepers protected their presence and defiance of rules by 
preventing the law from being enforced: 
Here, and in the market [a big Afghan market] people know what 
to do to keep the police quiet. Our butcher will send them [the 
police] a share of meat to keep them quiet as he is not meant to 
be there... He sends them two kilos of meat from the 250 kilos 
he has (Nooruddin Akhtar, PXA61). 
 
An example of “access” payment was seen in an unregulated residential area on the outskirts of 
Karachi (Ishtiaq Goth), where residents have limited access to water and electricity. Here, 
residents attempted to overcome the lack of water and electricity via the middlemen of the area, 
who made an informal agreement with the government (KSWB) and private (KESC) companies. 
The first case of protection & access mentioned official actors acting in informal ways; the 
second case mentioned local intermediaries. Local power holders (middlemen, landholders, 
powerbrokers) are often used as they have better connections with official actors (who have 
access to resources) and are better placed to engage in dialogue or negotiation with official actors. 
 
For authors such as Partha Chatterjee this alternative space, specifically when the law is 
prevented from being implemented, as is the case of the butcher, is a “richer” space for 
“democracy” (Chatterjee 2004). Here, the prevention of law is what people want; this is the meaning of 
Chatterjee’s political society (ibid). However, this labelling of “democracy” appears misplaced in 
the case of urban Pakistan – and indeed as Matthew J. Nelson highlights, may not even apply in 
Chatterjee’s Indian case (Nelson - forthcoming). Firstly, Nelson asks whether democracy can 
exist without law? The answer is no. Democracy that contravenes state law is not really 
democracy, but something else, simply an alternative space of politics (ibid). Secondly, practices 
of protection & access are often imposed on Afghans and Pakistanis and not just sought out. The 
spaces of “choice” are often suffocatingly restricted. For instance, in the Afghan case mentioned 
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above it was not the butcher who sought a bribe but it was local police officers who “requested” 
it through the lurking of potential force, i.e. physical violence or arrest for the butcher. The 
Afghan butcher and the police officer exist in an asymmetric relationship. Within the Pakistani 
political and official system the official has greater (potential) coercive power and is able to 
objectify the butcher in order to secure additional income for himself. Here, the exploitative 
nature of official and unofficial actors and intermediaries strikes down Chatterjee’s (2004) 
understanding of “democracy”, throwing caution on ideas about the desirability of “autonomy” 
(Bayat 2010) and the “vibrancy” of informal political activity” (De Soto 2000). 
 
The exploitative side of protection & access payments raises an important question: are the 
strategies of protection & access sufficiently “humanising”? Do they fully allow the conditions 
for the potentials of human lives to be protected and human recognition to be achieved? Similar 
to formal avenues of participation, protection & access strategies are contingent on asymmetrical 
power relationships and unequal forms of exchange that reduce Afghans and Pakistanis to 
exploitable objects. Whilst solidarity networks appear as sources of recognition, emotion, and 
value they are reliant on navigation practices, which can often lead to the reification of existing 
imbalances of social, economic, and political power, including the corrupted actions of officials 
and intermediaries. In fact, even though solidarity networks display a humanising capacity, 
without a system of regulation the execution of navigation strategies reinforces a number of 
challenges in Afghan and Pakistani lives. Indeed, as John Friedmann outlines (1992), alternative 
forms of political expression and processes are important and should begin at a local level. 
However, they “cannot end there” (Friedman 1992:7; see also Escobar 1995). In the current 
political context: 
Like it or not the state continues to be a major player. It may 
need to be made more accountable to poor people and their 
claims. But without the state’s collaboration, the lot of the poor 
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cannot be significantly improved. Local empowering action 
requires a strong state (Friedman 1992:7). 
 
Importantly, during the processes of navigating through systems of exploitation, Afghans and 
Pakistanis justify and understand their humanity against the inhumanity of the state and local state 
officials, which is captured in their oral testimonies and daily language. Indeed, in the face of 
“informal” injustice, greed, and corruption, Afghans and Pakistanis see that their “informal” 
actions as the opposite: self-humanising. Whilst Afghans and Pakistanis are engaged in a quest of 
empowerment this same perspective does not translate to state actors, who as sovereigns, are 
expected to lead through example.  
They say that leaders are reflective of the people whom they 
govern over. But we are not that bad. People are not that bad – 
how can we be compared to Zardari? It is they [the political 
classes] who force us to act in this way (Aftab Khalil, KHP52). 
 
Both Afghans and Pakistanis see the practices they are engaged in as ones of necessity – firmly 
juxtaposed against the “zalim” (“oppressive”) or “na-insaaf” (“unjust”) official and unofficial 
actors.96 Their actions are rationalised as necessary and the only possible routes for survival and 
further gains.  
 
Maintaining the State?  The Delegitimized State 
Governments often encourage self-help and 
local initiatives as long as they do not turn 
oppositional. 
Asef Bayat (2010:55). 
 
                                                          
96 These were the direct words used by interviewees and participants.  
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A fully autonomous life renders the state 
irrelevant. 
Asef Bayat (1997:15). 
 
The Pakistani state appears to direct, encourage, and/or strategically tolerate practices of 
presence and practices of protection & access. Two factors explain this: at the macro level they 
help to maintain the state, and at the micro level they act as a site of informal profit. At the 
macro level the purpose appears, at first-glance, to be “functional”. Solidarity networks and 
navigation practices fill in for the official when the official cannot act or cope. Thus, importantly 
the analysis of shared Afghan and Pakistani lives also reveals an understanding of how the state 
functions in Pakistan. The dominant Westphalian understanding of the state constructs the state 
and accompanying forms of absolute sovereignty as “facthood”, but in Pakistan – and indeed in 
other contexts (including the original Westphalian states) - this is not how things work. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Pakistan’s “political economy of defence” (Jalal 1990; Siddiqa 2007) and 
the fallouts from structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalisation (Hasan 2006; 
Toor 2011; Zaidi 2005) mean that the state is unable to deliver to citizens and non-citizens the 
rights they are due. This explains why solidarity networks and formal-informal navigation 
strategies are accepted and even promoted by the Pakistani state: at a macro-level solidarity 
networks and formal-informal navigation strategies are considered to be an effective and 
alternative way of maintaining the state.  
 
However, hybrid formal/informal realities are only a short-term method of maintaining the state 
and can also be wholly contradictory to the state. Returning back to why informality is possible 
this becomes clearer. Earlier it was outlined that informality reflects either a simple attempt to 
follow procedures by informally enacting/enforcing rules (albeit with accompanying cases of 
petty corruption); actors enabling the prevention and/or violation of rules; or a reaction to the 
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fact that there are no clear rules. Particularly in the case of actors (state or patrons) enabling a 
violation/ prevention of rules a deep contradiction to the state becomes clear, however, it also 
occurs because of the other listed factors.   
 
Solidarity networks and navigation practices are not in the long run quasi-complimentary to the 
state. Whilst the Musharraf era heavily promoted “civil society” organisations and other 
international institutions and I/NGOs to fill in for the state and encourage a neo-liberal reading 
of citizenship, informal political action is not the same as “civil society”.97 Even in the case of 
international institutions and I/NGOs it has been suggested that they too are transforming the 
nature of the modern state and understandings of sovereignty. Importantly, unlike civil society 
actors, solidarity networks and navigation practices are not bound to the state: they are not legal 
in any sense and have no loyalty to the state. They are substitutive and competing,98 which is why 
the work of Chatterjee (2004) and his acceptance of efforts to contradict the state seem so 
confusing (as a foundation for “democracy”). Whilst Chatterjee is correct in outlining that civil 
                                                          
97 In Pakistan I/NGOs were heavily encouraged under the Musharraf era (Zaidi 2011; Weiss et al., 2001; 
PCP 2010) and international institutions such as the UN and its sub-bodies have a central role for 
refugees and internally displaced persons in Pakistan. However, these organisations are bureaucratically 
organised and dependent on the approval and recognition of the state in order to act, secure funding, and 
be effective. The loyalty of these institutions is to state structures, rather than pushing beyond the state 
and contradicting it (Agier 2011). Solidarity networks on the other hand are not “legal” in any sense 
(Singerman 1995:133). This also means that they are not bound by the symbolic bureaucratic rituals of 
formal organisation, a “professionalization”, which can create a “hierarchy of authority, fixed procedures, 
rigidity, and the division of labour”, which reduces the “spirit of participation” (Bayat 2010:88). Whilst 
they may engage political and ideological organisations, they are not bound to particular political goals or 
ideological objectives for funding purposes as I/NGOs are, which are often accompanied by terms and 
conditionalites that create new types of clientelism (ibid). 
98 Helmke and Levitsky (2004) outline that when a state has ineffective formal institutions, if the outputs 
that are produced by informal actions have the same objectives as the state they are “substitutive”, i.e. 
they replace the state and have a functional role. They outline that when the same ineffective state is faced 
with informal outputs that do not meet the same objectives of the state these outputs are “competing”. I 
distinguish myself from Helmke and Levitsky by arguing that even when informal actions appear 
“substitutive” they still challenge the state. Often actions are only substitutive at a very short-term level, 
and the normalisation of informality, above formality, challenges the strength of the state as a sovereign 
legal body. 
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society reflects the interest of the state and those who are attached to the state, and political 
society is more reflective of sites of political resistance, his assumption that this is a real site of 
“democracy” does not hold. “Political society”, and in this case solidarity networks and 
navigation practices, also undermine the state.  They are sites of political action and political 
communities, but they are not a “democratic” site of action (Nelson - forthcoming).   
 
In the short term, solidarity networks and navigation practices act as a Band-Aid on leaky roof. 
Even when informal actions do not seek to break the rules or overturn the state they are only 
partially effective. Thus, even in the short-term, they are not really substitutive. In addition, in 
the long-term informal institutions and their outputs eventually become competing to the state. 
Survival and gains are extracted against the Pakistani state at a direct and powerful cost to 
officialdom. The state is meant to be the ultimate sovereign. However, solidarity networks and 
navigation practices produce alternative and more trusted sites of (always informal) power. 
Multiple sovereigns exist and continue to be created. Other actors also have direct influence and 
coercion. In some cases, this even leads to a pattern in which landholders, middlemen, and other 
intermediaries possess greater power than the state. Consistently, in his body of work, Arif 
Hasan shows how dallals (middlemen) have strengthened their position in urban Karachi (Hasan 
2006, 2010:43, 2012; see also Baken and Linden 1992).  In a 2012 report Hassan highlights that 
middlemen run 60% of informal land transactions (2012:68). A slow, piecemeal and unplanned 
revolution (Hasan 2008) is taking place in Pakistan against the workings of the state by wearing 
down its effectiveness through piecemeal informal actions. Particularly when there is no clarity 
over legality, the state is dismissed as irrelevant.  
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Physically, whilst unregulated residential areas offer a short-term solution of housing and shelter 
they also create densely packed, hazardous, and ecologically unsustainable urban spaces (Nenova 
2010; HRCP 2011; Davis 2006). In an Afghan informal refugee camp in Karachi discussed in 
Chapter 5 residents secure water (a basic good) through the Pakistani Rangers and private 
contractors. Navigation practices provide access to water, but the quality is questionable and 
residents are frequently anxious about the “unclean” nature of the water. One resident noted 
how, “The water that is available through the boxes is not clean; it is not safe to drink” 
(Habibullah, KHA13). In another unregulated residential area on the outskirts of Peshawar, 
residents’ semi-katcha, semi-pakka99 houses are densely packed together near a river, which means 
that when it rains heavily many houses collapse.  
Our house is close to the river... this house, and the roof was 
affected by the [2010] floods. I cannot tell you what the 
conditions were like...  I cannot tell you what the conditions are 
like in the winter or what is made of us here in the summer when 
densely packed houses create heat (Malalai Khattak, PXP46). 
 
The Pakistan HRC (2012:246-250) provides a list, each month full of people dying from 
structural housing collapses (“Feb 5: An infant girl died in Karachi and three family members 
were injured in the collapse of their house’s roof; Feb 14: A two-storey house in Peshawar 
collapsed. Six residents were killed and another six gravely injured; Aug 12: One man was killed 
while another was injured when a rain drenched wall of their home gave way in Karachi”). The 
physical landscape of Karachi and Peshawar is rapidly expanding and being “managed” 
informally, but this change is without planning and regulation and does not appear safe. During 
fieldwork in rural-urban housing settlements and inner city settlements, waterborne illnesses 
were routine features. The health of the citizens/non-citizens is in jeopardy and the conditions 
                                                          
99 Pakka, literally means solid. This usually refers to houses built with cement and bricks (rather than 
mud). 
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for a basic humanised existence and its potentials are not being provided. It is neither a fully 
effective nor a fully empowering solution (Friedmann 1992).  
 
 
Figure 3: Unregulated residential area built with a mixture of tents and more solid structures. 
 
Critically, official institutions also appear incompetent. Even if the “informal” is not looking to 
overthrow the state, a non-material corrosion occurs, affecting the legitimacy of the state. It 
appears that there are two disjointed and contradictory systems in operation – the formal and the 
informal. The state is expected to be able to act as the absolute sovereign, but is appears 
incapable of doing so. Whilst sovereign power is “always a tentative and unstable project whose 
efficacy and legitimacy depend on repeated performances of violence and a “will to rule”” (Blom 
Hansen 2005:3), in Pakistan the state appears to have no will to rule or ability to perform 
violence itself. It seems as if the state cannot cope and is dependent on other “sovereigns”. The 
significant presence of intermediaries and other power sources, such as landholders or 
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middlemen, reveals how the urban state’s reach is flawed. Instead the state is reliant on 
middlemen, patrons, and landholders, and other “quasi-entrepreneurs” who perform sovereignty, 
“manage” local populations, “govern”, and exercise a will to rule. A cyclical process of increased 
state delegitimization, thus, takes place. (In the next chapter it is shown that the state is 
dependent on local dallals, ethnic solidarity networks, and land holders, as they reach populations 
that the state cannot manage and provide informal housing/utilities to Afghans and Pakistanis, 
but that this process reinforces the strength of the local patrons, which state actors eventually 
emerge as unwilling and unable to challenge). The sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority of the 
state occupy a vulnerable position and instead forms of non-state power are strengthened 
through a normalisation of informality.  
 
However, most critically, the practices of protection & access show that local official actors 
behave in a way that goes beyond a “functional” role. At the micro-level opportunism is no 
longer about maintaining the state but reflects petty corruption and profiteering. Even when the 
outputs that are produced are substitutive and fill in for the state, the methods that are used 
undermine the legitimacy of the state. Payments indicate the exploitative, objectifying, and 
dehumanising face of official actors and non-official intermediaries – a view that is transferred 
directly onto the state, as these actors are understood as being embodiments of the state. The 
state is not just visible in a local government office. Local officials are direct embodiments of the 
state. This use of bribes as well as this complicity in propping up exploitive intermediaries 
shatters the human face of the state: the state is seen as unable to safeguard the people within its 
remit of responsibility, which includes both citizens and non-citizens. By being directly involved 
and responsible for dehumanising Afghans and Pakistanis, official actors undergo a process of 
delegitimization and dehumanisation themselves. Indeed, the state is even understood as an 
inhumane entity. 
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In the interviews and observations I completed, protection & access payments (bribes) were 
consistently viewed as actions that dehumanised official actors and made these actors appear 
inhumane and cruel. It was the official actors and not urban Afghans and Pakistanis who were, in 
the words of interviewees, understood as being ghair-insani (without humanity), ghair-qanuni 
(without law), na-insaaf (without justice), engaged in chori (thieving) and haram ki kamayi (unlawful 
earnings), and zalimi (oppressive/cruel). In the short-term, informal ways of working by official 
actors may “earn a quick buck” and also allow an alternative (substitutive) way of getting things 
done; indeed the outputs may not be criminal (see fn21), yet the methods used eat away at the 
state’s legitimacy. Even in cases where officials are not responsible for exploitative acts but 
various intermediaries are, state actors are viewed as complicit in propping up these 
intermediaries or too weak to stand up against them. In one case the death of a young boy in 
Karachi at the hands of a middleman was understood as being possible because of corrupt local 
officials. The boy is said to have been killed near an underpass in the city on his way back from 
after-school tuition.  
This happened to him because he has no-one to go to. The 
[middle]man was taking liberties (ziyaadtiyan) but the police, the 
government are not there to protect people from these criminals. 
It is often they who are involved! (Field notes, Karachi). 
In another interview with an Afghan resident in Karachi, I heard how the police demand bhatta 
for his informal house to remain in position.  
They [the police] come back again after two or three months 
demanding more money. “Give more money”, they say. For the 
people who are trying to run their homes [and earn a living] then 
what work can they do? They have homes in which at least 30-35 
people are living, so what can they give? They lose their homes 
this way. No. They are not even human (Jalaluddin, KHA61.C). 
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The state, given its perceived monopoly of power, is meant to be just (Lakhani 1991; Lazreg 
2008). It is assumed to hold a social contract with the people in its territorial boundaries – 
citizens and non-citizens alike. However, here it appears to actively fail and stumble at every turn. 
 
Afghans and Pakistanis justify the use of alternative (sometimes illegal) channels as “necessity” in 
the face of corrupt and inhumane adversaries: local official actors who represent the state or 
refugee regime. In the face of injustice their actions can only be just (Bayat 1997b; 2010). Yet, 
where solidarity networks and navigation practices offer some spaces of empowerment for the 
refugee, illegal migrant, and the devalued citizen, they have the opposite effect on official 
structures. Even middlemen, informal entrepreneurs, and criminals are held in better esteem 
than official actors because middlemen, informal entrepreneurs, and criminals are not held to the 
same moral standard (or contract) that the state actors or the refugee regime are.  
 
Bribes, greed and corruption are now a part of daily vocabulary to reflect how state actors are 
described. This transcends from the local level to the national. Local and national political 
leaders and officials are automatically assumed to be corrupt. President, Asif Ali Zardari, 
infamously referred to as “Mr. Ten Percent”, is frequently lampooned and considered the 
personification of the informal/criminal/incompetent Pakistani official, at the highest level. 
Indeed in July 2009 the PPP-led government introduced a ban on jokes about Asif Ali Zardari 
that were dominating the airwaves and social media.100 
                                                          
100 The country's interior minister, Rehman Malik, announced the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) had 
been asked to trace electronically transmitted jokes that "slander the political leadership of the country" 
under the new Cyber Crimes Act.  The bans were ineffective as I commonly received jokes from friends 
via SMS and circulated them myself as well. Indeed, there was even a joke in response to the ban: 
 
Law Teacher: America mein kutta ko marny per dou saal qeidi hoti hai 
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TV anchor: Terrorists have kidnapped our beloved President 
Zardari and are demanding $5,000,000 or they will burn him with 
petrol. Please donate what you can. I have donated five litres.  
 
Breaking News: Sadar Zardari ki hajj application Saudi Govt ne reject 
kar di. 
Why? Kion ke is tarah Hajjion mein confusion ho jati ke "Pathar Kis Ko 
Marna hain”? 
 
Breaking news: Leader Zardari’s hajj application was rejected by 
the Saudi government. 
Why? Because they were worried that the hajj goers wouldn’t 
know who to throw stones at. 
 
<Zardari bakre se khel raha tha...> 
Nawaz: Oye... Kuttay se khel raha hai? 
Zardari: Ye kutta nahi bakra hai ... 
Nawaz: Mai tum se nahi bakre se keh raha ho. 
 
<Zardari was playing with a dog...> 
Nawaz [Sharif]: Oye... You’re playing with a dog? 
Zardari: This is not a dog, it’s a goat. 
Nawaz: I wasn’t talking to you; I was talking to the goat. 
 
Common jokes circulating in 2010-12, usually via SMS. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Law Teacher: In America if you injure/kill an animal you get a two year jail sentence. 
 
Student: Ye to kuch bhi nahi hai Pakistan mein us ka mazaq urany par 14 saal qeid ho sakti hai. 
Student: That’s nothing. In Pakistan if you even joke about The Dog (i.e. Zardari) you can be jailed for 14 
years! 
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The frequency of these jokes (the above is just a tip of the iceberg) is of course explained by the 
uniquely deep unpopularity of Asif Ali Zardari. However, they importantly encapsulate the levels 
of distrust and ridicule in which the state and official actors are held in Pakistan. The state is not 
to be trusted. At the exact moment of getting what official actors want in Pakistan, a quick 
solution to maintaining the state or a quick way of making some profit, officials are contributing 
towards their own delegitimization. Herein lies the political impact of Afghan and Pakistani 
agency on the state. Slowly, piece by piece, repeated time and time again, these actions are 
eroding the legitimacy of the state.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a conceptual framework for understanding how ordinary Afghans and 
Pakistanis exert agency by analysing and explaining the role of solidarity networks and navigation 
practices in Afghan and Pakistani lives. Solidarity networks are important social structures that 
offer Afghans and Pakistanis a system of support and enhance the potentials for material and 
non-material redistribution. Whilst the state is unable to provide for citizens and non-citizens via 
legal channels, solidarity networks act as an important lifeline. Whilst both Afghans and 
Pakistanis are let down by officialdom solidarity networks produce important forms of social 
capital which enhance the potentials for material and non-material redistribution. Solidarity 
networks and accompanying navigation practices thus reflect the similarities of Afghan and 
Pakistani political agency in urban spaces. Here, lines of distinction between citizens and non-
citizens do not have significance.  However, this chapter has shown that solidarity networks 
often rely on navigation practices, which subsequently reveals a continued, albeit undocumented, 
role of the state and other power sources. In turn, this also reveals how the state functions in 
urban Pakistan. Solidarity networks, navigation practices, and informality are not as separate 
from the state as is assumed. The “cloak of invisibility” (Singerman 1995:7) is thin as solidarity 
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networks and navigation practices are in fact important tools that are promoted and encouraged 
by the state.  However, the long-term consequences of the outputs and norms of informality are 
significant for Afghan and Pakistani lives and for the state. Whilst some commentators outline 
that informality should encourage a new way of conceptualising and problematizing “the state”, 
this in itself is contradictory. Repeated informal acts challenge the state, which in its current form 
cannot be separated from dimensions of legality and absolute sovereignty. They change the 
physical nature of the urban cities in haphazard and dangerous ways, which also directly impacts 
the lived experiences of Afghan and Pakistani lives. Further, these acts bite back at the state and 
officialdom itself: the state and state law appears incompetent, irrelevant, comical, and cruel. The 
following two chapters will demonstrate these complex processes using detailed case studies 
collected during fieldwork. Bringing together the conceptual framework of “dehumanisation” 
outlined in Chapter 3, the cases studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 will show the following: how 
Afghans and Pakistani experience “dehumanisation”; how processes of self-humanisation using 
solidarity networks and navigation practices occur; how continued challenges for both citizens 
and non-citizens continue; and finally, what the political impacts of these alternative structures 
and strategies on official structures are.  
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Part II: Case Studies – Shared Afghan and Pakistani Lives   
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Chapter 5: Shared Urban Neighbourhoods & Survival: Fellowships of Charity 
 
He counts water as so precious, that  
His pots and pans are contaminated with dirty water. 
He makes no distinction between clean and unclean water, 
 Even if his water is mixed with urine. 
When he has the chance to steal water, he doesn’t miss it; 
 Even if resident of khanqah or mosque. 
When distributing water he doesn’t do it fairly; 
 Even if he holds scriptures in his hands, 
He does not gain in the merit of giving water; 
 Even if a sip were rewarded with the hajj. 
He doesn’t expect from God; 
 Even if there are clouds overhead all day long. 
How can he wash dirt from his body, 
 Where water is scarcer than rosewater? 
Don’t even mention bathing and ablution, 
 When a drop is as rare as a pearl. 
From making dry ablutions so many times  
His beard is forever soiled with dirt. 
 
Rahman Baba 1650-1715. 
 
Introduction 
This chapter uses case studies collected during fieldwork to show how solidarity networks 
specifically the fellowship of space & charity, is used to enable survival actions in informal urban 
space. It pays attention to unregulated residential areas and shows how these areas secure access 
to utilities, water, and housing. The case studies first focus on Afghans and Pakistanis in Karachi 
and shows the following: how dehumanisation is experienced; how processes of self-
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humanisation using solidarity networks and navigation practices occur; how continued challenges 
for both citizens and non-citizens remain; and, what the political impact of these alternative 
structures and strategies on official structures is. The second half of the chapter uses cases 
studies based in Peshawar to reveal how the urban state is maintained using different “patrons” 
in the two cities. 
  
“We Just Need Water!” An Afghan Neighbourhood’s Quest for Water 
Afghan Camp101 formed an important ethnographic and interview site in Karachi for over five 
months in 2010-11 with return visits in 2012. This section describes Afghan Camp, drawing on a 
series of detailed repeat interviews conducted with different “elders”102 of the camp, their family 
members, and other residents. This is accompanied by analysis of informal discussions, visits to 
homes, and day to day interactions that were completed in the camp. During my time in Karachi, 
observations and interviews were completed via an INGO medical clinic and the clinic’s adjacent 
informal school, through mediations facilitated by representatives from CAR and ARRC, and via 
                                                          
101 Afghan Camp is the only location I officially give in this study and is a decision that has been made in 
consultation with various residents of the area. All names and some details of interviewees have been 
changed.  
102 The position of elder (masher/namainda) usually translates as a “respected” figure of a given area or kin 
or clan base who is trusted to “speak for” and represent certain communities. Afghan Camp is home to a 
mixture of Afghan families from various locations in Afghanistan and different ethnic and linguistic 
groups. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmens, Mughals, and Uzbeks live in the camp and have one or more “elder” 
representing them. In the camp, these elders are recognised because of family position (i.e. senior male 
head), business enterprises, or levels of education (Islamic and non-Islamic education). Usually, these 
figures are male. These positions are usually fluid and interchanging.  However, in Karachi (and other 
locations) the process of recognising an elder is also influenced by external dynamics and interactions 
with organisations, such as C/CAR, NADRA, MORR, GOA, UNHCR or other actors including medical 
clinics, the Pakistani police and security forces. When external actors need a mediator to gather 
intelligence or implement policies elders are key points of contact, which can lead to the positions of 
elders being reinforced, reified, or indeed even created because of this external recognition. In some cases, 
external actors talk about female “elders”, even though this term is not used within Afghan communities. 
The need for a “mediator” has become increasingly strong in Karachi after 9/11 as Afghan repatriation 
programs have gained momentum and because of the start of POR registration programmes. Karachi also 
has a Council of the Afghan Muhajireen, which is headed by one lead Afghan representative who is chosen 
locally by various Afghan elders and their families across the city. The elder acts as a mediator with the 
GOP and UNCHR - although this process has been prone to break down and is not a fully bureaucratic 
structure. 
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local friendship networks I developed which did not involve the presence of official Pakistani 
actors. During fieldwork my presence around the camp became familiar, and some residents 
were already familiar with my Pakistani Kashmiri [maternal] uncle, a carpet trader, who had 
worked with Afghan Uzbek carpet traders and residents of Afghan Camp in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
 
Afghan Camp, or Camp e Jadeed (“New” Camp) for Farsi speakers, or Muhajir Camp (“Refugee” 
Camp) for all relevant linguistic lines in Karachi, sits on the extreme outskirts of Karachi. Afghan 
Camp is the only RTV - albeit an unofficial one - in Sindh. It was specifically built for Afghans, 
although some Pakistanis have moved in after post-2001 IDP movements.103 In interviews with 
camp residents and the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Sindh, I was told that the land was 
“given” to Afghans by the Government of Sindh (GOS), facilitated by the Sindh CAR office 
(interview: Akhtar 2010). However, the legal status and ownership of the land is unclear.104 In 
turn this places Afghan Camp in an ambiguous position with limited legal security (as Chapter 4 
outlines). In an interview with a resident of Afghan Camp, Yaqoob Gul, he said:  
We do not know how long we can stay here – we have been here 
for many years; but Pakistanis have started moving into the area 
and say that this land is Pakistan and Afghans should move. We 
do not know what we can do (Yaqoob Gul, PXA10). 
 
                                                          
103 The number of Pakistani families in Afghan Camp is relatively small, and it can be said that Afghan 
Camp is predominantly Afghan. The start of the camp area has now been occupied by some Pakistani 
families mainly from Pishin (Quetta) and Wana (Waziristan); and some families from SWAT are also 
present. An unpublished 2004 UNHCR Karachi field report states that some Punjabi and Baloch families 
are present  (UNHCR-PK-KH 2004).  
104 In interviews with representatives from CAR (interview: Akhtar 2010), the GOA (interview: Khaliqyar 
2010) and in interviews with residents (current and former) of Afghan Camp, I was told that there had 
been no legal agreement to Afghan Camp’s establishment.  
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Afghans were forcibly moved to the area in 1986105 in what has become a forgotten piece of 
history. Whilst a lot of attention has been given to Karachi’s violence, including the specific 
events of the 1980s which informed the creation of Afghan Camp (Haq 1995; Shaheed 1992), 
there is limited discussion about the Afghan experiences within the context of Karachi. Where 
Afghans are mentioned they are absorbed under “Pashtun dynamics”. This is despite the fact 
that many Afghans in Karachi are Afghan Tajiks, Afghan Hazaras, Afghan Uzbeks, and Afghan 
Turkmen, and that Pakistani Pashtuns make a distinction between Pakistani Pashtuns and 
Afghans (including Afghan Pashtuns and non-Pashtun Afghans).106 Throughout interviews in 
Afghan Camp and around other settlements on the outskirts of main Sohrab Goth, Afghans 
recalled how they were moved to Afghan Camp because of the intra-Pakistani violence of the 
1980s. An Afghan Pashtun fabric wholesaler who was living in Sohrab Goth during the 1980s 
said: 
                                                          
105 In interviews with residents the exact date of the camp being established is uncertain. It is likely that 
gradual movement, “encouraged” by the GOP, would have taken place – although the specific methods 
of coercion to move Afghans to this area remain unclear in my research. I was told that the camp was 
established in the mid-1980s, with 1985 and 1986 being specifically cited as the year of formation. One 
interviewee specifically stated June 17 1986 (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). A 2004 unpublished field report by 
UNHCR field staff states that the camp was established “Approx. 1982” (UNHCR-PK KH 2004) 
although this early a date was not verified in any other interviews or documentations and appears 
inaccurate. Whilst many Afghans did state that they had moved to Karachi in the 1970s and early 1980s 
they said they first settled in other areas and later moved (if they moved) to Afghan Camp.  In data from 
CCAR in 1986 and 1987 it shows that one RTV was present in Karachi in 1986 and 1987 (CCAR 1987). 
The RTV is present under two names of Bijar Buti (15-2-1987) and Deh Tasir (15-12-1986). A footnote 
regarding Deh Tasir states, “The freshly opened camp at Deh Tasir, Karachi is in the nature of a transit 
camp whose permanent location is yet to be decided by the government” (15-12-1987). 
106  During fieldwork I encountered Afghan Pashtuns and Tajiks who had “become Pakistani” by 
informally getting Pakistani citizenship. Other Afghan “ethnic groups” interviewed had not “become 
Pakistani”, but this may be because these ethnic groups did not also have CNICs. Rather,  my findings are 
likely to be a methodology issue as this study did not complete enough of a range of interviews with all 
the different Afghan ethnicities present in Karachi and nor is it trying to find out specifically how many 
Afghans have “become Pakistani”. Sources also indicated that some Afghan Pashtuns hold positions 
within the ANP. However, most Afghans (Pashtun and otherwise) still display an affinity to an “Afghan” 
identity. Perhaps as their presence continues in Pakistan their positioning has the potential to transform 
into a new ethnicity within Pakistan rather than a separate nationality, i.e. Pakistani Afghan, or a 
transnational form of existence. This will be looked at in another case study in this chapter in the case of 
Hassan Ali (PXP51). 
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Junejo [Pakistani Prime Minister] did it, the breaking down of the 
area... A notice came that the [Super] Highway’s Bara Market had 
become quite bad and of ill-repute. So they, the government and 
officials, were breaking it down (Rostam, KHA68). 
Another Afghan Uzbek resident now living in Afghan Camp said: 
They emptied people out from Sohrab Goth and moved them 
here [Afghan Camp] (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71). 
Whilst another Afghan Tajik said: 
All Afghans were shifted from Sohrab Goth to Afghan Camp, 
which is when we came here. There was nothing when we came 
here... This place had no population and no people. Imagine that 
this entire place was totally quiet, a jangal... there was nothing: no 
houses, no structure, nothing (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70). 
 
It appears that non-national (Afghan) lives were more vulnerable to the physical and structural 
violence of the local Pakistani state than Pakistani national lives, i.e. Pakistani Pashtuns, were,  
and that Afghans were also blamed for the violence in Karachi (“Our name was bad” [Rostam, 
KHA68]) – despite the fact that, “it was a not our issue” [Habibullah, KHA13]). In fact, this 
greater vulnerability of non-nationals within the “ethnicised” and political context of Karachi 
appears to explain why Afghan lives were objectified as units that could be simply “emptied”, 
“shifted”, and segregated to the barren jangal which became known as Afghan Camp. Who are 
lowest of the low in the “Afghan-Pashtun menacing” framework of Karachi? It would appear 
that Afghans are.  
 
Afghan Camp was built up through the efforts of residents. It was also partially supported by 
UNCHR and the WFP (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10; Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70; Mustafa Habib, 
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KHA47). Currently, Afghan Camp consists of mixed quality katcha houses107and resembles a 
quasi-rural settlement (i.e. a goth).108 Afghan families from various locations, ethnic, and linguistic 
groups in Afghanistan, with various communities defining themselves as Afghan Pashtun, Tajik, 
Turkmen, Mughal, and Uzbek live in the camp. The family, immediate and extended, is the most 
important unit of organisation in Afghan Camp, and housing structures are generally arranged 
around members of the same kin, clan, or ancestral village. Kin solidarities are important in 
explaining at a micro-level how personalised redistribution occurs, such as pooled incomes and 
shared housing (see Chapter 6).  
 
Mixed income levels are reported, but there are notable cases of extreme poverty – with poverty 
being measured as the inability to access food and/or shelter and/or earn an income of less than 
Rs.150-Rs.200 per earning person in the household per day. Some areas within the camp house 
high earning trading families, including some of the elders interviewed, and their houses are 
either pakka houses or with one or two pakka walls and the rest of the walls being katcha. These 
are families that have usually been in the camp for over 20 years. Other areas have more mixed 
income levels with katcha houses being the norm, and the poorest residents live in tent structures 
– the poorer residents are usually Afghans that have lived in the camp for three-to-eight years 
(see figures 4-6). However, there is no segregated “rich-poor” neighbourhood per se and almost 
                                                          
107 The katcha makkan is sometimes “preferred” in Afghan Camp and other unregulated housing areas in 
Karachi and Peshawar, particularly in hot weather because this allows for cooler household temperatures, 
particularly if electricity supplies (and therefore fans) are unreliable. It is also much cheaper to construct 
than a pakka makkan. 
108 Exact numbers of the people living in Afghan Camp are unclear. The unpublished UNHCR field 
report (UNHCR-PK KH 2004) placed the population at over 100,000. Following repatriation the area’s 
population is said to have considerably fallen. The current (2012) number of registered Afghan refugees 
in Afghan Camp is 25,000; and in all of Karachi, 71,000. However, numbers of unregistered Afghans in 
Karachi are said to be much higher, with figures ranging from 100,000 – 400,000, and a 2009 report 
(Befare 2009:61) estimating that Karachi has 1 million illegal Afghans (which, from fieldwork, seems like 
an over-estimate). During fieldwork I was told the camp is roughly home to 900 households (with an 
average of 6-12 persons per household), although numbers may have changed.  
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all housing structures are physically vulnerable to the weather - rain, floods, heat, and cold. The 
camp has a health clinic that was established by an INGO in 2008, a number of schools, 
madrassas, and a main bazaar. Generally, the camp is densely packed, and access to electricity is 
unreliable, which is not unusual in Pakistan and Karachi. The area also has poor access to 
effective sanitation, drainage systems, and water. Polio, waterborne illnesses, skin diseases 
(scabies), psychological stress and disorder, and malnutrition are all present in Afghan Camp.109 
 
The actors responsible for Afghans who are registered refugees110 in Karachi include the GOP 
via CAR and the ARRC, UNHCR, other UN bodies, and an INGO that entered the area in 2008. 
GOA actors are present in Karachi but only in a diplomatic and procedural role. However, the 
specific responsibilities of the CAR and UNHCR are unclear and ever-changing. CAR’s role in 
Afghan Camp for one is minimal. In an interview with the Commissioner of CAR Sindh, the 
Commissioner said that as Afghan Camp does not legally exist, because of the informal sub-lease, 
and because the numbers of Afghans in Karachi are less compared to other areas (i.e. Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and FATA 111 ) the department receives no money from the GOP (interview: 
                                                          
109 These notes are taken from interviews and ethnographic observations completed in the INGO medical 
clinic. The clinic also has a programme to feed some malnourished babies and infants in the camp. 
110 Afghans in Pakistan are classified as either registered refugees, for which they need to possess an 
Afghan Citizen’s Proof of Registration Card (POR); illegal immigrants (when no legal documents are 
possessed); or Pakistani Afghans (when Afghans appropriate Pakistani citizenship to become Pakistani in 
legal and documentary terms). UNHCR and GOP via CAR hold responsibility towards registered 
Afghans only.  
111 Historically little attention was paid to Afghans in Karachi. In earlier archives (1980-81) no mention of 
Afghans in Karachi is made. However, in 1982 a UNHCR Information Bulletin reads: “Many [Afghans] have 
sought employment in Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Lahore” (UNHCR-PK 1982b). But it was only in 1986 
that an “official” presence appears in the archives, with “15,141 Afghans” recorded in Karachi (15-2-1987) 
(CCAR 1987). The reason for this difference is to do with numbers, i.e. the fact that  FATA, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan bore the brunt of the emergency exodus given geographic proximity, with 
2.2 million Afghans in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA and 0.85 million in Balochistan. And, it is also 
related to the fact that during the Soviet-Afghan War, Peshawar, Quetta, and FATA were considered 
“frontline” zones, absorbing the majority of refugees and housing key resistance/mujahidin fighters, with 
vestiges of these “frontline” sentiments remaining post-2001 (even though Karachi was a strategic port 
city). On the ground this means that Afghans in Karachi have often been marginalised as insignificant 
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Akhtar 2010). The GOP thus “gives no money” to Afghans “for anything” (ibid). “We provide 
the documentation needed for repatriation but aside from that, nothing”, the Commissioner said 
(ibid). 112  As Afghan Camp lacks formal/official RTV status it has had an even tougher 
experience than other Afghan RTVs outside of Sindh (in this study, those in Peshawar). 113 
UNHCR is also aware of Afghan Camp’s existence and during fieldwork would send 
representatives or field staff to visit the camp and speak with elders and inform them of shifts in 
UNHCR policies or projects such as the repatriation programme. However, UNHCR’s presence 
in Afghan Camp, and other areas in Karachi, has historically been irregular and unpredictable 
(outside of Afghan Camp it has been virtually non-existent).114 Now when UNHCR is present it 
is only to encourage and monitor repatriation efforts and not any other forms of relief or 
support.  
 
The “ambiguity of unequal inclusion” (Ron 2003) creates a tenuous position for Afghan 
dominant areas in Karachi. Indeed, as Afghan Camp is purposefully placed by the state on the 
extreme edges of the city, the majority of Karachi’s Afghans have historically chosen not to live 
in Afghan Camp. Alternative informal spaces are preferred above Afghan Camp. Interviews were 
completed with former residents of Afghan Camp who said they moved as it did not even offer 
the basics: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“objects” compared to the geopolitically significant Afghan bodies in Peshawar, Quetta, and FATA. This 
has meant less infrastructural development of Karachi’s Afghan areas and Afghan Camp when compared 
to the BHU and basic primary schooling that are present in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s RTVs until today. 
(However, from the mid-1990s Peshawar has also faced RTV closures fostering a sense of abandonment 
and betrayal). 
112 Funds for repatriation initiatives are provided via UNHCR. 
113 Afghan Camp has not had the same historic infrastructure development, i.e. of a BHU, effective 
waterlines, and funded school systems. The current medical clinic only opened in the past 2 years. 
114 During field work there was no UNHCR office in Karachi, with the Karachi/Sindh office closing in 
2004. Even before 2004 the UNHCR sub-office in Karachi/Sindh had closed and reopened several times. 
At the time of writing in 2012 a field office was reopened in Sindh. UNHCR’s role in Karachi is primarily 
for repatriation programmes.  
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The conditions are still bad there. We moved early because we 
wanted better opportunities (Atef, KHA29). 
In other cases Afghans automatically avoided Afghan Camp: 
I would never have lived there. When we first moved to Afghan 
Camp we settled in another area and rented property then started 
up trading (Jahangir, KHA66). 
 
Certainly higher numbers of Afghans are present in mixed Afghan and Pakistani settlements 
along the Karachi-Hyderabad Super Highway, Sohrab Goth, and other areas within the city. 
However, these other spaces, particularly if they are “Afghan dominant”, have no formal support 
of the GOP or UNHCR - whatever its worth may be. 
 
The Pakistani state continues to bear some responsibility towards Afghan residents in Afghan 
Camp because of the norms of international refugee law and agreements it has with UNHCR 
and the GOA, and because the area is territorially “well within” the state. Thus the GOP 
provides a “minimum of legal protection” (Ron 2003:16) to the area. This is seen through the 
sub-letting, if it can be called that, of Pakistani land – which is essentially the only action that the 
state “does” for Afghans in Karachi as a whole. However, even this minimal responsibility is 
grudgingly expressed. The result is an ambiguous legal position of the camp that also means 
residents are vulnerable to neglect and exploitation. The waterlines and electricity lines that are 
falteringly present in Afghan Camp are not provided through formal channels. Instead residents 
depend on informal arrangements with official and private contractors, the Pakistani Rangers 
(state actors supplying water), and KESC (a private company supplying electricity). Like other 
areas, Afghan Camp is also vulnerable to official actors, such as the police acting in unofficial 
ways – i.e. demanding bribes –, as well as the influence of local power holders and middlemen 
157 
 
who “protect” the everyday material goods that Afghans possess, i.e. housing structures, as well 
as give access to them, i.e. building materials.  
This area used to have big people living in it before, who had 
connections; but many went back to Afghanistan. Now police 
officials come here asking for money all the time; it is routine” 
(Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).  
 
Police officers often come through on their motorbikes, trying to 
get money here (Changeiz, KHA14; Hidayatullah KHA15; 
Shaqeel, KHA16). 
 
 
Figure 4: Afghan tented housing belonging to poorer section of Afghan Camp 
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Figure 5: Housing belonging to poorer section of Afghan Camp 
 
Figure 6: Internal courtyard of a middle-income family in Afghan Camp 
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During fieldwork the issue of water and interlinked issues of poor healthcare and sanitation were 
repeatedly raised as an example in which a specific human right is denied to the residents in 
Afghan Camp. “There are many problems – are we not human?” an Afghan elder, Hajji Tooraj 
said during a semi-structured interview (Hajji Tooraj, KHA73). He continued: 
These are human rights (isnani haqq) violations. No sanitation, no 
water, no schools, no rights, no hospitals. No one can say that 
they have given any rights to the Afghan. 
 
For residents the lack of direct access to water is understood and experienced as a serious affront 
to life, health, and sanitation. Ethnographic observations across Afghan Camp and daily 
conversations were dominated by accounts of water-related illnesses and deaths. During one 
particular week in which I was conducting interviews and completing observations in a school 
attached to the medical clinic, the death of a pregnant woman, Sumaiya, facing labour difficulties 
whilst she was in a taxi en route to the hospital formed the focus of the mood in the camp. Elders, 
women, men, and children mentioned Sumaiya’s “story” with anger, frustration, remorse, 
resignation, and even as just another normal occurrence of daily life in Afghan Camp - “Women 
always die here in childbirth, because of no health care and no water... how can you give birth 
without water!” a female resident told me as we sat in her home with her pregnant mother 
nearby (Gulshaan, KHA13.B). Sumaiya, in labour was frantically placed in a wheelbarrow, “like a 
janwar (animal)” (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10) rather than a human being, and was pushed along by 
two children in a panic. She was taken to a taxi at the edge of the camp that was meant to drive 
her to the nearest government hospital, a 45-60 minute drive away (for a cost of Rs.800) but she 
died before reaching the hospital. I went to speak with Yaqoob Gul, Sumaiya’s relative and 
resident of Afghan Camp, to find out what had happened.  
We have no hospital near to us – the nearest Government 
hospital is miles away... It was too far. The car came back in the 
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morning. When I opened the door at the back it was filled all at 
the bottom and on the seats, with blood (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). 
 
As an area established for non-nationals, Afghan Camp’s positioning on the extreme frontier of 
the city isolates the undesirable and non-national remnants of society into quarantined spaces 
that cannot interact with Karachi “proper” (Agier 2011). The urban ethnocratic spatial 
organisation via a purposeful positioning of Afghan Camp on the urban frontier creates a 
daunting distance. In the case above it was this distance that combined with a lack of a material 
resource (water) to deny a basic right to life, and even a humanised death. 
 
Figure 7: Map of Karachi (Orangi Pilot Project Map). 
Many residential areas that have high Afghan demographics are situated off from Super Highway 
and Afghan Camp is at the furthest distance (near Town 18, Gadap). 
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Water used to be provided to the camp through direct pipes (apparently funded partly by 
UNHCR).115 However, the water supply was reduced in the mid-1990s and fully dried up from 
2001-2004.116 Residents spoke of failed efforts to try to get funds from the GOP and various 
INGOs in order to renew the waterlines. The Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Sindh said, 
“We do not have the funds and the money to renew the waterlines [for the camp]” (interview: 
Akhtar 2010). The lone INGO active in the area was also unwilling to “risk”117 the money 
required to regenerate water supplies on an area that is on a temporary and unofficial sub-lease. 
In a semi-structured interview with an Afghan elder, Maulana Abdul Qais (KHA70) who has 
lived in Afghan Camp for over 20 years and worked with others to lobby the INGO to supply 
water to Afghan Camp he said, “Anything that is Afghan, it is taken away [i.e. the dried up 
waterlines are not renewed]”. Revealing frustrations about another time when money that was 
raised privately for Afghan Camp was redirected to another initiative he continued, “Our things 
[piped water] were given to a “higher” priority area and went to Pakistanis during the [2010] 
floods. But we too are high priority – how many people need to die?!” Activities like this are 
“not an unusual occurrence”. Yaqoob Gul and an Afghan medical assistant, Mustafa Habib, 
                                                          
115 There is no documentation or full confirmation regarding which official actors provided the water in 
the first place. Most interviewees said that permission was provided by the GOS and that funding was 
supplied by UNHCR, although some interviewees mentioned UNICEF. In interviews with the 
Commissioner of Afghan Refugees, Sindh, he said that the government has always given permission for 
the waterlines but that it cannot fund them now that they have “dried up” (interview: Akhtar 2010), 
which leads one to suspect that it is likely that the waterlines were also previously funded by a non-state 
actor, i.e. potentially UNHCR and/or UNICEF as interviewees mention. 
116 Some interviews reported that the waterlines dried up in 2001 and other say around 2004 and 2005. 
However, it is clear that water access was increasingly drying up at the start of the 2000s, although the 
actual date of the waterlines becoming “fully dry” is unclear. In a visit I conducted in the area in mid-2012 
it was reported that the waterlines were re-active, but in a visit in 2013 the waterlines were said to have 
dried up again. Currently, problems regarding the cleanliness and regularity of the water remain. Whilst 
the Afghan position in Karachi – given the city’s volatile political conditions – has never been warmly 
welcomed by the city’s political powers (particularly when compared to the positive absorption of 
Afghans in 1980s Peshawar), a shift in the Afghan position is evident and is likely to have been influenced 
by changing instrumentalist geopolitical objectives as well as conditions within the city. Indeed, residents 
often spoke about shifts that they recently feel have taken place “in the past few years”, including 
“less/no support” and “increased harassment”. 
117 This English term was the specific word used by employees of the organisation during discussions. 
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working in the INGO added, more than once, in private and out of sight from other INGO 
workers: 
They have done this before, diverted funds away from Afghans. 
There was a foreign guy who came and he worked in the camp… 
he wanted to raise money for the Camp, and he did. But they 
redirected his money to other parts of Pakistan. They said other 
parts of Pakistan needed it more! (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10 and 
Mustafa Habib, KHA47). 
 
The bureaucratic and “rational” ways of seeing used by the INGO are understood as devaluing 
and dehumanising their lives. In other areas, however, the INGO is providing relief and is a 
needed presence in the area through feeding malnourished children, testing for diseases, and 
providing shelter to severely ill persons, but in this example the INGO does not act in the fully 
humanitarian way that it is expected to.  Maulana Abdul Qais continued:  
The costs [for renewing the waterlines] were coming to Rs.29 
lakh and Rs.30 lakh but they [the INGO] would not authorise 
this. They said that we have been here for a while but they do 
not know how much longer we will be here for and that money 
would go to waste! Behind all the talk of insaniyat 
(humanitarianism) is a profit based approach (Maulana Abdul 
Qais, KHA70). 
For Maulana Abdul Qais decisions of “investment”, “risk”, and a “cost-benefit” analysis are 
understood as having shaped the INGO’s decision rather than the urgent and pressing basic 
human need of water. An organisation that is expected by residents to act in a humanising way is 
instead seen to be using dehumanising lenses to inform their actions - or in this case inaction. 
Subsequently it was this organisation itself which appeared cruel and impervious to the needs of 
residents. During extended interviews with other residents regarding issue of water, concerns 
against “rational” ways of seeing based on “risk” were raised. In a response to the manner in 
which the local INGO had failed to deliver in the area Yaqoob Gul and Habibullah, another 
long-term resident and his friend, said: 
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These INGO’s make promises that they cannot keep… All of 
the people that work here, are they sincere? You know who I am 
talking about and you have seen them working. Do they really 
care about us? One doctor that comes to the hospital, he comes 
when he wishes and says that he is working to help us! But he 
does nothing. He comes once a month, if that, and when he 
comes he goes home early. Sits for a couple of hours and that’s 
it. Two weeks ago, you were there, you were there when I asked 
him to come and see that kid [his nephew] with the skin 
problems. That doctor he just comes and sits there. Do you think 
he cares? He doesn’t do anything. He never did see that kid. He 
died this week… If you’re going to help, then help [about the 
INGO]. But we don’t want to hear your false words. Stuff those 
words and keep them yourself. We will help ourselves, God 
willing (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10 and Habibullah, KHA13). 
 
Importantly, the various constructions of Afghan life as objectified units of cost (as well as 
earlier mentioned practices of urban ethnocracy), which lead to the denial of basic human needs 
are not silently accepted. Within Afghan Camp attempts to reverse the absence of water and 
other basic material resources are made using solidarity networks and navigation practices in 
which the fellowship of space & charity is important.  In the face of a lack of water different 
“anonymous” residents (Tajik, Uzbek, Pashtun, Mughal, and Turkmen) - some related to each 
other, many not - work together via human interactions to secure some form of access to water. 
The family and clan unit is the most important unit of organisation in Afghan Camp, but in the 
case of accessing water for the area, the family unit is transcended. A symbolic and shared struggle 
for water brings “anonymous” and unrelated actors together. “It is hard for us”; “We find it 
difficult”; “People struggle here” were common expressions used in the interviews when 
describing the search for water and basic material resources, to indicate a common attachment to 
Afghan Camp “humanity”. 
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At one point in Afghan Camp’s history, after the waterlines fully dried up residents met to 
discuss possible routes of action, pooled resources, and shared wider connections with formal 
actors and organisations. Guest rooms,118 homes, and mosques formed sites of public discussion. 
During this time, Yaqoob Gul, was in charge of producing the estimates for the costs of new 
waterlines. Other residents and elders, such as Maulana Abdul Qais, completed queries regarding 
the numbers of people in different sections of the camp, which helped Yaqoob Gul produce his 
estimates. Habibullah approached his contacts with the INGO to ask if they would support the 
waterlines scheme (which they did not). Others still approached various contacts in government 
departments as well as organisations they were familiar with, including an informal trucker’s 
organisation in Sohrab Goth. However, it was when an Afghan Uzbek, Hajji Mahfouz (KHA6) 
secured an informal agreement with the Pakistani Rangers who control some water supplies in 
Karachi that water access was secured. Full details of the terms of agreement between Hajji 
Mahfouz and the Pakistani Rangers were not fully disclosed during fieldwork - conversations and 
enquiries always stopped short of the full terms and conditions - but as Hajji Mahfouz has 
relationships with government officials as he acts as a mediator for Afghan Camp with external 
officials it is likely that his favour with the Commissioner of Afghan Refugees Sindh accelerated 
his deal with the Rangers. Here, different residents pooled their individual resources, social 
connections, inadvertently producing a rich form of social capital, in the interests of a wider 
Afghan Camp humanity, offering what help they could and when. Residents worked together to 
form “bridges” between their “weak ties” (Granovetter 1985) with each other. This 
neighbourhood consciousness was crucial in enabling a community-based form of action. Indeed, 
akin to other examples of networks in urban poor communities it is clear that “people, who 
utilize networks to fulfil individual and collective needs, and to influence the distribution of public 
and private goods and services, engage other people in their efforts... The system, allows people 
                                                          
118 In most Afghan households in the camp, homes have a guest room. This is the space in which male 
household members receive other male guests for socialisation and family, business, and political 
discussions. The guestroom reflects a public space within the household. 
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who have access to different types of resources to contribute to and prosper within the community, 
despite vast differences in status, wealth, education, piety of property” (emphasis added) 
(Singerman 1995:136-7). 
 
Currently, the Rangers and private contractors 119  supply different under-tank systems in the 
camp with water at the cost of a few hundred or a few thousand rupees per fill depending on the 
size of the under-tank (see also N.Ahmed 2008). This is then sold in blue 5 litre plastic cartons 
for Rs.5 or Rs.6 that residents have to refill. In this instance, by using solidarity networks and 
engaging with state actors through practices of access, water is redistributed, at least partially, and 
provided to the residents. 
 
Figure 8: Plastic container used to refill water with pipe to refill each container. 
 
                                                          
119 After the Rangers supplied water private contractors also started to supply water to the area. 
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In Afghan Camp basic levels of material goods are pursued in order to offer a route to meet a 
minimal level of a humanised life and to improve their lives.  In an interview with another 
resident and elder, Hajji Hayyat said, “Water is a basic human need. We are human, are we not? 
We need water” (KHA71).  
 
In addition, as faith is a central part of Afghan Camp120 residents also wanted conditions in 
which the non-material rituals of prayer are possible. In the interview with Hajji Hayyat, 
regarding the lack of water in the camp he said: 
Cleanliness is meant to be half of our faith – how are we 
meant to be able to pray and to follow our faith if we 
have no cleanliness – not even to do wudu. The mosques 
are half empty and without water – how can that be? 
(Hajji Hayyat, KHA71). 
Hajji Hayyat’s understanding of a fuller human life is deeply interlinked with his ability to 
practice the basic pillars of his Islamic faith. 
 
Importantly, given the significance of religion, the quest for water is also motivated by moral 
frameworks of charity which strengthen the bonds between these otherwise anonymous actors. 
In my dialogue with residents and elders they also understood their coming together as being 
based on moral concepts of charity informed by faith and a non-material order, even though 
these actors are from different religious schools and sects. In one instance I sat with Hajji 
Mahfouz informally, in a medical clinic in the camp as his eight-year old son had a high fever. I 
asked him why he was so active in the camp, trying to secure water and improve health and 
security. He said:  
                                                          
120 Mosques are central features of Afghan Camp life; and houses are identified by which mosque they are 
closest to. 
167 
 
I had to do this [this charity]… and I am still always trying to do 
something for the people here. This is the work of humanity, this 
is work for people. I have a duty. These other [material] things 
do not matter that much, this life is short (Hajji Mahfouz, 
KHA6). 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, in Islamic discourses generosity is one of the highest virtues; and the 
Quran and Islamic jurisprudence promise the obligation of almsgiving by all those who are 
capable to do so, which is reinforced by cultural norms.121 Thus for some residents and elders 
their actions are explained in the rhetoric of worldly matters and “a drama of otherworldly affairs” 
(Adib-Moghaddam 2010: 254-55).  This was repeated by Maulana Abdul Qais - a part of the 
group that worked to restore water supplies and who also runs his own mosque, housing for 
widows, and an orphanage with his wife.  When I asked him why he, his wife, and others worked 
so hard in the mosque, the orphanage, and the quarters for widows, he replied: “This is our zakat, 
our sadaqah” (Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70). 
 
Interestingly both Hajji Mahfouz and Maulana Abdul Qais have enough forms of capital to leave 
the camp. Hajji Mahfouz is an Uzbek Afghan with transnational connections in Afghanistan, is 
well-connected within Karachi, and is understood to have significant forms of cultural capital. 
Maulana Abdul Qais is an Afghan Tajik originally from Baghlan, who now lives in Karachi and 
Kabul in a fully transnational life. He has a regular, stable, income, and is well-connected within 
Karachi. However, neither Hajji Mahfouz nor Maulana Abdul Qais have chosen to leave Afghan 
Camp in pursuit of “modern” consumer comforts. Their actions are not a rejection of 
“modernity”, but a reflection of the multiple and contested forms of modernity possible 
(Appadurai 1996). When this question was posed to both of them (separately and on separate 
occasions) both referred to a sense of “responsibility” and a moral and ethical concern for 
                                                          
121 Nor does it just involve material donations; indeed, during our conversation Hajji Mahfouz said, “By 
doing this work we are in the service of others. This too is a form of worship; this too is living with imaan 
(faith)” (Hajji Mahfouz, KHA6). 
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“humanity”. This is not to say that both actors are “anti-modern”, but it is to show that for these 
actors an alternative form of social and metaphysical capital is possible,122 shaping their interests 
alongside an alternative imagining of a humanised existence other than what is offered by 
dominant official discourses.  
 
The Afghan capacity to “persist” (Butler 2010) in Afghan Camp carves out a space for Afghans 
in Karachi. Despite nationalised ways of seeing and corresponding forms of ghettoisation, a 
stubborn Afghan presence is practiced and one that is versed in a self-humanising rhetoric. The 
fellowship of space & charity is more responsive to the needs of Afghan Camp than the officials 
who are responsible to it: CAR, UNHCR, and the INGO. Unlike the bureaucratic structure of 
the INGO this solidarity network is practiced and supported by rhetoric that is not about “risk 
assessments” or “false charity”. Rather it is concerned with providing a basic material resource 
for the basic levels of a humanised life and it recognises the value of these human lives. “People 
need water”, Yaqoob Gul said (KHA10). “They need water to live. Half of our issues would be 
over if there was decent access to water”. In the face of these challenges and the shortcomings of 
the INGO residents attempt to regain their humanity by juxtaposing their position against the 
“heartless” (the word frequently used by Habibullah, KHA13 and Yaqoob Gul, KHA10) INGO 
and by assuming agency and responsibility (Pollman 2010).  
 
Crucially, however, these informal structures and strategies used in the quest for self-
humanisation are not a utopian alternative. Despite the expressions of agency and self-
                                                          
122 Bourdieu (1991) outlines that various forms of capital can also be sites of (symbolic) violence, i.e. what 
is considered to be important "cultural” capital may reaffirm existing modes of domination. But here 
Afghans use their social capital as a platform to secure material and non-material goods for a more 
humanised form of existence, which is rationalised in rhetoric different from the current political order. A 
different order, which contests the state’s understanding of “modernisation” or “bureaucratic” 
management is expressed. Alternative localities emerge as important sites that contest official ways of 
working (Appadurai 1996). 
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humanising frames of the fellowship of space & charity and the practices of negotiated access, 
the issue of water is not fully resolved. In the immediate term the water supplied by the Pakistani 
Rangers and private contractors is understood as a useful substitute, but it also creates a number 
of physical and physiological hazards. The water provided to the under-tanks does not meet any 
legal health and safety regulations – a factor that appears to have worsened with multiple water 
providers. During fieldwork residents often expressed concerns about the cleanliness of the 
water supplied.  
This is rough water, it is not safe (Rastin, KHA8). 
 
People are left to use water they cannot trust. Who knows 
whether this water is clean? Sometimes it is bitter and salty, 
sometimes it is sweet (Habibullah, KHA13). 
 
The water that is available through the boxes is not clean; it is 
not safe to drink (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). 
 
Forms of regulation when effectively managed are useful in preventing mass illnesses and 
preserving a certain standard of life. Where these regulations are not upheld the possibilities of 
human life, as in Afghan Camp, are vulnerable. The solutions are not fully effective and are only 
used as no other alternatives are available. Indeed Noman Ahmed’s (2009:179) study of Water 
Supply in Karachi shows that people were reliant on Awami (Rangers) tanks for water because 
“residents did not possess any options to subscribe to any combination of water supply. An 
overall shortage of water, lack of possibility to supply through piped means and remote location 
in the context of the city were the reasons [in his study] in this respect” (ibid). 
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Furthermore, many residents cannot afford to buy multiple five litre cartons of water each day, 
each at a cost Rs.5 or Rs.6. They simply do not earn enough. For these residents a dangerous 
alternative to the already alternative informal water supply lies in a mini “pond” in the camp, also 
referred to simply as “the dirty water”.  In an excerpt taken from an earlier interview with Hajji 
Mahfouz, he recalled the deaths of four children as a result of this dirty water. 
I want to tell you one other thing, and that is that the water here 
is not safe and clean at all. Where we are living four children died 
because they were washing and playing in the dirty water. Think 
about it. What type of parents would let their children bathe in 
dirty water? (Hajji Mahfouz, KHA6).  
Shortly after Hajji Mahfouz added, “But what choice do they have?”, to show that these actions 
are ones of desperation. For the very poor there is no affordable alternative. During my 
ethnographic work in the medical clinic, illnesses related to water were prevalent: scabies, 
tuberculosis, infections, and dehydration are normal occurrences in Afghan Camp. These two 
factors mean that whilst informal practices are to a degree substitutive they are not a panacea. 
The basic right to survival and a humanised life via water is not resolved. The struggle for safe 
water continues. 
We need water. We just need water! You can see for yourself. 
Just look. Look at people’s hands. Look at the cases of scabies. 
We just need good water! (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). 
Indeed, during fieldwork elders and residents were trying to fix the waterline in the camp and 
secure funding for water so that they could have clean piped water direct to each household.  
 
In some cases some residents and/or elders also exploit weaker residents during the water access 
process, and in other processes of accessing basic material goods. As some elders have 
established relationships with officials, variances in power standings within Afghan Camp do 
occur, which in some cases result in elders acting with equally dehumanising intentions. Within 
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Afghan Camp certain residents and elders, some of whom have now moved out of the camp and 
live in regulated housing in Karachi, were reported as renting out houses to residents in the camp, 
and charging residents high rates for utilities, such as electricity.  
 
The impact of the informal structures and strategies on the Pakistan state are also significant. 
The informal practices of Afghan Camp are encouraged by official actors because they fill in for 
the state, the refugee regime, and the INGO in question; and for the Pakistani Rangers they also 
offer some profit. Pakistani officials applauded the initiatives of the residents of Afghan Camp in 
accessing water “independently” and using formal-informal practices to do so. 
He [Hajji Mahfouz] did a lot of the running around and chasing 
after people… he should be given credit where it is due. He did a 
lot.  He is the one that resolved the entire issue of water. He’s a 
good organiser (interview: Akhtar 2010). 
However, at exactly the same time as informal processes are filling in for the state a dialectic of 
delegitimization and decay is also taking place.  
 
In the short-term the water supplied by the Pakistani Rangers and private contractors appears 
substitutive. However, as the outputs that are produced are half-baked and dangerous it means 
that the Pakistani city is expanding and being maintained with low quality and unsustainable 
infrastructures, which have the potentials of creating longer term problems for the state with 
regards to urban development and expansion. Further, in non-physical terms, as UNHCR’s 
position is sporadic and fluctuating, the relevant INGO appears concerned with a bureaucratic 
cost-benefit analysis, and CAR is essentially absent, as such, official organisations smack of 
incompetence and indifference to the basic human struggles that residents of the camp are 
involved in. Even the mention of officials was often met with a sneer. The ambiguity of Afghan 
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Camp’s position and corresponding responsibilities of official actors towards it make the state 
and refugee regime appear defunct, and even cruel.  
 
The only state organisation that delivers to Afghan Camp residents, and even this delivery is 
flawed, are the Pakistani Rangers.  
The Rangers are good – they are better than the rest of the 
Pakistani government and actors (Habibullah, KHA13). 
The Rangers are understood as being distinct from the rest of the Pakistanis bureaucratic and 
civilian administration. They also act as important sub-contractors of the Pakistani state who are 
not only engaged in internal policing and security but also in profit-generation and delivering 
resources to residents. This would normally not be an issue – a state organisation delivering 
materials to important groups is usually unproblematic. However, as various studies show, the 
Rangers and other military actors control a number of resources in the city (Ahmed 2009) (and 
other spaces in Pakistan [Siddiqa [2007]) and can be at odds with the central non-military 
government. For example, as Chapter 4 mentions, in July 2010 Pakistani Rangers were engaged 
in “illegal constructions” in Karachi against the wishes of two Sindh government departments. 
Whilst the Rangers were directed to stop construction by Jinnah Courts, their activities - which 
are routine - show complexities and multiple sources of power in the city (URC 2010).   
 
The arrangement with the Pakistani Rangers in Afghan Camp, an informal and undocumented 
agreement, also normalises informal activity via state actors. More importantly, it reinforces the 
strength of different power sources in the city; in this case of a military that is often at odds with 
the civilian administration and bureaucratic government departments. Thus whilst informality is 
a part of the state, it is so in contradictory terms. Informal forms of redistribution make it 
173 
 
difficult to locate sovereignty and authority in Karachi. Instead, multiple sites of sovereignty 
appear to be in active - and are being reinforced – that do not align with the central state 
apparatus (government departments, law, local union councils, and so on). Indeed in the cases 
where Rangers are held in high esteem by Afghans (Habibullah, KHA13), this does not transfer 
onto the state edifice as a whole; instead they are seen as actors who are doing the best they can 
in a corrupt state. Thus official (non-military) organisations are delegitimized and understood as 
ineffective, even cruel, and not to be trusted. Instead solidarity networks and a profitable military 
are seen as more trusted units of organisation.  
 
The incompetence (“We have no money”) and weak reach of official channels and official actors 
mean the state is itself reliant on formal-informal mechanisms that normalise formal-informal 
practices. Subsequently the “formal” appears abnormal. The informal means used to maintain 
the state have normalised a new culture of their own, which undermines the formal objectives of 
state policies, modernisation, and urban development. Karachi is aiming to become a “world 
class” city (CDGK 2007), but how can it achieve this with urban-rural housing areas that have 
weak infrastructure, poor health, sanitation, and no water supplies? And, as mentioned, these 
processes boost the formal-informal positions of the Pakistani Rangers and private contractors, 
and even middlemen and exploitative elders, whose objectives often work against “legal” and 
“official” objectives. These processes also create multiple sites of power in the city that exist 
outside of the rubric of the state. Indeed, Karachi’s multiple sites of power and accompanying 
political violence that currently engrosses the city cannot be separated from the significance of 
informality (see also Bremen 2012).  
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From all angles the state appears to stumble – neglectful, incompetent, or complicit. Indeed 
terms, such as “sifarish” and “bhatta”, are automatically associated with the state (either attributed 
to state actors or directly the state itself), and its character is subsequently deeply eroded. Thus, 
even when solidarity networks and navigation practices - with reliance on the Rangers, other 
private contractors, and intermediaries - do not fully solve the problem or involve exploitation, 
they at least enable a striving towards survival to occur and are more trusted than following the 
law and official channels. Indeed, whilst a strong local state for regulatory purposes or social and 
economic distribution is desirable (Friedmann 1992), in Karachi the idea of a strong state, to 
borrow from Mike Davis (2006:62), is clearly a “hallucination or a bad joke”.  Thus, solidarity 
networks and navigation practices offer at least some possibilities of redistribution. However, 
simultaneously these informal ways of working in Karachi also point to a potential boiling point 
for the Pakistani state which does not exercise control over these emerging and competing 
power sources.  
 
“Our Homes are Being Bulldozed!” A Pakistani Neighbourhood’s Quest for Shelter 
Importantly, the quest for basic survival, via solidarity networks, navigation practices, and their 
subsequent impact on official structures, is not confined to Afghans. Pakistanis use the same methods 
for survival. Afghans and Pakistanis (non-citizens and citizens) occupy a shared reality in Pakistan. 
This is not reflective of an alternative or “true” citizenship – this would be a stretch too far. 
However, it is reflective of a shared space in which both Afghans and Pakistanis are agents who 
create political pressures in Pakistan.  
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What follows is an analysis of a series of interviews and observations completed in an 
unregulated residential area called Ishtiaq Goth on the outskirts of Karachi.123 Unlike Afghan 
Camp, whose story is told through the struggle for water, the story of basic survival in Ishtiaq 
Goth is told through the efforts to safeguard shelter and maintain the existence of the entire 
neighbourhood. However, similar functional structures - a fellowship of space & charity - and 
physical and non-physical impacts on the state emerge, such as poor physical solutions and 
challenges to official legitimacy.  
 
In Karachi fieldwork was completed in a series of katchi abadis and goths in and around Sohrab 
Goth, Super Highway, and North Karachi (key “peripheral” areas of the city). These were 
possible through a grassroots worker from the CDGK (for non-Pakistani Pashtun and non-
Afghan areas) and personal networks (for Pakistani Pashtun and Afghan areas). The case to be 
discussed now uses oral interviews and observations that were facilitated via an introduction 
from the CDGK worker (he was, however, absent during the interviews).  
 
Ishtiaq Goth is not as far out of the city as Afghan Camp but it still sits on the northern frontier 
of the city (see Figure 7), reflective of the fact that most of Karachi’s informal housing expansion 
now takes place on city outskirts (Hasan 2006; 2010; Roy and Alsayyad 2006).  Ishtiaq Goth is 
home to a mixed population of Pakistanis: Sindhis, Saraikis, Baloch, and Pakistani Muhajirs. No 
Afghans live in this particular area. Male household members work as factory workers, labourers, 
and traders. The area is arranged around the unit of the nuclear family with some wider kin 
networks present.124 Residents of this area have been unable to buy land through formal and 
official channels in Pakistan because the costs - financial and bureaucratic - of a regulated house 
                                                          
123 The name of the location and people has been changed. 
124 This is perhaps related to the difference in nature of settlement and migration to Ishtiaq Goth by 
Pakistani citizens. 
176 
 
are too high and because, as discussed in Chapter 3, the state is not producing enough affordable 
housing (Hasan 2012). Unregulated residential areas, such as Ishtiaq Goth, act as a solution to 
this. 
 
Ishtiaq Goth is comparable to Afghan Camp in the standards of living, although it has a smaller 
population and is less densely packed, which also means that the size of the solidarity networks, 
including fellowships of space & charity, are smaller. Most houses are katcha houses, or a 
combination of katcha and pakka structures. Ishtiaq Goth is a relatively new neighbourhood with 
the oldest areas being eight-to-ten years old. There are no electricity lines 125 (unlike Afghan 
Camp); some water supplies are present, but they are sporadic; and roads, sanitation, and 
infrastructure are informally constructed.  
 
Ishtiaq Goth is built on contested land, which is not unusual in Karachi (Hasan 2006, 2010, 
2012). In Karachi, many informal settlements are built on sites of contestation/land grabs over 
private and government owned land with contests usually taking place between various informal 
entrepreneurs reffered to as the “land mafia” (i.e. political landholders and state actors acting 
quasi-legally or illegally). In Ishtiaq Goth this means the legal status of the area is unknown – 
again, the question of “who owns the land?” remains a legally and even politically contested 
question. The settlement has been strategically populated under the initiative of two informal 
property developers, Ishtiaq Mohammad (KHP35) and Omar Tariq (KHP36). These activities 
increased during 2010-11 because of floods in Sindh and across Pakistan. Ishtiaq Mohammad, a 
Sindhi, claims landholding rights to the area and is a member of the PPP - the other property 
developer is his business partner. However, during discussions, Ishtiaq Mohammad admitted 
that his claim on the land in Ishtiaq Goth was contested, which he said was the result a dispute 
                                                          
125 During fieldwork residents were awaiting an informal deal between the property developers and KESC 
to be agreed. 
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with the GOS (Ishtiaq Mohammad, KHP35). Ishtiaq Mohammad said he is the legal owner of 
the land and that the land has been in his family for generations. However, he admitted that he 
has no legal documentation to the land, and during discussions he would say that his claim to the 
land was based on a “native resident” claim to Sindhi land in Karachi. In other words, he often 
justified his claim to the land from an ethno-nationalist political claim. Parallel to Afghan Camp 
and the work completed by Matthew Hull (2008), the legal rights and responsibilities to Ishtiaq 
Goth are unknown leaving residents of the area vulnerable to exploitations by state and non-
state actors. 
 
Local government actors, including the CDGK, are aware that the settlement exists (indeed I 
visited the area via a CDGK worker), however, the area receives no official support from 
CDGK offices or from any other GOP offices. The area, in the words of residents, is “waiting to 
get made”,126 which is the process of becoming a formal and legally recognised area or included 
in “upgrading” projects. However, as the area and residents await “legality” and its legal status is 
unclear and “contested” Ishtiaq Goth is denied formal access to basic utilities and resources. It is 
also vulnerable to exploitations for profit by local state actors acting in informal ways and 
intermediaries. Perhaps if the area was a part of the state’s modernisation plans or home to 
desirable residents, i.e. the rich (Hasan 2012), state presence would be of a different type and 
would offer some forms of regulatory support; instead an anti-poor bias means that this area and 
the citizens living in the area extend the “ambiguity of unequal inclusion” (Ron 2003:16) to 
include the urban poor. 
                                                          
126 “Made”/bane-ga (future tense) is the specific word used to describe how the area is being settled by 
various Pakistanis. Other areas, which are regulated, also take time to get “made”. For example, in 
Islamabad a new regulated area slowly builds up. More people live on the land, legally, but there is a tense 
waiting period as people wait to see if other people will join the neighbourhood, which will then increase 
said neighbourhood’s security, future prospects, and monetary value. It is like waiting for any new entity 
to be made/successful/constructed. There is a period of time in which there is anticipation of its success; 
except here the stakes are significantly higher. 
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Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq offer marginalised Pakistanis who otherwise have 
difficulties in purchasing and accessing land a chance to access shelter, which is gradually built up 
into a more permanent form of housing – indeed this is how the area was built up.  At the time 
of fieldwork parts of the settlement were less than a year old and there were also older areas, 
spaced at a slight distance from each other, which had been present for over eight years. In the 
current process, local construction workers are hired by Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq to 
make basic housing plots (literally a low boundary wall and minimal house foundations or pipes 
and infrastructure for water and sanitation). After the housing plots are made or even during the 
construction process various settlers are encouraged to occupy the housing plots. 127  This 
included recent IDPs from the 2010 floods, other internal migrants from Sindh, and urban poor 
residents from other unstable unregulated residential areas in Karachi. During fieldwork I was 
told by residents that the housing structure is given to the various residents for free for a period 
of 12-36 months, during which they are encouraged to improve and even construct the structure. 
In one house, a 2010 flood IDP from Jacobabad (in interior Sindh) was encouraged to settle for 
free by Omar Tariq. His house was basic in structure. In fact there was no “house” - it was just 
an outer boundary with a wall, a door, one inner wall and a partial roof, and the rest was open 
space.  
Omar [Tariq] bhai (brother) brought us in to sit on this land. 
Ishtiaq Mohammad then said that we can have it for six months 
for free. God willing, the plan is to stay here (Maqsood, KHP37). 
 
                                                          
127 Fieldwork involved a detailed examination of the housing plots (unmade and made) as I was given a 
“tour” of the area by Omar Tariq and Ishtiaq Mohammad. 
179 
 
If residents can afford it they can “purchase” the land from the middlemen via an informal 
verbal contract. In another case a Sindhi family purchased a plot. The female household head, 
Nilofar, said: 
This is our house... We gave a Rs.7,000 - Rs.8,000 in advance to 
them [Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq] and then we did 
everything ourselves. We built the walls up ourselves – we did 
these ourselves, without hiring labour (Nilofar, KHP44). 
 
Residents are thus given access to land and are under the protection of the two property 
developers, but, given the contested nature of the land, this protection is tenuous and subject to 
challenges. Residents frequently face violent standoffs and conflicts with rival private contractors 
and the police, who are acting in illegal/informal ways by supporting Ishtiaq Mohammad’s and 
Omar Tariq’s rivals, which include houses being bulldozed.  
 
In one instance, a resident, Tabassum (referred to as Tabassum Khala [aunt] by younger residents) 
had her house bulldozed (Tabassum Khala, KHP39). Approximately 65 years-old, from an 
“Urdu-speaking” background (Pakistani Muhajir), with one son, Tabassum Khala was left 
homeless and with few possessions. For her and other residents, the act of bulldozing 
represented an embodied act of dehumanisation. As rival private builders and middlemen, 
supported by the police, bulldozed Tabassum Khala’s katcha house, her home and life were 
reduced to insignificance. The profit the land had to offer was of greater value than Tabassum 
Khala’s human life. In a group interview with two families in the area one of the women of the 
family noted how the builders who had initially built the settlement under an informal contract 
with Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq defected to Ishtiaq Mohammad’s and Omar Tariq’s 
rivals, which was speculated as being purely profit-driven.  
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What do they care if our homes are knocked over? We are poor 
and it is always the poor that die (Group interview, Ishtiaq Goth). 
Profit generation is, of course, on its own not dehumanising. However, when it becomes the 
primary determinant of action without due regard for human life, instead viewing lives as 
“automaton like” (Haslam 2006) profit generation assumes a dehumanising characteristic.  
 
In a recollection of her experience, which was corroborated with other interviewees in the area, 
Tabassum Khala recalled how she was left homeless, without money or possessions. As a man 
her son could occupy public spaces for shelter - although even this is not without significant risk 
-, but as a woman she faced greater taboos and stigma, as well as physical danger. Interlinked 
with this material absence of shelter was a non-material component of her character - her 
reputation, feelings of self-worth and social recognition were also at risk. Tabassum Khala, 
however, accessed everyday material resources, shelter and food, through a fellowship of space 
& charity that emerged in this shared area. Similar to the example in Afghan Camp, residents in 
Ishtiaq Goth are united by a shared space and a common, tenuous fate, this time with shelter and 
the area’s status and existence as the main issue at stake. Again, like Afghan Camp, this is not an 
imagined community (Anderson 1991) but one built on shared everyday experiences, and drawn 
together through human relationships. The shared space of the neighbourhood creates a shared 
solidarity and a network of actors that feels and acts together and transcends ties of kin and family for 
a macro political purpose. Again, the family unit is the most important unit of organisation in 
Ishtiaq Goth, however, residents also form an altruistic bounded solidarity based on their shared 
neighbourhood, which are also connected via emotional bonds which enables action.  
 
The women of the settlement sat and discussed in a group interview, how Tabassum Khala’s 
house was bulldozed: 
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We were all crying. We were all shedding tears; it was enough to 
be like an ocean. It was the first place that she has had as her 
own. We all stood by her... but they came without notice (Group 
interview, Ishtiaq Goth). 
 
In Tabassum Khala’s case the women in the area provided her with food, shelter, and moral 
support, expressing a collective solidarity, altruism, and sense of shared belonging in this 
contested space. One resident took her into her home until Tabassum Khala was able to rebuild 
her katcha house, which was completed through her son’s wages and labour. In other cases, other 
women provided food for her and her son, a practice which is exercised when food is frequently 
unavailable in the area. Resources were pooled through shared human relationships in order to 
humanise and safeguard Tabassum Khala’s life. In this case the bonds of friendship, as well as 
the fellowship of space & charity, are working to redistribute a basic material good – shelter. 
 
Similarly, when the area as a whole has been under threat from bulldozers standoffs frequently 
occur. Through the shared fate that atomised actors feel, however, an impetus for action - such as 
a conscious defiance of rule (practice of presence) - takes place. Here, and in the mentioned case 
of Tabassum Khala, actions are based on mutual insurance, i.e. by acting together a material 
resource can be safeguarded (Fafchamps 1992). This form of social capital has, partially, been 
successful in safeguarding a basic material resource (shelter) and exercising presence.  
 
The women of the area recalled how they were faced with bulldozers belonging to private 
contractors, who had the support of the police who were also present. The contractors were 
ready to tear down houses and were under the impression that the task would be easy given that 
they had chosen to arrive at Ishtiaq Goth when male household members (in this context 
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gendered symbols and sources of actual physical power) were at work. The rivals of Ishtiaq 
Mohammad and Omar Tariq were aware that the female residents of the area were vulnerable 
and “attacked”.128 The rivals were using this method in a bid to produce fear and insecurity to 
discipline residents to leave. During this time, the area’s women stood together and confronted 
the bulldozers and private contractors. In a group interviews with female residents of the area, 
one resident, Bilquis said: 
Ishtiaq Goth is like this now, and it is just up to us to have 
courage and fight it out and see what we can do here. It has been 
a year since the conditions have got tougher. This place was 
made with firing... it was made on bullets” (Bilquis, KHP46).  
For Bilquis, echoed by the other women - even though some were far more anxious than her -
the common identity of the settlement was expressed though her expressions of “we”.129 In the 
group interview Bilquis and other women continued: 
We had already lost three boys, they were shot last time… and 
before that they broke down Tabassum Khala’s house… we 
weren’t going to let them do this again. When we heard that the police 
were here, all of us [the] women of this area got ourselves together. Everyone 
came to this house, we all stood here. We knew something would 
happen. We got things together, what we could, stones... But they 
came at us, the builders, and their bulldozers; they came at us with 
tear gas. They threw gas on us and we came holding our Qurans, 
but it was of no use. They came two months ago, and they did the 
same a year ago. They are still demanding things. But we have 
nothing. We have nowhere else to go. Where can we go? But they 
will not leave us in peace here… we have said that we will not 
move from this place. Others have had to move from areas before. 
<Bilquis speaks loudest>: I had to move last time; I will not do it 
again. How many more times can I move? I will die here, but I 
won’t move from here. No. Not anymore! (Emphasis added). 
(Group interview, Ishtiaq Goth). 
                                                          
128 A very violent stand off again took place after fieldwork and the current standing/existence of the 
settlement is unknown. 
129 The interview was completed in Urdu. Bilquis used the term “hum”, which can also mean singular “I’ 
in formal Urdu, however, in this context “hum” refers to all the residents of the area. 
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In this case the fellowship of space & charity produces a form of social capital that brings 
together shared resources, human bodies, in a standoff to practice presence and survival. I was also 
told of how the women of the settlement, and men, meet and discuss what they can do “next 
time the standoff takes place” (Bilquis, KHP46). Political agency is evident in expression and 
practice. (However, this is not always successful as the deaths of the three boys shows). 
 
In some cases the women explained their actions through a prism of faith, as well as cultural 
practice. Feeding and housing Tabassum Khala was a “farz” (duty), sharing food brings “barkat” 
(blessings), and standing up against the “zalim” (oppressor/tyrant) is a duty of Muslims, they said 
(group interview, Ishtiaq Goth), to also reflect solidarity based on values (Portes 2000). It is also 
through the “strength of God” (Fahmeeda Qazmi, KHP42) that residents believe they will be 
able to “stay on this land” (Zeenat, KHP43).  Again, similar to the narratives in Afghan Camp an 
interacting material and non-material orientation shapes the lives, actions, and networks of 
residents in Ishtiaq Goth. 
 
Crucially, throughout the different types of instrumentalist motivations and emotional 
attachments, it is clear that residents understood their attempts at material redistribution (or 
perhaps of material maintenance) as being deeply tied to non-material issues. By securing shelter 
and their neighbourhood - a basic right - residents also understood their actions as acts that 
pursue a more humanised existence. “We want homes too. Are we not entitled to have a home?” 
Zeenat, a Baloch resident said (Zeenat, KHP43).  When Bilquis says that “I had to move last 
time; I will not do it again”, she reflects a yearning and desperation (“I will die here, but I won’t 
move from here”) for a basic right (shelter), which she is repeatedly denied. Neglected and 
ignored by the state and unable to use official channels, Bilquis’s words express a stubborn quest 
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for a humanised life. Certainly a humanising rhetoric, based on concepts of self-worth, such as 
“izzat” (honour), “hausala” (nerve), and “himat” (courage), permeated the narratives collected in 
this area and expressed via action.  
Yahan ki aurato ne bauhat himat dhikaya.... Hum ne hausala kiya... Hum 
bhi taqat mand hai. 
The women here, showed great bravery. We demonstrated real 
nerve. We too are strong (emphasis added) (Bilquis, KHP46). 
 
In the example above, Bilquis spoke of the standoff against the police as showing the human 
characteristics of this solidarity network, which is in stark contrast to the morally pugnacious act 
of bulldozing. By showing that they literally “did” courage and nerve her rhetoric expresses how 
she and the other women view their acts through humanising lenses. When residents faced the 
most recent standoff with the police and bulldozers from private contractors the residents said, 
“They threw gas on us and we came holding our Qurans” (group interview, Ishtiaq Goth). Here 
the Quran is symbolic of a non-material form of protection and a symbolic reminder and 
assertion of the residents, as well as the police’s and private contractor’s, humanity as understood 
through Islam. Here, similar to Afghan Camp (although of a different type and scale) the 
fellowship of space & charity also practices “presence” and shows the capacity of a neglected 
population to survive. 
 
The informal structures and negotiated practices above are, however, not fully effective (similar 
to the case of Afghan Camp). Indeed three residents lost their lives in Ishtiaq Goth. The 
dependency of residents on the two intermediaries, who themselves are not fully effective, means 
that conditions for the residents of the area continue to be challenging; this is also reinforced by 
the unknown and contested legal status of the land in Ishtiaq Goth. 
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Figure 9: Maqsood’s home (KHP37). 
 
It is worth reemphasising that it is Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq and not an autonomous 
and “vibrant” informal neighbourhood network, who have better access to economic and 
political capital and are the ones who direct the areas expansion. It is they who negotiate with 
private company and government workers (KESC and KWSB) to secure water and (future) 
electricity lines. It is also when they flex their muscles that the practices of presence, i.e. the 
continued existence of housing in the area, have a higher chance of being maintained and 
protected. In Ishtiaq Goth solidarity networks alone are not enough. Without understanding that 
it is Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq that protect informal activities and provide access to 
material resources the story of Ishtiaq Goth’s quest for survival is incomplete.  
 
The reliance on the two intermediaries reveals a solemn and exploitative face of “survival” in 
Ishtiaq Goth. The property developers want to strengthen their position in this contested area. 
They are not acting with benevolent tendencies to resolve the state’s housing crisis. Rather they 
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seek to strengthen their hold over their contested land by changing the facts on the ground,130 
and they use the residents bodies to do so. Whilst residents are encouraged to settle in these areas 
for free, such as the earlier mentioned IDP from Sindh, they are also expected to pay at a later 
date – in monetary and non-monetary terms. A material and non-material debt is in circulation 
without any form of legal regulation, creating a lived experience of exploitation. Newer house 
plots paid no rent but in older houses very high rent was being paid.  
Initially we did not have to pay Ishtiaq Mohammad. He brought 
us over and told us to settle in… But slowly then we started to 
have to pay him rent. The money built up and now we have to 
pay him much more (Gul Nabi, KHP41.B). 
In addition, for Maqsood, the IDP from interior Sindh, the scepticism over Ishtiaq Mohammad’s 
generosity was clear: 
What - you think he is not going to take money from us. We owe 
him… you don’t know how things work here (Maqsood, KHP37). 
 
Beyond this monetary exchange, the two property developers also extract a “service” from the 
individuals who come and settle in these areas by using their bodies and lives as a means to 
consolidate their grip over the area. Here, the bodies of residents are “automaton like” (Haslam 
2006) objects used in physical labour to build up the housing structures – such as Nilofar or 
Maqsood - and absorb the risk of inhabiting or squatting in an area without utilities. Indeed, it is 
these bodies that are living on an urban frontier, subject to the cold of an open unconstructed 
space at night. As two residents said: 
                                                          
130 Karachi contains its share of precedents in which informal settlements remain in place as official 
forces cannot or will not implement the law because they lack the capacity to do so and it is cheaper to 
allow a settlement to continue to exist and/or because a collusion between officials and the land grabbers 
takes place (Hasan 2012, 2010). This is a strategy that Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq are attempting, 
and in this process earn a profit via the exploitation of residents. 
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At night they [the police] stop people: children, boys, men. And 
once you have no light outside in this area there is no way that you 
can go outside. It feels almost as if you are standing in the middle 
of a graveyard... you cannot leave (Shahnaz Nabi, KHP41) 
And: 
There is no light here. We are living in darkness. Literally. You are 
here during the day, you cannot stay beyond maghrib (Fahmeeda 
Qazmi, KHP42). 
Indeed, it is these bodies that face the bullets and tear gas and confront the police and bulldozers 
when a physical contest with the state and other actors over the land occurs. It is their “three 
boys” who were killed by the bullets of the standoff.  
 
In addition, a lack of enforceable regulation and regulated development means that housing 
structures are of a poor standard. Residents are punished by a lack of clarity over the legal status 
of the area and the “prevention of law”/”violation of law” tactics that are used in the area. 
People frequently sleep in the cold, are vulnerable to the open heat in the day, and are at 
dangerous distances from healthcare, access to foodstuffs, and employment. 
There is no health service near us. There is not even a chemist’s 
shop here! How can we cope… there is nothing here! (Zeenat, 
KHP43). 
 
During fieldwork in various sites illnesses and cases of tuberculosis were recorded. In one 
household in Ishtiaq Goth a family owned a cow (Rubab, KHP38). The family used the cow's 
faeces to maintain and build their katcha house walls, a routine practice in poorer and rural areas, 
and as fuel to cook food. These practices are not usually hazardous to health provided enough 
space is given to allow the faeces to dry, indeed it is a normal practice used to build and fix a 
katcha house. However, in this case the housing plot size and structure was very tight and 
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haphazard. As a result, instead of having enough space for the faeces to dry out, fresh and moist 
faeces was present in the main section of the house. To quote Mike Davis’ work on informal 
"slums", urban residents are essentially “living in shit” (Davis 2006:137-42). Subsequently flies, 
which are not an unusual specimen in unregulated residential areas, were present in exceptionally 
large concentrations - so much so that the family had developed a technique of speaking and 
moving with their hands over their mouths, and covering their sleeping baby’s eyes and mouth 
with a soft cloth. Despite the fact that most members of the household were suffering from 
serious forms of illness (suspected tuberculosis131 - although this had not been diagnosed as the 
family could not access health services), the family was unwilling and essentially unable to sell the 
cow as it was one of their only sources of wealth and support, i.e. for the housing structure and 
for producing milk and fuel. Thus in Ishtiaq Goth basic physical survival continues but often 
only just, and usually it is a physically and physiologically hazardous survival.  
 
What do the presence of solidarity networks and navigation practices in this marginalised 
Pakistani community reveal about the local Pakistani state? In the short term and on a physical 
level they appear to be substitutive and filling a gap for the state by providing shelter to a 
population that the local government itself cannot take care of. Karachi’s rapidly expanding 
population needs shelter and housing, but the state is not constructing the numbers of houses 
needed by residents at a fast enough rate (Hasan 2010). The actions of the informal property 
developers resolve an “awkward” population issue. In addition Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar 
Tariq penetrate into areas that the state itself cannot reach: the rapidly expanding rural-urban 
frontier. They are also able to “manage” populations the state cannot, or will not, cater to, such 
                                                          
131 This suspicion was told to the family by other members of the area, including a former government 
employee. When process for medical diagnoses is not possible many people often turn to the most senior 
or experienced member of the community to discuss and “guess” a diagnosis. However, having also 
spoken to CDGK and health workers who have passed through this and neighbouring areas, I was told 
that it was very likely that the family was suffering from tuberculosis.  
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as IDPs, the extreme urban poor, and in other examples, undesirable ethnic groups, illegal 
immigrants, and refugees. Indeed, there are numerous informal settlements that surround Sohrab 
Goth, or that are positioned off from Super Highway where many Afghans (registered and 
unregistered), Pakistanis, including IDPs from FATA, and illegal immigrants (such as 
Bangladeshis) live. These informal settlements emerge quickly, organically, and in speedy 
response to the expanding populations on the ground. 
 
However, at the same time a number of challenges are produced. These seemingly small acts 
repeated time and again have a large impact on the state in both physical and non-physical ways. 
At the physical level the informal housing settlements that are produced expand the city rapidly 
in a way that contradicts official urban management and expansion plans and in a way that is 
physically unsustainable. Indeed the CDGK’s Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (CDGK 
2007) points to a need for having “strategic” growth rather than the current, “unplanned and 
haphazard growth” which is “leading to acute civic problems” (2007:2). It is these informal areas 
that are the first to be washed away in the rain and susceptible to illnesses and disease because of 
poor sanitation. It is these areas and processes of expansion that have created a mega-city which 
has poor and unsustainable urban infrastructure.  
 
At a non-physical level, the state is perceived as ineffective. For most of these urban poor 
residents the state was absent prior to settling in Ishtiaq Goth – indeed this ineffectiveness is why 
they had to settle in these informal areas in the first place. In Ishtiaq Goth the state continues to 
be ineffective in offering protection against exploitation for profit by the two informal 
“entrepreneurs”. Whilst local officials are aware of Ishtiaq Goth’s presence, with one local 
official speaking about the “challenges” the settlers of Ishtiaq Goth face and their sense of 
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“solidarity and perseverance” (interview: Shoaib 2010), the official and other officials remain 
impotent - similar to official actors in Afghan Camp. State regulation does not offer protection.  
But more importantly state law and regulation regarding the area is unknown and unclear. More 
often than not when I asked about the role of local officials or state actors in terms of 
maintaining order or offering support, a blank response was given.  
No one cares about us, and our voices are unheard. We want our 
voices and our struggles to be heard (Bilquis, KHP46). 
 
On the occasions when local officials (like the police) are present, they appear in corrupt roles, i.e. 
preventing the law from being implemented, or violating the law it, or in an alliance with the 
rivals of Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq to simply push residents off the land. This 
combines with deeper rooted resentments of not being able to afford a home because of wider 
state failures. The ambiguity, complicity, corruption, and apparent indifference to the lives of 
residents erode the legitimacy of local officials. Similar to Afghan Camp, through this experience, 
the silent undercurrent of the incompetent, offending, and complicit official actor is accepted as 
the norm. As a result, instead of the state, solidarity networks and a politics of presence are 
turned to. But in Ishtiaq Goth these have deeper exploitative tendencies. 
 
In Ishtiaq Goth, similar to the situation in Afghan Camp (with the Rangers and certain elders), 
even the two middlemen with their flaws and exploitative tendencies are considered as more 
effective than official actors and channels. It is the middlemen that provide the channels and 
routes for shelter and secure access to utilities in the area by informal agreements with the KESC 
and KWSB.  They can deliver. Official channels cannot. Alternative actors are performing 
sovereignty through a delivery of rights and a “will to rule”. Official laws and norms appear 
unfulfilling. Even some residents of Ishtiaq Goth understand the relationship they have with 
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Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq not as exploitation but as generosity. Informal 
entrepreneurs, and even outlaws, to a degree, are not perceived as negatively as official actors 
because the former are not held to the same moral standard or social contract as state actors, the 
refugee regime, or formal political parties. 
But Ishtiaq bhai (brother), he is doing a lot for the people here. It 
is because of him that we are settling and sitting on this area 
(Bilquis, KHP46). 
 
Critically in these Afghan and Pakistani cases mentioned above, it appears that neither 
“citizenship” nor “refugeedom” in the way of difference counts for much. Both Afghans and 
Pakistanis are impacted by structural shortcomings and objectified ways of seeing. Both Afghans 
and Pakistanis use similar structures and strategies in an attempt to redistribute material and non-
material goods. Both Afghans and Pakistanis are impacted by the shortcomings of informality. 
Further, both Afghans and Pakistanis have a political impact on the state through these quiet 
(albeit not fully effective) encroachments of the ordinary that change the physical and non-
physical characteristics of the state. Whilst the state considers informality as an alternative form 
of management the reality from Afghan Camp and Ishtiaq Goth appears that it is in fact eroding 
its power. 
 
 
“Pashtun Lives Don’t Count!” Ethnicised Lenses & Pashtun Neighbourhood Action 
In certain areas in Karachi specific citizens within the urban poor bracket appear to be at a 
greater disadvantage because of ethnicised ways of seeing. During fieldwork in areas with high 
demographics of Pakistani Pashtuns residents understood the challenges they faced being the 
result of the state’s ethnicised way of seeing. The following section is based on repeat one-on-
one interviews over a period of three months with Hussain Ali (see Chapter 3) who lives in one 
such settlement: Saeed Goth (Hussain Ali, KHP51). A specific visit to Saeed Goth was not 
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completed in the same way as it was for the previous two areas.132 Rather, this section uses one-
on-one interviews and supporting interviews from colleagues that worked with Hussain Ali in a 
bazaar in the main city. The material collected in the interviews is facilitated by my work in areas 
neighbouring his settlement and our shared contacts in these areas. 
 
Hussain Ali is 35 years-old and was born in Karachi. His grandfather migrated to Pakistan from 
Afghanistan, and his family settled in Karachi during the 1960s.133 All of his family are Pakistani 
in documentary terms, possessing Pakistani CNICs and documents. His family have limited 
connections in Afghanistan and do not really live transnational lives as some other Afghans who 
have “become Pakistani” do. This is also likely to be related to the fact that his family did not 
migrate to Pakistan in the context of the massive refugee movements starting with the Soviet 
War. Hussain Ali perhaps reflects a new type of “ethnicity” in Karachi: the Pakistani Afghan 
(and, within Pashtuns, the Pashtun Afghan) where he is aware of his “Afghan” heritage but also 
positions himself as “Pakistani”.  
 
Saeed Goth is home to Pakistani Pashtuns, Pakistani Afghan-Pashtuns, including Hussain’s 
family and extended kin, some “Farsi-speaking Afghans” and “also some Punjabis” (Husain Ali, 
PXP51), and homes are arranged around the family unit (nuclear and extended134). When I asked 
                                                          
132 This was not done with any overtly political reasons. Rather Hussain Ali worked near my aunt’s 
apartment (my accommodation in Karachi) and it was logistically easier to conduct interviews with him in 
the late evenings (after 8pm) on my way home from other field activities. 
133 The exact date of his parent’s movement to Karachi is unknown, but is assumed by Hussain to be in 
the 1960s as all of his siblings were born in Karachi.  
134 In Hussain’s case he said, “Our immediate and extended family live in one line [of houses] in the area. 
Paternal and maternal uncles together, so the people of our home, our family, is together”. He, however, 
also said that whilst marriages, trade, and socialisation occur within they also occur outside of it. “It is not 
necessary to always marry within the family. We find out if the other family is good, you know get 
information on them, and get to know them, and that is how we build relationships”, he said.  
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him how many people lived in the settlement he said approximately “6-7 lakh people” (ibid).135 
The area is an unregulated residential area off Super Highway, with a mixed Pakistan area 
(predominantly Sindhis) and an “Urdu speaking” area nearby (see Figure 7). Ishtiaq Goth has no 
institutionalised schools, although informal madrassas are present. Hussain Ali’s brother travels 
at a distance in order to get to school. There is no hospital nearby, waterlines are present, and 
electricity was installed in 2000. Whilst the area has been built up over more than 30 years, it has 
no legal recognition and the land is not leased to tenants. In Ishtiaq Goth, a non-Pashtun area, 
the lack of recognition is more related to its new status and contest over who owns the land. In 
Saeed Goth it is understood by residents as being the result of ethnicised official lenses.  
 
Saeed Goth is not a “katchi abadi” area (the title given to informal settlements built of 
government land [Hasan 2010:7]) but appears to be an informal subdivision of (private) 
agricultural land (ISAL) (see also fn66). However, who the main legal landholders are in Saeed 
Goth, i.e. the government or private landholders, is unclear. Details of the legal status of Saeed 
Goth were not investigated as they were in Afghan Camp and Ishtiaq Goth (which even then 
were unclear), however, Hussain Ali revealed that residents do not have documented leases to 
the land. Thus, combining the area’s tenuous position as an unregulated residential area and an 
ethnicised way of seeing, the state behaves in a different way in this area. Hussain Ali 
understands that his area (“a Pashtun area”) is not upgraded but: 
In the area behind us, [where] you have mainly Sindhis living the 
land is [officially] leased... If you go ahead of us the land is leased 
in the Urdu speaking area. You have the Sindhi and Urdu speaking 
communities behind us and ahead of us and we are in the middle. 
                                                          
135 During fieldwork, when data was not available via government or INGO data I usually completed 
ground level interviews with a number of different residents, particularly people who had deep historical 
experience of the area in order to corroborate numbers and get a more “accurate” idea of numbers. In the 
case of Saeed Goth this was not possible, and instead I rely on the interview with Hussain Ali.  
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So the area behind us gets leased and the area ahead of us gets 
leased... what can you say to this? 
Here the politics of Karachi, which have been shaped by the rising presence of the MQM and 
the strength of the PPP, are understood as impacting everyday urban life.  
 
In interviews with Hussain Ali he was concerned whether or not the area would get upgraded 
because of the political context of Karachi and the city’s ethnic politics. 
The land is not leased, but people are living here. We are waiting 
to see what will happen here. We’re just waiting... But the thing is 
people are spending Rs.20, Rs.25 lakh on their house, building the 
property. They would not be spending this money if the land was 
not secure or if the lease was to going to happen. 
Asking me for my opinion as someone who worked with official organisations, Hussain Ali 
asked me, “This area will get upgraded, yes?” 
 
Hussain Ali explained that criminal activities occurred because state law and regulation are absent. 
He said, “What does the state do? We cannot turn to them when there are crimes and problems 
going on”.  In Hussain Ali’s view, the state does not meet its responsibilities towards this area, i.e. 
including providing shelter, education, health care facilities, basic urban infrastructure, and 
security, because the area “belongs” to “Pathans” (see fn67 and fn69) – here he used the word 
“Urdu-speakers” use to describe Pashtuns.  The area is home to some Afghan families as well. 
Had the area been home to only Afghans, as is predominantly the case in Afghan Camp, the 
unwillingness to formalise the lease may have been rationalised through a national legal logic, i.e. 
that non-nationals do not have legal property and land rights in Pakistan. However, this area is 
home to a large number (in fact majority) of Pakistani citizens who expect to be incorporated 
into the formal urban development plans of the city. The fact that they are not indicates that for 
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some citizens in Karachi, i.e. Pakistani Pashtuns - including Pakistani Afghan-Pashtuns -, 
citizenship has little value. For other Pakistanis living in the area - Punjabis -, the implications of 
living in a predominantly Pashtun area also negatively impacts their experiences of citizenship.  
 
In Hussain Ali’s account conditions of dehumanisation are not readily accepted by him and other 
residents. The fact that the area has grown to house between “6-7 lakh people” and now has 
electricity lines, that there is an attempt to get gas lines into the area, that people have invested 
“Rs.20-25 lakh on their house”, and that, according to Hussain Ali, Saeed Goth is on a 
government waiting list to become formalised is an indication of the quiet encroachments of the 
ordinary, which are slowly changing the face of the city and enabling “undesired” Pakistanis 
(Pashtuns, Pakistani Afghans, and Afghans) to become a key part of it. 
 
Hussain Ali recalled how this mixed neighbourhood worked together through solidarity 
networks based on a fellowship of space & charity and bonds of friendship since 2009. Residents 
transcended differences in ethnicity and nationality and family bonds to produce forms of social 
capital which enable residents to work together for issues of infrastructure and security. 
There are four of us friends who have lived here all our lives, and 
we thought we needed to do something. So that is what we did. 
We got together, we’re friends, we’ve grown up together, and we 
said, “We should do this”. We had thought that we would be part 
of a political party, but so many people warned us against working 
with them that we changed our minds – you cannot trust these 
organisations. 
 
Hussain Ali, his friends, and the residents of the area completed “consultations from the elders 
and others around us”, and started activities in the area. This has included different residents 
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patrolling the area against criminal activity. Here different “men” 136  are assigned “patrolling 
duties” on different days of the week or month.  
I have to attend duty every Thursday night. Until fajr I patrol the 
neighbourhood. Everyone takes their turn to do their duty. Even 
the elders - our elders are not ashamed of working.  
Indeed on some days when I would go to meet Hussain Ali he would have left early for these 
patrolling duties. In addition, Hussain Ali discussed how residents were working together to 
build a road link, which was needed as the settlement lacked a safe crossing and link to another 
road making it “difficult for the labourers, and even children, who have to come and go from 
this road to pass through”.  He said how residents pooled together shared resources totalling 
Rs.4-5 lakh to build the road link. An engineer who provided a quote for the area said it would 
cost Rs.13-14 lakh. As the residents could not afford this fee they instead decided to build the 
road together. 
There is some land that comes before the road link and we bought 
the empty plot... right on the edge there is also a house, we 
decided to buy that house and the plot of land so we can build this 
road link.. But as the Engineer was too expensive we took it on 
ourselves. Everyone, the elders, the youngsters are working 
together to build the road. Everyone has a role. 
 
In Saeed Goth residents act out of shared space & charity, friendship and emotional bonds, as 
well as for material purposes, i.e. to build needed shared urban infrastructure. This exertion of 
agency, “We did it, we took it on ourselves”, is versed in an empowering rhetoric which attempts 
to overcome the shortcomings of the state.  
So what if the state is not there? We can do things without them. 
 
                                                          
136 In this context, “manhood” was explained as starting from the teenage years. 
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However, in this informal settlement issues continue for residents and state structures. Whilst 
patrolling and the road link have offered some solutions to the area, the area is still awaiting to 
hear its fate on whether it will be regularised or not, and issues of everyday survival and gains are 
not resolved. Hussain Ali once said:  
There are many things that are lacking in this area. We still need a 
school, we still need safety. The area is getting built up… but it is 
difficult for people to manage this area and build it up alone. 
This impacts the state by making the state appear incompetent. It appears that the state cannot 
deliver. “You could say that there is no government near us”, Hussain said, flabbergasted, as he 
often was by my questions of “state support and interaction”. 
 
In physical terms, the road link that was being built during fieldwork was constructed in an 
informal way that does not meet any formal regulation plans, and points to a future point of risk 
to the residents, as is the case in other informal areas. For the local state these physical changes 
also create forms of urban infrastructure that are developing and expanding the city and do not 
meet state regulations – which, as mentioned earlier, pose challenges to the local state’s longer-
term vision of modernisation. Further, whilst dominant political discourse in Karachi shows 
strands of anti-Pashtun (and indeed anti-Afghan) sentiment, through informal structures and 
practices of presence, an informal settlement that is home to Pakistani Pashtuns, Pakistani 
Afghans, and Afghans reveals itself to be a permanent presence in the city. 
 
Further, the informal patrolling systems do not guarantee security. For the state it appears that 
there are alternative and more trusted sources of power (solidarity networks) which are “policing” 
the local state and performing sovereignty (Blom Hansen 2005). If the state, in Weberian 
tradition, is meant to have a monopoly on violence, these “patrols”, when repeated across the 
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city (as they are), present potential challenges to the authority and sovereignty of the state. As 
small groups across the city take on policing competing concepts of justice and law enter the 
political landscape. Indeed, this appears to be a key reason why the current political situation of 
Karachi appears to be based on multiple “armed” groups enacting “law” and “protecting” citizen 
rights in a violent order.  
 
The Different Patrons of Peshawar 
The practices of protection & access used in the cases discussed in Karachi produce an 
interesting insight about how the state functions. Managing urban expansion, urban population 
growth and migration is not something that the state is equipped to handle alone.  In Karachi, 
local officials are unable to penetrate large urban populations and areas alone. Instead they are 
dependent on intermediaries (such as in Ishtiaq Goth)137 and official actors acting in informal 
ways (such as the Pakistani Rangers in Afghan Camp), and solidarity networks (across all 
examples, and particularly less-penetrated area like Saeed Goth). These areas are zones of 
unequal inclusion because of “nationality” (Afghan Camp), “poverty” (Ishtiaq Goth), and 
“ethnicity” (Saeed Goth). The state bears some responsibility towards these areas but acts in 
minimal - and often unclear - ways, or when it is present is usually in an informal/illegal capacity. 
Instead of maintaining the state, however, these aspects challenge the state.  
 
In Peshawar informal urban growth is again partly accepted as an alternative way of maintaining 
the state, which includes issues related to Afghans and Pakistanis, such as large protracted 
Afghan refugee populations and internal migrations or displacements. However, here the state is 
also unwilling to interfere in “organic” growth because of an unwillingness to challenge the 
                                                          
137 Whilst in Ishtiaq Goth, the choice of the intermediaries (Ishtiaq Mohammad and Omar Tariq) is under 
contestation, the alternative outcome would still be dependent on intermediaries acting in informal ways – 
certainly no formal housing scheme is going to be implemented in Ishtiaq Goth.  
199 
 
strength of Peshawar’s existing landed classes.138 When local officials do intervene it is usually to 
check if housing regulations meet minimum requirements or to extract small bribes from smaller 
landholders or unprotected individuals. In Peshawar, it is the local landed classes who emerge as 
central to understanding the expansion of the “rural-urban interface” (Roy and Alsayyad, 
2004:21) and informal politics. Whereas in Karachi land is a deeply contested issue, with contests 
taking place on both public and private land (but increasingly on private land), in Peshawar the 
strength of the landed classes is greater, which reflects the historically different types of urban 
development in the two cities.  However, either way in both cases it is clear that the state is 
dependent on intermediaries – albeit of different kinds, i.e. middlemen versus landholders - 
which often leads to the prevention, or violations, of Pakistani law that creates a slow piecemeal 
erosion of the state’s legitimacy and undermines its strength.   
 
To highlight the difference between Karachi and Peshawar, this section pays attention to the 
unregulated residential areas on the outer ring of Peshawar surrounding the recently complete 
Ring Road and within the city near Nasir Bagh and University Town. For four months oral 
narratives and observations were recorded in different rural-urban unregulated residential areas 
that pepper the Ring Road, Nasir Bagh, and University Town. This was possible through 
professional and personal networks. On some occasions, I accompanied an NGO, which was 
completing surveys in the area, and at other times I used personal friendship networks in the area 
to visit certain households. Activities involved household interviews, one-on-one interviews, 
group discussions, area surveys, and ethnographic observations. 
 
                                                          
138 This is partly related to differences in the historical and political developments of the two cities. 
Karachi is a mega city (19 million people), a port city, and the former capital of Pakistan. On the other 
hand, Peshawar is relatively more rural, smaller (5 million people), and a “frontier” city. 
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In Peshawar as a number of studies have shown, the city has absorbed large numbers of Afghan 
refugees from the 1970s onward (Connor 1987; CSSR 2005). Here, the refugee regime has a 
sizeable presence. Many Afghan refugees have historically been supported by UNHCR and its 
implementing partners. However, the refugee regime has increasingly reduced its support for 
Afghans in the city. As mentioned in Chapter 3, ration programmes and other initiatives closed 
down in the mid-1990s, and since then there has been reduced funding in education and health 
programmes. A large number of RTVs alsoclosed down.139 In addition, for other Afghans, the 
refugee regime and RTV life did not offer enough scope for a humanised existence in the first 
place and many families chose to live outside of RTVs. Currently, the majority of Afghans in 
Peshawar do not live in RTVs, and instead live in rented, and in some cases owned, informal and 
formal areas. This section pays attention to non-RTV Afghans living in unregulated residential 
areas in Peshawar. For Afghans that live outside of the RTV, UNHCR and CAR have limited 
significance, and interactions are limited to occasional surveys, identity card production, or the 
attestation of documents (i.e. school certificates). Instead Afghans rely on solidarity networks 
particularly of kin, including clan, which are the main unit of social organisation, and/or bonds 
of friendship. And, in Peshawar, practices of protection & access act as a critical strategy that 
enables an urban presence in terms of shelter and housing to be secured. 
 
Similarly for Pakistanis, specifically the urban poor and internal migrants from other areas in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the local state is understood as morally and politically responsible for 
protecting and distributing goods to citizens. However, it often does not meet these 
responsibilities. With regards to housing, there are no clear strategic development plans for 
affordable housing and the development of urban infrastructure in the city. The Government of 
                                                          
139 In an interview with a senior Pakistani official working for CAR, he said that despite RTVs closing 
down to “encourage” repatriation to Afghanistan many Afghans could not return and so instead settled in 
regulated and unregulated residential areas in Peshawar (interview: Maroof 2011). 
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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s 2010-2017 Strategic Development Plan is more concerned with affordable 
housing for government employees than the urban poor, and detailed plans for urban property 
development do not stretch beyond regulated residential areas, such as Hayatabad and Regi 
Town. Thus poorer residents must rely on solidarity networks, usually of kin and clan, and 
practices of protection & access in order to secure affordable housing.140 
 
                                                          
140 Schemes, such as the PDA and the Defence Housing Scheme, were introduced in the late 1980s, with 
new phases being updated since then for a more regulated form of urban expansion. These schemes have 
been highly successful and many families have rented accommodation here, however, many families 
simply cannot afford the rent in these areas.  
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Figure 10: Maps showing the growth of Peshawar district by decade from 1866-2009. 
(a) Pre 1866 built up area; (b) built up area 1866; (c) built up area 1947; (d) built up area 
1981; (e) built up area 1991 (f) built up area 2009. 
Note how the first maps show the city boundaries are concentrated to the inner city (i.e. Old 
Peshawar/Androon Shehr). Later images show how the city has expanded, formally and 
informally, and show the expanding boundaries of the city now touch the rural-urban 
interface.  
Maps by Samiullah (2013), Institute of Geography, Urban and Regional Planning, University 
of Peshawar. 
 
Crucially, the development of informal housing structures on the agricultural peripheries of the 
city (i.e. the rural-urban interface) via informal structures and strategies meets the needs of a 
large and growing population that the local state itself cannot manage, and, to a degree, provides 
both Afghans and Pakistanis with opportunities in which the potentials of human life can be 
pursued. However, as the maps above show, they have also massively transformed the city in 
informal and unplanned ways.  
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The construction of the Ring Road141 has influenced pockets of informal rural-urban housing 
areas to be developed in this area. The informal settlement in the following images, Gul Kalay,142 
is one example and is home to Afghan and Pakistani tenants.143 Residents are arranged around 
the family unit (nuclear and extended, i.e. paternal families living together).  
 
As residents settle in the area, they have historically either constructed new, unregulated housing 
structures - sometimes katcha structures or a mix of pakka/katcha structures -, or occupied pre-
existing housing structures. In Gul Kalay the settlement has grown as the landlord, who is also 
the ancestral landowner of the area, wanted to generate additional income by renting land. 
Tenants, Afghans and Pakistanis, are not related to the landholder, although as you go deeper 
into the area and closer to the core of the original village, housing structures and land owned by 
kin members are present. For many Pakistanis in Peshawar whose ancestral village is within 
Peshawar or within these rural-urban interfaces, the connections of the ancestral village and clan 
are a critical source of social capital and housing security. But in the case of urban tenants who 
are not “native” to the land, tenants pay rent to the landowner. Their rent is collected by various 
local “representatives” within specified area parameters – in this area the representative is 
someone who is designated to collect the rent for every 10 or 20 houses in a given area. In the 
first image, a resident of one of the houses collects rent for the houses in his row of houses and 
the adjacent rows.  
                                                          
141 The Peshawar Ring Road is an orbital road, still in construction at the time of writing, that encircles 25 
km of road around Peshawar. The Ring Road has strategic significance for transporting goods and fuel to 
Afghanistan for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces stationed there; this is why the 
US government has invested millions in its speedy completion (US SD 2011). As it has created links with 
other areas it is also a site that attracts people to live in.  
142 Kalay is Pashto for village but in these examples resemble Karachi’s goths or urban-rural settlements. 
143 All names of locations and residents have been changed.  
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Figure 11: Shared Afghan and Pakistani housing in Gul Kalay, Peshawar. 
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Figure 12: Shared Afghan and Pakistani housing in Gul Kalay, Peshawar. 
 
In this area there are minimal interactions with local authorities and the structures do not meet 
most (if any) legal building requirements as outlined in Pakistani law. Urban tenants, Pakistani 
and Afghan, practice their presence and informal way of living with minimal interference by the 
local state because they have the “guardianship” of the local landowner. They build their housing 
structures and extend and modify structures with limited regulations. Only in matters of security 
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has the state intervened in this area.144 In Karachi in contested informal settlements, such as 
Ishtiaq Goth, Saeed Goth, Afghan Camp, or other settlements surrounding Sohrab Goth, it is 
common for police officials to demand bhatta (extortion) if the strength of protection & access 
networks from local intermediaries is weak (and in some cases even when this is present). A 
Pakistani Pashtun resident who lives in an unregulated residential area near Sohrab Goth in 
Karachi said:  
Even if I try to move one brick the police will ask me for money if 
I want to carry on building! (Mansoor, KHA65).   
Another resident said:  
The police will even come and break down your wall on purpose 
and then tell you to pay them if you want to rebuild your wall 
(Zmaray Khan, KHA61.B).  
In Karachi too, where the strength of local patrons is strong the vulnerability of the area is less 
likely to occur. However in Karachi, unlike Peshawar, land is a much more contested issue, 
which means incidences of “interference” in informal residential areas is greater. In Gul Kalay in 
Peshawar interference or an implementation of law is not the norm. I was told by the local 
landowner: 
This is my land – I can do as I please with it (Landowner of Gul 
Kalay).145  
His explanation for the lack of conformity to housing regulations was a frequently and typically 
heard response across interviews in the area and in the city.  
 
                                                          
144 After a bombing in Peshawar (2010) police suspected that some of the individuals involved in the 
bombing were hiding in these areas and a security raid was conducted. Residents in this area complained 
that they were targeted arbitrarily by virtue of being Afghan. 
145 This was also repeated in a number of other settlements across Warsak Road, Kohat Road, and rural-
urban lands touching on University Town, where the strength of the landed families was significant. 
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In Peshawar it is often the prevention of law, which appears to be the dominant type of formal-
informal navigation rather than the unclear, contested, and ambiguous nature of land in Karachi. 
The rationale of “this is my land – I can do as I please with it” was repeated time and time again 
to explain how certain unregulated houses are built and why they faced limited interrogation 
from official actors: “The stronger the family the less likely intervention will take place”, I was 
told. In Gul Kalay and other cases, a type of protection emerges for these tenants, with 
landholders being the ones to negotiate with the state as they possess the economic, cultural, and 
political capital to do so, rather than tenants. This, again, reveals the limits to the capital that 
atomised actors and their solidarity networks possess.  
 
In a series of interviews conducted in Gul Kalay and other areas I asked residents about the 
incursion of the state on informal housing practices, with questions146 focusing on the processes 
involved in the construction of various housing structures. “Who constructed this housing 
structure?”; “Did you have to submit any forms to the local council?”; “Did you ask a 
middleman to submit the forms for you?”; “Do you ever face any questioning from local 
authorities, i.e. government officials or the police, regarding your housing structure?” were asked 
and in most cases the response was related back to the strength of the local landholder and the 
landholder’s networks and interaction with state and political structures. This “strength” is 
measured in a number of ways, which includes the landowner being connected to political 
figures of authority through his own family or friendship networks or if he himself is in a 
significant position of political power and authority. In Peshawar, as in Karachi, local patrons 
matter. However, in Peshawar it is usually the direct landholder (and his affiliates) who are the 
main intermediaries rather than the competing, contested, and mixed number of middlemen in 
Karachi. 
                                                          
146 The semi-structured questions were asked during the course of discussions and interviews and were 
not completed in formal settings or circumstances – see Appendix 4. 
209 
 
 
The strength of the local landholder was also visible in other areas, such as Asadullah Khan 
(named after the landholder) near Nasir Bagh, which used to be home to one of Pakistan’s 
largest RTVs. On one occasion family interviews were conducted with an Afghan family that had 
migrated from Nangarhar in Jalalabad (Afghanistan) in 1982. The male household head, Ibrahim 
Hafiz recalled how the land that they live on and (informally) own was donated to them by the 
Pakistani landholder, who also donated other surrounding land to other Afghans during early 
phases of mass migrations in the 1980s. 
We all came together, all of the 8-10 households of our family. We 
made this house in 1983, before the rains started. The people here 
(from this area), the people helped us. People came and gave us 
food for a month – people opened their doors to us. We had to 
make the houses and homes ourselves – this was the condition of 
all of the people here... everyone in the same harsh reality. When 
we moved to here first we just settled on some land nearby near 
the (deep) pond. But Asadullah Khan the landholder told us to 
move and settle on this area, the area we are in now, because the 
other land flooded during the rains. We never knew these things 
but he told us that we would be safer on the land we are in now. 
That insan and his family let us settle here, out of generosity. We 
never had to pay for the land and our eight families still live here. 
This is the thing, he treated us like brothers. He has died, but even 
then his family, his son, say that “No, my father gave these people 
this land during the war, and I will do as my father did. These 
people will still live here, have this land (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41). 
 
Ibrahim Hafiz and his family (immediate and extended) worked, using the solidarities of kin to 
migrate and settle in the area. But it was through the practices of protection & access through 
the Pakistani landholder that he and his family secured their position in the area. Ibrahim Hafiz 
mentioned how he “bought materials, hired labourers” to build the large housing structure in 
which their immediate family and extended kin members live. This housing settlement was made 
without interaction with local officials. His younger son, Ejaz, explained, “If the landholder does 
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not have an issue, what can the police do?” (Ejaz, PXA41.B). Legally Ibrahim Hafiz and his 
family have no right to the land – there is no documentation to say that this land and property 
are in their name. However, the informal contract that they held with the landholder, which has 
since his death been maintained by his children, is enough and appears binding.  
 
Importantly, the case of Ibrahim Hafiz and his family reveals how regulation is not enforced 
because these actions also resolve issues of urban population growth that the state on its own is 
incapable of dealing with. Similar to Karachi, these actions reflect a way of managing urban 
populations and the actions of Asadullah Khan serve a functional role that appears, at least at 
first, convergent with official objectives and act as a substitute for the state. In Peshawar, the 
Soviet-Afghan War bore a significant imprint. The acts of Asadullah Khan are considered by 
Ibrahim Hafiz as an act of human generosity, which are also laced with religious and cultural 
understandings of migration, refuge, solidarity, and hospitality (Centlivres 1988). And for the 
Pakistani state, these acts of generosity were particularly encouraged during the Soviet-Afghan 
War because having a sizeable Afghan population in Pakistan, including militarized resistance 
groups, was strategically beneficial but not something that the state could manage alone. In 
Ibrahim Hafiz’s case, eight families migrated together. In other cases entire towns and villages 
moved together or individually, such as RTVs in Akora Khattak with people from one village in 
Kabul Province, or Hajizai with people from clustered villages in Nangarhar, or clustered 
Turkmen village movements from Jawzjan to Attock 147 . As millions migrated in emergency 
exoduses from Afghanistan into Peshawar the Pakistani state used the rhetoric of Islam and 
promoted the role of the Pakistani ansar (helpers) helping the Afghan muhajireen 
(migrants/refugees) (Baitenmann 1990). Thus Asadullah Khan’s actions did not need official 
intervention because Asadullah Khan was effectively contributing towards managing a large 
                                                          
147 Observations taken from fieldwork. 
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(needed) urban population as well as the wider foreign policy objectives of the Pakistani state. 
However, this is no longer the case. As outlined in earlier sections Afghans in Pakistan are no 
longer welcomed by state actors and policy. Yet now the state is too weak to challenge the 
landholders on whom it was previously so heavily reliant and whose power it so heavily 
encouraged and reinforced.   
 
Currently, Peshawar faces continued issues of increased migration because of floods and 
violence in FATA. Many Pakistani IDPs settle in the RTVs that were once donated for Afghan 
purposes. Many others settled in regulated and unregulated residential areas, such as Gul Kalay 
mentioned earlier. The informal housing boom thus also reflects a functional way of “managing” 
Peshawar’s population growth. Unlike in case of Ibrahim Hafiz, there is no longer any 
ideological obsession with defeating the Soviet Union, but these practises still reflect a way of 
maintaining the state. For other Afghan and Pakistani residents in Gul Kalay the housing area 
also absorbs large numbers of the unmanageable population that official actors cannot cope with.  
 
However, there are a number of challenges that remain with these informal housing structures, 
which do not necessarily produce conditions that can enable a fully humanised existence. In 
physical terms the condition in Gul Kalay, and other similar settlements, continues to pose 
challenges for the lives of both Afghan and Pakistanis residents. The physical outputs that are 
produced do not meet health and safety regulations and legal building requirements. The 
prevention of laws from being enforced means that sanitation systems are present but basic. 
Electricity lines are present (Figures 14-16). Some households have direct access to water 
through waterlines, other houses have an under-tank system, but the poorest houses have no 
waterlines and instead siphon water off from the local mosque. The housing structures are 
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vulnerable to local flooding, and the pathways of the settlement frequently get bogged down 
with sewage waste and rubbish. Thus, whilst they provide housing and shelter the conditions that 
are present are densely packed, hazardous, ecologically vulnerable, and unsustainable. In the 
poorest sections of the settlement illnesses and poor sanitation were visible, and can be seen in 
the images provided in this section. In Gul Kalay and across Peshawar (as well as other areas in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), nothing captures the potential hazards of poor urban infrastructure and 
development with greater clarity than the numbers of buildings that were damaged and washed 
away in the 2010 floods. In an extract from an interview with an Afghan family, the mother of 
the house said: 
I lost my roof, the walls, everything… at least half of our house 
was broken down from the rain. The structure collapsed 
(Mezghan, PXA38). 
Malalai another Pakistani resident in the house opposite said this often happened with adverse 
weather conditions:  
Something usually happens here because of the weather... A wall 
falls, the roof collapses, and the roads flood (Malalai Khattak, 
PXP46).  
If a form of regulation was in effect, it is likely that the upheaval the floods had on the lives of 
Mezghan and Malalai as well as millions of others may have been a different story.  
 
Moreover, because of limited regulation, tenants can be subjected to higher forms of rent, or 
informal/implicit contracts of agreement which can involve the landowner giving out loans to 
produce a bonded debt. It is unclear what the legal rights of tenants are, as such residents are 
often punished with high rents. In one area Afghan residents complained that the Pakistani 
landed family was demanding very high rent and residents said, “The prices are getting higher 
and higher”. In another rural-urban area on the outskirts of Ring Road, near Bahadur Kale, a 
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man who was approximately 70 years-old said that his family have lived in the area for many 
years with their own katcha house, which the local landholder had given to them (Fariduddin, 
PXP52). In return he and his family offer services to the local area and landholder’s family, but 
are (implicitly) expected to stay in this “role”, as “caretakers/in servitude”. Thus, whilst limited 
forms of regulation and informal forms “fill in for the state” when the state cannot act or 
provide some scope for a humanised existence, it must be acknowledged that limited regulation 
can also enable the reification of existing social power asymmetries.  
 
The acts of formal-informal housing expansion for Afghans and Pakistanis create inadvertent 
physical and non-physical impacts on the state. Again, seemingly small and insignificant acts 
repeated time and again create significant changes. In physical terms, whilst informal housing is 
substitutive and manages populations that the state cannot manage, in the long-term low quality 
and hazardous urban infrastructure is produced, which actually impedes the urban development 
objectives of the state.  
 
Further, official actors and laws appear weak. For Afghans who do not live in RTVs the refugee 
regime and actors, such as CAR, are essentially non-existent, and the state cares in minimal terms 
for Afghans. For the urban poor Pakistanis and Afghans who live in shared areas, the local state 
and its norms appear ineffective and the legitimacy of official institutions is in doubt. Local 
officials are unwilling to interfere with landholders’ urban expansion projects, so residents 
instead find trusting the strength of landed and non-official families via practices of presence 
more effective. The state is not absent but it acts, in the long-run, to contradict and undermine 
its own strength through a reliance on a formal-informal way of working and reinforces the 
strength of non-state actors. 
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Figure 13: Gul Kalay, showing water that rises during floods. 
 
Figure 14: Gul Kalay and new houses being developed by the local landholder and intermediaries. 
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Figure 15: Gul Kalay, note how the outer boundary walls are very close together. 
 
Conclusion 
Solidarity networks and the agency they enable reveal a shared space for self-humanisation by 
Afghans and Pakistanis. Afghans and Pakistanis are engaged in the pursuit of bettering their lives 
in the face of official failings. A stubborn quest for survival is in effect. However, these formal-
informal activities are not a panacea to the failures of officialdom. Significant challenges continue 
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to press on the lives of Afghans and Pakistanis and, ultimately, even to the state. These small 
everyday actions repeated millions of times by both Afghans and Pakistanis are changing the 
nature of Karachi and Peshawar - often in physically unsustainable ways. In addition, official 
structures, particularly the state, are deeply wounded and dismantled through these formal-
informal actions. In Karachi the state is complicit with and reliant on exploitative middlemen 
and intermediaries or too weak to reach needed areas, and in Peshawar the local state is too weak 
to question landed classes. Alternative sovereignties are continually being performed and the 
bribing, corrupted, and incompetent state appears to be stumbling at every turn.  
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Chapter 6: Micro-level Survival & Gains: Family and Friendship Solidarities 
 
My best friend is Pakistani; we’ve grown up 
together all our lives. Of course he will help 
me when I need it. It is not like anyone else 
will help us.  
 Interview with Mudassir, PXA36. 
 
You have to take everything by proxy. The 
house we have is still not [in] my father’s name. 
It is in the name of a friend of his - the house 
is registered under his [friend’s] name. 
Interview with Abdul Wahid, PXA1. 
 
Introduction 
Intimate networks of friends and family are central in understanding micro-level, personalised 
actions of basic and beyond-basic gains. This chapter first continues on with the story of 
everyday life and urban survival, but in a slightly different way to the actions that sustain the 
wider urban neighbourhood discussed in the previous chapter as it pays attention to intimate 
micro-level actions within family networks and focusing on elements of social security, 
remittances, and loans. After this, the chapter explains how intimate solidarity networks enable 
both Afghans and Pakistanis to secure even larger gains, which go beyond urban survival and basic 
redistribution. It does so by analysing two cases of property ownership in regulated residential 
areas. Again the Pakistani state and law is directly challenged, transformed, and revealed as 
increasingly insignificant. Official structures and laws, including those that make a distinction 
between the refugee, illegal immigrant, and the citizen are understood as ineffectual and 
alternative sites of sovereignty continue to be in effect. 
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Pooled Resources I: Basic Security & Migration 
The examples discussed in the previous chapter show how the fellowship of space & charity 
enable macro-types of actions that redistribute goods that allow the “survival” of larger urban 
informal settlements. Crucially, however, intimate solidarity networks prove useful in allowing 
micro-level actions to occur, such as shared household security, and income generation. 
Although not counter-intuitive, these networks and their small detailed workings are also crucial 
in understanding how basic material and non-material redistribution are sustained and made 
possible, without which the stories of Afghan and Pakistani survival would remain incomplete.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in Karachi’s Afghan Camp, the family structure is a central form of 
security through which an access to material goods is possible. Like all structures, the family is 
not wholly benevolent (Singerman 1995:43), but in Afghan Camp, “the family orders people’s 
lives” (ibid), and is central to community life. Here understandings of a humanised life are also 
related to relationships of kin. The family structure is itself humanising as well as acting as a 
structure through which income can be generated in order to access basic material goods, i.e. 
income to eat, access shelter, and access health services for “persistence” and “flourishing”. As 
these are strong ties, families are also willing, or obliged (Portes 2000), to take on more 
responsibility for other members.  
 
In Afghan Camp, most “families” are understood through patrilineal genetic lines, and most 
households consist of the husband and wife/wives, children of the husband and wife (and 
sometimes the husband’s children from previous marriages), at times the husband’s parents, or - 
where relevant if they have married sons and the required space - sons and their wife/wives and 
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children. Extended kin networks are also present in the camp, and a number of areas in the camp 
are also arranged around wider kin and clan networks.  
 
When Afghan Camp was first established, with residents settling from Sohrab Goth and other 
areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the vast majority settlement patterns were based around 
immediate and extended kin networks.148 As a number of migration studies have shown, the 
family unit is often one of the most important structures that enable migration and settlement 
(Boyd 1989; Dorai 2003; Harpviken 2009),149 this is amplified in other emergency situations as 
well (Clarke and Short Jr. 1993). In the historical recollections of many Afghan residents of 
Afghan Camp it was via the strength of family networks that migration practices were enabled 
and facilitated. In an interview with Yaqoob Gul, Yaqoob Gul revealed how he and his family 
migrated from Baghlan to Karachi. 
At first my paternal uncle and his family came here and came to 
Karachi straight away. Once they got settled in my parents came 
over and other members of my family. Slowly, bit by bit we all 
came over. I came to Karachi in 1983, where I moved in with 
everyone in Sohrab Goth. When Sohrab Goth was broken down 
                                                          
148 Information taken from various interviews with older residents and former residents of Afghan Camp. 
149 In emergency situation settlement patterns can also be “cluster-based”, where whole villages move 
together and clan and sectarian based, which overlaps with family networks. In this study interviews were 
conducted with Hazara Afghans in Karachi and Islamabad who provide an example of cluster-based 
movements supported by strong social networks and a transnational civil society organisation, FOCUS. 
The majority of Hazara Afghans are Ismaili and had the support network of the Agha Khan foundation 
and during the migration phase via FOCUS. Interviews with Hazara Afghans revealed how central 
FOCUS had been in managing the Hazara migration to Pakistan during the late 1990s and 2000s. In an 
interview with Pakistani officials one official said, “The Agha Khanis were really good, they managed 
everything themselves. You see that there case is slightly different to everyone else’s they are organised. 
The government has never said anything to them, because in fact they do the GOP and UNHCR’s job 
better than them!” (interview: Azam 2010). In an interview with an Afghan Hazara recalling her migration 
to Karachi she said, “When we first came over we were in a big emergency hall location for a few weeks. 
We were told how things work in Pakistan, where we could stay… Then they helped find us jobs, housing, 
and accommodation. They even supported us for a while. Now they say we should work ourselves, but 
they helped me get the job” (Ferdous, KHA26). This was also supported by an interview with the main 
representative of Hazara Afghans in Karachi, Mohmmad Darwaish (interview: Derwaish 2010). 
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we all moved to Afghan Camp. Some families have moved out of 
Afghan Camp and others of us are still here (Yaqoob Gul, 
KHA10).   
 
On this point a slight digression is useful in order to show how intimate solidarity networks 
enable many Afghans to move beyond the frames of “exemplary suffering” through which the 
refugee regime and host state view Afghan lives. In a number of interviews in Karachi and 
Peshawar, the independent family unit was important in explaining how Afghans settled into 
RTVs, moved out of RTVs, or in some cases did not even live in an RTV. In an interview with 
an Afghan family living in rented accommodation in Hayatabad (Peshawar) Maryam Jan, the 
female head of the family, revealed how she and her family migrated to Pakistan from Kabul City 
in 1994 in an emergency response to militarised violence in which her younger sister “lost two of 
her children by rocket bombing”, and her “maternal uncle also lost his two children by rocket 
attacks” (Maryam Jan, PXP32.B). Her family, which included her husband, her five children, and 
the sister who had lost her children, initially stayed in an RTV in Nasir Bagh, but shortly after 
moved to an unregulated housing area before finally moving to rented accommodation in the 
regulated Hayatabad neighbourhood. Whilst UNHCR was important in offering initial relief, i.e. 
emergency shelter and basic goods Maryam Jan’s family moved out of Nasir Bagh after her 
family’s “emergency phase”. Maryam Jan explained that this was possible because some family 
members “used to live in Hayatabad before us”, and although her extended family “moved out 
to Canada (a while after)”, they still “left all of their things and possessions for us. Whatever was 
here they left it for us and then they moved away from here”. Using family networks Maryam 
Jan’s family settled in Peshawar, which provided the conditions for a life that went beyond the 
basic life of the RTV. In the RTV Maryam Jan said: 
I was concerned for my daughters… Who wants to live with 
them in a camp? My daughter, my sister, we were all afraid. 
Every type of person was there... everyone was living there. We 
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were not used to this.  In Nasir Bagh we had difficulties; we had 
problems with money and to earn… Once we had heard 
rumours that someone was going into neighbouring tents to rape 
the girls. Yes, we had heard that they were going to rape the girls. 
Once I heard this we had to leave...… And the bathrooms – uff! 
<Exasperated sigh>. We had to share with everyone and you 
had to walk so far. It was not a bathroom, it was not a toilet – it 
was open. Everyone used it. It was a kinara and everyone was 
there using it (ibid). 
 
Maryam Jan positioned RTV life as one of anonymity - “everyone was there” - in which the 
public “kinara” reflects a source of devaluation compared to what her previous experiences of 
city life in Kabul. RTV life did not offer enough and indeed in the RTV there was even a 
perceived looming threat (rape). In contrast her family connections offered a chance for more 
human relationships, emotional attachments, and a life that went beyond models of exemplary 
suffering. Maryam Jan currently works from her home and her three sons work in Khyber 
Bazaar in Peshawar. All three of her sons earn a steady income, at least more than what was 
available in the RTV. Maryam Jan’s two younger daughters both attend a high school in 
Hayatabad, pursuing formal education, and the eldest daughter is a teacher. For Maryam Jan and 
her family a different form of existence from the “baseline” forms of human survival than the 
refugee regime provides were pursued. 
 
In Afghan Camp, it is also usually the family (immediate and extended) that one turns to 
generate and get access to everyday material and non-material resources such as food, money, 
shelter. This is especially the case when the state, refugee regime, or supporting I/NGOs are 
ineffective, if present at all. Again, “it seems that all people, regardless of culture, rely less on 
social networks when there are professional agencies that can support them” (Harpviken 
2009:28). In the case of Zareena, a Turkmen Afghan widow, aged 30, and mother of five 
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children, Zareena revealed how her younger brother had been essential for her survival (Zareena, 
KHA40). Zareena has been a widow for four years. Her husband passed away from an illness he 
got in Afghan Camp, and both her parents have also passed away. She had no in-laws. In fact, 
according to Zareena her marriage had been arranged by deception by her paternal aunt and her 
aunt’s husband in order to pay off a material debt for them. 150  After her husband’s death, 
Zareena turned to her younger brother, who is 20 years-old, and who felt obliged through forms 
of enforceable trust (Portes 2000) to support his older sister and her five children. Zareena said:  
He is only 20 years old.  He says he works in the city… He earns 
Rs.4000-Rs.5000 a month [Rs.160-Rs.250 per day]. The electricity 
bill alone is Rs.1500. Everything is so expensive. 
Yet despite these material constraints, her brother continues to support her. In part this is 
because he feels obliged to do so, and because his reputation is also vested with that of his 
sister’s, i.e. his reputation cannot afford to let his sister be self-dependent or in absolute poverty, 
which could also lead to becoming  “bad/ruined woman”, as his sister’s body is also a site of his 
honour. “He is my brother, he must do this”, Zareena said. However, this also shows that in this 
context the family unit and structure acts as a site in which concepts of a humanised and valued 
life are constructed. 
 
In another example in the camp, as mentioned in previous chapters, Maulana Abdul Qais and his 
wife have set up separate housing quarters for widows that are a part of his wider kin network 
(Maulana Abdul Qais, KHA70). He said: 
                                                          
150 Zareena grew up in Peshawar and moved to Karachi with her aunt and uncle when she was meant to 
be getting married to their son, her cousin. However, when she arrived in Karachi her aunt’s husband 
needed to settle a material debt with a contractor. Zareena was the payment for this debt. Instead of 
marrying her cousin she married the contractor. After her husband’s (the contractor) death it was only 
through her remaining nuclear family network via her younger brother (who has also migrated to Karachi) 
that she was able to survive. In this example we see how kin networks can have a complex role as 
facilitators, liberators, and oppressors – which serve as a warning against the romanticisation of informal 
networks of survival. 
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We have set up a women’s quarter, we actually built it. It is for 
people of our own family so that they have security... We - my 
wife and I - make dry roti and give people some fruit. We do at 
the women’s quarters as well… These are our people.  
Thus in Afghan Camp the family unit (immediate and extended) is a critical source of social 
capital and security at the micro-level. It is this unit that decides and deals with immediate and 
everyday decisions of redistribution and support through which an Afghan persistence and 
presence is possible, in which basic goods, and goods that deliver beyond what officialdom offer, 
are secured. These structures are also important structures through which formulations and 
understandings of the self are given meaning through the family unit. This central position of kin 
networks is crucial in understanding how survival is possible – without which the lived reality of 
Afghan lives is incomplete. 
 
Outside of Afghan Camp in Sohrab Goth, two teenage brothers have been able to survive and 
persist in the city because of their sibling relationship. Interviews were completed with Zalmay, 
who is 15 years-old (KHA1). Zalmay lives in a single room with his brother, Jibran (KHA1.B), in 
Al-Asif Square. As the older brother Zalmay safeguards and provides for his younger brother. 
Zalmay and Jibran migrated from Afghanistan to Pakistan in 2000 with their immediate and 
extended family, including his father and mother, step-mother (his father’s first wife), and uncles. 
Since then, their mother passed away and his father has moved back to Afghanistan with 
Zalmay’s step-mother. Zalmay’s relationship with his father and his step-mother is increasingly 
stretched with limited interaction. As Zalmay and Jibran migrated to Pakistan after 2000 and 
without proof of arrival or any registration with the refugee regime, both are also considered to 
be illegal immigrants. Both Zalmay and Jibran are undergoing the Refugee Status Determination 
(RSD) assessment process, however, the process itself is long, arduous, and, in the words of 
Zalmay, “tormenting my life”. Zalmay writes to UNHCR regularly (he learnt English informally 
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and has recently been enrolled in a school) in order to make his case to UNHCR. But he does 
not, it appears, speak the “language” that UNHCR wishes to hear (Khosravi 2010:33). The 
letters he sends include pictures coloured by felt pens. “I am scared”, he wrote in one letter with 
a drawing of the sky, which for him reflected a better place that he wanted to get to. When I 
spoke with a worker from an INGO, which supports UNHCR, and who is familiar with his case, 
the worker said, “Yes, UNHCR is dealing with his case. However they need to know if he is really 
a refugee. Many people are scared”. In the office of this INGO I was told, “He phones 
everyday”. One day I phoned UNHCR in Islamabad on Zalmay’s request. Zalmay said, “You 
speak English properly; you know how to say what they want to hear. Ask them about my case. 
Why won’t they help me”? When I phoned I was told by an office worker, “Zalmay must stop 
phoning here. There is a process that he is aware of. He will be notified of his outcome”. Zalmay 
said he has never been notified of anything, but more importantly he said he does not know how 
this “system” works. During fieldwork Zalmay was provided with a UNHCR letter stating his 
case was being assessed. He keeps the letter safe in case of police harassment, even though the 
letter usually does not work. However, he has no other support or guidance from UNHCR, CAR, 
or wider GOP bodies in any capacity.  
 
Zalmay and Jibran are, however, able to survive and support each other through their sibling 
relationship and accompanying material, non-material, and emotional attachments. As the older 
brother, Zalmay safeguards and provides for his younger brother. He said, “I get really worried 
for my brother, but I have to take care of him. I work a lot, I do not want him to, and he is too 
young”. Zalmay works two jobs: in Al-Asif Square he is a bus-boy and on weekends he travels to 
the affluent Defence neighbourhood to work in a bazaar, which attracts many middle and upper-
class families in Pakistan. “It is far for me to come in, but they [the customers] pay well. They 
give you tips here at least”, he said. Here, bonds of affection (Hyden 1983) and obligation 
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motivate (Portes 2000) Zalmay’s actions to provide income and emotional support. Both are 
essential in understanding how micro-level security is achieved.  
 
In the cases above (particularly Zareena and Zalmay) it is clear that the family unit acts as both a 
constructive and destructive unit. The fact that Zareena was sold by her paternal aunt to settle a 
debt reflects how her life was viewed as a commodity to be traded. Yet the fact that her brother 
has supported her and her five children also reflects the constructive dimension of family bonds. 
For Zalmay the fact that his father’s wife and her family abandoned Zalmay and his brother also 
point to the destructive potentials of the family-unit. Yet the fact that he is supporting his 
younger brother points to a more constructive nature. However, in all of the cases mentioned 
above, the complex working of family structures – both constructive and destructive – still 
provide an important resource pool. Whilst these cases are not counter-intuitive, they provide a 
better understanding of the micro-level processes that enable survival and basic material 
redistribution are possible, without which the Afghan story in Pakistan would remain incomplete. 
They show that routes to a more humanised life are not monopolised by the state and refugee 
regime but include intimate solidarity networks that are understood themselves as being 
humanising, and also enable agency and a striving towards a more humanised life.  
 
However, these solidarities of kin are not a panacea in terms of distributive capacity. In the case 
of Zareena (in addition to having been sold as a commodity) she and her children, her brother 
and other siblings, struggle without food, her brother’s Rs.4000-Rs.5000 income is not enough to 
support them all. Zalmay and Jibran live in fear without security in a one room apartment. One 
evening Zalmay phoned me frantically worried that his brother had been taken by people 
associated with his step-mother or by criminals that he said live in his building. “I cannot find 
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him. Where is he? What do I do?! What if they have taken him?” 30 minutes later he phoned to 
tell me he had found him. “He had just gone to the shop. He is fine. I told him off…  I am just 
worried for us. I am always worried. People know we are alone, they could do anything”, he said. 
In these cases, intimate solidarity networks are an important structure and offer important forms 
of social capital, yet without other forms of capital, i.e. economic or cultural, and without 
support by official actors the full potentials of a secure “humanity” are not fully possible or 
practiced (Friedman 1992). Functional official structures and laws would be of benefit 
particularly for the more vulnerable. Instead the failure of official actors to meet the expectations 
of Zareena, Maulana Abdul Qais, Zalmay, and others when repeated time and time again, create 
expressions of discontent and delegitimization that directly target the state, and, in the case of 
Zalmay, the refugee regime, or for Zareena the local INGO. As I sat with Zareena in Afghan 
Camp’s INGO school, her daughter’s application was rejected. “She’s not that desperate, there 
are people worse off than her”, a school employee told me. Zareena said to me later: 
We do everything ourselves. What do you think [officials] will do? 
We get nothing. How will they help us? Where will these people 
[from Afghan Camp’s INGO] help us? How much poor am I 
meant to be? (Zareena, KHA40).  
For Zalmay, the idea of official support was also nothing but a crude joke: 
No one will ever do any one thing for you. Not one thing. Don’t 
go to UNHCR (Zalmay, KHA1).  
 
This is not to say that either Zareena or Zalmay seek to escape official structures or forms of 
support – indeed these structures still have access to resources that both Zareena and Zalmay 
need and want, i.e. education, legal status, and safety. In an ideal situation they would be able to 
access these rights and goods via official channels as well as solidarity networks. However, the 
failure of this to be the case creates a scenario in which official structures and actors are 
increasingly delegitimized, considered ineffective, and even ridiculed.  
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For most Pakistanis it is also the family unit (immediate and extended), when present, that 
appears as the most trusted and effective unit of organisation. Similar to the cases discussed in 
the section above, the family unit is central to migration strategies, moving beyond ideas of 
“exemplary suffering”, and basic everyday security. 
 
Many IDPs from FATA or the recent floods have periodically been located in RTVs in Pakistan 
(HRC 2010; OCHA 2012), but many have avoided the RTV and state support altogether. This is 
because the RTV and the state do not provide the same trust that solidarities of kin or even 
bonds of friendship do.  In Karachi a series of interviews were completed with a Pakistani 
(unofficial) IDP from Waziristan belonging to a Mehsud family, which were supported by 
interactions with her sister and children (Orzala, KHP12). Orzala and her immediate family 
initially migrated from Waziristan in 1996 to Karachi. Orzala’s family, land, and house also 
remain in Waziristan but her immediate and extended family are split across the two locations. 
She returned to Waziristan when she married but when conditions in Waziristan deteriorated she 
and her husband moved back to Karachi where the two of them have informally purchased a 
house. IDPs from FATA have been provided with RTVs by the Pakistani state and via UNHCR 
(HRC 2010; UNHCR 2010b), but in many cases the government response has been slow (IRIN 
1 June 2005), lacking, or marred with suspicion given the Pakistani military actions in FATA. For 
Orzala, who already had family members in Karachi, government support was not needed or 
desired. They first stayed in an apartment with her parents and cousins in Al-Asif Square, making 
use of family obligations and social and cultural obligations of hospitality. Similar to Maryam Jan, 
for Orzala RTV life was not desired.  
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Why would I live in a camp when I have my family here? We 
have a lot of connections and history in Karachi, so we moved in 
with our family (Orzala, KHP12).  
For Orzala family life is crucial to her security, sense of self, and understanding of a humanised 
life. Orzala, her husband, her sister (Khadijah, KHP12.B), and her sister’s husband (later joined 
by her mother) later moved to another area in the city – again on the rural-urban interface. Here 
they pooled their resources and bought some land that was being informally sold where Orzala 
and her husband purchased her house. The family unit again, alongside informal navigation 
practices, reveals itself as central in enabling micro-level actions which, when repeated time and 
time again, help to sustain, transform, and expand the urban city.  
 
In another informal housing area in inner Karachi repeat interviews were conducted over three 
months. In this settlement – of Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochis, Kashmiris, Punjabis, Hazaras, and 
Muhajirs - most houses are arranged around the family unit of husband and wife/wives, children 
of the husband and wife (and sometimes the husband’s children from previous marriages), and 
sometimes the husband’s parents, and - where relevant if they have married sons, and the 
required space - sons and their wife/wives and children. Extended kin networks are also present, 
though not to the same degree as Afghan Camp, and networks are arranged across both 
patrilineal and matrilineal lines. In one case interviews were completed with Hassan Bilal and his 
family (Hassan Bilal, KHP7). Hassan Bilal lives with his seven daughters and wife in two 
informally constructed rooms that were built above his brother’s semi-regular home. Hassan 
Bilal is a Baloch Pakistani who has been living in Karachi since 1965, i.e. since infancy. In my 
interviews with him and his family he revealed that he had just found work as a driver after 
having been unemployed for a number of months. Just a few months earlier he and his 
immediate family were homeless, unable to pay rent, and without an income. There was no 
system of support offered by the local Pakistani state.  
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We receive no help – we have to rely on our own resources. Eik 
glass pani tak nahi dehenge ([they will] not even give [you] one glass of 
water). [Here] Sometimes, the political parties come into the areas 
for election time… then they just disappear (Hassan Bilal, KHP7). 
 
It was through Hassan Bilal’s intimate relationship with his brother that he got access to shelter 
and survived. His brother, Ahmed Bilal said, “His situation got really bad. You see even now his 
conditions are bad” (Ahmed Bilal, KHP7.B). He continued, “But he is my brother. This is my 
house, so I just told him to build two rooms on top of my house (ibid).  
 
As we walked up the stairs, the steps of mud and brick moved as they were poorly constructed. 
“We essentially live on the roof”, Hassan Bilal said. He continued, “We can’t even shut the door 
of this room, which creates a lot of problems when it rains and when it gets cold”. He said:  
If I tell you really what the situation is, well then, here in this 
household there was no food to eat last night and there was no 
tea to drink this morning. [Or food to eat]. This is the condition. 
How are you going to manage a household on Rs.3000-Rs.4000 
per month. How? (Hassan Bilal, KHP7). 
In addition, his brother Ahmed Bilal highlighted how his own house now, with additional rooms 
on top and no effective drainage system, quickly floods when it rains and is “sinking” lower in to 
the ground (Ahmed Bilal KHP7.B). 
 
In this case the solution provided by solidarity networks is, again, not a complete solution. 
Hassan Bilal and his family are still maintain an inherent human quality that all human beings 
possess simply by virtue of being human. Social solidarities, forms of recognition, and self-
responsibility mean that this continues to be the case. Not having adequate shelter does not 
make one less human. However, it is clear that Hassan Bilal’s life is not provided with the basic 
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needs conditions or recognition that could improve the conditions and possibilities of his life 
however he should see fit. A fully “humanised life” or “human dignity” are not inherent and 
unchanging facts, given the potentials for humans to be dehumanised (Pollman 2010), but by 
being provided with a minimum set of conditions and recognition the potentials of human life 
can be reached – or at least striven towards. In the current political order, these conditions are 
expected to be delivered by the state. But in the case of Hassan Bilal, and the other Afghan and 
Pakistani lives mentioned in this thesis, the state fails.  
 
As a result of the state failings that citizens and non-citizens face, official actors are, again, 
delegitimized in physical and non-physical ways. Housing adjustments that are made are 
completed without any form of planning and do not meet the state’s modernisation and 
developmental objectives. Further, repeated time and time again these “minor” adjustments are 
creating massive developmental, ecological, and health challenges for the residents in these 
spaces and for the state itself. In Hassan Bilal’s neighbourhood the wider area is full of housing 
adjustments which have subsequently made the area densely packed, which residents explained 
have meant the area has increased water and sanitation blockages, particularly when it rains and 
because of a high concentrations of plastic bags blocking drains and of garbage being piled up. 
The Pakistani state appears incompetent and unsure of how to act in this area.  
There is nothing. No help. [But] yes, sometimes here you have 
the welfare people. During election time you have the people 
from the parties. You have the goods that are delivered but they 
are not distributed. The people that need these things they do 
not get anything. Not a thing. What do they care (Hassan Bilal, 
KHP7).  
Here local political actors appear callous and corrupted with goods not being redistributed. The 
moral character of the state is again questioned, eroded, and challenged. 
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Figure 16: Garbage piled up outside Hassan Bilal's home. 
 
In another informal housing area in Peshawar, I interviewed a family that had taken in the 
recently divorced sister-in-law (Ruqaiya, PXP70.C) of the household head (Abdul Sattar, PXP70). 
Hafsah Jan, the niece of Ruqaiya said, “Her husband was not good to her. Our women do not 
normally get divorced” (Hafsah Jan, PXP70.B). And, it is usually not the norm that in cases of 
divorce that the divorcee will move in to the household of their married sister. However, for 
Ruqaiya, with no other family members able to support her, no means of income, and no 
possibility of state support, she turned to her sister’s family. “We are all cramped in one place”, 
Ruqaiya said as I conducted the interview in the two-room house, “but this is what my sister felt 
she must do to help me”. Hafsah Jan added: 
Someone [officials] really should help her. Her life and the lives 
of her children are lived in difficulty. People do not accept her, 
but what support can she get. We can only offer her something 
little. Our conditions are tough, but what about her and her 
children. She needs something more than what we can give her 
(Hafsah Jan, PXP70.B).  
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Figure 17: The inner courtyard of Abdul Sattar’s home (PXP70). 
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Figure 18: View from the neighbour's house of Abdul Sattar's home. 
Note how the home of Abdul Sattar has been divided with other neighbours as well (informally) 
via a brick wall. 
 
 
A stubborn persistence and presence continues, as Hafsah Jan, Abdul Sattar and other family 
members are willing, because of strong ties, to take on the deeper demands and responsibilities 
of caring for an additional household member. However, for this family unit, who survive on the 
daily wages of Hafsah Jan’s husband and Abdul Sattar, who sells potato and bread on a food cart 
outside of schools near his home, their everyday conditions of existence continue to be difficult. 
“Persistence” continues, but under stressful circumstances. Given the shortcomings of official 
actors, who are expected to deliver, the state also continues to appear incompetent: 
We get nothing, nothing. Someone will come and do a 
government survey, and that is it… What else? Nothing. And 
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nothing even works. The electricity goes; the house is packed 
[with us]. Government support? Ask us if there is even a 
government! (Ruqaiya, PXP70.C). 
 
Figure 19: Abdul Sattar engaged in his daily trade 
 
Pooled Resources II: Bonds of Family - External Migration & Remittances 
Even the refugees are fleeing. 
Interview with government official, Islamabad. 
 
Afghan and Pakistani families also pool resources and provide security, not only by providing 
shelter and support to each other but also by working, trading, and generating income together. 
As conditions in urban Pakistan do not provide the opportunities and conditions for a fully 
humanised life many Afghans and Pakistanis are migrating out of Pakistani cities (and rural areas) 
and moving abroad. Current push and pull factors – i.e. the global and racialised labour market 
(Rana 2011) – have enabled a wider range of classes to enter the transnational working class 
(Rana 2011:111), which include the urban poor and “refugees”.151 Under this strategy, members 
                                                          
151 Traditionally in Pakistan it has been the rural classes that have migrated out of Pakistan or a landed 
and educated class (Rana 2011: 111; see also Werbner 190, 2002; Azam 1995).  
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of the nuclear and extended family (usually male) migrate to a third country, legally and illegally, 
where they perceive employment and economic opportunities to be greater, as well as the chance 
to improve their social standing (Arif and Irfan 1997b). Particularly in cases where migration is 
illegal, intermediaries or officials acting illegally are involved to reflect a practice of access. 
However, this also extends to legal migration, such as labour migration to the Gulf States (HRW 
2006:6; Arif 2009). 
 
In Peshawar and Karachi many families, both Afghan and Pakistan, were interviewed who had 
some family members living in Peshawar or Karachi and/or other areas in Pakistan. Other family 
members were living across international borders in Afghanistan and Iran (Jalal et al., 2005; 
Monsutti 2005; Monsutti and Stitger; Saito 1999), the Gulf States (Addleton 1992; HRW 2006; 
Rana 2011:97-133), Western Europe, and Australia.152 By sending family members (immediate 
and extended) abroad for work these families ideally receive economic remittances that support 
activities - such as paying rent, purchasing property, paying school fees, and buying everyday 
goods and food - in what have been mis-described as “altruistic” remittances by IMF working 
papers (Bougha-Hagbe 2006). The IMF also understands remittances as an essential way of 
maintaining the state and generating state wealth. The IMF (Kock et al., 2011:3) outlines that 
remittances, mainly from the Gulf countries, are equal to 4.2 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP ($7 
billion), and are boosted by state labour contracts with Gulf States and “manpower contracts” 
(Azam 1995; Arif and Irfan 1997; HRW 2006:26). However, the story is not that simple. They 
also create a number of challenges for Afghans, Pakistanis, and even the state. 
 
                                                          
152 The Western countries that Afghans interviewed in this study had family members living in included: 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, and the UK. Pakistani families interviewed had migrated mainly to 
the UK, which is related to the long-history of Pakistani-UK migration and the large Pakistani Diaspora 
in the UK. See Werbner (1999, 2002). 
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Afghan Migration (Again) & Family Remittances 
In interviews many Afghans highlighted that it is not unusual for a family member or members 
to be living and working abroad and/or existing in transnational connections. Afghans thus 
become double and sometimes triple or more migrants. In interviews with a family living in 
rented accommodation in a regulated housing area in Peshawar, the family revealed how the 
remittances they received from extended family members were essential to the family’s ability to 
make rent payments. “They send us money from Australia, which is how we pay the rent… It 
makes a difference to us” (Baitool Amin, PXA20).  In another RTV in Peshawar an interview 
was completed with a family whose two sons are working in Germany. “At least when you earn 
money there, you know you have earned and you can keep the money”, the father said, reflecting 
the distrust of the way the Pakistani labour market functions (Wazir Gul, PXA5). And, in Afghan 
Camp, a number of families have transnational connections with family members working in 
Afghanistan and Iran. In one household, in Afghan Camp, Gulshaan (KHA13.B), the daughter 
of Habibullah (KHA13) (see Chapter 5), told me how her husband and brother-in-law live and 
work in Iran and send money back to her and other family members through informal money 
transfers (Gulshaan, KHA13.B). Another interviewee revealed how his uncle was contemplating 
joining the Taliban in Afghanistan in order to earn additional income, which would be re-
invested in his family in Karachi (Dilawar Noor, KHA36). Further, in an interview with a family 
living in an informal housing area on the outskirts of Sohrab Goth, a man had just returned from 
Iran after living there for four years. “The conditions there were so difficult, but I needed to earn 
something, which I thought I could do better there”, he said (Salahuddin, KHA62.D). Finally, 
another family revealed their experience of sending their son from Pakistan to Iran to Turkey 
and now potentially to Italy (Irfan, KHA48; Abdullah Zuhair, PXA89). For these Afghan 
families, personalised networks are important in pooling resources, enabling migration, and 
generating and sharing income. Here the corrupted ways in which the Pakistani economy 
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functions are evaded through migration, which subsequently enable other family members to 
persist and practice presence within Pakistan.  
 
However, for many of these interviewees challenges remain. For some families the remittances 
are not always consistent and for others not enough. Dilawar Noor (KHA36) spoke of how his 
older maternal uncles, who were his guardians, left to Iran two years ago but were not supporting 
him financially (Dilawar Noor, KHA36). In other cases, depending on the method and location 
of migration, the monetary costs are considerable. For illegal migration the financial costs and 
human risks are considerably higher (Khosravi 2010:27-40). Sending a family member abroad 
through illegal actions requires the support of an intermediary, a dallal  or other types of 
middleman, and even officials (Khosravi 20:56-8). This can involve high payments to 
intermediaries and officials (Khosravi 2010), where intermediaries and officials view human lives 
as sites of opportunity. Further, for those involved in migration the act of migration, specifically 
if it is illegal, involves risky activities for the travellers (Khosravi 2010:28). In December 2012 11 
people (some Afghan) were killed at the Iran-Pakistan border (Dawn 22 Dec 2012) and in 2009 
62 people (Afghan and Pakistani) suffocated to death in a truck near Quetta’s border with 
Afghanistan (Huffington Post 4 Apr 2009 [note, this case was not a repatriation movement]). 
Thus whilst migration and remittances strategies are an important way of generating income and 
survival, the processes involved are not always fully humanising. 
 
Irfan (KHA48) was interviewed over a period of 12 months during fieldwork (communication 
has continued thereafter). Irfan is an Afghan Tajik who was born, raised, and educated in 
Pakistan. He left his home in Peshawar and moved to Karachi. From Karachi, he moved to Iran, 
in search of employment opportunities after he had been struggling to find work to support his 
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family. His father, Abdullah Zubair (PXA89) a former leprosy sufferer, works, but does not earn 
enough income for his family. In interviews and discussions I had with his father, he told me 
that he wanted better opportunities for his son.  
He went to school, he has an education. But what can he get here. 
The work in the city does not offer him anything, and he gets no 
money. He can speak English from school but what can he do 
here. One day someone is killed… they ask him if he is Afghan, 
and create problems. I do not want him to live here (Abdullah 
Zubair, PXA89). 
 
Irfan had fake Pakistani documents made through an intermediary, “I’m just getting my 
documents made from someone who my father knows, and then I will start travelling”, he said 
as we sat in his home (see also: Khosravi [2010:62-2]). Having these documents made required 
him and his father to pool their incomes. Once his documents were made, he travelled by foot 
and by van into Tehran (Iran) where he worked in a factory, sharing a room with other Afghans 
and earning a low wage. Unsatisfied with the conditions in Tehran, where he was treated badly - 
“The conditions for us as Afghans are really bad here; you know… it is just not good” (see also 
Olszewska 2010; Jalal et al., 2005; Saito 2009) -, he moved to Istanbul (Turkey) with money from 
his father and his income as well by being supported by other “global” intermediaries. Again his 
journey was made partly through walking and partly by road, “We walked for at least three days”, 
he said. (At the time of writing he is on his way to Italy). At each phase, from what Irfan and his 
family have shared with me, Irfan tries to send money back to his family, but this can be difficult. 
In addition, his own living conditions are cramped and vulnerable. In Istanbul (like in Tehran) he 
also works in a factory with a poor wage. “I’m just trying to get my money together, but if they 
paid us it would be easier. At the moment we get paid, but on and off... I’m not even sure what I 
can do to resolve my situation” Irfan said despondently. Further, his methods of travel are also 
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high risk, “Don’t worry, the man who organises this will think of a way to get us in”, he said 
regarding Italy, “Maybe by boat, or by car, or hiding in cargo… let’s see” (Irfan, KHA48). 
 
Remittances are personalised actions that help maintain Afghan lives in urban Pakistan via 
income generation but they can be riddled with challenges. For the state, they take away 
resources and lives in the form of human capital which could contribute towards the Pakistani 
city and relocate them in the economies of other states. (The 2010 Afghan Management and 
Repatriation Strategy [SAFRON 2010] and UNHCR Surveys [SAFRON et al., 2010a-c] have 
recognised the contributions of Afghans to the Pakistani economy). Further,  the example of 
Irfan being able to make documents illegal via a middleman delegitimize the state, who are seen 
as incompetent and even complicit in allowing these actions to take place. State actors acting in 
informal ways are breaking the law. They are not just preventing it from being implemented but 
are actively violating it. “What will happen if you get caught?” I asked, “You can just show 
officials some money”, Irfan said (Irfan, KHA48). Echoing the work of Kamal Sadiq (2009), the 
sites of legal documentary creation are not just monopolised by the state – multiple lawmakers 
are present and active in Pakistan, including corrupted officials and intermediaries. 
 
However, most crucially, whilst the GOP’s main objective is to encourage Afghans to leave 
Pakistan, the illegal migrations of Afghans to get out of Pakistan are deeply symbolic of the 
broken nature of the Pakistani state. In the words of a Pakistani official, “Even the refugees are 
fleeing” (interview: Zeb 2011). These acts also reflect the broken system of refugee protection, 
which also impacts the international refugee regime. Repatriation, naturalisation, and (legal) 
resettlement to a third country – the three main refugee solutions – are ineffectively 
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implemented and redundant. In the case discussed, the refugee regime was not to be trusted and 
consulted at any juncture. 
 
Pakistani Migration & Family Remittances 
The example of pooled resources via remittances and increased migration using intimate 
networks is similarly applicable to Pakistani families. Even citizens find that there are not enough 
opportunities or forms of security in Karachi and Peshawar to keep them rooted in Pakistan. In 
a number of interviews in Karachi and Peshawar, remittances, and pooled incomes of immediate 
and extended family networks were revealed as important ways in which families survive (Azam 
1995; Arif and Irfan 1997; Rana 2012; Werbner 2002). For both citizens and non-citizens a 
shared, often informal, strategy of income generation via migration is in effect. In an interview in 
Peshawar a woman revealed how her father lives in the UK and returns once every one-to-two 
years; “There is nothing in Peshawar for him, so he moved abroad”, she said (Shawana Khan, 
PXP22). In another area, one family is partly supported their by their 20 year-old son’s migration 
to the UK. In Peshawar his father, Sarfaraz Ali said, “We want him to study, earn money, and 
become something. There is nothing for him in the city and in our [ancestral] village”, he said 
(Sarfaraz Ali, PXP37).  
 
In a semi-formal residential areas in Peshawar, interviews were conducted with Waqqas (PXP9) 
with his family present. Waqqas migrated to Peshawar from Landi Kotal (in Khyber Agency, 
FATA) in search of employment opportunities in the mid-1990s. However, for Waqqas, even 
Peshawar did not offer enough opportunities, so he now lives a transnational life between 
Peshawar and Kuwait where he works as a driver. He intermittently returns to Pakistan to see his 
immediate and extended family and transfer his financial capital to his property and family in 
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Peshawar and Landi Kotal. For Waqqas and his family the remittances are constructive. They 
generate income and redistribute wealth and are a form of “offensive” survival (Bayat 2010). If 
there is no help from officialdom or when circumstances are tough, an initiative is taken to push 
forward in the pursuit in the betterment of their lives – even if this betterment takes them away 
from their territorial “homeland”. Alternative ways of belonging, both within and outside of the 
state – are in effect. When the state fails, Pakistanis use intimate solidarity networks to create 
opportunities to generate income, which crucially also transcend the state.  
 
Again, these forms of survival and income generation are not without their challenges. In the 
case of Sarfaraz Ali’s son, Rameez Ali (LNP1), when I met him in London he revealed how he 
was living and could barely make rent. “I wish I could send something back”, but he could not 
(Rameez Ali, LNP1). Similar to the Afghan examples mentioned above, the challenges of illegal 
migration (or indeed poorly regulated legal migration [HRW 2006; Arif 2009]), which includes a 
reliance on intermediaries creates high costs and high-risk. In September 2012 58 illegal 
immigrants (including Pakistanis) were killed by a boat that sank near Turkey (Pakistan Today 7 
Sep 2012), and in December 2012 17 Pakistanis were killed en route to Australia (Dunya 29 Dec 
2012). A 2009 report (Arif 2009) indicates that even many legal workers who go to work in the 
Gulf States are recruited in processes in which their legal rights are not safeguarded, and a 2006 
Human Rights Watch report documents workers frequently having their wages (1.5-2 months’ 
worth) withheld as “security” to prevent workers from “running away” (HRW: 2006:30).153 
 
                                                          
153 Although migration and remittance patterns Afghans and Pakistanis exist in shared realities and use 
similar mechanisms to survive and secure gains (the family unit and practices of negotiated access). These 
shared lives create conditions in which the boundaries between the citizen and non-citizen are irrelevant. 
Indeed, illegal immigrants and migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan occupy shared spaces and ways of 
being even in global cities. Afghans and Pakistanis work together in shared factories in Istanbul (Irfan, 
KHA48) or the Gulf States (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10; Rostam KHA68), and are equally a part of a 
globalised and racialised labour diaspora (Rana 2011).  
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For the Pakistani state, increased emigrations of citizens also pose deep existential questions 
which erode the state’s physical potential and non-physical legitimacy. Whilst from a neo-liberal 
perspective freedom of movement and migration may represent a truly globalised world and a 
key source of remittances to maintain the state (Kock et  al., 2011), what can be said of a state 
whose citizens feel they must leave in order to improve their lives and the lives of their families? 
This is not migration for the sake of tourism and the spaces of “choice” are not as vast is often 
assumed for illegal/legal migration (Khosravi 2010). Many migrants do not return to Pakistan - 
either unable or unwilling, which indeed question the meaning of the state in a Weberian sense 
(i.e. a state comprises of a “people”, as well as territory and sovereignty). Thus, the continued 
and consistent migrations out of Pakistan for income generation thus question the very value of 
Pakistani citizenship in Pakistan. For Waqqas his transnational existence has improved his 
monetary income but it was a decision made because of the lack of opportunities for him in 
Peshawar. “I had to go. I do not have anyone here, just my work, which my family needs me to 
do. Staying here [in Peshawar]... what good does it do for us? Nothing” (Waqqas, PXP9).   
 
Cross-Cutting Afghan and Pakistani Networks: Friendship & Loans 
In other cases it is the intimate bonds of friendship (not family) that provide a space of trust and 
reciprocity in which micro-level and personalised actions can be executed. In a neighbourhood in 
Peshawar, Afghan and Pakistani households frequently turn to each other when they need 
everyday goods, foodstuffs, water, or small loans to pay children’s school fees. Similarly cases 
were seen in Pakistani households. Quick sprints across the street to neighbours houses were 
shared tactics by Afghan and Pakistani households to ask neighbours for minor loans to pay for 
school fees, shopping, and rent. In Hayatabad in Peshawar, this was not unusual. “We pay each 
other back…we do these small things, to help each other”, Afsana said (Afsana, PXA105). In 
Ishtiaq Goth (Chapter 5) it was through the bonds of friendship that the sharing of food was 
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possible (alongside moral and ethical concepts of charity) and in Saeed Goth (Chapter 6) it was 
friendship and charity that pushed actors to work together and pool resources to build a road. 
Thus these small everyday loans are crucial micro-level acts which enable both Afghan and 
Pakistanis to continue to live, whilst experiencing human interactions and relationships. The 
actions also point to the shared spaces and shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis that 
challenged nationally segregating lenses.  
 
This pattern can be expanded to the exchange of large monetary loans between friends. As 
Afghan refugees many Afghans have had difficulty establishing bank accounts and taking out 
formal loans. It was only in 2010 that Afghan refugees in which registered Afghans were eligible 
to open bank accounts (interviews: Azam 2010-11; Maroof 2011; Mehmood 2011, Siddiqi 2011). 
However, the process remains long and bureaucratic,154 and for some Afghans too costly. For 
illegal immigrants there are, of course, no avenues for opening a formal bank account. Many 
Pakistanis also face difficulties in setting up bank accounts, and are ineligible for bank-loans and 
formal credit.  Often it is cheaper in both time and cost to bypass formal proceedings (Arif et al., 
1999). Thus again, for both Afghans and Pakistanis, human relationships based on trust and 
mutual reciprocity prove more useful than the bureaucratic processes of bank loans, which, for 
different reasons, cannot be accessed.  
 
In an interview with two friends, one Pakistani (Mehboob PXP12), and the other Afghan 
(Mudassir, PXA36) both said that it was through their friendship that they were comfortable in 
loaning money, when needed to each other. There was an underlying assumption that the money 
would be paid back, but Mudassir added, “if he can’t it does not matter… we have grown up 
                                                          
154 Indeed an implementing partner of UNHCR in Karachi frequently had to communicate (in person or 
via phone and/or written communication that registered Afghans can open bank accounts).  
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together since we were children”. In another series of interviews conducted with two Pakistani 
Pashtuns in Karachi - both fabric wholesalers introduced in earlier chapters, Anwar Khan 
(KHP50) and Abdul Mateen (KHA69) - the bond and trust friendship allowed Anwar Khan to 
give Abdul Mateen a loan so that he could rent a market space. The affinity and friendship that 
the two had for each other has grown over a number of years. They live in the same area where 
they and their families often cook and eat meals together and share bonds of trust and affection. 
Both Anwar Khan and Abdul Mateen used to work in the same market, however, Abdul Mateen 
wanted to expand his own business and move elsewhere. With no bank account he turned to 
Anwar Khan for a loan. “I never had any issue in giving money to Abdul Mateen”, Anwar Khan 
said. “He is good on his word and I know him. He plays football with our kid <points to his 
younger brother Yusuf Khan, who is sitting in the store>… We don’t need these banks, credit 
cards and systems” (Anwar Khan, KHP50). The premise is based on a relationship of mutual 
reciprocity. If Anwar Khan ever needs something he will be able to turn to his trusted friend for 
the support and respect he needs. 
 
These relationships and systems of loans, however, can breakdown. They are not a guarantee of 
security. Despite this, in the face of structural shortcomings they offer an important way in 
which the presence of Afghans and Pakistanis can be practiced, and practiced in humanised 
frameworks and relationships. Solidarity networks are an important lifeline. In addition, these 
small actions repeated time and time again create inadvertent impacts on the state. They reveal 
circulations of wealth that do not directly interact with the state (Arif et al., 1999). Whilst authors 
such as Hernando De Soto (1989, 2000) point to the vibrancy of these small micro-economies 
and generations of wealth, these actions are based on the foundations of a distrusted officialdom, 
which, repeated time and time again (and not just with regards to loans) challenge the character 
and competence of the urban state. At all times, the official ways of working are avoided. 
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Property Gains 
Finally, personalised connections of family and friendship are also essential in enabling micro-
level actions that allow Afghans and Pakistanis to engage in significant material and non-material 
redistribution. This is different in scale to the macro-level actions enabled by the fellowship of 
space & charity and is also different to some of the micro-level actions discussed above. This 
section demonstrates this with regards to formal property gains.  
 
As non-citizens Afghans cannot purchase land or property, and when RTVs close down many 
are faced with problems of finding shelter. Similarly, as urban poor citizens, many Pakistanis 
cannot purchase formal property, but this time it is because they lack the capital to do so (Hasan 
2006, 2012; Hasan and Mansoor 2012). As this thesis demonstrates, informal property 
settlements offer an important route of access to shelter and housing for both Afghans and 
Pakistanis. In informal housing settlements in Karachi, where land is contested, and in Peshawar, 
where the strength of the landholder counts, both Afghans and Pakistanis are able to “own” 
property in similar ways.  
 
In Karachi, in an informal settlement near Sohrab Goth both Afghans and Pakistanis live side by 
side. The land that they both “own” was sold to them by middleman approximately 18 years 
ago.155 I asked Jalaluddin (KHA62.C) and Salahuddin (KHA62.D), Afghan Tajiks whose family 
                                                          
155 Often once the land has been sold in this way, residents are left to defend their territory themselves. 
This means that local official actors have an opportunity to bribe and contests the positions of these 
actors, which they do. New areas, where informal settlers are trying to secure their presence they face the 
task of negotiating with official actors, who often demand bribes and payment. 
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has been living in various areas in Karachi for over 25 years, “How did you purchase this land?” 
Salahuddin responded that the land was purchased through an informal agreement in which 
some paper documentation was provided – though this documentation was not an official lease 
(i.e. a sanad). In legal terms these actors have no right to this land but the land was able to be sold, 
informally, because of a contestation over it in which the GOP, the PPP, and the landowners, 
also connected to the PPP, were involved, but one in which ultimately the PPP and “their” 
landholder emerged the strongest. (The legal status of the land essentially remains unclear and 
contested.) 
 
In Peshawar, in one informal housing area, Afghans and Pakistanis no longer pay rent to the 
landholder who has “given” residents the land (Field notes: Wardak Rasool). This was also seen 
in the case of Ibrahim Hafiz mentioned in the previous chapter, it is through the “benevolence” 
of the landholder in Asadullah Khan that Ibrahim Hafiz’s family “own” the land (Ibrahim Hafiz, 
PXA38). Because the likelihood of official repercussions is low, and because laws are not 
implemented, “ownership” (or occupation/squatting) is possible. 
 
However, what happens in areas where legality is more strongly enforced and the state is present 
in its coercive capacity? Do the practices of protection & access discussed above still work? How 
is it that in some cases even Afghans “own” houses in formal and regulated areas? How is it that 
many Pakistanis hide (camouflage) their ownership in order to extract real gains against 
officialdom? This, I argue, occurs when intimate networks are present and more willing to invest 
in riskier activities, and which may also cut across the nationally segregating practices of 
citizenship.  
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Cross-Cutting Afghan and Pakistan Networks: Afghan Property Gains with the Support 
of Pakistanis 
As non-citizens in Pakistan, Afghans are not legally allowed to own immoveable property or land 
in Pakistan (Foreigners Law 1946). The segregating logic of the nation-state does not wish for 
the Afghan presence in Pakistani to become sedentarised and permanent, particularly within 
regulated areas. However, a small number of Afghans have used solidarity networks, such as the 
bonds of friendship and solidarities of kin & clan, to extract tangible gains of “possession” in 
contradiction to Pakistani state law. The desire for greater forms of security that are not possible 
through RTV accommodation nor from simple renting have pushed Afghans to see alternative 
routes for a more permanent presence in urban Pakistan.  These cases are usually only possible 
when strong forms of social capital combine with strong forms of economic capital, to highlight 
as Bourdieu does (1985), the interconnectedness of his three fields of capital (Bourdieu 1981, 
1985). Indeed, many Afghans have very strong social networks and social capital (i.e. large 
solidarities of kin). However, without the relevant financial and cultural capital their capacity to 
act is restricted. 
 
In this study a small number of Afghans that “owned” property in formal and regulated areas in 
urban Peshawar and Karachi for either housing or business purposes were interviewed. The 
willingness to discuss “ownership” issues, particularly if the Afghan in question has not “become 
Pakistani” (Sadiq 2009), was a sensitive question. Indeed, when interviews were conducted with 
Pakistanis who had affiliation with a formal organisation present, discussions over housing 
ownership were never completed. In many cases, this was because ownership may well not have 
existed. However, in the cases where it may have been present, it is likely that the topic was not 
discussed for fear of repercussions by actors seen to be associated with the state. In the cases 
discussed of two Afghans in Peshawar discussed in this section, Abdul Wahid (PXA1) and Hajji 
248 
 
Khairuddin (PXA71), both of whom possess Afghan POR cards, 156  the interviews were 
conducted via personal networks rather than I/NGOs or other local official actors. Both 
interviews were repeat interviews, with each interview being conducted for two-to-three hours 
each.157 Where relevant they are also supported by other interviews. 
 
Abdul Wahid is an Afghan Tajik who migrated from Baghlan province in Afghanistan to 
Pakistan in the mid-1980s with his family (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). During the phase of their initial 
migration he and his family first settled in Chitral, staying in the house of a Pakistani business 
partner and friend of Abdul Wahid’s father. Their stay in Chitral was for eight years and was 
possible through concepts of hospitality and a shared bond of friendship. No rent was ever paid 
during this time. Here, access to a basic good (shelter) was possible through friendship bonds 
and reveals the importance of social networks in migration and settlement processes (Boyd 1987; 
Dorai 2003). After eight years Abdul Wahid and his family moved to Peshawar and purchased a 
house in a regulated housing area. Abdul Wahid’s family own their house as a result of informal 
processes, “We own the house. It is ours”, Abdul Wahid said. This ownership was possible 
through the “good connections” of his father and his Pakistani friend. In the second interaction 
with Abdul Wahid said: 
We have a business of gems, which we bring from our own 
province [in Afghanistan] and that helped with the good 
connection between my dad and his friends/business partners 
because they do business together. It was because of this I think 
they came to the conclusion that our family should be shifted to 
Peshawar, so it could be easier for my father’s work. 
                                                          
156 Examples of Afghans who have “become Pakistani” are not used, as the process for purchasing 
housing formally is the same as it would be if you are a “full citizen”. 
157 The interviews covered a wide range of issues, however, only some elements have been include in this 
section. 
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For Abdul Wahid it was because of a “solid reputation” and the fact that he and his father’s 
friend had known each other beforehand that his family was able migrate and “survive”, and 
then purchase a house in a regulated housing area in Peshawar. Familiarity, experience and trust 
fostered the ties between the two families to produce a strong and intense form of social capital 
that enables and motivates action.  
They [the Pakistani friends] have been working with my father 
for many years. Reputation is important; you should have good 
connection with others… and ensure that they know you for 
some time beforehand (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). 
 
In the case of Hajji Khairuddin, he and his family migrated from Afghanistan during the 1980s 
(Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71). Hajji Khairuddin is an Afghan Pashtun and former ant-Soviet 
resistance fighter (or “Mujahidin” member). During the 1980s he spent much time in between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, during which he built up a number of friendships and wider networks 
of business connections (Granovetter 1973).  He and his family own a number of businesses that 
operate in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and he and his family (nuclear and extended) own a 
regulated house in Peshawar. For Hajji Khairuddin, similar to Abdul Wahid, forms of strong ties 
shaped his ability to secure gains of a more difficult and “high risk” nature. Through friendship 
solidarities and emotional connections which he built up during his years as a mujahidin fighter, a 
trader, and via connections of wider kin (i.e. clan networks) he purchased his home as well as 
business properties.  
 
In another interview completed with an extended family member of Hajji Khairuddin (his wife’s 
cousin), Ghazaleh Jan revealed how having intimate and personalised bonds are central in being 
able to access (or not) significant gains (Ghazaleh Jan, PXA91). She also, however, added a 
gendered perspective to the debate by juxtaposing her inability to own property against Hajji 
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Khairuddin’s ability to own property. Ghazaleh Jan is an unmarried Afghan woman in her mid-
forties. Because of the conflict in Afghanistan, Ghazaleh Jan had a disrupted youth in between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and for a number of other reasons Ghazaleh Jan never married. In the 
context of her social and family settings, being an unmarried woman means Ghazaleh Jan is 
dependent on her immediate and extended family members to secure access to shelter and 
housing. Currently, she lives in rented accommodation with her disabled father who she cares for 
in Peshawar. She has five brothers living in Europe.  Her mother has passed away, and she has 
three sisters that are married. Although her brothers send her and her father remittances, within 
Pakistan she has weaker solidarity networks than Hajji Khairuddin. She does not have intense 
personal friendships or business ties with men, who are often the key to “hard” forms of power 
(i.e. property) in patriarchal social and political structures in Pakistan. For example, Ghazaleh Jan 
has strong bonds of friendship with other Afghan and Pakistani women, including her cousin 
and wife of Hajji Khairuddin, but these friendships do not allow for the provision of housing 
rights, to illuminate the existence of a gendered power asymmetry which shapes the ability (or 
inability) to redistribute material goods.  Having a solid male contact is important form women 
and acts as a key form of protection, access, and mobility in Ghazaleh’s example in Peshawar. 
Ghazaleh Jan said:  
Hajji Khairuddin was able to secure his position and future in 
Pakistan because he has been so well-connected and because of 
his work. But there are others of us (i.e. extended family 
members) who cannot do the same because we do not have the 
same connections. For me it is difficult, because I never got 
married. I live here on rent, I can’t buy a property. My situation 
is such that I don’t have enough connections to be able to get the 
paper work cleared [in someone else’s name]. I am not that well 
connected – I am an unmarried,45 years old woman… in some 
regards my position is not that strong (Ghazaleh Jan, PXA91). 
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For Hajji Khairuddin the situation is different. He and his immediate and extended family are 
well-connected on both sides of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. As a man he has been more 
easily able to get access to “hard” forms of material goods, i.e. property. He has purchased 
property in the name of a Pakistani man he knows well through clan and business connections. 
He said that, “People knew us already, within FATA and Pakistan from our previous work and 
trade so we were able to start things off again here” (Hajji Khairuddin, PXA71). As such, “When 
it comes down to buying any properties and so on, our partners, our traders, are our friends and 
people who we have very good and trusted relationships with they will do this for us”. He 
continued that, “We buy things (business outlets) on others names, which is what we did with 
our business in Rawalpindi... [This is possible] because of our good links and good connections” 
(ibid).  
 
In both the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin, intimate bonds are explained through 
human relationships. Human relationships shape and incentivise action and are fundamentally 
quite different to official structures, which unfold in environments of anonymity. These 
relationships are built on emotions and trust, as well as instrumentalist ideas of reciprocity, and 
circumvent the legal restrictions and give non-citizens access to rights and goods in Pakistan. 
Hajji Khairuddin, given kin networks that cut across both Afghanistan and Pakistan, frequently 
mentioned that, “This Durand Line was a created border, a created line, made 108 years ago”, 
adding, “the people across both lines of the border are one and the same” (Hajji Khairuddin, 
PXA71). 
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For both Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin property is owned “by proxy” (Abdul Wahid, 
PXA1), circumventing the restrictions on Afghans purchasing immovable property and goods in 
Pakistan. Abdul Wahid explained: 
You have to take everything by proxy. The house we have is still 
not [in] my father’s name. It is in the name of a friend of his - the 
house is registered under his [friend’s] name. 
Hajji Khairuddin said, “We buy things like our business outlets in other people’s names”.158 In 
order to overcome the absence of legal property rights for non-citizens in Pakistan, Abdul 
Wahid’s and Hajji Khairuddin’s friends sign the legal deeds and have the property registered in a 
Pakistani name at local government offices to camouflage the Afghan ownership, whilst all of the 
payment for the house was completed by Abdul Wahid’s father and for Hajji Khairuddin by his 
friend.  
 
Here bonds of friendship and the solidarities of kin & clan produce a social capital that, when 
combined with financial capital, enable an agent to secure access to a human and material right 
which would otherwise be denied by the state. A gain is made against the official system. In the 
earlier case of the area of Asadullah Khan, a Pakistani (Asadullah Khan) donates land to Afghan 
families, which occurs without networks of solidarity but with (initially) strong implicit support 
by the Pakistani state and strong protection from a local landholder. However, for Asadullah 
Khan the gains are also explicable because Asadullah Khan’s generosity occurs on the outskirts 
of Peshawar in an unregulated housing area, which is usually the site in which an Afghan urban 
presence is tolerated. This is not the case for Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin, where the gains 
are made in regulated housing areas. Regulated housing areas are areas in the city that local 
authorities want as part of the longer term Pakistani “developed” and “sustainable” city. They 
                                                          
158 This was also supported in other interviews where Afghan traders working in Peshawar spoke of 
buying things under Pakistani names. 
253 
 
are neither on the frontier nor in the ghetto (Ron 2003) but within “Pakistan proper”. Indeed 
significant official investments are made by the state to achieve this, unlike in unregulated 
housing areas, where actions are shaped more the strength of the landholder (Peshawar) or issues 
of land contestation (Karachi). Thus in the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji Khairuddin a “bigger” 
gain is made, which are in clear divergence with official objectives.  
 
“Gain” here is measured in two ways. One is of scale, for example in the case of Abdul Wahid 
and Hajji Khairuddin property is “bigger” than the examples used in the fellowship of space and 
charity, which are about everyday basic resources such as water, shelter or food. The second 
measures “gain” against the official, legal system. Thus is the case of Abdul Wahid and Hajji 
Khairuddin, gains are made against the system and formal housing expansion in informal 
housing settlements. However, these gains are not accessible to everyone, revealing a continued 
problematic of social solidarity networks that require further analysis, which, unfortunately, this 
thesis is not fully able to engage with. Despite this, however, the small acts of solidarity between 
friends and clan members discussed do reveal importantly how the landscape of Peshawar is 
changing and also intensely challenging Pakistani state’s idea of its domain. Here, the state is not 
being maintained, but it is being directly challenged with Afghan and Pakistani social 
relationships being considered as more significant in extracting gains against the state. When the 
state cannot decide who can own property in Pakistan and informal contracts are considered 
more valid, is the state still a relevant actor?  
 
Conclusion: Shared Lives: Self-Humanisation and the Delegitimized State Revisited 
Often the formal-informal sphere is more effective in redistributing material and non-material 
goods in Pakistan than the formal sphere. The micro-level actions that intimate networks 
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facilitate enable basic material redistribution (shelter, income, foodstuffs) and “beyond basic” 
material redistribution (property ownership). Both Afghans and Pakistanis are let down by 
official structures and their segregating and technological ways of seeing, which is why there 
appears to be very little difference between the lives of non-citizens and citizens. Solidarity 
networks appear to be based on particularistic, idiosyncratic, organic needs of specific people in 
specific contexts, and are versed in humanising terms that stand in stark contrast to official 
actors. Critically, these networks reflect a shared space between Afghan and Pakistani lives, with 
solidarities often cutting across lines of national distinction – particularly friendship ties. These 
solidarities and navigation practices reveal the integral significance of both Afghans and 
Pakistanis to urban Pakistan. Afghans and Pakistanis exist in shared spaces, are exercising agency, 
are redistributing material and non-material goods, and are continuing on in the pursuit of 
bettering their lives (Bayat 2010). Pooling resources via incomes and housing, providing each 
other with loans, migrating for employment, or helping each other transcend legal barriers via 
property exchanges, Afghans and Pakistanis are living, working, and pushing for gains together – 
or at least in similar ways in urban Pakistan. The case studies discussed have also shown that as 
small formal-informal actions are repeated time and time again they create significant changes to 
the urban state. Across these two case study chapters (5 and 6) it has been shown that 
informality is also implicitly understood as being a part of the state and a way of maintaining the 
state. State actors are never too far from the surface. Yet looking beneath the surface at the ways 
in which the state engages in informality - either allowing informal actions to enact laws (albeit 
informally with petty corruption), to prevent or violate laws, or simply as a result of there being 
limited clarity on the writ of the state - these actions are synonymously eroding the state, 
particularly its legitimacy. Even exploitative middlemen and intermediaries and non-official 
sources of power are associated with greater trust than official actors. In other cases these 
actions mean that sites of law-making are resting with mini lawmakers, as is the case for Irfan’s 
document providers, which in fact directly challenge the significance of the state. In other cases 
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solidarity networks are able to engage in property exchanges in contradiction to state law. The 
trust of the state, its character - as embodied in local actors -, and its laws is lost. This trust 
continues to be attacked in the context of “security”, and official tactics of enumeration, policing, 
and surveillance, which also impacts “everyday” life in Pakistan and is discussed in the next 
chapter. Here both Afghans and Pakistanis witness the continued delegitimized and 
dehumanised face of official actors, although as Chapter 7 shows, this occurs more intensely for 
Afghans, to create a limit to the shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis in urban Pakistan.  
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Part III: Case Studies: When Citizenship Counts 
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Chapter 7: When Citizenship Counts: “Security” and the “Global War on Terror” 
 
 
It is not us who are “terrorists”. It is them, the 
officials. They have forgotten their humanity.  
Interview with Engineer Aziz, PXA59. 
 
Have you ever seen a Pakistani jail? They are 
just trapped rotting (sarrahe hain) there… stuck 
in their own filth. Only God can save them. 
Interview with Abu Zakariya, PXA53. 
 
Memory buried deep does not disappear. 
History relentlessly resurfaces. In a knowing 
smile or a racist crime. In words blurted out or 
a gesture one regrets. 
Diddier Fassin (2007:28-9). 
 
Introduction 
Check-posts, surveillance, and deportation – all related to military actions in Afghanistan and 
FATA and internal bombings - dominate urban Pakistan. In a “security” context citizenship, via 
identity cards, matters. This chapter first shows how both Afghans and Pakistanis are quantified 
and surveilled in new ways at an interacting local and global level because of the GWOT. It then 
shows how Afghans face quantification and enumeration more intensely than Pakistanis. Next it 
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shows how Afghans in Pakistan face specific practices of dehumanisation in everyday life, which 
includes daily stop and searches, arbitrary detention (individual and mass), and deportation. 
These are acts that do not impact most Pakistanis in the same way or to the same degree to draw 
a limit to the shared lives of Afghans and Pakistanis in urban Pakistan. It concludes by showing 
how the dehumanising actions of the Pakistani state bite back at the state itself, and in some 
cases refugee regime, and erode its legitimacy. They also pose future problems for the Pakistani 
state of a hostile and mistrustful population (Afghans), who are a part of urban politics – even if 
they are not legal citizens.  
 
Population Management and Surveillance in a Globalised Military Conflict 
Official strategies of biometric identification, enumeration, and surveillance are increasingly 
important in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Shortly, this will be explained as being related to the 
GWOT. But first it is important to understand that enumeration and surveillance are modern 
tools of “order making”. Technologies of identification consolidate state control (Scott 1998:53-
83). They allow bodies that belong to the state, i.e. citizens, to be identified and used by the state 
as human capital to fulfil political objectives, such as state modernisation, warfare, and taxation. 
In addition, identification and surveillance schemes allow modern states to “embrace” citizens 
(and the refugee regime to embrace refugees or IDPs) and improve the quality of life via 
“inclusionary surveillance” (Handel 2011:262-4; see also Foucault 2003[1976]:246, Torpey 2001). 
Here, the state and the refugee regime use identity schemes to distribute rights and protection159 
to those who are eligible for it. 
 
                                                          
159 John Torpey (2001:271 in Sadiq 2009:106) highlights how the identity card was an important “currency 
of domestic administration marking out eligibles from ineligibles in the areas of voting [and] social 
services”.  
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Documentary forms of identification have been important for Pakistan’s process of state-
building. Permit-systems (1948) and passports (1952) were crucial in absorbing and then limiting 
Muslim migration from India into the South Asian Muslim homeland of Pakistan after Partition 
(Zamindar 2007). Two years after the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) 160  Pakistan 
introduced the 1973 National Registration Act that paved the way for the introduction of a paper-
based National Identity Card (NIC) (NRD 1993) (see Appendix 13 for images). In addition, birth, 
marriage and death certificates, property and land deeds, the passport,161 and the national census 
have been important tools in processes of national ordering and state-building. Currently, all 
Pakistani citizens are provided with computerised identity cards, which the GOP understands as 
being central to modern forms of governance (NADRA 2012). Computerised databases also 
provided 2010 and 2011 flood victims with a Watan card to improve access to rations and shelter 
(UNHCR-PK 2010f) and in 2012 NADRA technologies helped identify 67 plane crash victims 
(Business Recorder 23 April 2012). The GOP also uses computerised databases to support more 
transparent electoral processes, with over 37 million ghost voters said to have been eliminated 
ahead of the scheduled 2013 elections (Dawn 24 November 2012).   
 
In Afghanistan, socialist inspired reforms in the 1970s introduced the first national census in 
1979 (GOA 1981) as well as and identity cards (see Appendix 13 for images). Similar to Pakistan, 
birth, marriage, and death certificates, property and land deeds (Alden Wiley 2003), and the 
passport were “embracing” tools.162 With mass migrations into Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s, 
                                                          
160 Bengalis (after 1971, Bangladeshis) who “came to Pakistan before 1971 are legal citizens of Pakistan. 
They number about 40,000” (Sadiq 2009:161).  However, Bangladeshis who came after 1971 are 
considered illegal immigrants. The amended Citizenship Act of 1978 required all Bangladeshis, including 
those who came before 1971 to legally apply for citizenship (ibid). See also Mehdi (2010).  
161 The passport is a form of identification for inter-state and international travel created in the context of 
the emergence of the modern system of nation-states (Torpey 2000).  
162A number of authors have looked at the state building and modernisation process in Afghanistan 
(Cullather 2002; Hopkins 2007, 2008; Haroon 2007:153-186); but limited attention has been paid to the 
shifts and importance of enumeration and documentation in this process and the significance of  the 
1970s and 1980s.  Shah Hanifi (2012) has produced an insightful analysis on the construction of a 
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Afghan identity documents gained further importance. Ration passes allowed the refugee regime 
to embrace refugees by delivering food, health care, and housing (SAFRON 1981, 1984). 
Currently, the Afghan identity card, UNHCR supported birth certificates, 163  and various 
UNHCR surveys are seen as providing Afghans in Pakistan with an environment in which they 
can “survive” and be “protected”.164 (For the role of the Afghan resistance parties in Pakistan 
“embracing” Afghans during the 1980s see fn51 and Appendix 13.) 
 
However, the recent intensification and sophistication of enumeration and surveillance of both 
Afghans and Pakistanis (2001-2012) is less about inclusionary forms of surveillance and more 
about local and global exclusionary practices and counterinsurgency tactics. A racialised global 
migration system defined by “Northern” hostility towards “Southern” migration (Richmond 
1994; Sadiq 2009:131) creates an urgency to monitor and restrict undesirable migration. This has 
increased with the GWOT and its accompanying rhetoric of the “dangerous” mobile “Muslim” 
body (Rana 2011). Increased enumeration is also not just about enhancing life and living 
(biopolitics) it is also about deciding who dies (necropolitics) (Mbembe 2003 in Handel 2011). The 
counterinsurgency tactics that are being practiced in Afghanistan and Pakistan by US-led forces 
and their “junior partner” Pakistan means that control technologies - such as biometric identity 
cards or censuses - provide a panoptical and elevated view of Afghan and Pakistani societies, 
transforming them into legible units to enhance the success of military tactics in the context of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dominant “Pashto-ised” Afghan identity; Antonio Giustozzi (2000) has produced an analysis of Afghan 
political development in 1978-1992. 
163 The benefits of having birth certificates for refugees are aimed at preventing an entire generation of 
Afghans from “not-existing”. Indeed you only “exist” if you have the right type of documentation (Sadiq 
2009). 
164 As highlighted in Chapter 3, UNHCR considers that is imparts “protection by presence” in Pakistan, 
“i.e. a strategy whereby an international humanitarian presence provides assistance while at the same time 
contributing to the deterrence of human rights abuses” (B Khan 2012:104). 
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global war.165 Ethnographic observations in identity card offices and interviews show that names, 
father’s names, provinces of birth, family trees, facial photographs, and finger prints are now 
tracked and mapped with efficiency (see Appendix 15, Figures 20-1 and 31-2). Forms of “border 
control” have been significantly improved. Further, it has even been speculated that GOP 
information and “data” – i.e. Afghan and Pakistani lives – has been shared with other 
international actors, 166  promoting patterns of extraditions, rendition, torture, and drone 
bombings, all of which are now a routine feature of post-2001 Pakistan and Afghanistan (AI 
2006; Grey 2006; Stanford NYU 2012).  
 
Currently, a private organisation known as the National Database and Registration Authority 
(NADRA) - initially the National Database Organisation (NDO) - is responsible to order 
Afghans and Pakistanis into legible units of understanding. NADRA creates and manages 
computerised Pakistan national identity cards (CNIC),167 other Pakistani documentation,168 and 
the Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration (POR) card.169  
 
                                                          
165 Examples of colonial and military rule being facilitated by enumeration and surveillance practices are 
present in the work of Appadurai and Breckenbridge (1991); Cohen (1993); Fiscbach (2010); Abujidi 
(2010). 
166 In an interview with Imran Khan (leader of Pakistani opposition party Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf), Julian 
Assange revealed that Wikileaks had, "Discovered a cable in 2009 from the Islamabad embassy [where] 
Prime Minister Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik went into the [US] embassy and offered to 
share NADRA [information]... A front company was set up in the United Kingdom, International 
Identity Services, which was hired as the consultants for NADRA to squirrel out the NADRA data for all 
of Pakistan” (Assange and Khan 2012). 
167 The CNIC card is also commonly called the shanakti (identity) card. 
168 This includes a Multi-Biometric e-Passports; Child Registration Certificates (a registration document 
used to register minors under the age of 18 years); Family Registration Certificates (documents issued to 
nationals of Pakistan highlighting the family tree structure of the applicant); National Identity Card for 
Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP); and the Pakistan Origin Card (POC) which provides “eligible foreigners” 
of Pakistani origin to “get back to their roots” (NADRA 2012). NADRA has also extended to provide 
technology for other initiatives including:  vehicle management (toll booths), automated border control, e-
driver’s license, e-balloting, and e-commerce (paying for utilities bills) (ibid). 
169 The POR card is also commonly called the muhajir (refugee) card. 
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NADRA was established under General Musharraf in 2000 under the NDO Ordinance 2000 as 
an attached department under the Interior Ministry. However, the organisation now sits under 
the Interior Ministry as “an independent corporate body with requisite autonomy to operate 
independently and facilitate good governance” (NADRA 2012c). NADRA reports itself as self-
reliant with no government funding. 170  In part, NADRA’s funds are generated from its 
involvement in local and international public and private surveillance projects.171  
 
In August 2012 it was reported that 92 million Pakistanis have been registered with CNIC cards. 
With only individuals who are over the age of 18 being eligible for a card, this, in the words of a 
NADRA press statement, means that, “Pakistan has emerged as one of the few countries in the 
world where 96 per cent of the adult population has been registered through the most secure 
biometric technology” (Dawn 18 Aug 2012). The same statement goes on to say that:  
Registration level[s] in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa had been observed at 99.9 per cent, followed by 
Punjab 99 per cent, Gilgit-Baltistan 89 per cent, Sindh and Fata 
88 per cent and Balochistan 76 per cent against the projected 
population... Our focus is now Sindh and Balochistan and we are 
moving ahead in Fata despite severe law and order situation 
(ibid).  
 
All eligible Pakistanis are required to possess a CNIC, and nationwide registration schemes 
during the 2000s upgraded individuals from the older NIC to the CNIC and registered new 
individuals. Identity cards have thus emerged as an essential feature of Pakistani life. (Indeed one 
                                                          
170 Most of NADRA’s senior staff and board have a mix of government experience and international 
corporate experience. The current Chairman Mr. Tariq Malik reports himself as having been the “Chief of 
Technology in the largest county of State of Michigan, USA” (NADRA 2012b).  
171 NADRA’s website and presentations stored on the World Bank database boasts that it has provided 
services to Pakistani and international government departments and multinational corporations such as: 
The Government of Sudan’s, Civil Registration Project; The Government of Kenya’s, Passport Issuing 
System; The Government of Nigeria’s: National Identity Management System; The Government of 
Bangladesh’s: High Security Driver’s License; telecommunications companies, including: Telecom; 
Mobilink; Ufone; Telenor; financial institutions including: Barclays; Royal Bank of Scotland; Standard 
Chartered; and utility bill companies including: PTCL, IESCO, SNGPL, SSGPl. (NADRA 2010, 2012; 
Daily Times 25 Jul 2009).  
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just needs to go to a NADRA registration center and see the buzz of people getting their CNIC 
cards made). 
 
Since 2001 Afghans in Pakistan have also faced intense forms of enumeration. However, 
Afghans in Pakistan have been enumerated in ways that Pakistanis have not. Pakistan has not 
completed a national census since 1998 and the government has been stalling on the 2011 census 
project. Yet Afghans have been nationally enumerated twice since 2001, once with the 2005-06 
Census of Afghans in Pakistan (SAFRON et al., 2006), and second with the 2010-11 Population Profile 
Verification (PPVR) scheme (SAFRON et al., 2010). In August 2001 the National Aliens 
Registration Authority (NARA), the twin of NADRA, was established to manage illegal 
immigrants in Pakistan. Whilst the 2006 Afghan Citizens Proof of Registration (POR) card 
scheme was initially managed by NARA, it soon shifted to the more sophisticated NADRA in 
2007. This is because, unlike other illegal immigrants, who are also numerous172 and who remain 
under NARA management, Afghan bodies have a specific significance in Pakistan because of 
importance of the war in Afghanistan to both Pakistan and its “partner”, the US administration 
and other allied states.  
 
The scale of identification, enumeration, and surveillance of Afghans is enormous. In 2006-07 
the Afghan POR card was introduced under the 2006 Registration Agreement and 2007 Tripartite 
Voluntary Repatriation Agreement between the GOP, GOA, and UNHCR. Currently 1.7 million 
Afghans are registered with the POR card in Pakistan (UNHCR-PK 2012). The card was initially 
designed to last until 31 December 2009 but was extended to 31 December 2012 under the (May) 
2010 Tripartite Voluntary Repatriation Agreement, and later to June 2013. Under the 2010 Agreement 
                                                          
172 In a 2009 report, NARA is cited as estimating that “a population of more than 3.35 million illegal 
residents [is] in Pakistan, mostly located in Karachi”, including Bangladeshi and Burmese populations 
(Befare 2009:39).  
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the POR card was upgraded to include more secure technology, the Secure Cards for Afghan 
Citizens (SCAC), which resulted in another nationwide card renewal scheme in 2010-
2011(NADRA 2011; UNHCR-PK 2010g). This was followed by the 2011 Unregistered Members of 
Registered Families (UMRF) scheme, which registered immediate Afghan dependents (spouses, 
children, and parents) who missed the 2006-2007 registration process.  During fieldwork a 
considerable amount of time was spent at NADRA offices for the Afghan POR card 
(re)registration processes, and some images are provided in Appendix 13 to give an indication of 
the scale of activities. 
 
Afghans are enumerated in more intense ways than Pakistanis. National identity cards act as 
documentary sites that imprint and rigidify the national frontier in an era that has limited 
tolerance for transnational forms of existence or multiple senses/practices of belonging (Malkki 
1995; 1995b; Monsutti 2005; Monsutti and Stitger 2005).173 The scale of enumeration is also 
related to the fact that to be an Afghan in Pakistan is increasingly to be a negative political being. 
Whilst at the global level all “Muslims”/“Arabs”/“South Asians” (Said 1997; Mamdani 2004; 
Rana 2011) are constructed risks (Douglas 1992[1966]), within Pakistan it is “Afghans” who 
undergo this “Othering” process. An intra-“Muslim” form of Othering within the apparent 
Muslim homeland of South Asia is taking place - a homeland that had previously used the 
rhetoric of Islam to encourage Afghans to seek refuge Pakistan. Further, the main US-led 
military actions in the GWOT from 2001-2012 have taken place in Afghanistan. Interlinked with 
this is the international community’s and the GOA’s focus on “rebuilding” Afghanistan. Afghan 
refugees are understood as a vital source of human capital that should be used to rebuild the 
Afghan nation as well as to win a counterinsurgency campaign, which explains why the GOA, 
                                                          
173 Afghans in Pakistan are anomalies and a threat to the “natural” order of the modern state. Indeed, the 
dominant “solution” they are offered by UNHCR is to repatriate. The other options of naturalisation and 
resettlement to a third country are not engaged with in the same way; and as UNHCR is dependent on 
the GOP to work it do not push the naturalisation agenda.  
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GOP, UNHCR, and of course the USA are primarily concerned with repatriation programmes 
(UNHCR-PK 2002a-2012; UNHCR-AF 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2007a-b, 2008; see also Tripartite 
Agreements 2003, 2006). To demonstrate the significance of repatriation efforts and its 
connection to US counterinsurgency tactics a slight, but useful, digression is necessary. 
 
During fieldwork in Peshawar I was repeatedly told by Afghans that in the immediate post-2001 
years (i.e. 2002-05) that leaflets had been “dropped” in different Afghan RTVs in Peshawar, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and FATA, which were calling on Afghans to “return” to Afghanistan in 
an effort to “rebuild” the state. In the discussions and rumours, Afghan residents said that they 
did not know for certain who had dropped these leaflets, but in once case Engineer Aziz 
(PXA59) and his neighbours said they had been dropped by air and suspected that the leaflets 
had “probably been dropped by the Americans, of course”. Engineer Aziz said, “The leaflets 
said that it is safe now to return to Afghanistan, that our homes are free… but how could this be 
true, when there is still a war taking place in Afghanistan?” In addition, in one of my interviews 
with Engineer Aziz, Engineer Aziz said: 
A year ago [2010] they [US state representatives]  held a grand 
meeting to speak to us and our representatives to inform us that 
they have made a difference to our lives – that they have bought 
us stability, that they have come to make our country stable and 
give us democracy. (Engineer Aziz PXA59). 
Thus, here, the efforts of repatriation are inextricably intertwined with broader state-building and 
counterinsurgency efforts.  
 
Returning back to the importance of computerised identity cards in Pakistan and increased 
Afghan enumeration, it is evident that this intensification and subsequent normalization of 
identity cards works to impresses national boundaries on Afghan bodies in more intense, 
266 
 
individualising, and new ways.174 During the 1980s and 1990s only family heads, usually men, 
held ration passes or were registered with mujahidin resistance parties (Appendix 13). However, 
now, all individuals over the age of five must have a POR card, and all children under the age of 
five are registered on the back of one of their parents POR card - this can be compared with 
Pakistani citizens who can only receive a CNIC after the age of 18 (Appendix 13).  
 
In everyday life grades of differences between Afghans and Pakistanis are experienced because of 
identity cards. The everyday formal-informal political activities discussed in the previous chapters 
shows how citizens and non-citizens live in shared realities, but identity cards are increasingly 
suffocating everyday life. Computerised identity cards are necessary for official routes to 
purchasing “Pakistani” SIM cards, registering at government and private schools, colleges, and 
universities, 175  getting treatment at government hospitals, purchasing (Pakistanis only) and 
renting property, paying for utility bills, voting in elections (since 2011), and, as will be shown 
shortly, navigating through check-posts. Whilst other paper documents can be used (Sadiq 2009), 
such as real and counterfeit college identity cards or driving licenses, official identity cards 
increasingly matter.  
 
Afghans with the POR card face greater obstacles than Pakistani citizens because they do not 
have the “right type of card”. Correctly or incorrectly176 everyday institutions often only accept 
                                                          
174 Parallels of this have been deeply debated in the post-colonial discourse influenced by Edward Said’s 
Orientalism (1978), to show how colonial practices of enumeration (Cohn 1987, 1996) were never really 
scientific and neutral but rather also created forms of contestation (Dirks 1994; Rai 2004; D.Scott 1999) 
and/or reified existing social asymmetries (Dirks 1991). 
175 For those under the age of 18’s parents’ cards are used. 
176 Incorrect examples occur when Afghans are eligible to access some material goods but not given this 
access. This is either as a result of a lack of knowledge by Pakistani actors or it is the result of increased 
discrimination that Afghans experience at local levels. For example, the computer databases of mobile 
phone operators dispensing SIM cards initially did not recognise the POR card, even though SIM cards 
are not illegal for Afghans. And, although in 2011 Pakistani officials told me that “Now Afghans can also 
buy SIM cards” (interview: Azam 2011), it is still difficult, if not impossible, to purchase a SIM card using 
the POR card. Similar situations arise for bank accounts; and many Afghans mention that some private 
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the Pakistani CNIC. Rights that are reserved for citizens are policed and “protected” with greater 
ferocity. Even some of the informal urban gains that Afghans have achieved are reversed. 
Buildings that are “owned” by Afghans or occupied by them are treated with increased suspicion. 
For example, Ibrahim Hafiz, who was introduced in the previous chapter, has noted increased 
“interest” in his property by local Pakistani officials (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41). This also helps 
explain why the interviews with Afghans who own property in Pakistan discussed in the previous 
chapter were more difficult to complete. 
 
Some Afghans have, during the 1970s-2000s, informally gained C/NIC cards, which allow them 
to become “paper” Pakistanis (Sadiq 2009). However, even these cases are being overturned. 
This was observed in ethnographic observations and interviews with Afghans and 
representatives of the tripartite parties177 who oversee the POR card registration and renewal 
process (as well as in media reports – see Appendix 12). Observations and interviews in 
NADRA Afghan registration centres when the 2006-2007 POR card was being updated to the 
2010-2011 POR SCAC card were completed and in one interview a Pakistani NADRA worker 
said:  
Now if anyone possesses an Afghan card and a Pakistani shanakti 
card it [the CNIC card] immediately gets flagged up on the 
system when they come in for registration. This is how we catch 
them out (interview: NADRA02 2010). 
 
The same NADRA worker also upgraded NIC cards to CNIC cards in the Pakistani scheme. He 
continued:  
If Afghans had the older (non-computerised) identity card (NIC) 
and went to get the CNIC they got caught out. The database for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
schools, colleges, universities, and even government hospitals have turned Afghans away after they 
showed them the POR card. Examples of this were captured in interviews and legal aid documents which 
I collected from UNHCR’s implementing partner, SHARP (2008-2010). 
177 Representatives from the Afghan Refugee Repatriation Cell (ARRC) in Karachi, CAR in Peshawar, 
UNCHR, and the MORR (GOA) oversaw the card renewal process and NADRA workers executed the 
mechanical processes of registration.  
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the new card asks for more details, family trees etc. You can pull 
out the whole family tree system, which goes into more detail. It 
is here that they (Afghans) get caught: in the [family] histories 
(ibid). 
 
Mansoor is an Afghan Tajik (Mansoor, KHA65) and interviews were conducted with him at a 
NADRA office in Karachi and in his home, with his immediate and extended family (without the 
presence of any officials) in an unregulated settlement outside of Sohrab Goth. On one occasion 
Mansoor walked out of the NADRA centre after seeing his paternal uncle being caught with 
having both a POR and a CNIC by the computer systems. He said afterward, “I cannot risk 
them cutting up my CNIC card” (ibid). In another interview, Rostam, an Afghan fabric 
wholesaler who has lived in Karachi since 1982 and possesses a Pakistani CNIC card as well as 
Pakistani property, said: 
My relative had a CNIC card. He also wanted to get an Afghan 
[POR] card made [in case he goes to Afghanistan] but when he 
went to the registration centre to get the Afghan card made, his 
documents were “cut” [made void]. That is why I will not get an 
Afghan card made; I need my CNIC for my business (Rostam, 
KHA68).  
 
Moreover, the GOP 2010-2012 Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy (Appendix 5) outlines: 
NADRA should launch a special drive to detect and cancel 
NICs[,] passports etc., fraudulently obtained by refugees and 
discourage the tendency of obtaining illegal NICs, passports, and 
domicile certificates (SAFRON 2010:Section IX:V).  
 
A table that lists available online (English) media reports in which Afghans were caught in 
possession of CNICs by Pakistani officials is provided in Appendix 12, which includes a case in 
2008 that reports “80,000 Afghans possessing CNIC cards” had CNIC’s revoked via NADRA’s 
updated technology (Dawn 29 Dec 2010).  
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By identifying and managing Afghans, the Pakistani state is trying to ensure that Afghan non-
national bodies do not become a permanent (legal) feature of the state. Rather the objective is to, 
Reduce the state’s responsibility towards the subjects. The state 
does not “chase” the subjects in order to catalog and embrace 
them; rather it chases them and spies on them in order to prove 
that they do not belong to it (Handel 2010:264).   
 
Intertwined with documentation is the increased legal specificity of the Afghan status in Pakistan.  
Unlike the 1970s-1990s there are now four clear categories of Afghans in Pakistan: registered 
Afghans who possess POR cards; illegal immigrants who have no legal documentation; Afghans 
with valid visas and passports; and Afghan Pakistanis who possess CNIC cards (and even this 
latter category is subject to challenges). A reversal of prima facie recognition - if indeed it was ever 
legally given (B. Khan 2012:4-5), even if the political rhetoric (i.e. SAFRON and CCAR 1981:3, 
see Chapter 3) and I/NGO material at the time suggested otherwise - is inextricably linked with 
the shifting Pakistani relationship with Afghanistan. As international pressure on the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan intensified during the 1990s, the GOP distanced itself from the 
Taliban (despite their involvement with the Taliban) and discouraged Afghan migration into 
Pakistan. The state wanted to reinforce lines of national distinction at the state level because of 
international pressures, which had direct consequences for Afghans in Pakistan or in 
transnational ways across the border. On November 9, 2000, Pakistan closed its borders with 
Afghanistan, also contributing towards the illegalization of Afghan asylum seekers. 
On February 2, 2001, a circular was issued wherein it was 
declared that all Afghan nationals without refugee cards/permits 
or valid visas would be considered ‘illegal’ migrants and would be 
treated as per the laws applicable to Foreigner Laws (B Khan 
2012:2-7). 
Anyone who arrived after 2001, or failed to register by then, such as Zalmay (KHA1) in Chapter 
6, were not considered as refugees but economic migrants and assessed through a new Refugee 
Status Determination (RSD) process by UNHCR (B Khan 2012:2-9; Kronenfeld 2008). In 2001, 
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for the first time, a screening process known as “individual status determination” was introduced 
for new arrivals in RTVs in Nasir Bagh, Jalozai, and Shamshatoo Peshawar (B Khan 2012:9). 
Those assessed to be eligible for international protection… were 
not given the status of refugee but were merely qualified to be 
‘persons of concern’... entitled to ‘temporary protection. The 
GOP was aiming to close down the aforementioned camps 
[Jalozai and Shamshatoo] were alleged to be hotbeds for criminal 
and militant activity (ibid).  
 
Discouragement continued most intensely after September 2001 and Pakistan’s firm decision of 
alliance with the US. This discouragement has been facilitated by biometric and computerised 
technologies. During 2001-2012 the main objective of the GOP, alongside UNHCR, the GOA 
and international donors, has been to repatriate Afghans from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The 2003 
Voluntary Repatriation Agreement between the GOP, GOA, and UNHCR set the tone for future 
repatriation strategies. It referred to Afghans as “citizens who have sought refuge in Pakistan and 
not Afghan refugees” (in B Khan 2012:9-10; see also 2003 Agreement). It also introduced a 
scheduled repatriation programme with a time-limit. This was initially set to last for three years 
but has since been extended a number of times. The Afghan Management & Repatriation Strategy 
2007 was approved by the Pakistani Cabinet in May 2007 and for the first time spoke of the 
“deportation” of Afghan “illegal” migrants (B Khan 2012:11). The 2010-2012 Afghan Management 
& Repatriation Strategy (Appendix 5), informed by the 2010 Voluntary Repatriation Agreement, also 
stresses the “temporary management” of Afghan POR card holders in Pakistan (SAFRON 2010: 
Section 2; Section IX). The 2010-2012 Strategy states that, “Unregistered refugees are to be 
considered illegal immigrant[s] and need to be deported/ dealt with under the law of the land” 
(SAFRON 2010: Section IX: II). It also calls for a “Separate dedicated [police] force to trace the 
271 
 
unregistered Afghans” (SAFRON: Section IX: III).178 In addition, the primacy of repatriation is 
seen via financial incentives that official UNHCR repatriation programme offers ($150 financial 
assistance per head to each family, which is received at encashment centres in Afghanistan). It is 
also seen in the symbolic act of cutting the POR card when Afghan returnees cross the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border, where repatriating Afghans have their POR physically “cut” and they can no 
longer, legally enter, live, and move in Pakistan.  
 
This tightening of the Afghan experience in Pakistan and emphasis on repatriation cannot be 
separated from the shifting geopolitical involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan, and, as 
mentioned, a counterinsurgency campaign headed by Pakistan’s senior “partner”, as well as 
Pakistan’s own internal “ethnic” insecurities, and the Pakistani state’s insecurity over the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border (Tarzi 2012). No other non-citizens are subject to the same forms 
of enumeration and surveillance in Pakistan. For example, the number of Bangladeshi migrants - 
either “refugees” or “illegal immigrants” - in Pakistan is striking,179 specifically in Karachi (Befare 
2009; Mehdi 2010; Sadiq 2009:161-2). However, there is no focus on Bangladeshis by 
international institutions such as UNHCR nor by the Pakistani government (bar NARA). This 
neglect is related to unresolved issues from the 1971 war, but more importantly it is explained by 
the fact that Bangladeshis are not “bodies” that need to be monitored in the same way as 
                                                          
178 Interestingly, though not surprisingly, the 2010-2012 strategy documents show some leniency to some 
groups, (though exact terms are not specified apart from the mention of business permits). These are 
towards the “rich” – “those who have invested over Rs.5 million in productive businesses should be 
allowed to continue their businesses” (SAFRON 2010: Section IX: VI) and, “Afghans that want to bring 
in investment of over Rs.50 million”. According to the document, “All countries in the world should 
encourage investment” (SAFRON 2010: Section IX: VIII). It also shows leniency towards cheap daily 
labour, the “skilled and unskilled” Afghans, which again is convergent to the GOP neo-liberal objectives 
of pushing towards “shiny” and “developed” cities (see chapter two). Finally, it adds leniency towards 
“single women who have lost their bread-earners and have no one to support them”.  
179 Fieldwork and interviews were also conducted in Bangladeshi heavy settlements in Karachi. Many 
Bangladeshis said, “At least Afghans have some form of identity cards, we do not even have any 
document to say who we are” (Group discussion with Bangladeshi residents in an informal goth near 
Liaquatabad, Karachi). 
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Afghans are. First, Bangladesh is not a bordering neighbour as Afghanistan is. Second, Pakistan 
has a vested political and military stake in Afghanistan, which is not the case with Bangladesh 
anymore (see fn6 and fn160). Third, international institutions such as the UNHCR are influenced 
by hegemonic superpowers via funding routes, i.e. the US, which has a vested interest in 
monitoring Afghans in the context of a counterinsurgency campaign. The separation between 
humanitarianism and counterinsurgency strategies, clearly, is thin. Finally, Bangladeshis are not 
constructed as the same type of negative political beings that Afghans in Pakistan and at the 
global level are, i.e. suspected “militants”, drug-dealers, “Taliban”.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, even when no Afghan involvement in internal acts of violence in 
Karachi or Peshawar is evidenced Afghans are blamed. The “dangerous” Afghan “Other” is a 
useful caricature to justify Pakistani political and military action and support of the war in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is also reproduced in public discourse. Afghans in Pakistan are 
reduced to sub-human, violent, and vicious site of “terror”. They are now constructed as “bad” 
Muslims – operatives of “Al-Qaeda”, the “Taliban” or a “dehshat ghard”. In an interview I 
conducted with Engineer Aziz, which was conducted in Pashto and Urdu, he specifically used 
the English word, “terrorist” to describe how Afghans were currently understood in Pakistan 
(Engineer Aziz, PXA59). His use of the word “terror” may have been influenced by his 
awareness of my English fluency and my position as a researcher, but it also reflects the 
penetration of this word into everyday language in Pakistan. He said: 
This label that is associated with us - this label that all of a 
sudden has been thrust upon us - of “terrorists”. All of a sudden 
we heard it, “terrorist”! All of a sudden we, Afghans, had become 
“terrorists”. They never called us this before, because they 
needed us then (Engineer Aziz, PXA59).  
 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, negative stereotyping is also experienced by Pakistani Pashtuns 
in Karachi. In Karachi, Pakistani Pashtuns are stereotyped by non-Pashtun discourses, 
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particularly of the MQM, as being responsible for the city’s drug, crime, and security problems. 
During fieldwork interviews and observations (and direct experience), police harassment of 
Pashtun (or suspected Pashtuns) was routine.  
The police try to see if you are Pashtun or not – we have a bad 
reputation. Our name has been dishonoured by them. They see if 
you are Pashtun and if they think you are then they will stop you 
– irrespective.  The police always harass us. Always, it goes 
without saying – this is just natural and obvious (Anwar Khan, 
KHA50).180 
 
Pakistani Pashtuns are, however, to a degree safeguarded by virtue of being Pakistani, which is 
now identified and reinforced through the CNIC card. I now use James Ron’s (2003) “ghetto 
versus frontier” concept discussed in Chapter 3, which is related to geographic spaces and apply 
it to Afghan and Pakistani bodies.  As a reminder, Ron’s work (2003) analyses the reasons for 
different types of state violence in different geographic spaces, showing that the state shares a 
sense of legal responsibility towards geographic spaces that are territorially well within the state, 
such as ghettoes, which is not the case at national frontiers. As a result ghettoes may face 
discrimination and forms of violence, but this is much less than what takes place at the frontier.  
 
Ron’s (2003) notion of space can be extended to include human bodies, which is made possible 
through forms of computerised enumeration. Borders and distinct national spaces are not just 
located at crossing points but are also located in the lives and bodies of people (Khosravi 
2010:99).  However, this means that Afghan housing areas covered in previous chapters get 
treated differently than Afghan mobile bodies, because unlike geographic areas that are fixed within 
Pakistani territorial sovereign spaces, Afghan bodies are mobile and “unpredictable” 
                                                          
180 One meeting with Anwar Khan was interrupted when Yusuf Khan (KHP50.B), his younger brother, 
was stopped by the police on his way to meet us.   
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embodiments of an Afghan national frontier and threat. Indeed, whilst some authors 
conceptualise the frontier as a space that “builds and connects” different communities (Marsden 
and Hopkins 2012:4), in Pakistan, the “Afghan frontier” is constructed as a “dangerous” non-
national Afghan space/body, in which the bounds of legal responsibility and penetration of the 
state do not full apply.  
 
In Karachi, then, Pakistani Pashtun bodies via their CNIC cards belong “well-within” (Ron 
2003:16) the Pakistani state. This means whilst Pakistani Pashtun bodies are “ghettoised” and 
despised by Karachi’s official actors they are not, like Afghans, a walking/talking “dangerous” 
frontier figure. In Karachi, the Pakistani Pashtun body is “ghettoised” but the “state bears 
substantial responsibility for their welfare” (Ron 2003:9). This means that despite being 
negatively stereotyped in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtun bodies fare better than Afghans, particularly 
when it comes to passing through a check-post or being detained by the police, i.e. they may be 
harassed, as the interview with Anwar Khan shows, but their experience will not match the 
Afghan one. 
 
Afghan bodies on the other hand are living and mobile embodiments of the frontier (Khosravi 
2010:99; Ron 2003). In fact, they embody the wrong side of the frontier,181 which is made clear via the 
                                                          
181 FATA too has continually been placed on the frontiers of imagination and administrative rule by the 
colonial, post-colonial, and neo-colonial paradigms that have shaped the modern state experience of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan (Haroon 2007; Hopkins and Marsden 2011; Tarzi 2012). Indeed, FATA 
continues to be categorised as Tribal Areas and not full provinces. There is limited institutional infrastructure 
from the Pakistani state in FATA, from mundane radio and television presences, to government schools, 
hospitals, and buildings. During fieldwork I was told that, “There is not any development here; not 
because we do not want it, but because they [the GOP] do not care for the people here... what do they 
know of FATA” (Murtaza, PXP8). And, authors such as Amin Tarzi state that the incorporation of 
“FATA into Pakistan proper” is essential for improved Afghanistan–Pakistan relations as it will lay to rest 
Afghan claims to, and Pakistani insecurity of, the Durand Line (Tarzi 2012:28). This position of FATA on 
the margins of Pakistani imagination explains why it is easier for FATA to be bombed, and not say, 
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Afghan POR card. The proliferation of negative stereotyping and scapegoating creates a culture 
of fear and risk associated with Afghans, which combines with new individualising and 
penetrating forms of enumeration to form a potent mix. The Pakistani state is not bound “by the 
same legal and moral obligations” to Afghan bodies (Ron 2003:9), which explains why Afghan 
bodies face forms of greater violence as they move across cities in Pakistan. 182  These 
transgressions are visible in everyday routine harassment and humiliations that Afghans face.  
 
Humiliating and Harassing Afghans: The Check-Post, Mobility, Detention, Deportation, 
and Crime 
Humiliation is a non-material concept interlinked with constructions of self-worth and dignity. 
According to Fattah and Fierke, “emotions such as humiliation or betrayal are universal”, but are 
“given meaning in culturally specific forms and in response to historically and contextually 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Lahore (which also has significant and high levels of violence), which again fits in with Ron’s idea of the 
“frontier” as being a zone more vulnerable to transgressions by state and non-state actors (Ron 2003). In 
recent history this helps explain the military campaigns and drone attacks that have dominated FATA. In 
addition, residents of FATA are also negatively stereotyped as responsible for producing the “safe havens” 
that have sheltered the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. But whilst the physical region on the whole is imagined 
may be a “frontier” – and even this is not a “full” frontier - this does not always translate to the “bodies” 
of individuals from FATA. This is because, ultimately, FATA residents carry Pakistani citizenship cards – 
the CNIC. FATA bodies are thus considered “well-within” the Pakistani state. They are Pakistani bodies. 
This means they do not face the same issues that Afghans do at the check-post in cities such as Peshawar.  
This can be seen in the example of two friends in Peshawar. One, Ziauddin (PXA60) is 29 and an Afghan 
Pashtun who studied in Pakistan and for a short-time in Tajikistan. Ziauddin and his family have been 
living in Peshawar since 1982. The other friend, Murtaza (PXP8), is 28 years old, a Pakistani Pashtun 
from Khyber Agency (FATA), who runs a furniture business in Peshawar’s karkhano area. Ziauddin 
moved into Peshawar proper approximately 10 years ago (2001). In a semi-structured interview with both 
of them in the home of the Ziauddin, I asked both of them if they ever face any issues when they were at 
the check-post in the city. Murtaza responded that, “I have a CNIC card, so they say nothing to me, they 
know I am Pakistani. However, for him [Ziauddin] the situation is different” (Murtaza, PXP8). Ziauddin 
responded with a simple, as if obvious, “Yes!", and started discussing police harassment in the city.  “The 
police are always ready to make problems; they’re after money. You have to understand the injustices and 
harassments that Afghans face. The police stop you and say that you are hiding something, when you are 
not” (Ziauddin, PXA60).  
182 The GOP does still have legal obligations to Afghans reflected in international law, agreements with 
UNHCR and the GOA, and its role as “guardian” of Afghans in Pakistan, which is upheld via institutions 
like CCAR. This means Afghans do not face the same degrees of violence that James Ron (2004) 
uncovers in his work at the Serbian frontier, i.e. of ethnic cleansing. 
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specific events” (Fattah and Fierke 2009:71). In addition, Fattah and Fierke highlight that an 
understanding of a “prior equilibrium” is also needed to understand “humiliation and betrayal”. 
Within this historical state of equilibrium, “all humans have identity and a degree of agency 
measured in self-respect, trust in their social world and thereby a sense of safety” (ibid). 
Humiliation (and betrayal) takes place within a relationship “where one party, who expects a 
higher status, is lowered in status and feels shame or a loss of self-respect” (ibid). Afghans 
expressed sentiments of humiliation as they are routinely stopped at check-posts, searched, asked 
to pay bribes, face verbal and physical abuse, and experience arrest without legitimate 
justification. Afghans undergo these experiences in ways that Pakistanis do not and during 
fieldwork many Afghans felt these acts reflected a rapid lowering of status, or as Fattah and 
Fierke state, “a disruption of equilibrium” (ibid). Previously revered (“People used to give up 
their seats for us on the bus - that is how much we were honoured” [Engineer Aziz, PXA59 – 
Chapter 1]), the shift of the Afghan position in Pakistan has been sudden and deep (“All of a 
sudden we, Afghans, had become “terrorists”” [ibid]).  
 
At the micro-level these actions are shaped by corrupt local officials who view Afghans as 
objects that can be exploited for illegal profit. However, at a macro-level these acts, repeated 
time and time again, reflect a “performance” of sovereignty (Blom Hansen 2005). Everyday 
forms of sovereignty are repeated by everyday performance of violence and “reproduced 
through ritualised everyday laws, the killings of criminals as well as enemies of the state, or those 
who did not pay absolute respect [to the sovereign]” (Blom Hansen 2005:6). Repeated and 
ritualised requests for bribes, stop and searches, physical and verbal abuse, and arbitrary arrest 
reflect a strategy of exclusionary discipline.  
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The Check-Post & Mobility  
Increasingly, Karachi and Peshawar resemble fortress towns. Check-posts and road blocks 
dominate urban roads. Stop and searches are a routine part of daily life and in order to get 
through the check-post and identity card is essential. The check-post is meant to act as a public 
site of theatre (Handel 2011) to survey, police, and deter subversive political actors, i.e. potential 
bombers. Indeed, in light of the number of internal bombings in Karachi and Peshawar check-
posts are considered as a crucial form of surveillance. Accurate figures of the numbers of 
Pakistanis killed since 2001 in Pakistan are not available, but estimates from 2004 range 
“between 14,780 and 43,149... and more than 40,000 injured”, mainly through internal bombings 
(CW 2012). Bombings leaving over 40 people dead in a week (15 December 2012, Peshawar 
Airport Attack; 17 December 2012, Jamrud Bazar Khyber Agency Blast; 22 December 2012 
ANP Peshawar Meeting Blast), and blasts such as Khyber Bazar blast 9 October 2009 
(Peshawar), or the 7 October 2010 Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine blast (Karachi) are now a 
“routine” feature of urban life. Police and ambulance sirens form the background music to the 
cities. Periods of “lulls” in violence and bombings are not taken for granted, and asking people 
about the “conditions” (halaat) is a routine part of daily conversation. In this thesis interviews 
were completed with Afghans who had also been victims of the internal bombings within 
Pakistan. In one interview a man took off his shirt to show how his body had been violently 
scarred by the 2009 Khyber Bazaar bombing. I left the room as he showed the male friend I was 
with the rest of his body, with the scars covering his legs and back (Jan Mohammad, PXA31.B). 
In another case a child’s face had been deeply disfigured as a result of an internal bombing. “This 
is the city of amputees, for one reason or another”, a medical doctor in Peshawar said.  
 
For ordinary Afghans in Pakistan the check-post, however, has also taken on a more perverse 
role. The check-post is not just about security and protection of the city and residents from 
bombings – as important as this is. For Afghans the check-post also acts as a public site of 
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“theatre” for disciplining Afghans via harassment and humiliation strategies, which reduce 
feelings of self-worth, in order to “encourage” Afghans to leave Pakistan. Afghans, find it more 
difficult to pass through the security check-posts than Pakistanis and are now easier to identify 
via the POR card (or by having no identity card). Whilst previously distinguishing between 
Afghans and Pakistanis may have been difficult, now who is Afghan and who is Pakistani is 
known with greater certainty through identity cards. In order to get through the check-post 
Afghans are much more likely to have to engage in some practice of negotiation, usually the 
payment of bribes.183 Amal Jamal focuses on concepts of “racialised time” among Palestinians to 
highlight how this results in a specific form of dehumanisation (Jamal 2008 in Zureik 2011:17-8). 
Jamal, building on Martin Heidegger’s work, shows that, “control over one’s time is an essential 
human prerequisite”, which “distinguishes humans from animals” (ibid). In the Afghan case 
(similar to the Palestinian case) the denial of control over time because of the check-posts, 
results in a theft of Afghan time and means that the value of Afghan life as being distinctly 
human is not recognised. In an interview with Ibrahim Hafiz (see Chapter 5) he noted that he 
and his business suffer considerably in the current climate of stop and searches.  
The police are systematic as they check Afghans at all of the 
different entry points in Peshawar; at the six-gates – Hayatabad, 
Phase 6, Phase 3 pull, Ring Road… How are we supposed to get 
anywhere, it takes so long. Hayatabad was being made in 1994 by 
us, Afghan workers, and yet we face these issues. Now you 
cannot live your life with any dignity. You live here without your 
honour and without your dignity. The police have no respect for 
us; we are not treated as humans here. Before things were relaxed, 
there was no pressure or troubles. But now the situation has 
changed (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41). 
 
                                                          
183 In addition if you pay attention to the Afghan POR card it is written in English (Appendix 13) 
compared to the Pakistani CNIC which is in Urdu. This also contributes to the problems that Pakistani 
police forces have when they are presented with the card, as many officers cannot read English, and do 
not accept the card as valid. Some education initiatives were conducted by UNHCR and circulars issued 
by CAR regarding the POR card. However, given the political attention that is attached to Afghans in 
Pakistan it is unlikely to be the main explanatory cause.  
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Ibrahim Hafiz’s excerpt also shows that movement is restricted.  For Ibrahim Hafiz these actions 
actively infringe on his “honour” and “dignity” (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41). Ariel Handel (2011:268) 
outlines the check-post as a public site of theatre, which “is not a surveillance apparatus but an 
uncertainty production post that is designed to control movement – not to regulate it but to 
minimise it”. Afghans thus do not live fully free lives. Instead their movement is restricted, caged, 
and increasingly suffocated. In one interview in Hayatabad, a 25 year-old Afghan man, Ferhan 
Rashid, who was living with his parents, with his father having recently suffered a nervous 
breakdown, mentioned how he longed for freedom of movement.  
Sometimes, I wish I could move and be free… I feel like a caged 
bird. We [as a family] are constantly stressed and in each other’s 
faces, but because we find it difficult to move we cannot do 
anything else. Our lives and those of others face a lot of (internal 
family) problems now… there is a lot of tension (Ferhan Rashid, 
PXA19). 
 
This restriction on movement is not experienced to the same extent by Pakistanis. Afghan 
mobility is severely restricted, curtailed, and subsequently localised, as are feelings of self-worth 
and a valued life. Pakistani mobility and self-worth is not. Thus when the Afghan compares his 
or her self-worth next to that of the Pakistani, in this situation, his or her status has a lower value. 
Where the previous chapters show that Afghans and Pakistanis exist in shared realities, at the 
check-post and in the “security” context, the shared realities between non-citizens and citizen 
reach a limit. Afghans and Pakistanis, friends, colleagues, neighbours, family members, and/or 
strangers see the other being treated differently in public spaces through public performances of 
sovereignty and deterrence via harassment and humiliation. The Afghan status and valuations of 
self-worth and dignity are lowered in an effort to “alter behaviour”, i.e. encourage repatriation, 
via emotional responses (Fattah and Fierke 2009:71-2).184 Even Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi 
(and to a lesser degree Pashtuns from FATA in Peshawar) who are subjected to discrimination 
                                                          
184 In other cases harassment and humiliation is used to send “messages” to the GOA in cases where 
Afghan and Pakistani state relations break down (a frequent occurrence). 
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and negative stereotyping, when faced with the theatre of the check-post and other cases of 
detention and harassment, are afforded significant protection via the possession of a CNIC card. 
They do not have to suffer through the same suffocating and stressful circumstances.  
 
The difference of experience between Afghans and Pakistanis can be seen in the example of the 
two friends in Peshawar mentioned in Chapter 6, Mudassir (PXA36) and Mehboob (PXP12).  
Mudassir is 40 years-old and an Afghan Pashtun originally from Jalalabad in Nangarhar. He and 
his family migrated from Jalalabad in 1979. He returned to Afghanistan a year ago but returns to 
visit his friends and family (his parents, brothers, and in-laws still live in Peshawar). Mudassir said 
that he returned to Afghanistan the year before, and explained that: 
Since 2001 things changed. We couldn’t even eat [earn an 
income]. I was concerned about when the police would next 
harass me at the check-posts. If you have money it is ok, you can 
get released… but without it becomes too much of a rush, you 
are always under some sort of pressure, you are always in a rush 
when you are moving across the city... I grew up in Pakistan 
since I was six or seven. It is my home too, all of my family are 
here, Mehboob and I have grown up together, and we went to 
school together, got married at the same time… I walked all of 
these streets with my friends. But the police… it got too much 
(Mudassir, PXA36). 
 
When I turned to Mehboob, a Pakistani Pashtun who is originally from a rural village outside 
Peshawar, and asked him if he faced any issues at the check-post in the city he replied, “I just 
show them the shanakhti [CNIC] card and they say nothing”. Simple. Thus Mudassir’s status is 
lowered from his previous experiences of being revered in a place he considers home, especially 
when compared to his lifelong friend. An inculcation of fear and uncertainty through practices of 
humiliation, by slowing down time, by creating “pressure” on Mudassir’s availability of time and 
movement, make Mudassir feel less valued. The result is that Mudassir’s behaviour has been 
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altered; he has done what the GOP wanted. An Afghan has repatriated. Quotas are being met. 
The national borders are being safeguarded from a supposedly “dangerous” threat. 
 
Most Pakistanis usually pass through a check-post quite easily, and instances of (individual and 
mass) arrest and deportation are non-issues.  I entered into a database all the interviews I had 
conducted with Afghans and Pakistanis (this does not include ethnographic observations and 
daily interactions). 70.43% of Afghans I interviewed across Karachi and Peshawar said they have 
faced police harassment in the form of verbal/physical abuse, request for bribes, arrest, 
detention, deportation. This is in comparison to only 41.94% of Pakistanis I interviewed. By city, 
in Peshawar 72.65% of Afghans said they face police harassment, compared to 24.68% of 
Pakistanis; and, in Karachi 68.14% of Afghans said they faced police harassment compared to 
58.97% of Pakistanis. A more detailed breakdown of these figures can be accessed in Appendix 6.  
 
Table 1: Afghan vs. Pakistani experiences of police harassment, both cities 
Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment 
experiences, Karachi & Peshawar 
Total respondents (Afghan & 
Pakistani): 
385 
Afghan respondents Total as a % of all Afghans 
interviewed in Karachi and 
Peshawar 
Harassment  70.43% 
No harassment  18.70% 
Unknown answer 10.87% 
Pakistani respondents Total as a % of all 
Pakistanis interviewed in 
Karachi and Peshawar 
Harassment  41.94% 
No harassment  56.13% 
Unknown answer 1.94% 
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Table 2: Afghan vs. Pakistani experiences of police harassment by city 
Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment 
experiences by city 
Peshawar total respondents 
(Afghan & Pakistani): 
194 
Afghan respondents Total as a % of Afghans 
interviewed in Peshawar 
Harassment  72.65% 
No harassment  18.80% 
Unknown answer 8.55% 
Pakistani respondents Total as a % of Pakistanis 
interviewed in Peshawar 
Harassment  24.68% 
No harassment  72.73% 
Unknown answer 2.60% 
Karachi total respondents 
(Afghan & Pakistani): 
 
Afghan respondents  Total as a % of Afghans 
interviewed in Karachi 
Harassment  68.14% 
No harassment  18.58% 
Unknown answer 13.27% 
Pakistani respondents  Total as a % of Pakistanis 
interviewed in Karachi 
Harassment  58.97% 
No harassment  39.74% 
Unknown answer 1.28% 
 
 
Even in some cases where Pakistani citizens do not have a CNIC, local forms of knowledge and 
intelligence, such as detection of variations in Pashto dialects (in the case of police forces 
Peshawar), or local familiarity (in both cities), means that these Pakistanis are often able to prove 
themselves as Pakistani, i.e. a non-negative stereotype and “threat”, and face reduced challenges 
in passing through the check-post. In an interview with Pakistani residents living a quasi-
regulated housing area in University Town, I asked two property developers who lived in the 
area what they did in the event that they forgot their CNIC cards and were requested for it by 
local police officers (Meherban Aminullah, PXP4; Janat Gul, PXP5). One of the developers, 
Meherban Aminullah replied: 
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The police know us here, the same officers have seen us every 
day and know we are Pakistani, they won’t say anything to us 
(Meherban Aminullah, PXP4).  
 
However, if an Afghan who does not have his card this situation is near impossible. For these 
Afghans, who often have the lowest forms of economic capital, i.e. the poorest, life and 
movement is restricted to slipping in and out of the shadows and engaging in practices of 
camouflage from official state forces. Highly localised realities are easier to exist in and 
movement across greater distances is avoided.  
 
In Karachi’s Afghan Camp some of the poorer segments of the camp are without appropriate 
documentation, with some residents having migrated after 2001. One resident, Behrooz, works 
as a daily labourer 15 kilometres away and has no POR card or C/NIC.  
I am scared every time I leave my house… on my way to and 
from work. Sometimes I worry so much, so does my wife, so I 
won’t leave. There are many others that just will not leave this 
area at all (Behrooz, KHA60).  
 
Yaqoob Gul, who was present at the time added: 
Many are too concerned to leave their houses. Those that do, 
even those with cards, what do they earn in a day - Rs.250? Even 
this is taken from them at the check-posts by the police… They 
snatch their daily earnings and daily bread from them (Yaqoob 
Gul, KHA10). 
 
Police harassment and violation by other security forces are not unusual in Pakistan (Abbas 2011; 
ICG 2008; ISPU 2009; TI 2010; HRW 2012). A 2011 report outlines that the police in Pakistan 
complete “routine excesses, violations of human rights” (Abbas 2011:9). In 2010 the Pakistani 
police were named as the most frequent recipients of bribes in the 2010 Global Corruption 
Barometer of the Transparency International, with the weighted figure for police being 4.5. (1 is 
for not at all corrupt and 5 for extremely corrupt) (TI 2010; Dawn 10 December 2010). However, 
Pakistanis (devalued or not) do not undergo the same scale and type of harassment and forms of 
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humiliation that Afghans do. Indeed, during fieldwork questions such as, “Have the police ever 
asked you for money” were laughed at by Afghans for the sheer absurdity of the question. But 
Pakistanis took time in considering a response.  
 
In this study, most Pakistani instances of complaint against police forces (at the check-post or 
otherwise) were for specific cases that affect both Afghans and Pakistanis,185 such as not helping 
in cases of crimes, asking for petty bribes, or as was shown in the example of Ishtiaq Goth in the 
previous chapter, siding with middlemen in cases of land disputes. However, these were shared 
issues amongst Afghans and Pakistanis. This is not to dismiss the negative perception of a 
“corrupt” police force, but it is to indicate that there is a difference in the degrees and types of 
experiences of dehumanisation that Afghan and Pakistanis face.  
 
In this study, Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi also faced similar forms of verbal abuse and 
denigration, indeed from the data breakdown of interviews completed 54.84% of the Pakistani 
Pashtuns interviewed in Karachi during fieldwork reported cases of police harassment, compared 
to 31.11% of non-Pashtun Pakistanis interviewed in Karachi (Table 4, Appendix 6). But the 
details of the interviews with Pakistani Pashtuns reveal that the forms of police harassment that 
they faced did not usually result in arrests, detention, court proceedings (unless criminal activity 
was involved), or deportations. Thus, as mentioned, the Karachiite Pashtun is safeguarded, to a 
degree, by virtue of the CNIC card. 
 
Further, from fieldwork interviews and observations at check-posts (and occasional direct 
experiences myself on suspicion of being Afghan) the amount of money paid to officers shows 
                                                          
185  The cases of the Pakistani Baluch involved in the separatist movement within Baluchistan may, 
however, prove an interesting anomaly to the argument of this chapter, and one that should also be 
considered. The violent military clamp downs on Baloch demands for increased provincial power and/ or 
separatism have resulted in hundreds of killings by state forces with many more and missing (See: HRW 
2011).  
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that the Pakistani starting fee is much lower, Rs.50-100 compared to the Afghans starting fee of 
Rs.500 upward – in some cases extortionately high fees of Rs.10,000 and higher are also asked. 
(In both cases fees are then negotiated downward). For Pakistanis interactions with the police at 
check-posts result at most in a small bribe and these are not (usually) justified by local officials 
using the same dehumanising stereotypes and rhetoric that accompany Afghan cases. Excerpts 
from interviews show that Afghans are increasingly accused of being “terrorists” – “Al-Qaeda”, 
“Taliban”, “deshat ghard”, or “terrorist”. This is also combined with accusations of not “belonging” 
to the city. In one interview, Suleiyman, a factory worker living in Peshawar since 1992 said: 
Every day on the way to work we know we will get stopped, or 
maybe after every four or five days. The police, they accuse us of 
being terrorists, of being Al-Qaeda. Tell me, if I was Al-Qaeda 
why would I be walking to work, [and working] in a factory? Tell 
me. What is the logic of this? They accuse us of being terrorists, 
Al-Qaeda! (Suleiyman, PXA22).  
 
For Suleiyman, he is dehumanised through the label of “Al-Qaeda”, reduced to a caricature, by 
the theft of his time, and by a routine enforcement of humiliation by local officials. He said, 
when speaking of the number of Afghans who have been arrested, that many “have lost their 
confidence now” (Suleiyman, PXA22). Feelings of self-worth, valuation, and dignity have been 
taken away.  
 
In another interview, Junaid Tareen, a 26 year-old teacher living in Peshawar since 1996 tole me 
how he was slapped across the face by a local police officer, his physical space and body violated 
and humiliated and his position in Pakistan questioned (Junaid Tareen PXA104).  He said:  
The police officer slapped me across my face when I was coming 
home from teaching at college one day. He asked me, what I was 
still doing here [in Pakistan], that we create trouble here.  
Here, Junaid was angered by the fact that he could not do anything: 
I said he could not hit me. That I belong here, and am an insan, 
but it did not affect him. 
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In retaliation to the slap, which smacks the authority and claimed superiority and power of the 
Pakistani official onto Junaid - physically and emotionally - Junaid verbally expressed resistance, 
but this did not stop the officer, to whom he later paid a bribe. And again, whilst in Karachi 
Pakistani Pashtuns are also subjected to similar forms of verbal abuse and denigration, the 
Karachiite Pashtun is comparatively safeguarded by virtue of the CNIC card, as well as an 
awareness of the norms of “national rights”.  Anwar Khan once said: 
Our families have been on this land, what is called Pakistan, for 
thousands and thousands of years. We have always been here; we 
know that this is our land (Anwar Khan, KHP50).  
 
 
Within Peshawar, the world’s largest Pashtun city, Afghan Pashtuns are said to have an “easy 
time” (Chapter 2). However, during fieldwork this did not appear to be the case when it came to 
issues of police and state harassment. Peshawar is often constructed as an integral Pashtun 
capital in Afghan Pashtun and Pakistani Pashtun ethno-nationalistic discourse. Many public and 
academic commentators interchangeably use “Afghan” and “Pashtun”, ignoring the complex 
composition of the modern Afghan state, which is home to Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Mughals, 
and other “ethnic” groups. Through this conflation and the position of Peshawar in Pashtun 
nationalist discourse, it is assumed that Afghans in Peshawar are, effectively, at “home”. In Paper 
Citizens Kamal Sadiq (2009:53), using the 2005 Census of Afghans in Pakistan, states the majority of 
Afghans (81.5%) are Pashtuns, “which means they can easily be absorbed into the larger co-
ethnic Pakistani Pathan and Pashtun communities”. Whilst social (as well as cultural and ethnic) 
solidarities do transcend national boundaries, and whilst at a local and informal level (as the 
previous chapters have shown) citizenship does not count for much, in the security context and 
in interactions with the state it does have importance. To be an Afghan Pashtun among Pakistani 
Pashtuns is not to be at “home”.  Indeed, in Peshawar 78.89% of the Afghan Pashtuns I 
interviewed in the city complained of police harassment (Table 3, Appendix 6). This can be 
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compared to only 24.68% of the Pakistanis I interviewed - 94.81% of whom were Pashtuns, in 
Peshawar.  
 
In addition, ethnic variances within the “Afghan” category add nuance to the Afghan experience 
in Peshawar. Afghan Tajiks, Turkmens, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Kabulis and others are more noticeable 
as Afghans than Afghan Pashtuns as they speak Tajiki, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Dari (rather than 
Pashto) and (sometimes) considered to look different and more easily identifiable by Pakistani 
officials. Their visual “threat” and presence is even greater than for Afghan Pashtuns. Indeed, in 
Karachi all Afghans are absorbed under the Pashtun/Afghan “Other” framework, which 
explains how a number of Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks have made CNIC cards, and are assumed 
to be “Pathans” by non-Pashtun Pakistani actors. However, in Peshawar, a Pashtun city, the 
differences within the Afghan category are more easily picked up on.186 As one interviewee, an 
Afghan Turkmen living in Peshawar noted: 
I always get stopped. I can’t even make a fake CNIC in Peshawar 
because the police will know I am not a Pashtun (Khizar, 
PXA81.B). 
 
Individual and Mass Arrest: Collective Punishment 
Unlike Pakistanis, many Afghans, registered and unregistered POR card holders, have faced 
consistent and large scale arbitrary arrest and deportation, primarily since 2007 onwards, i.e. after 
the introduction of the POR card. Registered Afghans are legally allowed to live and move in 
Pakistan, but despite this numerous cases of arrests under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act were 
evident. In an interview with a human rights lawyer for Afghans in Pakistan the lawyer said: 
Male detention occurs in an extremely high number of cases – it 
is not unusual. People will be arrested on the basis of being 
                                                          
186 The statistics in this thesis show that non-Pashtuns Afghans face less harassment than Afghan Pashtuns 
(60.87% of non-Pashtun Afghans interviewed in Peshawar complained of police harassment compared to 
the 78.89% of Afghan Pashtuns interviewed). However, this is likely to be a sampling issue as the number 
of non-Pashtun Afghans interviewed in Peshawar was small and female-heavy (Appendix 6). 
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Afghan and detained. If Afghans are committing criminal 
activities why are they not arrested under Pakistan’s criminal laws? 
Why are they arrested under the Foreigners Law? (Interview: 
Siddiqi 2011) 
 
In 2009 and 2010 mass arrests were visible on an unprecedented scale amid discussions of 
renewing the Afghan POR cards. These acts were possible, in part, because of a lack of clarity 
about the Afghan legal position in Pakistan as the POR card expired in December 2009 and 
official renewal was not explicitly agreed until 2010. Some circulars were issued by CCAR (CAR-
KPK 2009, 2009b) to state that in 2009-10 Afghans, despite the expiry of the POR card, 
Afghans still had permission to remain in Pakistan, however, a lack of clarity and communication 
within the different GOP departments and institutions meant that even the legal courts were 
unsure of the Afghan legal position in Pakistan. In one Judicial Magistrate court case in Peshawar 
in February 2010, an Afghan applicant was arrested under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. The 
Afghan was a POR card holder, yet because of the confusion surrounding the extension of the 
POR cards the application for bail was rejected.  
This court feels that Afghan Citizens who are/were refugees, but 
their statues of refugees have ended on 31-12-2009 and their 
status have not been renewed by the concerned officials, hence 
they have become foreigners in circumstances and hence they 
should not be entitled for bail on concession on the basis of old 
Afghan Citizenship card. (February 2010, AJ son of GK vs. the 
State. Bail rejected). 
 
However, the mass arrests of 2009 and 2010 were not just about a lack of legal clarity. The 2009-
10 mass arrests also served the purpose of harassing and humiliating Afghans in a collective way 
in which Afghans as a whole were being informed of their reduced status in Pakistan. It has also 
served as an important political message to the GOA from the GOP, which the GOP and other 
refugee host states intermittently make, in order to display their sovereignty and bargaining 
position with regards to the GOA - even if the “real” impact on the GOA is minimal. As state 
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level relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan have become increasingly strained during 
the 2000s, Afghans in Pakistan are often on the receiving end of the frustrations of this 
relationship. Afghan bodies are the sites in which the shifting geopolitical objectives of the 
Pakistani state are played out. One human rights lawyer said: 
Afghans are constantly subjected to police harassment. Often it 
serves as a pressure point to the Afghan government if a 
Pakistani political leader/government needs to make a point 
(interview: Siddiqi 2011). 
 
On the ground, only one implementing partner of UNHCR, the Society for Human and 
Prisoners’ Rights (SHARP), which is only active in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad (cities with 
smaller Afghan demographics) and not Peshawar or Quetta (cities with the highest Afghan 
demographics), was present to negotiate with Pakistani police forces and representing Afghans in 
Pakistani magistrate courts for the lawful release of Afghans. (This support, however, was only 
afforded to POR card holders). Otherwise Afghans (both POR and non-POR card holders) had 
to rely on themselves, solidarity networks, and navigation practices with police forces after 
arrests. This navigation usually involved paying bribes. If it could be afforded. When arrests went 
to court often private legal advocates were hired, but again, only if it could be afforded. Rumours 
continued to circulate throughout fieldwork about the numbers of Afghans that are languishing 
in jails, not able to afford access to any form of legal aid or informally negotiate their way out of 
prison. Indeed throughout fieldwork, interviews were dominated by this topic. “The police! The 
police! The police! You must ask what they have made of us!”, a group discussion on the 
outskirts of Karachi once powerfully said. “The police!” were words said with a shudder for 
most Afghans during fieldwork. Given the circumstances, there was heightened sensitivity about 
sharing information regarding arrests when I conducted interviews. Usually information and 
experiences about police harassment either at the check-post or through individual and mass 
arrest was only shared after a degree of trust had been built up and interviewees were satisfied 
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with my status as a researcher (not in any way affiliated with the GOP or a national or 
international institution). For example, part of my ethnographic fieldwork involved 
accompanying teams involved in the PPVR Household Survey’s (2010-11) in Peshawar and the 
wider Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area. The survey has specific question about detention (SAFRON et 
al., 2010b 7.14-7). I never encountered any interviews over a three-and-a-half month period with 
an answer that said, “Yes”. However, in some cases I returned to the exact same households at a 
later point, introduced myself as an independent researcher, with no GOP affiliation, and 
explained the purpose of my research. During these interviews, I was told in greater depth and 
detail about cases of police harassment and arrest. Other examples of this occurred in Afghan 
Camp. When I was present with representatives from CAR/ARRC, I was given insightful, but 
formal interviews where the main issue of Afghan Camp was restricted to discussions around 
water. However, as my position in Afghan Camp developed apart from GOP affiliated actors 
many people were much more willing to talk about cases of police harassment.  
 
In an interview with Habibullah from Afghan Camp he said:  
There was a time last year [2009-10] when people were 
constantly being arrested, one elder had to go and get 150 people 
released who were arrested at one time. At another point 40 
people were taken. This is what we had to deal with. Our women 
were taken too. They [the police] would demand money from 
each person, from each man the police said, “Pay us Rs.10,000, 
Rs.20,000 and you can go”. Who had this money? They stopped 
our women as well – they still stop the ladies and search them 
too. They are animals, they are not even human. Who knows 
what they are! No one is here to listen to our issues, to the things 
that have happened to us, to the times that we were arrested or 
to the harassment that we have faced. Is this just? Is it? Record 
this, the truth as to what happens to us (Habibullah, KHA13). 
 
Here, women (often constructed as sites of honour) were also humiliated, which also contributed 
towards the emasculation of male Afghans, who could not complete their gendered duties to 
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protect “their” women. In addition, the scale of excessive and un-payable fees indicates that the 
actions of arrest are not to do with the disciplining Afghans into acting in accordance with the 
law.  Rather these actions are a display of the norms of corruption, and the performance of 
Pakistani superiority in order to lower the value of Afghans in relation to the Pakistani.  
 
As one interview with Yaqoob Gul highlighted (as well as numerous other interviews), the mass 
arrests involved families, friends, neighbours, and strangers, and were repeated across the country 
in 2009-2010.  
At one point I was in Karachi trying to get people released. Then 
I was in Jacobabad, or Larkana, or Sukkur, or Kashmore. I had 
relatives telling me they were having problems in Quetta 
(Yaqoob Gul, KHA10). 
 
Interviews conducted in all sites, Karachi, Peshawar, as well as other areas in Sindh, FATA, 
across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Islamabad revealed that during 2009-10 Afghans faced 
significant police harassment and chances of arrest, much of which also continued on in 2011. 
Abdul Wahid, introduced in Chapter 6, recalled how he was arrested in Peshawar and taken to 
prison after Eid in 2010.  
One police officer asked me [It was a mobile police van, you 
know with Datsun vans]. He stopped me; he asked me about 
everything, first he asked me, “Are you from Afghanistan? Are 
you a muhajir?” I said, “Yes I’m from Afghanistan, and I say yes I 
am muhajir... because I am confident, I have everything. I have 
the ID [POR] card…  He took it to his senior officer, he was 
sitting in the car, then he wrote the arrest form out, and took me 
to the police station. I was shifted to a cell where there were 15 
or more Afghans there standing... there was no place to sit. In 
the morning we were then shifted to court. There were some 
judges there... what you have to say, the lawyers... it is getting 
funnier as I remember (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). 
 
Again, in this case the performance of superiority, with the superior officer sitting in the car, 
remains clear. Abdul Wahid also mentioned how 15 other Afghans were present in the jail with 
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him. He said that the prison experience is almost a rite of passage for Afghans in Pakistan, 
reflecting the collective Afghan experience that is created in Pakistan: 
It is impossible that you do not see the prison at least once. This 
is a stamp to prove you are Afghan (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). 
 
Similar to Julie Peteet’s (2002) study of arrest being a male rite of passage in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories, the Afghan experiences of arrest in Pakistan is but another (male) “rite of 
passage”. Abdul Wahid continued to discuss the “awful” conditions in the cell: 
We were there for some time... it was dark; cells of children are 
different to those who are men like me. We had nothing. No meal, 
no beds. We didn’t sleep at night – there was no place, it was full 
of other people.187 Most Afghans had been there for 13-14 days. 
 
No longer satisfied with the political climate in Peshawar, Abdul Wahid has now moved to live 
in Islamabad in the hope that he will face fewer issues in the capital city. 
 
Further, during fieldwork in Karachi, a story was circulating amongst different Afghans who 
lived around Sohrab Goth, the Super Highway settlements, and Afghan Camp. “You heard what 
happened to Hajji Tooraj [KHA73, a senior Afghan elder mentioned in earlier sections] didn’t 
you?” Sohrab Din and (KHA67) and Jahangir (KHA66) asked me as I sat in their shop 
informally, on my way home from fieldwork. I had heard something surrounding the elder in 
question, one of Karachi’s most senior elders who negotiates with CAR, UNHCR, and other 
actors, but was unsure of the full story. Sohrab Din continued: 
It turns out the police had arrested all of these Afghans near 
Gulshan e Maymar. The people who got arrested and their 
families phone up Hajji Tooraj to help them get out of the cells. 
So Hajji Tooraj turns up with some other elders, protesting and 
demanding that the prisoners be released. You know what the 
police did? They put Hajji Tooraj in jail! They don’t even leave 
the elders alone! (Sohrab Din, KHA67). 
                                                          
187 Interestingly, Abdul Wahid adds that he met prisoners “Even from Africa, from Bangladesh I met 
several people… they could speak Urdu” (PXA1)  
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Even a key representative is not left alone in Karachi, pointing to the exertion of a collective 
display of discipline targeting Afghans. As thousands of Afghans were individually, collectively, 
and repeatedly arrested and transported to prison cells and police stations, a creation of a shared 
Afghan experience, of collective humiliation and discipline appears to have been enacted. 
 
These collective experiences were further recalled in other stories, which were circulating in 
Karachi, where I was told how a newly married teenage woman had gone missing and were 
presumed dead after travelling back from Afghanistan with her husband and after having been 
subjected to police harassment and physical abuse. The husband, I was told, in despair kept on 
pleading with the police to tell him where his wife was.  
There was a man who was coming back to Karachi from 
Afghanistan via Quetta… No one knows what to say to him. He 
had been in Afghanistan as he got married and he was bringing 
back his wife. She was from Afghanistan and had never lived in 
Pakistan before. Along the way the police stopped the bus that 
they were on and told them to get off the bus. The man was 
arrested. The police said his documents were incorrect even 
though he had his POR card and the required documents. He 
was taken to jail and the bus went off…  He kept asking, time 
and time again, “Where is my wife”? He said that he had been 
repeating this the whole time that he was arrested. He said, “I 
don’t care what you do to me, but tell me, where is my wife!?” 
They had arrested him, but no one knows to this day what 
happened to his wife. He still has not found her. She had never 
been here before. How would she know what to do…? God 
knows what has happened now. They are jahil (ignorant); they are 
zalims (oppressors)… This is janwari (animal) behaviour…” (Story 
repeated in discussions).  
In this “waqiya” (story), as I heard it, what should have been a joyous occasion was rapidly 
snatched away and transformed into a tragedy, or a “hadsa” (incident). The life of a woman was 
narrated as having been lost and destroyed - physically and non-physically.   
 
294 
 
Deportations & Rotting Prisons  
In a number of cases Afghans who are caught without POR documentation have been deported. 
The legality of this is derived from: 
Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 which allows the 
Federal Government to make orders providing that a particular 
foreigner or prescribed class of foreigners “shall not remain in 
Pakistan or in any prescribed area therein (B.Khan 2012:189).188 
 
Again, official numbers of deportations are difficult to attain, although it was admitted to taking 
place in interviews with Pakistani and Afghan officials (interviews: Khaliqyar 2010; Maroof 2010), 
recorded in reports taken from human rights lawyers in Pakistan, some magistrate rulings, 
reports from SHARP, and interviews with Afghans in Karachi and Peshawar (see also B. Khan 
2012). In interviews that I completed with Afghan residents in a rural-urban informal settlement 
in Peshawar I was told how the area experienced three police raids during which a number of 
men were detained, arrested, and some deported (Sibghatullah, PXA42). This residents said 
occurred despite the fact that there was no security threat in the area. In one family’s case, 
Spozmai spoke of her husband being deported as he did not have documentation (neither did 
she), but, “He just moved back across”, she said (Spozmai, PXA44). Similarly, in Karachi, in 
interviews across the city I was told how Afghans have increasingly been deported in the past 
few years, which “did not happen before” (Hajji Hayyat, KHA71; Mustafa Habib, KHA47; 
Rostam, KHA68).  
 
                                                          
188  B.Khan (2012:189-90) highlights that: “A private member's bill was introduced in the National 
Assembly by MNA Shireen Arshad Khan on March 30, 2010 seeking to amend the FA [Foreigners Act]”. 
But because “The National Assembly Standing Committee is yet to submit a report on the bill… has not 
been discussed in Parliament. The bill seeks to: add the terms ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’ and ‘endorsing 
authority’ (namely, UNHCR, NARA & CAR) to the FA; exempt recognized asylum seekers and refugees 
from the penal provisions of the FA; set a requirement that police officers must obtain a search warrant 
from a court before entering into a dwelling unit or property when seeking to give effect to orders, 
directions etc. in pursuance of the FA; prohibit the deportation of an asylum seeker while his status 
determination case is pending before the endorsing authority; and eliminate the existing bar against 
instituting civil or criminal proceeding against persons acting in good faith under the FA”. 
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In instances of deportation Afghans are booked by the police under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act 
for having no legal documentation and then face trial. Conviction for no documentation carries 
the maximum sentence of 10 years. Judges may be discreet and instead imprison Afghans for a 
day, a week, or a month (and so on), or they give orders for immediate deportation. However, 
the GOP is reported to have no money to physically deport prisoners or pay a third party to do 
so. And as non-POR card holders, UNHCR has no mandate to support these Afghans. In an 
interview with a lawyer working for the SHARP, I was told: 
We can only defend registered Afghans. We simply have to turn 
down Afghans that are not registered. As our organisations work 
for all prisoners, we can try to be discreet. But UNHCR is only 
meant to help registered Afghans (Mehmood [SHARP] 2010). 
 
 And in an interview with a GOA official in Karachi a senior representative said:  
[The Government of] Pakistan says that the GOA must take 
responsibility for the fees and the costs of deporting Afghans. 
They say they do not have the money. The problem is that the 
GOA does not have the money either. The past years have not 
allowed us to have this money...Where are we going to get the 
funds for this? (interview: Khaliqyar 2010)189. 
  
In these cases prisoners are left to pay for their deportation themselves, if they can afford it, and 
only then are escorted out of Pakistan by Pakistani officials. But there are many cases where 
Afghans simply do not have the money to pay and are simply sitting in jail. “Have you ever seen 
a Pakistani jail?” one Afghan elder in Peshawar asked during an interview, “They are just trapped 
rotting (sarrahe hain) there… stuck in their own filth. Only God can save them”, he said (Abu 
Zakariya, PXA54). Cases of “sarna”, which literally means “rotting”, being eaten away, and sitting 
in their own filth reflects a dehumanised status of Afghans who are violently denied the 
                                                          
189  In the interview the Afghan official said that, “We held a dinner here at the embassy. And we 
approached the attendees to cover the costs... enough money was raised to cover the costs for 200 
prisoners” (interview: Khaliqyar 2010).   
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conditions which could enable the potentials of a “humanised” life to be practiced. Instead in 
Abu Zakariya’s understanding an Afghan life is reduced to organic decay and helplessness.  
 
Further, Habibullah, speaking in a group interview with other residents of the camp recalled that:  
I went to the prison [after a case of mass arrests] and there were 
210 people there. Women were there too. I met three Afghans 
who were crazy. There is no justice here. One of them was very 
lively. There was one Afghan in there that has been there for ten 
years. He has gone completely crazy; I tried to talk to him and he 
just spurts <does motion>. I asked the guard, ‘Why is he like 
this?’ I asked the jailer, ‘Why is he like this?’ The jailer replied, 
‘When we picked him up, when he came over from Afghanistan 
he was like this’. No! No! They [the police] have made him crazy. 
<Echoes of agreement across the factory>. It is they who have 
made him crazy. They have forgotten their humanity; they do not 
know what it means to be a human any longer (Habibullah, 
KHA13 leading an informal group discussion). 
 
In this example, Afghans are dehumanised, hoarded together like cattle, and their mental 
capacities increasingly strained, and the body is stripped of its humanity (Scarry 1985) and unable 
to respond. 
 
Sites of Self-Humanisation 
Even in these cases the constructions of the “dangerous” Afghan and practices of humiliation 
are not, however, readily accepted, internalised, and reproduced by Afghans. There is space for 
agency and action. Unlike cases of torture (Lazreg 2008), in the examples discussed here state 
aggression against Afghans does not reflect the exertion of absolute power, where the body is 
stripped of its humanity (Scarry 1985) and unable to respond - although as the examples of 
mental degeneration demonstrate the “unbecoming” of the human body remains a real 
possibility. 
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In physical terms, many Afghans use solidarity networks to navigate around the Pakistani state or 
influence officials to change their actions. Habibullah negotiated with Pakistani officials in order 
to get releases for arrested Afghans. In other cases, Habibullah, Yaqoob Gul, and others 
facilitated border crossings and raised funds when individuals have not had money themselves. 
The case of Afghan Camp provides an interesting example through which solidarity networks 
and practices of navigation offer some space to “self-humanise”. Here a group of elders and 
residents have devised a process where they dispense their mobile numbers to residents: 
unrelated neighbours, relatives, and friends. During times of bad security conditions in the city 
when Afghans are more likely to be arrested - for example, if a bomb blast has taken place - 
many elders and residents either call people to ensure that residents of the camp are safe, have 
their numbers available in cases when individuals try to contact them, or go to negotiate with 
police officials, or in some cases scour the city in cases of severe violence, in a bid to counteract 
the tactics of harassment and humiliation. In one interview, Yaqoob Gul explained: 
When the situation in the city gets really bad [either due to 
political conflicts between political parties or due to police 
harassment] I get a lot of phone calls from friends and people we 
know, people who are concerned. I advise them and I make 
phone calls myself and I tell them to sit within your own 
businesses [i.e. just go in your shops and shut the shutters], sit in 
your own homes, do not go outside, do not enter the city... stay 
in your own homes, stay inside (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).  
 
Similarly, in the informal housing settlement in Peshawar, Gul Kalay, a father, Afsandar Ali 
(PXA36), who has been living in Peshawar since 1992 recalled how his son was arrested but was 
able to get bail through his solidarity networks – specifically through bonds of friendship. 
Afsandar Ali migrated with his family from Sukhrod in Nangarhar province in 1992 when 
conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated. He has three sons who have been schooled in Peshawar, 
one of whom is still studying (Shin Gul, PXP37, who was arrested) and the other two are 
working. Afsandar Ali recalled: 
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[My son and his friends] they were out here playing cricket – just 
nearby. The police came and picked him up and took him in as a 
result. They took him in for no other reasons other than he was 
Afghan. He had to pay Rs.1000 – for what? In the police cell, the 
police were demanding Rs.1000... It was his friends that went and 
got him released. They are the ones, his friends, Afghan and 
Pakistani, who went and got him released, got the money 
together. As people we have no issues between us; but with the 
police the story is different (Afsandar Ali, PXA36). 
Even in the earlier case of Abdul Wahid it was his family that came to help him get access to a 
court (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). This was a theme that was similarly repeated across interviews and 
documents collected in this thesis.  
 
However, informal solidarity networks and navigation strategies are not always successful. The 
scale and reach of the networks is not fully effective. Many Afghans have been deported, others 
continue to be harassed on a daily basis, and passing through check-posts has not become easier. 
Indeed, in Afghan Camp, Yaqoob Gul also noted how once his relative had been killed in the 
main city, but because the conditions were bad, and the challenge of moving within the city 
increased he could not even retrieve the body for three days (Yaqoob Gul, KHA10).  Even death 
occurs in non-humanised conditions, “His body, it just lay there” (ibid). For Afsandar Ali whilst 
the bonds of friendship enabled his son to be released, he was still arrested another time shortly 
after. During fieldwork Afsandar Ali’s son, Shin Gul, continued to find it difficult to pass 
through a check-post in the city (Afsandar Ali, PXA36). The GOP is still able to carry out its 
“disciplinary” strategy as a bribe has to be paid. Similarly Abdul Wahid continued to face forms 
of police harassment, and indeed he eventually moved to Islamabad in order to try to escape 
forms of harassment (Abdul Wahid, PXA1). Solidarity networks only offer a brief respite.  
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In non-physical terms, the constructions of the “dangerous” Afghan and practices of humiliation 
are not, however, readily accepted, internalised, and reproduced by Afghans. “Stories” of 
harassment and humiliation, some serious and some comic, are routinely circulated and retold 
amongst friends, families, and strangers. In part, they reflect an environment of uncertainty and 
fear that has been produced and retained in the consciousness and memories of Afghans - and 
increasingly in collective ways, as the earlier mentioned “stories” reflect. But crucially, they also 
reflect a space for mocking, humiliation, and dehumanisation of the unjust and immoral 
Pakistani “dehumanisation” regime itself. In one case, I conducted interviews with a group of 
Afghan men in their twenties who lived near me in Peshawar over a period of three months. 
During these interviews jokes regarding the times that they, or others, had been arrested were 
commonly shared. 
Once, Khaled, Shaukat, and I were stopped. It wasn’t that late, 
we were on our way to Khaled’s brother’s wedding. But of 
course the police stopped us. “Afghan”, he said. So, we showed 
him our muhajir card [Afghan POR card] but he wouldn’t accept 
it. He said: “You must pay me Rs.500 [approximately $5]; 
otherwise I will not let you go”. So, I’m looking at him, thinking, 
“I’m not going to pay”. I said. “Look, I have nothing; I have 
Rs.20 [approximately 20 cent], that’s it. You should let me go”. 
He stopped and thought for a few seconds. Then he took my 
Rs.20 and divided it with his colleagues! (Junaid Tareen, 
PXA104).  
 
In addition, in the earlier story that was circulating in Karachi, people also demonstrated an 
attempt to humanise the Afghan life in question, and by extension the Afghan position in 
Pakistan, by juxtaposing the Afghan life against the injustice of the state. In that story, the 
Pakistani state, which is considered to have some responsibility towards Afghans, has betrayed 
its position of trust. In one instance a Pakistani man who also relayed this story to me, said, “I 
could not look him [the woman’s husband] in the eye. He just kept saying, again and again, 
“Where is my wife?” This is the condition of our state”. In the face of dehumanising experiences 
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and an inhumane state many Afghans understand that the positions they occupy are out of 
compulsion and necessity. Self-respect, personal responsibility, contextual awareness, and agency 
(Pollmann 2010) – even if they exist in an asymmetrical reality - are vocalised through these 
stories of resistance. The stories are not a utopian panacea, but they do allow Afghans to 
maintain an understanding of possessing a “humanised” existence, certainly more so than the 
juxtaposed inhumane Pakistani state and its actors.   
 
Delegitimized Guardians 
Both the GOP and, to a degree, UNHCR are considered the official institutions responsible to 
Afghans for the protection of material and non-material rights in order to provide the conditions 
for a humanised existence. However, it is clear that both the GOP and refugee regime do not 
simply fail in this effort but that they are also at the heart of creating and enabling the conditions 
of violence which Afghan lives are subjected to. Critically, however, by dehumanising Pakistanis, 
and more intensely Afghans via tactics of harassment and humiliation, the state and official 
actors are themselves reproduced as delegitimized and inhumane structures that fail in their 
duties of governance.  
 
Forms of security control and surveillance are important tools and are needed in Pakistan where 
thousands of people have died in the past ten years alone from internal bombings and other 
forms of political violence. An issue of hypocrisy and scepticism, however, arises when 
enumeration is not simply about inclusive protection but is also about determining who lives and 
dies in the context of the GWOT, a war whose motives were continually questioned in the 
course of interviews and discussions. During the processes of enumeration, and shared 
intelligence (as discussed in the first section of this chapter), the trust and legitimacy of official 
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actors and institutions is deeply eroded. The state and refugee regime are expected to uphold 
basic rights such as safety from violence - indeed they project themselves as the “guardians” that 
are capable of doing so. However, the state and refugee regime are revealed not only as 
incompetent but complicit in allowing these rights to be violently snatched away. In a group 
discussion with several Afghan men aged between 30-45 the group spoke with guarded suspicion 
of the numerous enumerative purposes that UNHCR was involved in.  
They are not doing this [enumeration] for us; they want to know 
how many of us there are. They are keeping an account and 
monitoring how many of us Afghans there are and know every 
single detail about our lives (Rastin, KHA8; Habibullah, KHA13; 
Saleem, KHA17; Tariq, KHA18; Gulzar, KHA19). 
 
The security climate in urban centres has created an environment in which suspicion, fear, and 
rumours are now a norm. However, critically, this fear is not just against the “Talibani”, 
“terrorist”, “Al-Qaeda”, or any of the additional terms that are used to describe the “threats” 
(constructed or real) that are lurking within urban Pakistan. This fear is also against the GOP and 
local officials, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the numerous international 
intelligence agencies that are rumoured to be operating in Pakistan from India’s Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW), the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to the British Security 
Service (MI6). By being engaged in extra-judicial violence against these actors it is the Pakistani 
state that is also considered a site of terror, fear, and oppression. Michael Taussig (2002[1984]) 
analyses The Putyamo Report, which was submitted to the British government in 1913 after seven 
weeks of travel through the rubber gathering jungles of Caraparana and Igaraparana and six-
months in the Amazon basin. In this he shows: 
The system of torture [colonialists and rubber company employees] 
devised to secure rubber mirrored the horror of the savagery they 
so feared, condemned – and fictionalized (Taussig 2002[1984]). 
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Indeed, in the interview with Engineer Aziz he said, “It is they; it is the NATO forces, who are 
the real terrorists” (Engineer Aziz, PXA59). Increasingly the state is analysed through a prism 
and language of “terror” itself by both Afghans and Pakistanis. The state is understood as being 
cruel, callous, and inhumane. Throughout fieldwork state institutions and actors and 
international institutions were often automatically considered as being infiltrated with “jasoosi” 
(spy/intelligence) elements.190 Moreover, the continual reference to official institutions (namely 
the state, but also international institutions) as “ghadar” (traitor), “zalimi” (oppressive), and “na-
insaaf” (without justice), “beghair insani” (without humanity), “jahil” (ignorant), or “janwari” 
(animalistic) reflects the deep lack of trust, which permeates Afghan and Pakistani relationships 
with official structures in this context of “security”, or rather insecurity.  
 
As this chapter has demonstrated, experiences of state violence and enumeration are intensified 
tenfold for Afghans in Pakistan as Afghans face specific and targeted harassment and 
humiliation, and have a vulnerable (and unclear) legal position in Pakistan. The Pakistani state 
and its specific arms, such as the police, are delegitimized. Afghans are not wary of law, security, 
                                                          
190 During fieldwork I was continually told by Afghans and Pakistanis to avoid working with any INGOs 
because they were assumed to be full of international intelligence operatives.  Indeed in some INGOs I 
was actually introduced to retired military personnel. This would later informally be explained to me as 
“code for ISI”. In other cases with other colleagues in organisations that I was completing ethnographic 
work (I/NGOs, NADRA centres, and other enumerative bodies), a “game” that was played was “Spot 
the Agent”, where you would literally (as the name suggests) try to guess who the intelligence officer 
within the organisation was.  Further, in discussions with Anwar Khan (KHP51) he said to me to, “Stay 
away from NGOs, especially when you are in Peshawar [and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. Over 70% of people 
have zero trust for them as most of them are infiltrated with some foreign and national intelligence 
agency or the other” (KHA51 2011). And, on a number of occasions by various sources in Karachi and 
Peshawar I was told that “over 30-40% of international aid agencies are infiltrated/working with some 
kind of intelligence service or the other”. Moreover, recent killings of I/NGO workers in Pakistan show 
how I/NGO workers have become symbols of the “(in)security” climate that dominates Pakistan. In 
2012 this included the killings of a Swedish social worker in Lahore (December), a British Red Cross 
worker in Quetta (April), three Pakistani Christian aid workers (August); five Pakistanis polio workers in 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (December) (Dawn News 24 December 2012), and a further seven polio workers 
in Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Dawn News 1 Jan 2013). This mistrust of INGOs has been significantly 
influenced and increased after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011, which is 
understood as having been reliant on the information of a local I/NGO worker. With these statements, I 
am not concerned at “proving” if INGOs are infiltrated or not, but I am concerned at demonstrating 
how various I/NGOs are constructed as symbols of distrust in a political climate of suspicion and 
intrigue. 
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and order, but they are in fear of a particular type of law, security, and order: the corrupted and 
objectifying  Pakistani one, which appears to be the dominant, normalised order. 
 
The refugee regime and UNHCR, which is set up to protect via presence, appears both impotent 
(unable to prevent harassment and humiliation from taking place) and complicit in the exclusion 
of Afghans in Pakistan. In Karachi, UNHCR has funded SHARP, its implementing partner, to 
provide protection for Afghans in the city. However, in Karachi its actions have not been able to 
assist all Afghans, and as mentioned earlier, there are no SHARP offices in cities with high 
Afghan demographics (Peshawar and Quetta). Because UNHCR and “the regime of refugee law 
owes its primary allegiance not to refugees but states” (Aleinikoff 1995:11) and acts to maintain 
the international order of states, illegal immigrants are left alone “to rot” in jails. The continued 
use of nationally segregating lenses means that humanitarian regimes are not as fully humanising 
as they would like to claim. Thus, the refugee regime and UNHCR’s role as a guardian is often 
met with sneers and scepticism, if it is ever even considered at all. The cases of Yaqoob Gul, 
Habibullah, and others assisting Afghan detainees demonstrates how many Afghans are in fact 
left alone to deal with the transgressions of the Pakistani state. Indeed, during semi-structured 
interviews in the interview segments regarding “help/protection from UNHCR” a blank face at 
the absurdity of the question was the usual response. The questionings of UNHCR’s 
“humanitarianism” and even its claims to neutrality are further challenged by the fact that 
UNHCR (and others) offer no support or enumeration to the sizeable Bangladeshi “refugee” 
population in Pakistan. This lack of support to Bangladeshis cannot be separated from the fact 
that Bangladeshis in Pakistan do not have the same geopolitical significance that Afghan bodies 
do in the context of a US-led counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Thus UNHCR, a 
seemingly neutral institution, also appears complicit with or at least vulnerable to the wider 
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political goals of global hegemons and, again, not necessarily concerned with the 
“humanitarianism” to which it lays claim.  
 
Moreover, for Afghans, sentiments of betrayal by both the GOP and UNHCR (as well as failures 
of the GOA and former Unity of Islamic Resistance) run deep. As Fattah and Fierke (2009) 
highlight, betrayal occurs when, in a relationship, one’s status is lowered from the previous 
equilibrium. For Afghans the rapid descent of their status from iconic and mythologised warriors 
to objects who have no control over their time, space, and movement has deeply fostered this 
sense of betrayal. In his seminal lecture, Terrorism, Theirs and Ours, Eqbal Ahmed (1998:258) 
reminds readers that, 
In 1985, President Ronald Reagan received a group of bearded 
men… President Reagan received them in the White House. 
After receiving them he spoke to the press. He pointed towards 
them, I’m sure some of you will recall that moment, and said, 
“These are the moral equivalent of America’s founding fathers”. 
These were the Afghan Mujahiddin. They were at the time, guns 
in hand, battling the Evil Empire. They were the moral 
equivalent of our founding fathers! [...]The matter of terrorism 
[then] is rather complicated. Terrorists change. The terrorist of 
yesterday is the hero of today, and the hero of yesterday becomes 
the terrorist of today. This is a serious matter of the constantly 
changing world of images in which we have to keep our heads 
straight to know what is terrorism and what is not.  
 
In the narratives collected for this thesis, including interviews carried out with former members 
and fighters of the “Afghan mujahidin”, many Afghans illustrated having felt used, reduced to 
objects only of geopolitical value - as Maulana Jamil ur Rehman highlights in Chapter 3’s 
opening statement, like “tissues” that could be thrown away once their use complete. Just by 
glancing at the narratives mentioned thus far in this thesis the disjuncture between past and 
present experiences is clear.  
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Since 2001 things changed (Mudassir, PXA36); 
 
Now, you cannot live your life with any dignity…. Before things 
were relaxed, there was no pressure or troubles. But now the 
situation has changed (Ibrahim Hafiz, PXA41); 
 
Then, at that point, it was a big deal to be an Afghan refugee…. 
Now we are thinking and now we feel that we are not recognised 
as refugees, that now we have no status, that now no one believes we 
are refugees…Now we get nothing. Are we human or are we not 
worth anything? We are nothing” (Engineer Aziz, PXA59); 
 
I was greeted by the Washington State Department and thanked 
by the government for our efforts in the war, this was in 1995. 
After that they left us under the open sky to do what we could 
(interview: Maulana Jamil ur Rehman). 
 
For Afghans, the GOP is considered responsible for providing basic safety and security from 
physical and emotional harm, especially in light of the promises of the 1970s and 1980s. At a bare 
minimum, the GOP is not expected to violently attack these basic rights by humiliating Afghans in 
strategic ways and for instrumentalist purposes. And at a bare minimum UNHCR is not meant 
to sit idly by and allow them to take place. The 180-degree shift that Afghans have encountered 
was not anticipated. By engaging in these practices, Pakistani official actors have betrayed their 
trust, a trust that they themselves promoted so vociferously during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
prevalence of harassment and humiliation that is conducted on Afghan bodies is witnessed by all, 
citizens and non-citizens, and is testament to the hypocrisy and betrayals by Pakistani (and other 
state) officials, and indeed its cruel character. In this chapter alone, the narratives are seeping 
with terms that describe Pakistani officials as oppressors. When the narrative of the “missing 
woman” is narrated it is not the woman who is the ultimate sub-human, but the Pakistani official. 
When the prisoners have been “made crazy” this is not the fault of the prisoners, it is the 
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officials who have made them crazy, through which their own character and legitimacy is 
compromised: “They have forgotten their humanity; they do not know what it means to be a 
human any longer”. At the very moment the state appears to be getting what it wants with the 
repatriation of Afghans, its own character, legitimacy, and morality are severely attacked. Here 
informal political action and navigation practices (protection & access payments via bribes) used 
by the state are not upholding the state or official actors in anyway. Instead they are a source of 
decay.  
 
Whilst Afghans are not “citizens” in Pakistan, and therefore cannot impact votes or electoral 
power bases, the Pakistani state is still affected by its relationship with Afghans in Pakistan, as 
well as the reality of transnational lives across the Afghan-Pakistan border. The Pakistani state 
must think beyond the short-term for the actions in which it is engaged, which is important for 
both internal reasons and external reasons. The practices of harassment and humiliation 
increasingly appear to be occurring in a collective form and as such are retained in the collective 
consciousness of Afghans in Pakistan, as well as those who return to Afghanistan (or those who 
move elsewhere), which has been expressed in daily narratives or stories collected in this thesis. 
If the Pakistani state ignores, denies, and does not acknowledge the actions it has engaged in, the 
repercussions of its acts are likely to resurface. To borrow from Didier Fassin (2007:28), 
“Memory buried deep, does not disappear. History relentlessly resurfaces”, whether in a 
“knowing smile”, or a “racist crime” (ibid), or broken down relationships, and other forms of 
violence. On a regional level, thus, if the Pakistani state is serious about cooperation in Central 
and South Asia it must rethink the consequences of its actions – this is especially pressing given 
the transnational reality of the area.  Furthermore, on an internal level, the problems of not 
rethinking its actions are even more urgent. Internally, these memories are retained in the 
consciousness of a people that are a real and active presence within Pakistan and particularly the 
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urban fabric of Peshawar and Karachi. As has been shown in the previous chapters, Afghans are 
an integral part of these cities. Their presence reflects an alternative way being, which is shared 
with many Pakistanis. But by using profiling tactics to harass, humiliate, and discipline Afghans, 
the Pakistani state is in effect creating resentful and mistrustful groups that, even if not legal 
citizens, are members of an active and important informal political space in Pakistan. This is the 
reality that the state cannot refuse to address and points to a potential future crisis point for the 
state. Fassin (2007) outlines that memory is not passive, it is continually mobilised, 
reappropriated, and reinterpreted, thus, all is not lost for the future of Pakistani state. However, 
in order for the state to be able to get to this point, its actions and policies must undergo  serious 
re-evaluation.  
 
Conclusion 
“Citizenship” or identity appears not to matter when it comes to a story of survival or relative 
gains. However, it does matter when it comes to shifting geopolitical concerns, which is masked 
in and justified through the “security” context that dominates Pakistani cities. This chapter has 
shown that the limits to the shared realities that Pakistanis and Afghans occupy in Pakistan are 
reached in the “security” context in Pakistan, which combines with negative stereotypes 
associated with Afghans in Pakistan and more penetrative forms of enumeration and surveillance 
to culminate in a violent lived reality of insecurity for Afghans. To be an Afghan in Pakistan means 
to be subject to more violent forms of “national ways of seeing” and specific forms of 
dehumanisation via state harassment and humiliation practices. Whilst both Afghans and 
Pakistanis are increasingly enumerated, surveilled, and policed in the context of the GWOT and 
the war in Afghanistan and FATA, the Afghan experience is different and more intense within 
Pakistan when compared to Pakistanis – devalued or not. Afghan bodies are perceived and read as 
mobile embodiments of the frontier – and indeed the wrong side of the frontier – in which the 
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shifting geopolitical objectives of the Pakistani state are practiced. (Indeed, even the disciplining 
of the Afghan state to meet Pakistan’s Afghan foreign policy objective with regards to 
Afghanistan seem to take place on Afghan bodies in Pakistan). Critically, however, throughout 
these processes the Pakistani state and even the refugee regime do not remain unscathed. 
Because UNHCR is effectively silent about the processes of harassment and humiliation Afghans 
face and is a driver behind population profiling, UNHCR is understood as an impotent actor as 
well as a guilty party in the betrayal of Afghans in Pakistan and at the global level. In addition, 
UNHCR’s impotence regarding “illegal” Afghans who are “rotting” in prisons fundamentally 
questions the label of “humanitarianism” to which the organisation lays claim. This is 
compounded by the fact that UNHCR’s neutrality is questionable as its interest in “protecting” 
Afghans cannot be separated from the significance given to the US-led counterinsurgency 
campaign in Afghanistan in the current international order. The lines between humanitarianism 
and counterinsurgency in the context of Afghans in Pakistan wear thin. Crucially, however, for 
the Pakistani state, the main “guardian” of Afghans in Pakistan, a delegitimized status - as well as 
its own dehumanisation - is even more pronounced. This is because it is the Pakistani state and 
actors who directly engage in acts of violence, harassment, and humiliation on Afghan bodies. 
The state, by achieving its goal of “encouraging” repatriation through the use of harassment and 
humiliation tactics is itself dehumanised and indeed constructed as an inhumane, unjust, and un-
trusted caricature. This is something the Pakistani state cannot afford if it is serious about 
regional cooperation and regional peace building efforts (which frankly it appears not to be), or 
its own internal strength and well-being. Afghans, legal or not, are an integral part of the 
Pakistani state, and the state cannot afford to isolate them, when it is itself beset with internal 
concerns related to urban mafias, middlemen, or landholders, and alternatives sources of power, 
aside from the networks of solidarity who are ready to step in for the state and redistribute and 
protect material and non-material goods. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: The Inhumane State  
This thesis has sought to bring to light the similarities and differences of Afghan and Pakistani 
lives in urban Pakistan by using often side-lined Afghan and Pakistani oral narratives. It has 
shown that legal citizenship or refugeedom, and even illegal migrant status - i.e. no status -, only 
creates a difference in daily life in the context of geopolitics, borders, and a counterinsurgency in 
FATA and Afghanistan, masked in the language of “security concerns” (real and constructed). 
Otherwise, in everyday life Afghans and Pakistanis live in similar realities.  This is perversely 
fitting for a state which is dominated by geostrategic concerns and the military - a position that is 
constantly reinforced by external “allies” and global hegemons. Thus, whilst other works have 
shown how a “security consciousness” dominates Pakistan as a result of the historical birth and 
development of the Pakistani state and its geostrategic significance in international relations (Jalal 
1990) or the vast industrial-military complex that permeates every sphere of Pakistan (Siddiqa 
2007) this research has inadvertently illuminated the pervasiveness of this “security” 
consciousness through the comparative analysis of Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens in 
Pakistan.  How the Pakistani state conceptualises itself and its understandings of “statehood” are 
visible in how it treats its citizens, and indeed refugees. And in this security state of Pakistan 
citizenship is simply a computerised identity card used to check whether you are or are not a 
threat to this security state. Even then the concern about belonging does not result in the delivery 
of rights or welfare; instead, it is simply a safeguard against some forms of state violence, namely 
harassment and humiliation tactics. Otherwise citizenship has limited value and is not 
understood in a positive and empowering way.  For Afghans too, their refugee and non-citizen 
identity is simply a computerised identity card, however, here, instead of acting as a tool for 
protection it enables forms of state violence – a violence that is, again, indicative of the “security” 
consciousness that permeates the Pakistani state. 
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Returning to one of the questions that this research set out to answer, this research has 
demonstrated that for both Afghans and Pakistanis “legal identities” and lines of national 
distinction do not make a difference to the everyday urban lives of Afghans and Pakistanis. Even 
when legal identities are visible, i.e. at the check-post or via an identity card, they are not 
empowering – however, for Afghans they are an active and violent site of disempowerment.  Yet 
in most aspects of everyday life in Karachi and Peshawar, legal identities and lines of national 
distinction do not make a difference to the lived realities of Afghans and Pakistanis, with this 
research paying specific attention to the urban poor. The lines of legal distinction between 
citizens and non-citizens in Pakistan do not impact how both Afghans and Pakistanis are able or 
unable to access basic and beyond basic material and non-material goods – i.e. social security -  
in order to secure the conditions in which the potentials of a “humanised life” can be practiced.  
 
This research started by showing how Afghans, exert political agency in Pakistan, challenging 
assumptions of the limited political significance of refugees in Pakistan. However, very quickly, it 
also demonstrated that many Pakistanis, particularly the urban poor, live in shared realities with 
Afghans, illuminating a devalued embodied experience of Pakistani citizenship. Through this 
comparative analysis this research has revealed that in everyday urban Pakistan, in stories of basic 
survival and relative gains, the language of legal distinction between citizens and refugees are 
often irrelevant in explaining local political patterns. It has demonstrated this by looking at: how 
both Afghans and Pakistanis are not provided with material goods by the state (or refugee regime); 
how both Afghans and Pakistanis attempt to overcome official failings using social solidarity 
networks and navigation practices to engage in material and non-material redistribution; how both 
Afghans and Pakistanis understand and express state failings and their subsequent agency in a 
language of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation”; and how the redistributive actions of 
312 
 
both Afghans and Pakistanis have a direct political impact on the state by creating physical 
changes to urban cities and challenging the legitimacy of the state and exposing its incompetence.  
 
Whilst experiences of forced migration, living in exile, and the creeping significance of national 
documentation should not be discounted, most Afghans (the majority of whom have been living 
in Pakistan for 20-34 years) live similar lives with Pakistanis in everyday urban life. Aside from 
the language of “security”, the state does have other legal responsibilities and expectations 
towards both Afghans in Pakistan (influenced by the international refugee regime) and its own 
“national”/“natural” (Malkki 1995) Pakistani citizens. However, often the state (and in some 
cases refugee regime) is unable to distribute the material goods it claims responsibility for. When 
the urban poor – be they Afghan or Pakistani – try to get access to utilities, shelter, and social 
security in day-to-day life, the Pakistani state, and in some cases refugee regime, appears 
incompetent to both citizens and non-citizens alike. The state has limited interest in and capacity for 
the social security of citizens, or indeed refugees, and certainly not for illegal migrants. In the 
informal housing settlements I explored in Ishtiaq Goth, Saeed Goth, Gul Kalay, the informal 
refugee camp of Afghan Camp (Chapter 5), other informal settlements, and even regulated 
housing areas, Afghans and Pakistanis are living, working, and engaged in similar everyday 
struggles.  
 
Throughout this thesis Afghan and Pakistani narratives express this shared space between 
Afghan and Pakistani lives using a language of “dehumanisation” and “self-humanisation”. This 
research has proposed that all human beings possess, to a degree, an inherent value within them, 
described either as humanness, a humanised life, or human dignity. This value is shaped by an 
equal vulnerability of life and a reality of death that touches all human life. However, it has also 
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understood that “humanness” (human dignity and a humanised life) must be considered as a 
potential rather than an inviolable fact (which is made clear by the very fact that a human life can 
be dehumanised), or in the very least it can be said that different levels of “humanness” are 
possible. The question of whether we are ever fully able to unfold this potential (however we see 
fit) is contingent upon the concrete circumstances of our life. In this research the failures of the 
state are explained and expressed as being dehumanising because they stunt the conditions in 
which even basic levels of a life with human dignity can be lived - for both Afghans and 
Pakistanis. Very often this denial is a result of the ways in which state actors recognise, 
misrecognise, and exclude Afghan and Pakistani human lives as either “units” to be managed, 
“exemplary victims”, the “dangerous Afghan/Pashtun”, or the “undeserving poor”. Water, 
shelter, food, social security, freedom from violence, and other basic rights are not provided by 
the state (and in some cases the refugee regime), either by design or incompetence, or both. But 
these are not just “service delivery” failures, they are also understood and expressed as actions 
that ignore the status of their (Afghan or Pakistani) humanity. Indeed at various junctures one 
can even move beyond my argument regarding Afghan and Pakistani similarities as both 
experience a shared reality (and death) with animals. In Afghan Camp, Sumaiya died in childbirth 
after having been pushed around the camp like a “janwar” (animal). In Ishtiaq Goth, Rubab and 
her family live with cow faeces and flies all around (Chapter 5). Here, Afghans and Pakistanis 
expressed that their human lives were not recognised as having distinctly “human” qualities as 
they were not provided with the conditions in which the potentials of human life could be 
practiced because of state and refugee regime failures. 
 
In other cases, Afghan and Pakistani lives are understood as having been constructed as sub-
human lives by officialdom through processes of objectification, being reduced to automaton-
like units – free from human agency and qualities – and only to be used for politically 
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instrumentalist purposes. In Chapter 3 this thesis has shown that during the Soviet-Afghan War 
the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others fawned over every detail of Afghan lives in 
Pakistan. From massive oil tankers being filled with milk, to millions of pencil sharpeners no 
detail was spared. Yet as soon as the Soviet Union had been defeated, Afghan lives were 
forgotten. Perhaps this is because they were never really understood as “human lives” to begin 
with (Butler 2010:xix) but simply objects to be used and “thrown away in an instant” (interview: 
Maulana Jamil ur Rehman). Critically, this abuse and lowering of status and type of humiliation 
has not been forgotten by Afghans living in Pakistan. Similarly, many Pakistanis understand that 
they are viewed as objects to be used for wider political objectives – winning an election or 
winning the “hearts and minds” of people in the context of an on-going counter-insurgency 
campaign. (Inadvertently, again, these cases reveal how “identity” often only matters in the 
context of state “security” and geopolitical considerations.) Further, in other instances, both 
Afghan and Pakistan lives are denied agency as they are constructed as “exemplary” victims and 
allowed to occupy limited definitions of helplessness and need.   
 
For some lives within this shared “dehumanising” space, this research has shown the situation is 
markedly worse. There are grades of difference in the levels of devaluation experienced. To be 
an Afghan in Pakistan is not exactly the same as being a Pakistani in Pakistan. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, nationalist and ethnic lenses of exclusion applied by local state and political 
representatives make the experience of everyday life even worse for some. Afghans and areas 
with high Afghan demographics are stereotyped as dens of crime and “terror by state actors and 
local political representatives. Afghan areas are “ghettoised” (Ron 2003) through forms of urban 
ethnocracy (Yiftachel and Yakobi 2004; Yiftachel 2006). Here, Afghan lives are devalued - not 
just because they are not provided with the material resources which could help to improve the 
quality of life (i.e. with water) but also because they are not recognised as lives that are worthy of 
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having access to these goods in the same way as other Pakistani lives are. Many Afghans 
understood their position in urban Pakistan as being neglected because “[We’re] Afghan... that’s 
why” (Habibullah, KHA13). However, in Karachi, Pakistani Pashtun areas also experience forms 
of urban ethnocracy. Pakistani Pashtuns in Karachi are stereotyped and “ghettoised”. In this 
study, Pakistani Pashtuns such as Hussain Ali (KHP51) explained their neglect through the lens 
of ethnic discrimination. Here, Pakistani Pashtun-dominant areas in Karachi compared to non-
Pashtun areas are constructed as less human and thus less worthy of having access to the 
material goods which could help improve the conditions of their lives.  
 
This thesis, however, has shown that Afghans and Pakistanis do not silently accept these various 
forms of devaluation. Afghans and Pakistanis stubbornly persist, survive, and flourish, turning to 
solidarity networks - using friends, family, and even anonymous neighbours - to redistribute 
material and non-material goods so as to “self-humanise” their lives. Even in circumstances in 
which the value of a human life is attacked, under threat, or humiliated it is possible to assume 
personal responsibility (Pollman 2010) and contextualise actions to maintain a humanised life - 
personal agency, responsibility, self-respect, and formulations of self-worth ensure that this is the 
case. This push for non-material redistribution was captured in the narratives and expressions 
analysed in this research, to illuminate and emphasise that informal political action is not just 
about material redistribution but also non-material redistribution in juxtaposition to what was 
explained to be a dehumanising Pakistani state.  
 
Importantly throughout this thesis various forms of social capital, social networks, and human 
relationships and their outputs were shown to be more trusted than state actors and bureaucratic 
processes. The case studies discussed in Chapter 5 showed how fellowships of charity emerged 
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in Afghan and Pakistani neighbourhoods to enable residents to redistribute water, shelter, basic 
infrastructure, and security. In Chapter 6 the family appeared as a central force that is able to 
redistribute incomes, food, shelter, and, thus, humanise lives. Urban lives, Afghan and Pakistani, 
are working and pushing for a material and non-material redistribution side by side. Our 
obsession with legal, and indeed ethnic distinctions, does not capture the ground level lived 
realities of the complex, multi-national, urban lives in Peshawar and Karachi. These shared cross 
cutting spaces are not an alternative space of citizenship; they simply reflect an alternative way of 
belonging in Pakistan – an alternative that is also an important site of politics. 
 
This thesis has, however, also illuminated that solidarity networks must rely on hybrid formal-
informal actors and strategies to secure material and non-material goods. Intermediaries, 
middlemen, landholders, other patrons, or state actors acting in informal or illegal ways are a 
central component of this informal labyrinth - or rather formal-informal labyrinth - in urban 
Pakistan.  Importantly, then, by looking at the shared lives of Afghan and Pakistanis, this 
research also reveals how the state functions in Pakistan. Whilst the Westaphalian model 
constructs the state and accompanying forms of absolute sovereignty as solid fact in Pakistan – 
and indeed in other contexts - this is not how things work.  This questioning of absolute 
sovereignty of course supports the idea proposed by Thomas Blom Hansen (2005) and others 
that sovereign powers are always required to continually reassert their authority and legitimacy via 
“performances” of sovereignty. However, in Pakistan it is also a reflection of the limited reach 
and capacity of the state – indeed, a limited capacity that means the Pakistani state is unable to 
engage in these required performances. Pakistan’s colonial inheritance and history of weak 
institutional development has influenced state “strength”, or lack of (Jalal 1990). In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, in Pakistan the military dominates the state – with some arguing the military is 
the state. This military domination has been the result of the Pakistan’s hyper-Realist sensitivity 
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to regional geopolitical security, which, given Pakistan’s geostrategic significance in Central and 
South Asia, has continually been reinforced by global superpowers - most recently with the US-
led war in Afghanistan, and prior to that with the Soviet-Afghan War. Further, the fallouts from 
enforced structural readjustment programmes of the 1990s and state-led liberalisation of the 
2000s have led some commentators to refer to Pakistan as a “neo-liberal security state” (Toor 
2011) that is simply unable to deliver the goods its citizens and other members are due. Critically 
then, the geostrategic importance of Pakistan and its peripheral position in the international 
economy is central in understanding political developments within the state. If agency is limited in 
Pakistan, it is not only limited for Afghan refugees and Pakistani citizens but also for the state 
itself.  
 
This neoliberal security state is unable to deliver to citizens and non-citizens the goods they are 
due - indeed, instead it prioritises security, geopolitics, and liberalisation, and is encouraged to do 
so by global hegemons (the USA, the IMF, and so on). These factors creates an impetus for the 
state itself to accept and even promote solidarity networks and formal-informal navigation 
strategies, as they are considered an effective alternative for maintaining the state (and at local 
levels also offer sites of opportunity and profit). “Informality” in Pakistan is thus a part of how 
the state functions – albeit an unacknowledged part. In Peshawar and Karachi the state simply 
lacks the capacity and will to meet the social security needs of the cities populations, such as the 
massive housing demands of rising populations from natural birth rates, rural-urban migration 
and forced displacements – for example from 2010 and 2011 floods or military and drone 
campaigns in FATA. This explains why the informal housing settlements that are present around 
the Ring Road in Peshawar, or off from Sohrab Goth, or North Karachi - built by Afghan and 
Pakistani solidarity networks and/or middlemen or landholders -, or informal utility access, or 
informal remittances, and the other examples discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 reflect an important, 
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albeit informal, processes of “urban management”. For Pakistan, as for many other states, 
informal spaces of action are crucial in understanding how the state is “maintained”.  
 
However, whilst some commentators propose that informality should encourage a new way of 
conceptualising and problematizing “the state”, this research has repeatedly demonstrated that 
these formal-informal strategies are deeply contradictory to the state and work to undermine it. 
Even when informality appears to be substitutive for the state, the benefits of these substitutions 
only applies for the very short-term, and even then the benefits are not always effective and are 
often “half-baked”. For Afghans and Pakistanis, the lived experiences of informal actions are far 
from being fully empowering. Unlike the “civil society” organisations promoted by the 
Musharraf regime, informal structures and strategies are not legal in any sense and have limited, 
or at least ad hoc, regulation. This means in physical terms the informal expansion of urban 
settlements is unsafe, unsustainable, and often dangerous. In this research, the water in Afghan 
Camp is unclean, and informal housing structures across both Karachi and Peshawar frequently 
fall down in the rain (Chapters 5 and 6). Without clear regulation - or with legal enforcement 
being prevented or violated via the protection (or neglect) of middlemen, landholders, and 
officials - hazardous informal housing areas now dominate Peshawar and Karachi. In Karachi 
and Peshawar densely packed housing areas with an accumulation of waste materials because of 
poor sanitation and refuse collection result in hazardous living conditions shared by urban poor 
Afghans, Pakistanis, and other regional migrants (Bangladeshis, Somalis, Burmese and so on). 
Walking up the stairs of Hassan Bilal’s informally constructed home (Chapter 6) or walking 
through Gul Kalay (Chapter 5) is, in a word, risky. Whilst survival, persistence, and agency can 
be applauded these cannot be read as a satisfactory source of providing the condition in which the 
potentials of human life can be practiced. Real and pressing challenges remain.  
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Further, everyday acts of solidarity and the formal-informal nexus also have a direct political 
impact on the state. As this research has demonstrated, at a macro-level, informal processes are 
understood by officials as maintaining the state. However, at a micro-level they offer official 
actors a chance of profit and opportunity, and if the surface is scratched a little deeper it is clear 
that the different ways in which the state enables and tolerates informal actions actually reveal a 
deeply contradictory form of “maintenance”. The state enables and tolerates informal actions as 
either an alternative way of enforcing law (albeit with petty cases of corruption), to 
prevent/violate laws, or, as a consequence of no clear rules being in place. However, in all of 
these cases the state is undermined - even when informal actions reflect an alternative way of 
enforcing law or maintaining the state. This is because these actions undermine the norm of 
legality and create new norms of informality – or illegality –, and they expose the ambiguous, 
contradictory, and incompetent nature of the state. Herein lie the political impacts of urban poor 
(Afghan and Pakistani) agency and the accompanying formal-informal nexus in Karachi and 
Peshawar. Small, ordinary acts, repeated time and time again are powerfully and physically 
transforming urban landscapes in unsustainable ways, legal ways of working are delegitimized, 
and, furthermore, alternative sources of power are being created and reinforced.  
 
Inadvertently the formal-informal nexus creates multiple pockets of sovereignty across both 
cities that are not loyal to the state. Mini lawmakers and “kings” with their own orders are being 
created and/or reinforced. In addition, as local official actors – embodiments of the state – act in 
corrupted ways, the trust of the state is lost. Local middlemen, landholders, and other patrons 
are not held to the same moral standards as the “protectors of the nation”, thus, even if they (the 
patrons) act in corrupted ways, their reputation and legitimacy is less affected than that of state 
actors. Thus, whilst informal political actions appear to maintain the state this is almost certainly 
an illusion. At the exact same time as formal-informal actions appear to be maintaining the state 
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they are undermining its strength and legitimacy. Even if the idea of absolute sovereignty can 
never be fully practiced, a state is still expected, both in the Weberian sense and, in this study, by 
local populations, to have a monopoly on sovereignty – but this appears not to be the case in 
Pakistan’s urban centres.  
 
If citizens or non-citizens want to get access to a material resource or rights the best chances of 
access these days are not the legal and official ways of working but informal ones. What can be 
said of a state in which legality holds limited significance, where there appears to be no rule of 
law? Or a state in which the distribution and protection of rights lie not with the state but 
alternatives? Or a state in which “citizenship” is seen as insignificant, irrelevant, and even 
devalued? Indeed, these processes help illuminate why the current administration of Asif Ali 
Zardari and the PPP is unable to exert its influence in many urban areas. As the state is unable to 
deliver rights and resources to citizens and non-citizens, citizens and non-citizens turn to 
solidarity networks and informal navigation strategies, which include middlemen, landholders, or 
corrupt officials, to get access to goods. Informal structures and strategies are considered more 
effective and trusted than legal ways of working (“everything is possible here” – Chapter 4). The 
normalisation of informality, a disregard for law, and the deep delegitimization of the state 
means the state is not to be trusted; instead, alternative sovereigns or solidarity networks which 
take its place are. And whilst this has not been the remit of this study, it is clear that the violence 
and political contests in Karachi and Peshawar, which the current state is unable to manage, are 
closely related to these norms of informality.  
 
If the Pakistani state is serious about the long-term development of its urban centres (and rural 
areas) its ability to dispense justice and rights to the people must transcend ad-hoc norms of 
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informality. And crucially, within the wider global political context, it must be given the chance 
to do so. However, in the security state of Pakistan and in the context of global political and 
military conflicts, whether Pakistan will be able to transcend from a state only concerned about 
state security to a state concerned about social security, and, thus, not reliant on ad-hoc forms of 
informality, remains a deep challenge. Indeed, broader questions emerge when the significance of 
enumeration and identity cards is analysed. Why and how is it that a state that is unable to 
distribute basic rights (water, utilities, shelter, education, and healthcare) to citizens, one of the 
most intensely enumerated states in the world – enumerating not only its own citizens but 
extending this practice to non-citizens. Here, the wider global geopolitical climate and the 
politics of neo-imperialism appear to have a significant hand. A racialised “Northern” quest to 
“manage” globalising migration patterns and the dangerous “Muslim body” (Rana 2011), the 
globalised and privatised security industry, and the continued role of Pakistan as a key 
geostrategic state – currently in the war in Afghanistan and FATA - are crucial.  
 
The increased enumeration that Afghans and Pakistanis face in Pakistan demonstrates that 
“identity” and “legality” only matters in the context of geopolitics, borders, and a 
counterinsurgency in FATA and Afghanistan, masked in the language of “security concerns” 
(real and constructed), and not for issues of social security. Even here “identity” and “legality” is 
not empowering. It is just a computerised identity card to help you, or inhibit you, from passing 
through a check-post. It does not result in a delivery of rights. However, for Afghans in Pakistan, 
unlike for the Pakistanis this study engaged with, identity cards also act as an active site of 
disempowerment. This research has concluded by revealing that there is a limit to the shared 
lives of Afghans and Pakistanis, which is most visceral in the context of “security”. Afghan 
bodies in Pakistan are constructed and understood and mobile embodiments of a 
walking/talking dangerous “national” frontier. In a state that prioritises state security, borders, 
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and geopolitics, this creates specific forms of violence – practices of harassment and humiliation 
– which are played out on the bodies of Afghans in daily life. In Pakistan, Afghan bodies become 
sites in which shifting geopolitical objectives of the state are practiced. Unlike previous years, 
namely the period of the Soviet-Afghan War and even the early 1990s, when Afghans were 
welcomed in Pakistan, since 2001, the Pakistani state has continually attempted to emphasise a 
line of distinction between Afghans and Pakistanis – in territorial and population terms. Mass 
arrests, everyday forms of harassment, and deportations via discipline tactics are used to 
“encourage” Afghan bodies to leave Pakistan. Afghans are no longer welcome in Pakistan as the 
Pakistani state is desperate to be understood as the “Good Muslim” state (Mamdani 2004) in its 
alliance with the USA – a role and alliance that is justified within Pakistan as a preventative 
measure against a similar invasion and occupation to the one that took place on the “Bad Muslim” 
(ibid) Afghan state by the USA and its other neo-imperial allies (see Musharraf 2008).  
 
This post-2001 targeting of Afghans, however, is effectively creating resentful and mistrustful 
groups that are a part of the state. These are wounds that are retained in the memory and 
consciousness of Afghans who, even if they not legally citizens, are active members of an 
important informal political space in Pakistan. This is the reality that the Pakistani state cannot 
refuse to address; it points to a future crisis point for the state. Again, through these processes of 
harassment and humiliation the Pakistani state and even the refugee regime do not remain 
unscathed. Most crucially, the Pakistani state is delegitimized and constructed as an unjust and 
un-trusted caricature. In this study it is the local official actor – an embodiment of the state –
who carries out acts of harassment and humiliation that is himself not recognised as being “fully 
human” and is in fact understood as inhumane by Afghans and Pakistanis in their shared urban 
spaces, a labelling which transfers directly onto the state itself. In combination with the state’s 
failings, incompetence, and corrupt presence in everyday urban life, which are clear to Afghans 
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and Pakistanis alike, it is, thus, the Pakistani state which is the Dehumanised and even Inhumane 
State – not the Afghan and Pakistani lives which live in a dehumanised state of affairs because of 
misrecognition, exclusion, and a denial of the conditions for human survival and flourishing.  
 
If the current political order in Pakistan (and beyond) is a socially constructed one, as I 
understand it is, in the spirit of understanding that our worlds can be made, unmade, and remade, 
this research urges a reconsideration of the exclusionary and stunting frameworks that are being 
applied by the Pakistani state on Afghans and Pakistanis, which are also reinforced by 
asymmetrical international power balances and global hegemons. Afghans are an integral part of 
the Pakistani state as are urban poor Pakistanis. The embodied experiences of state failures and 
violations are retained in the memories and consciousness of Afghan and Pakistani lives, 
however, these memories are not passive (see Fassin 2007). They can be mobilised, 
reappropriated, and reinterpreted. Thus, all is not lost for the Pakistani state and the lives within 
it. However, in order for better memories to be created and old wounds to be healed there is a 
need to push for a more inclusive form of politics, which is concerned – aside from lip service – 
to the lived realities of the urban poor in Pakistan, and recognises the value of both Afghan and 
Pakistani lives. Pakistanis and Afghans, in their quest for recognition of their “humanity”, 
demonstrate the potentials of urban centres like Karachi and Peshawar and demonstrate an 
active quest for flourishing, survival, and a change from the current political order. These 
potentials, however, can only be achieved if the Pakistani state is able to emerge beyond its 
constructed role as a “key” geostrategic state for global hegemons, if the Pakistani state, political 
leaders, and institutions are recognised as being effective, and ultimately, if the Pakistani state is 
able to provide urban centres and people the regulation which they so need.   
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: All Interviews Sampling Summaries 
Note these numbers do not include all ethnographic observations and interactions.   
 
Table 1: Summary of all respondents, Peshawar & Karachi 
Summary of all respondents, Peshawar & Karachi  
  
Total as a 
number  
Total as a % of all 
interviews 
completed  
Total as a % of all 
Afghan/Pakistani 
interviews 
Peshawar & Karachi 385 100.00% NA 
Afghans  230 59.74% 100.00% 
Pakistanis 155 40.26% 100.00% 
        
Afghan Women  72 18.70% 31.30% 
Afghan Men  158 41.04% 68.70% 
        
Pakistani Women  64 16.62% 41.29% 
Pakistani Men  91 23.64% 58.71% 
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Table 2: Summary of all respondents – city breakdown  
Summary of all respondents – city breakdown 
  
Total as a 
number  
Total as a % 
of all (385) 
interviews 
Total as a % of 
all interviews 
for the city 
Total as a % 
of all Afghan 
/ Pakistanis 
interviews in 
the city  
Peshawar   194 50.39% 100.00% NA 
Afghans  117 30.39% 60.31% 100.00% 
Pakistanis 77 20.00% 39.69% 100.00% 
  
Afghan Women  25 6.49% 12.89% 21.37% 
Afghan Men  92 23.90% 47.42% 78.63% 
  
Pakistani Women  17 4.42% 8.76% 22.08% 
Pakistani Men  60 15.58% 30.93% 77.92% 
  
Karachi 191 49.61% 100.00% NA 
Afghans  113 29.35% 59.16% 100.00% 
Pakistanis 78 20.26% 40.84% 100.00% 
          
Afghan Women  47 12.21% 24.61% 41.59% 
Afghan Men  66 17.14% 34.55% 58.41% 
          
Pakistani Women  47 12.21% 24.61% 60.26% 
Pakistani Men  31 8.05% 16.23% 39.74% 
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Table 3: Summary of Afghan respondents by ethnicity, Peshawar & Karachi 
 
 
Table 4: Summary of Afghan respondents by ethnicity – city breakdown 
Summary of Afghan respondents by ethnicity - city breakdown 
 
Total Afghans, Peshawar 117 
Ethnicity  Total as a number  
Total as a % of all Afghans 
interviewed, Peshawar 
Farsiwan  2 1.71% 
Gujjar  1 0.85% 
Pashtun 90 76.92% 
Tajik 17 14.53% 
Turkmen 3 2.56% 
Unknown 4 3.42% 
  
Total Afghans, Karachi  113 
Ethnicity  Total as a number  
Total as a % of all Afghans 
interviewed, Karachi 
Hazara 25 22.12% 
Mughal  2 1.77% 
Pashtun 45 39.82% 
Tajik 19 16.81% 
Turkmen 4 3.54% 
Uzbek  18 15.93% 
Summary of Afghan respondents by ethnicity, Peshawar & Karachi  
Total Afghans, Peshawar 
& Karachi 
230 
Ethnicity* Total as a number  
Total as a % of all Afghans 
interviewed 
Hazara 25 10.87% 
Farsiwan  2 0.87% 
Gujjar  1 0.43% 
Mughal  2 0.87% 
Pashtun 135 58.70% 
Tajik 36 15.65% 
Turkmen 7 3.04% 
Uzbek  18 7.83% 
Unknown 4 1.74% 
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Table 5: Summary of Pakistani respondents by ethnicity, Peshawar & Karachi 
Summary of Pakistani respondents by ethnicity, Peshawar & Karachi 
Total Pakistanis, 
Peshawar & Karachi 
155   
Ethnicity  Total as a number  
Total as a % of all 
Pakistanis interviewed 
Baloch 13 8.39% 
Hindko 4 2.58% 
Kashmiri 5 3.23% 
Muhajir (Pakistani) 2 1.29% 
Pashtun  104 67.10% 
Punjabi 3 1.94% 
Saraiki 6 3.87% 
Sindhi 16 10.32% 
Unknown 2 1.29% 
 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of Pakistani respondents by ethnicity - city breakdown 
 
Summary of Pakistani respondents by ethnicity - city breakdown 
 
Total Pakistanis, 
Peshawar 
77 
Respondents by ethnicity  Total as a number  
Total as a % of all 
Pakistanis interviewed, 
Peshawar 
Hindko 4 5.19% 
Pashtun 73 94.81% 
  
Total Pakistanis, Karachi 78 
Respondents by ethnicity  Total as a number  
Total as a % of all 
Pakistanis interviewed, 
Karachi 
Baloch 13 16.67% 
Kashmiri 5 6.41% 
Muhajir (Pakistani) 2 2.56% 
Pashtun  31 39.74% 
Punjabi 3 3.85% 
Saraiki 6 7.69% 
Sindhi 16 20.51% 
Unknown 2 2.56% 
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Appendix 2: Quick Reference of all Interviews Used in Thesis   
Arranged alphabetically by forename. For further details see Appendix 3. 
 
Note all names provided are alias names. No real names are provided for reasons of 
confidentiality and security.  
Aasiya (KHP9) 
Abdul Mateen (KHA69) 
Abdul Qais, Maulana (KHA71) 
Abdul Sattar (PXP70) 
Abdul Wahid (PXA1) 
Abdus Samad (KHA8) 
Abu Haider (PXA51) 
Abu Zakariya (PXA54) 
Afsandar Ali (PXA36) 
Aftab Khalil (KHP52) 
Ahmed Bilal (KHP6) 
Anwar Khan (KHP50) 
Asmat Afridi (PXP27) 
Atef (KHA29) 
Aurangzeb (PXA58) 
Aziz, Hajji (PXA59) 
Behrooz (KHA60) 
Bilquis (PXP46) 
Burhanuddin (PXA24) 
Changeiz (KHA14) 
Dilawar Noor (KHA36) 
Ejaz (PXA41.B) 
Fahmeeda Qazeemi (KHP42) 
Fariduddin (PXP52) 
Farukh, Hajji (PXA56) 
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Ferdous (KHA26) 
Fereydoun (KHA57) 
Ferhan Rashid (PXA19) 
Ghazaleh Jan (PXA91) 
Gul Nabi (KHP41.B) 
Gulshaan (KHA13.B) 
Gulzar Amin (KHA56) 
Gulzar (KHA19) 
Habibullah (KHA13) 
Hafsah Jan (PXP70.B) 
Hamza Noor (PXA65) 
Hassan Bilal (KHP7) 
Hayyat, Hajji (KHA71) 
Hidayatullah (KHA14) 
Hussain Ali (KHP51) 
Ibrahim Hafiz (PXA41) 
Ishtiaq Mohammad (KHP35) 
Ismail Ibrahimi (PXA55) 
Jahangir (KHA66) 
Jalaludin (KHA62.C) 
Jamshed Ali (PXA57) 
Janat Gul (PXP5) 
Jan Mohammad (PXA31.B) 
Jibran (KHA1.B) 
Junaid Tareen(PXA104) 
Khadijah (KHP12.B) 
Khairuddin, Hajji (PXA71) 
Khizar (PXA81.B) 
Mahfouz, Hajji (KHA6) 
Malalai Khattak (PXP46) 
Mansoor (KHA65) 
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Maqsood (KHP37) 
Maryam Jan (PXA32.B) 
Mehboob (PXP12) 
Mehrban Aminullah (PXP4) 
Mezghan (PXA38) 
Mohammad Imran (PXA76) 
Mudassir (PXA38) 
Murtaza (PXP8) 
Mustafa Habib (KHA47) 
Naseeb Khan (PXA52) 
Nawar Saleh (PXA99) 
Nilofar (KHP44) 
Nooruddin Akhtar (PXA61) 
Nowroz Beg (PXA35) 
Omar Tariq (KHP36) 
Orzala (KHP12) 
Rafique (KHA58) 
Raheemullah (PXA53) 
Rameez Ali (LNA1) 
Rastin (KHA8) 
Rostam (KHA68) 
Rubab (KHP38) 
Ruqaiya (PXP70.C) 
Sameena Haroon (KHP18)  
Salahuddin (KHA62.D) 
Saleem (KHA17) 
Sarfaraz Ali (PXP37) 
Shahid Haque (KHUR1) 
Shahnaz Nabi (KHP41) 
Shaqeel (KHA16) 
Shawana Khan (PXP22) 
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Shin Gul (PXA36.B) 
Sibghatullah (PXA42) 
Sohrab Din (KHA67) 
Soroush, Hajji (KHA 72) 
Spozmai (PXA44) 
Suleiyman (PXA22) 
Sundus Malikyar (PXP61.B) 
Tabassum Khala (KHP39) 
Tariq (KHA18) 
Tooraj, Hajji (KHA73)  
Waqqas (PXP9) 
Wazir Gul (PXA5) 
Yahya Din (PXP101) 
Yaqoob Gul (KHA9) 
Yusuf Khan (KHP50.B) 
Zareena (KHA41) 
Zalmay (KHA1) 
Zeenat (KHP43) 
Ziauddin (PXA60) 
Zmaray Khan and family (KHA61) 
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Appendix 3: All Interviews Details 
All interviews completed during fieldwork are listed in the table to follow. The table does not 
include additional ethnographic observations, discussions, and interactions (although some 
interviewees were a part of ethnographic observations). 
 
Interviews were completed in a semi-structured and informal format. Forms and questionnaires 
were not used during the interview process, although as Appendix 5 shows, there were a range of 
questions I covered during the interview process. Before the table is provided details about the 
categories used are explained. 
 
ID Reference  
KH: Karachi. 
PX: Peshawar. 
LN: London. 
A: Afghan. 
P: Pakistani. 
Number: Interview reference number. 
*Alias name: If interview directly used in thesis, alias name provided. 
Letter following number: same family member. 
Examples 
1. PXA10: Interview in Peshawar, interview with an Afghan, interview reference 
number 10. 
2. PXA10.B: Interview in Peshawar, interview with an Afghan, interview reference 
number 10.B; household family member of interview reference number 10. 
3. KHP7 
Hassan Bilal 
Interview in Karachi Peshawar, interview with a Pakistani, interview reference 
number 10.B; household family member of interview reference; Hassan Bilal is the 
alias name used in the thesis. 
UR: Unrecorded 
 
Sex 
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M: Male. 
F: Female. 
 
Age 
Ages were recorded either by asking respondent / relative of their age. In some cases exact ages 
were not given (approximates were given by the respondent). 
 
Interview Type 
GI: Group Interview, completed with 2 or more respondents. 
1:1: One-on-one interview. 
L: Long interview, i.e. over 30 minutes 
B: Brief interview ranging from 10-25 minutes 
R: Repeat interviews conducted 2 or more times. 
 
Place of Origin (Afghanistan / Pakistan) 
Afghanistan origin: Applies only to Afghans. Details of the province of origin are provided. 
 
Pakistan origin: Applies only to Pakistanis. 
Note on Pakistani interviews in Peshawar 
For respondents originating from within Peshawar details of the area / village in 
Peshawar are provided. For respondent originating from outside of Peshawar details are 
provided by city or district. 
Note on Pakistani interviews in Karachi 
Province of origin / district of origin within Pakistan are provided.   
 
Date of first migration  
For Afghans, the date of first migration means the date of first migration to Pakistan (not the 
city they currently live in). The date is either for the individual in question or if the individual was 
born in Pakistan for his/her family. The date of first migration (and not second or third) is used 
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as a number of Afghans migrated back to Afghanistan only to resettle in Pakistan or currently 
exist in transnational lives.  
 
For Pakistanis, the date of first migration means date of first migration to the city in question (i.e. 
Karachi or Peshawar). For Pakistanis that are “native” to the city, i.e. ancestral heritage and links 
are within the expanding modern city, his question does not apply. For example, in Peshawar as 
the city has expanded many rural areas has become a part of the city. When this is the case, 
“Origin” appears. 
 
Origin.: Originates from area within the city.  
Unk.: Unknown place of origin. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the 
interview.  
 
Residence in Peshawar or Karachi 
Notes area of residence in Peshawar or Karachi during interview. During interviews specific 
details (addresses) were provided or noted down. However, in this appendix only general area 
names have been provided for reasons of security / sensitivity.  
Unk.: Unknown residence. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the interview.  
 
Housing type 
Owned: Respondent / family member owns the house. 
Rented: Respondent / family member rents the house. 
UNHCR RTV: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Refugee Tented Village. The 
RTV is recognised by UNHCR, CAR, and the GOP and has the legal status of RTV. The land is 
owned either by the GOP or leased to the GOP by a Pakistani landholder. In most cases RTV 
inhabitants should not pay rent. In some cases landholders now rent the land out to new settlers 
(including Pakistanis) – if this was the case a note has been made in the column. 
UH: Unregulated housing. This includes housing that is constructed with no legal recognition or 
quasi-legal recognition by the state, i.e. when informal housing areas are waiting to get upgraded 
to a regulated area. This includes katche ghar (houses made from mud) and squatter settlements 
on government or private land.  
RH: Regulated Housing. This includes housing that is constructed in regulated housing areas and 
housing that has legal status and recognition by the state and conforms (on the whole) to legal 
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building requirements. However, even in these cases, houses may be built without meeting legal 
building requirements. 
Squatter: The housing area was under a “live” / current land contestation during fieldwork. 
Occupants were brought in, usually by middlemen, as a wider strategy to build up the area. In 
these cases the land/ housing is either free, rented, or informally sold by the middleman to 
occupants. Notes of free / rented / ownership are made when relevant. 
IRTV: Informal RTV. The RTV is informally recognised by UNHCR, CAR, and the GOP as an 
RTV; however, this recognition is not legally noted.  
Madrassa free: Free housing for madrassa students. 
Nomad: No fixed abode. 
GOP Colony: Government housing provided to government workers, which is rented, free or 
owned. 
Unk.: Unknown housing type. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the 
interview. 
 
Ethnicity  
*Note on Afghan and Pakistani ethnicities listed: This is not an exhaustive list of all Afghan and 
Pakistani ethnic groups. The ethnic groups were self-defined. 
The determination of “ethnicity” was made by asking questions on language, mother tongue, 
qaum/qabile. 
Afghan ethnic groups listed 
Hazara 
Gujjar 
Farsiwan 
Mughal 
Pashtun 
Pashtun (Arab) 
Tajik 
Turkmen 
Uzbek 
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Unk.: Unknown ethnicity. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the 
interview. 
 
Pakistani ethnic groups listed 
Baloch 
Hindko 
Kashmiri 
Muhjair (Urdu-speaking) 
Pashtun 
Pashtun (Afghan) 
Punjabi 
Saraiki 
Sindhi 
Sindhi-Memon  
Unk.: Unknown ethnicity. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the 
interview. 
 
Occupation 
Listed occupations 
Beautician 
Daily labour: This included rural daily labour (fieldwork), construction,  
Disabled  
Doctor 
Domestic: Housewife or household duties, this includes unmarried women (daughters, 
children) who have key domestic production duties. 
Domestic servant 
Driver: private car/ rickshaw/ taxi 
Elderly 
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Factory worker: Factory work, which is different from daily labour as some contracts 
may be signed 
Govt. employee: Government worker  
Handicrafts  
Imam 
Informal: Bottle collector, rag picker, recycling (refrigerators) 
IT Consultant  
Landowner 
Land.: profit brought in from other lands 
Madrassa student 
Mechanic  
Middleman 
NGO Worker 
Other 
Painter / artist 
Political profession 
Property developer: formal 
Retail: Formal retail (mall) store worker 
Retired 
School director 
Shepherd 
Shop keeper: informal store owner / manager  
Street vendor (Informal): additional details provided 
Student 
Teacher: This included primary, secondary levels of education; as well as principals/ vice-
principals of schools (distinctions are noted). 
Trade/ Business: Involved in their own trade / business. In some cases details of specific 
trade are provided (i.e. trucking, transport of goods) 
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Unemployed 
Unk.: Unknown occupation. The question was either unasked or unanswered during the 
interview. 
Web designer 
Widowed 
Wholesaler: honey/ fabric/ fruit/ vegetables  
 
Identity Card 
POR: Afghan Citizen Proof of Registration Card (Afghan only) 
CNIC: This includes both the computerised national identity card (CNIC) and older National 
Identity card (Pakistani and Afghan). 
None: No identity cards were possessed by respondent. 
Unk.: Unknown of respondent possesses an identity card or not. The question was either 
unasked or unanswered during the interview. 
 
Police harassment  
Y: Yes 
N: No 
Harassment includes: unwarranted verbal and/ or physical abuse, arrest, detention, been forced 
to pay a bribe, deportation, police/ security raids in housing areas, repeated stop and searches 
(aside from routine check-post policing). Interviewees usually responded to these instances 
specifically occurring by the police forces, although in some cases complaint against other 
security forces (intelligence officers, military personnel) were also made. Harassment was either 
experienced directly on the respondent or their lives were impacted by these forms of police 
harassment as a family member harassed. For example, a wife whose husband was repeatedly 
arrested is equally impacted by police harassment even if she was not arrested.  
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PXA1 
Abdul 
Wahid  
M 27 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Badakhshan  1985 University 
Town  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Teacher; 
student 
POR Y 
PXA2 M 24 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Kabul (City) 1979 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Teacher; 
student 
POR Y 
PXA3 M 48 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Kabul (City) 1983 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Farsi Teacher: 
principal  
POR Y 
PXA4 F 18 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Kabul (City) 1992 Unk.  Rented: 
AP 
Pashtun  Student  POR  N 
PXA5 
Wazir Gul 
M 50 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1979 Meera 
Kachori 
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Daily labour POR Y 
PXA6 F 48 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1979 Meera 
Kachori 
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Daily labour POR N 
PXA7 M 50 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Nangarhar 1979 GT Road Unk.  Pashtun Trade/busn: 
trucking 
POR Y 
PXA8 M 43 GI (L) Nangarhar 1979 GT Road Unk.  Pashtun Trade/busn: 
trucking 
POR Y 
PXA9 M 32 GI (L) Nangarhar 1979 GT Road Unk.  Pashtun Trade/busn: 
trucking 
POR Y 
PXA10 M 50 GI (L) Nangarhar 1979 GT Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Mechanic  POR Y 
PXA10.B M 17 GI (L) Nangarhar 1979 GT Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Student POR Y 
PXA10.C M 47 GI (L) Nangarhar 1979 GT Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Mechanic  POR Y 
PXA11 M 38 GI (B) Kabul (City)  1990 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Retail  POR Y 
PXA11 M 42 GI (L) Kabul (City)  1990 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Retail  POR  Y 
PXA13 M 28 GI (L) Kabul 
(Province) 
1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Wholesalers: 
honey; land 
POR Y 
PXA13.B M 17 GI (B) Kabul 
(Province) 
1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Street vendor POR Y 
PXA14 M 60 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1978 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
& 
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Street vendor POR Y 
PXA15 M 53 1:1 (B) Kabul 
(Province) 
1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA16 M 53 1:1 (B) Kabul 
(Province) 
1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
& 
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA16.B F 60 1:1 (B) Kabul (City)  1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Kabul  Widowed; 
domestic  
POR N  
PXA17 F 40 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Teacher  POR N 
PXA18 F 73 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1991 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Elderly  POR N 
PXA19 
Ferhan 
Rashid 
M 25 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Factory 
worker 
POR Y 
PXA19.B F 24 1:1 (L) Kabul (City) 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Domestic  POR Y 
PXA20 
 
F 45 1:1 (L) Kabul 
(Province) 
1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Domestic  POR N 
PXA21 M 45 GI (B) Kabul (City) 1999 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Unk.  Daily labour POR Y 
PXA22 
Suleiyman 
M 28 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1996 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Factory 
labour 
POR Y 
PXA23 M 53 GI (B) Nangarhar 1979 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Taxi driver POR N 
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PXA23.B M 17 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1979 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Unemployed POR N 
PXA24 M 56 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1993 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Unemployed POR N 
PXA25 F 15 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1979 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Student  POR N 
PXA26 M 18 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1979 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Student  POR N 
PXA27 F 45 1:1 (B) Laghman 1996 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Domestic  POR N 
PXA28 M 50 1:1 (B) Laghman 1980 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA29 F 45 GI (B) Kabul (City) 1995 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Domestic  POR Y 
PXA30 M 35 GI (B) Kunduz 1983 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Web designer Visa Y 
PXA30.B M 26 GI (B) Kunduz 1983 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Student  Visa Y 
PXA31 M 35 GI (L &R) Kabul (City) 1993 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Painter; artist POR  Y 
PXA31.B 
Jan 
Mohammad 
M 60 GI (L &R) Kabul (City) 1993 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Business POR  Y 
PXA32 M 15 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1994 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Student  POR  N 
PXA32.B 
Maryam Jan 
F 50 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1994 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik  Domestic  POR  N 
PXA33 M 50  1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Unk.  Unk.  POR  N 
PXA35 
Nowroz Beg 
M 50  1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1980 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour None  N 
PXA36 
Afsandar Ali 
M 55 1:1 (L & R) Nangarhar 1992 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Retired None  Y 
PXA37 
Shin Gul 
M 16 1:1 (L & R) Nangarhar 1992 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Student  None  Y 
PXA38 
Mezghan 
F 38 GI (B) Nangarhar 1992 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Domestic  None  Y 
PXA38.2 M 15 GI (B) Nangarhar 1992 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Student  None  Y 
PXA39 M 15 GI (B) Laghman  1985 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour None  Y 
PXA40 M 60 GI (B) Nangarhar 1978 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Unemployed 
(disabled) 
None  N 
PXA41 
Ibrahim 
Hafiz 
M 50 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Nangarhar 1982 Nasir Bagh  Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun 
(Arab) 
Business POR  Y 
PXA41.B 
Ejaz 
M 30 GI (L) Nangarhar 1982 Nasir Bagh  Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun 
(Arab) 
Business POR Y 
PXA42 
Sibghatullah 
M 40 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1981 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour CNIC  Y 
PXA43 M 35 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1999 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA44 
Spozmai  
F 55 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1976 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Domestic  POR Y 
PXA45 M 55 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1979 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA46 M 19 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1978 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Student; daily 
labour  
POR Y 
PXA47 F 35 1:1 (B) Unk.  NA Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Tajik Domestic  NA Un
k.  
PXA48 M 45 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1995 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Wholesalers: 
vegetables 
POR Y 
PXA49 M 53 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1992 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Trade/busn: 
tin boxes 
POR Y 
PXA50 M 62 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1978 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Teacher 
(retired) 
POR Y 
PXA51 
Abu Haider 
M 40 1:1; GI (L & R) Nangarhar 1981 Kababian UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Trade  POR Y 
PXA52 
Naseeb 
Khan 
M 71 GI (L) Kunar  1981 Kababian UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Trade  POR Y 
PXA53 
Raheemullah  
M 70 GI (L) Nangarhar 1981 Kababian UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Elderly  POR Y 
PXA54 
Abu 
Zakariya 
M 66 1:1; GI (L & R) Paktia 1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Teacher: 
principal 
POR  Y 
PXA55 
Ismail 
Ibrahimi 
M 68 GI (L) Baghlan 1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Tajik Unk.  POR Y 
PXA56 
Hajji Farooq  
M 65 GI (L) Kabul 
(Province) 
1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Unk.  POR Y 
PXA57 
Jamshed Ali 
M 66 GI (L) Loghar 1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Unk.  POR Y 
PXA58 
Aurangzeb 
M 63 GI (L) Nangarhar 1979 Akora 
Khattak   
UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Unk.  POR Y 
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PXA59 
Engineer 
Aziz 
M 58 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Kunar 1978 Hajizai UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA60 
Ziauddin 
M 29 1:1; GI; (L) Nangarhar 1979 Tajabad Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Trade/busn: 
furniture 
CNIC; 
POR 
Y 
PXA61 
Nooruddin  
M 58 1:1 (L) Kunar  1983 Tajabad Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA62 M 55 GI (B) Nangarhar 1983 Tajabad Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA63 
Mudassir 
M 40 1:1; GI; (L) Nangarhar 1979 Gulabad Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Business  POR  Y 
PXA64 M 23 GI (B) Loghar 1983 Gulabad Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA65 
Hamza Noor 
M 68 GI (B) Nangarhar 1979 Nasir Bagh  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun 
(Arab) 
Retired POR  N 
PXA66 M 60 GI (B) Nangarhar 1979 Nasir Bagh  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR N 
PXA67 M 30 GI (B) Loghar 1978 Nasir Bagh  Unk.  Gujjar Shepherd None Y 
PXA68 M 63 1:1 (B & R) Nangarhar 1978 Kohat Road Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA69 M 60 1:1 (B) Nangarhar 1979 Androon 
Shehr 
Squatter Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA70 M 23 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun NGO worker POR Y 
PXA71 
Hajji 
Khairuddin  
M 60 1:1 (L & R) Paktia 1978 Hayatabad  Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Trade/busn. Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA72 M 55 1:1 (L & R) Kabul 
(Province) 
1981 Hayatabad  Unk.  Unk.  Unk.  Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA73 M NA 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1987 Hayatabad  Unk.  Pashtun Daily labour None  Y 
PXA74 M 28 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Kabul (City) 1991 Hayatabad  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Teacher; 
painter 
POR Y 
PXA75 F 27 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1989 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  NGO worker POR N 
PXA76 
Mohammad 
Imran 
M 45 1:1 (L) Nangarhar 1981 Kharosan UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Teacher: 
principal  
POR Un
k.  
PXA77 M 60 1:1 (L & R) Nangarhar 1984 Khazana  UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Unk.  POR Y 
PXA78 M 60 GI (B) Nangarhar 1984 Khazana  UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Unk.  POR Y 
PXA79 M 60 GI (B) Nangarhar 1980 Khazana  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Teacher: 
principal  
POR 
Card 
Y 
PXA80 M 45 1:1 (B) Kunar  1981 Khazana  UNHCR 
RTV 
Pashtun  Teacher POR  Y 
PXA81 F 35 GI (B) Jawzjan 1991 Khazana  UNHCR 
RTV 
Turkmen Domestic  POR Y 
PXA81.B 
Khizar  
M 29 GI (B) Jawzjan 1991 Khazana  UNHCR 
RTV 
Turkmen Street vendor POR Y 
PXA82 F NA GI (B) Kabul (City) 1991 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Teacher: 
principal  
POR N 
PXA83 M 55 GI (B) Kabul (City) 1991 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Teacher: 
principal  
POR Y 
PXA83.B M 21 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1991 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Teacher; 
student 
POR Y 
PXA83.C F 45 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1991 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Student  POR Y 
PXA84 F 18 GI (L) Kunar 1981 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Student  Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA85 F 18 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1991 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Student  Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA86 F 21 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1991 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Teacher; 
student 
Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA87 F 17 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1995 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Student  Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA88 F 17 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1996 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Unk.  Student  Unk.  Un
k.  
PXA89 
Abdullah 
Zuhair 
M 50 1:1; GI  (L & 
R) 
Unk.  1983 Unk.  Rented: 
RH 
Tajik Hospital 
worker 
POR Un
k.  
PXA90 M 55 1:1 (B) Qandahar  1990 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Teacher: 
principal  
POR  Y 
PXA91 
Ghazaleh 
Jan 
F 50 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1989 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Hospital 
worker 
(dentist) 
POR Y 
PXA99 
Nawar Saleh 
M 55 1:1 (L & R) Nangarhar 1980 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun NGO worker POR Y 
PXA100 M 63 1:1 (L) Unk.  1981 Zindai  UNHCR  Pashtun Teacher: 
Principal  
Unk.  Y 
PXA101 
Yahya Din 
M 60 GI (L) Nangarhar 1980 Shamshatoo  UNHCR  Pashtun Teacher Unk.  Y 
PXA101.B M 60 GI (L) Nangarhar 1980 Shamshatoo  UNHCR  Pashtun Teacher: 
Principal  
Unk.  Y 
PXA102 M 24 1:1 (L) Kabul (City) 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: Pashtun Teacher; POR Y 
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RH student 
PXA103 M 24 1:1 (L) Kabul (City) 1992 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Teacher; 
student 
POR Y 
PXA104 
Junaid 
Tareen 
M 26 1:1 (L) Kabul (City) 1980 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Teacher; 
student 
CNIC  Y 
PXA105 
Afsana 
F 29 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1980 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun NGO worker CNIC  Y 
PXA106 Mi
xed 
Mix
ed 
GI (L) Jawzjan 1987 Attock, 
Punjab 
Rented 
RH 
Turkmen Trade/busn: 
Carpet 
weaving 
POR Y 
PXA107 M 35 GI (L) Nangarhar 1978 Attock, 
Punjab 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour POR Y 
PXA108 M 55 GI (L) Nangarhar 1978 Attock, 
Punjab 
Squatter  Pashtun Retired None  Y 
PXA109 M 45 GI (L) Nangarhar 1995 Attock, 
Punjab 
Squatter  Pashtun Daily labour CNIC Y 
PXA110 M 45 GI (L) Laghman 1986 Attock, 
Punjab 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour No 
POR 
Y 
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KHA1 
Zalmay 
M 17 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Baghlan  2000 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Tajik Student; daily 
labour 
None  Y 
KHA1.B 
Jibran 
M 13 GI (L & R) Baghlan  2000 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Tajik Student; daily 
labour 
None  Y 
KHA2 M 47 1:1 (B) Unk. 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Katchi 
Abadi  
Tajik Daily labour  POR N 
KHA3 M 16 GI (B) Unk. 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Unk. Tajik Student POR Y 
KHA3.B M 14 GI (B) Unk. 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Unk. Pashtun Student POR Y 
KHA4 F 35 GI (B) Hazara  1999 Aliabad Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Beautician  POR Un
k.  
KHA4.B F 12 GI (B) Hazara  1999 Aliabad Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student POR Un
k.  
KHA4.C F 14 GI (B) Hazara  1999 Aliabad Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student POR Un
k.  
KHA5 M 50 1:1 (B) Unk. 1980 Sohrab 
Goth 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Driver 
(UNHCR) 
POR Un
k.  
KHA6 
Hajji  
Mahfouz  
M 45 1:1; GI; (L & 
R) 
Baghlan  1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Trade POR  Y 
KHA7 M 50 1:1; GI (L & R) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
KHA7.B F 40-
45 
GI (L) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Domestic POR Y 
KHA7.C F 30-
35 
GI (L) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Domestic POR Y 
KHA7.D F 14-
16 
GI (L) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Domestic POR Y 
KHA7.E 
 
F 14-
16 
GI (L) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Domestic POR Y 
KHA8 
Rastin 
M 33 1:1; GI (L & R) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
Abdus 
Samad 
KHA9 
M 28 GI  (L & R) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
KHA9.B M 32 GI (L) Kunduz 1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
KHA10 
Yaqoob Gul 
M 32 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1983 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Trade; land POR Y 
KHA11 M 25 GI (L) Kunduz 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Factory 
worker 
POR Y 
KHA11.B M 20 GI (L) Kunduz 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Shop   POR Y 
KHA11.C F 55 GI (L) Kunduz 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic POR N 
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KHA11.D F 16 GI (L) Kunduz 1985 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic POR N 
KHA12 F 24 1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 1991 Gulshan e 
Iqbal  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  NGO  POR Y 
KHA13 
Habibullah 
M 40 1:1; GI (L & R) Unk. 1983 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Mughal  Business  POR Y 
KHA13.B 
Gulshaan 
F 26 1:1 (L & R) Unk.  1983 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Mughal  Domestic POR Y 
KHA14 
Hidayatullah 
M 13 GI (B) Kunduz  1987 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun  Daily labour Unk.  Y 
KHA15 
Changeiz 
M 28 GI (B) Unk. 1987 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun  Daily labour POR   Y 
KHA16 
Shaqeel  
M 28 GI (B) Unk. 1987 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun  Mechanic POR  Y 
KHA17 
Saleem 
M 50 GI (B) Kunduz  1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
KHA18 
Tariq 
M 38 GI (B) Kunduz  1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
KHA19 
Gulzar 
M 35 GI (B) Kunduz  1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek Carpet trade POR Y 
KHA20 F 45-
50 
1:1; GI (L) Balkh 1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Domestic POR  N 
KHA20.B F 21 1:1; GI (L & R) Balkh 1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student POR  N 
KHA20.C F 18 GI (B) Balkh 1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student POR  N 
KHA20.D F 16 GI (B) Balkh 1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student POR  N 
KHA21 F 15 1:1 (B) Unk. 1998 Lasbela Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student POR  Un
k.  
KHA22 F 19 1:1 (B) Unk. 1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student  POR  N 
KHA23 F 20 1:1 (B) Unk. 1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student  POR  Un
k.  
KHA24 F 17 GI (B) Laghman  1998 Metroville Rented: 
UH 
Hazara Student  POR  N 
KHA24.B F 26 GI (B) Laghman  1998 Metroville Rented: 
UH 
Hazara Student  POR  N 
KHA24.C M 17 GI (B) Laghman  1998 Metroville Rented: 
UH 
Hazara Student  POR Y 
KHA25 F 33 1:1 (L) Kabul (City) 1998 North 
Nazimabad 
Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Domestic POR  Y 
KHA25.B M 19 GI (B) Kabul (City) 1998 North 
Nazimabad 
Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student  POR  Y 
KHA25.C M 15 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1998 North 
Nazimabad 
Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student  POR  Y 
KHA26 
Ferdous 
F 50 1:1 (L) Kabul (City) 1999 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Retired 
factory 
worker; 
Domestic  
POR  Un
k.  
KHA27 M 15 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1999 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Student  POR  Un
k.  
KHA28 F 28 1:1 (L & R) Baghlan  1999 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Beautician  POR  Y 
KHA28.B F 55 GI (L) Baghlan  1999 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Domestic  POR  Un
k.  
KHA29 
Atef 
M 24 1:1; GI (B) Kabul (City) 2002 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  Street vendor: 
chips 
POR  Y 
KHA29.B F 17 GI (B) Kabul (City) 2002 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  Domestic  POR  Y 
KHA30 M 24 1:1; GI (L & R) Nangarhar 1991 North 
Karachi  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  NGO  POR Y 
KHA31 F 22 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1982 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Tajik   Domestic POR Y 
KHA31.B M 55 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1982 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Tajik   Factory 
worker 
POR Y 
KHA31.C F 40 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1982 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Tajik   Domestic POR Y 
KHA31.D F 23 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1982 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Tajik   Domestic POR Y 
KHA32 F 30 1:1; GI (L) Kabul (City) 1997 Garden Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Retail POR Y 
KHA32.B M 40 GI (L) Kabul (City) 1997 Garden Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Factory 
worker 
POR Y 
KHA33 M 55 1:1 (B) Ghazni  2002 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Tajik  Street hawker  POR N  
KHA34 F 45 1:1 (B) Balkh 2000 Metroville Rented: 
RH  
Hazara Domestic POR  Y 
KHA35 M 29  1:1 (B) Badakhshan 2004 North 
Karachi 
Free: 
Madrassa 
Tajik  Madrassa 
student 
POR N 
KHA36 
Dilawar 
Noor 
M 13 GI (L & R) Kunduz  1996 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Turkme
n  
Student POR  Y 
KHA36.B F 37 1:1 (L) Kunduz  1996 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Turkme
n  
Domestic POR  Y 
344 
 
KHA37 M 13 GI (L & R) Kunduz  1985 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Pashtun  Student; Daily 
labour 
Unk.  Y 
KHA38 M 13 GI (L & R) Kunduz  1985 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Turkme
n  
Student  Unk.  Y 
KHA39 F 28 1:1 (L &R)  Kunduz 1983 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  Domestic None  Un
k.  
KHA40 F 30 1: 1 (B) Baghlan  1989 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Turkme
n 
Domestic None  Un
k.  
KHA41 F 44 GI (B) Kunduz 2002 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Pashtun Domestic None  Un
k.  
KHA42 M 14 GI (B) Kunduz 2002 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Pashtun Inf: ragpicker  None  Un
k.  
KHA43 F 26 GI (B) Baghlan  Unk. Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Tajik Domestic None  Un
k.  
KHA44 F 44 GI (B) Baghlan  Unk. Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Tajik Widowed None  Un
k.  
KHA45 M 28 1:1 (B) Kabul (City) 1993 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  Shopkeeper POR Y 
KHA46 F 30  1:1 (L & R) Kabul (City) 2001 Mangopir  Rented: 
UH 
Tajik  Teacher  POR N 
KHA47 
Mustafa 
Habib 
M 50 1:1 (L & R) Baghlan  1983 Mangopir  Owned: 
RH  
Tajik   NGO worker CNIC Y 
KHA48 
Irfan  
M 20 1:1 (L & R) Baghlan  1983 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH  
Tajik   Student; 
factory 
worker 
CNIC Y 
KHA49 M 37 1:1 (B) Kunduz  1991 Malir  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour POR  Y 
KHA49.B M 35 1:1 (B) Kunduz  1991 Malir  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour POR  Y 
KHA50 M 24 GI (B) Paktia  2001 Orangi  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Inf: ragpicker  POR  Y 
KHA50.B M 30 GI (B) Paktia  2001 Orangi  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Imam  POR  Y 
KHA51 F 18 1:1 (B) Qandahar 2002 Gulshan e 
Iqbal  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun  Student  POR  Y 
KHA52 M 45 1:1 (B) Kunduz  1995 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour  POR  Y 
KHA53 F 24 GI (L) Unk. 1991 Gulshan e 
Iqbal  
Rented: 
RH  
Uzbek  Domestic POR  N 
KHA53.B F 21 GI (L) Unk. 1991 Gulshan e 
Iqbal  
Rented: 
RH  
Uzbek  Student  POR  N 
KHA53.C F 55 GI (L) Unk. 1991 Gulshan e 
Iqbal  
Rented: 
RH  
Uzbek  Domestic  POR  N 
KHA54 M 60 GI (B & R) Kunduz 2005 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun Disabled 
(Paralysed)  
N N 
KHA55 M 93 GI (B & R) Unk. 2008 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun  Unk.  N N 
KHA56 
Gulzar Amin 
F 50 GI (B & R) Herat  2007 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun  Inf: ragpicker  N Y 
KHA57 
Fereydoun  
M 35 GI (B & R) Kunduz 1982 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Unk.  CNIC Y 
KHA58 
Rafique  
M 35 GI (B & R) Kunduz 1982 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Inf: bottle 
collector 
CNIC
; POR 
Y 
KHA59 M 55 1:1 (L & R) Baghlan  1991 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
UH 
Tajik Shop keeper  POR  Y 
KHA60 
Behrooz 
M 66 1:1 (L) Kunduz  1999 Afghan 
Camp  
IRTV Tajik  Inf: ragpicker None Y 
KHA61 F 60 GI (L) Kunduz 1976 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic; 
Handicrafts  
POR  Y 
KHA61.B 
Zmaray 
Khan 
M 35 GI (L) Kunduz 1976 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Inf: recycling, 
refrigerators 
POR  Y 
KHA62 M 65 GI (L) Balkh 1998 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour  CNIC
; POR 
Y 
KHA62.B M 65 GI (L) Balkh 1998 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour  CNIC
; POR 
Y 
KHA62.C 
Jalaluddin 
M 35 GI (L) Balkh 1998 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour  CNIC
; POR 
Y 
KHA62.D 
Salahuddin 
M 32 GI (L) Balkh 1998 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Daily labour  CNIC
; POR 
Y 
KHA62.E F 60 GI (L) Balkh 1998 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic POR  Y 
KHA62.F F 25 GI (L) Balkh 1998 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic POR  Y 
KHA63 F 35 1:1 (B) TBC  1998 Metroville  Rented: 
RH 
Hazara Domestic POR  N 
KHA64 F 35 1:1 (B) Kabul  1998 Metroville Rented: 
RH 
Hazara Domestic POR  N 
KHA65 
Mansoor 
M 23 1:1 (L & R) Baghlan  1983 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Tajik  Factory 
worker  
POR; 
CNIC 
Y 
KHA66 
Jahangir 
M 35 1:1 (L) Balkh 1976 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Trade/Busn: 
fabric store 
CNIC  Y 
KHA67 
Sohrab Din 
M 26 1:1; GI (L & R) Qandahar 1983 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Trade/Busn: 
fabric store 
CNIC  Y 
345 
 
KHA68 
Rostam 
M 40 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1980 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Trade/Busn: 
fabric store; 
wholesaler; 
land 
CNIC Y 
KHA68.B 
Asef  
M 37 1:1; GI (L & R) Baghlan  1980 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Trade/Busn: 
fabric store 
CNIC Y 
KHA69 
Abdul 
Mateen 
M 27 1:1; GI (L & R) Unk. 1965 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Trade/Busn: 
fabric store; 
wholesaler 
CNIC Y 
KHA70 
Maulana 
Abdul Qais 
M 45 1:1; GI (L &R) Baghlan  1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Tajik  Trade/Busn; 
land 
POR  Y 
KHA71 
Hajji Hayyat 
M 50 1:1 (L) Baghlan  1980 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek  Trade/Busn. POR  Y 
KHA72 
Hajji 
Soroush 
M 65 1:1 (L) Unk. 1983 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Pashtun  Trade/Busn; 
land 
POR  Y 
KHA73 
Hajji Tooraj 
M 66 1:1 (B) Unk. 1980 Sohrab 
Goth  
Unk. Pashtun Trade/Busn; 
land 
CNIC Y 
KHA74 M 50 1:1 (B) Kunduz 1983 Sohrab 
Goth  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun Teacher: 
Principal 
POR Y 
KHA75 F 24 1:1 (L & R) Baghlan 1983 Afghan 
Camp 
IRTV Uzbek  Domestic POR N 
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PXP1 M 45 1:1 (B) Kohat  2002 Meera 
Kachori 
RTV: R Pashtun Daily labour  CNIC  Un
k. 
PXP2 F 33 1:1 (B) Swabi  1992 Hayatabad Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Domestic CNIC  N 
PXP3 M 38 1:1 (B) Dir  1998 Kababian Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour  CNIC  N 
PXP4 
Mehrban 
Aminullah 
M 60 1:1 (B) Malakand 1970 Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Property 
developer  
CNIC  Y 
PXP5 
Janat Gul 
M 45 GI (L) Charsadda 1965 Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Property 
developer  
CNIC  Y 
PXP5.B M 45 GI (L) Charsadda 1965 Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Property 
developer  
CNIC  Y 
PXP6 M 20 1:1 (L) Upper Dir  1990 Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Student CNIC  N 
PXP7 F 50 1:1 (B) Lower Dir Unk.  Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Domestic CNIC  N 
PXP8 
Murtaza 
M 28 GI (L) Khyber 
Agency  
1980 Arbab 
Road 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Trade/ busn. CNIC  Y 
PXP9 
Waqqas 
M 45 1:1 (L) Khyber 
Agency  
1996 Gulabad Owned: 
UH  
Pashtun Driver 
(Kuwait) 
CNIC  N 
PXP10 M 60 1:1 (L) Khyber 
Agency  
1960 Gulabad Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Teacher 
(retired) 
CNIC  N 
PXP11 M 27 1:1; GI (L & R) Charsadda 1980 Canal 
Town  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Middleman CNIC  N 
PXP11.B M 20 GI (L) Charsadda 1980 Canal 
Town  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Student; 
middleman 
CNIC  N 
PXP12 
Mehboob 
M 40 GI (B) Mardan  1980 Canal 
Town  
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Daily Labour CNIC  N 
PXP13 M 64 1:1; GI (B) Nasir Bagh Origi
n. 
Nasir Bagh Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour: 
Land 
None  N 
PXP13.B M NA  GI (B) Nasir Bagh Origi
n. 
Nasir Bagh Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Unk.  Unk.  N 
PXP14 M 45 1:1 (L &R) Nasir Bagh Origi
n. 
Tekhal Owned: 
RH / Land  
Pashtun Landowner; 
property 
developer 
CNIC  N 
PXP15 NA NA GI (L & R ) Androon 
Shehr  
Origi
n. 
Androon 
Shehr  
Rented: 
RH 
Hindko; 
Punjabi; 
Pashtun; 
Urdu  
Unk.  CNIC  N 
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PXP16 M 35 GI (L) Unk. 1965 Androon 
Shehr  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Political 
profession; 
trade/busn. 
CNIC  N 
PXP17 M 35 GI (L) Unk. 1965 Androon 
Shehr  
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Domestic Unk. N 
PXP18 M 28 1:1 (B) Kohat Road  Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Mechanic  CNIC  N 
PXP19 M 50 1:1 (B) Kohat Road  Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Store owner  CNIC  N 
PXP20 M 36 1:1 (B) Kohat   1961 Hayatabad Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun NGO worker CNIC  N 
PXP21 F 28 1:1 (L & R) Swabi  1988 Hayatabad Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun NGO worker CNIC  N 
PXP22 
Shawana 
Khan 
F  23 1:1 (L & R) Charsadda 1971 Saddar Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun NGO worker CNIC  N 
PXP23 M 33 GI (L & R) Mohmand 
Agency  
1970 Androon 
Shehr  
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun  Wholesaler CNIC  N 
PXP24 M 35 GI (L & R) Swat  1965 Androon 
Shehr  
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun  Wholesaler CNIC  N 
PXP25 F 34 1:1 (L) Mansehra  Unk.  Androon 
Shehr  
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun  Teacher   CNIC  N 
PXP26 F 26 1:1 (L & R) Karak  2002 University 
Town  
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun NGO CNIC  N 
PXP27 
Asmat Afridi  
M 32 1:1 (L & R) Khyber  
Agency 
2001 Hayatabad Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun Trade  CNIC  N 
PXP28 M 26 1:1; GI (L & R) Tehkal Origi
n. 
Tehkal Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun NGO  CNIC  N 
PXP29 F 30 1:1 (L) Swat Unk.  Hayatabad Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun NGO  CNIC  N 
PXP30 F 33 1:1; GI (L & R) Bannu 1960 GT Road Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun NGO  CNIC  N 
PXP31 M 60 1:1 (B) Karak  1970 Hayatabad  Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Doctor  CNIC  N 
PXP32 M 33 1:1 (L & R) Malakand 1995 Hayatabad Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun IT Consultant  CNIC  N 
PXP33 M 50 1:1 (B) Nowshera  1970 Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Teacher: 
principal 
Unk.  N 
PXP34 M 28 GI (L) Tajabad  Origi
n. 
Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun School 
director 
CNIC  N 
PXP35 M 28 1:1 (L) Nowshera  9 Tajabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun School 
director 
CNIC  N 
PXP36 
Sarfaraz Ali 
M 62 1:1 (B & R) Swabi Unk. Gulabad Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour Unk N 
PXP37 F 55 1:1 (B) Unk. Unk. Tekhal  GOP: 
Colony  
Pashtun Govt. 
employee 
CNIC
. 
N 
PXP38 M 30 1:1 (B) Unk.  Unk.  Tekhal  Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Unk. Unk. N 
PXP39 M 36 1:1 (L) Peshawar 
City  
Origi
n. 
Peshawar Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun NGO CNIC  N 
PXP40 M 37 1:1 (B) Palosai  Origi
n. 
Palosai Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Shopkeeper CNIC  Y 
PXP41 M 46 1:1; GI (L) Palosai  Origi
n. 
Palosai Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Mechanic CNIC  Y 
PXP41.B M 38 1:1; GI (L) Palosai  Origi
n. 
Palosai Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Mechanic CNIC  Y 
PXP42 M 29 1:1 (L) Palosai  Origi
n. 
Palosai Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Business CNIC  Y 
PXP43 M 50 1:1 (B) Warsak 
Road  
Origi
n. 
Warsak 
Road 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Business CNIC  N 
PXP44 M 27 1:1 (B) Warsak 
Road  
Origi
n. 
Warsak 
Road 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Business CNIC  N 
PXP45 M 60 1:1 (B) Charsadda 1940 Warsak 
Road 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Govt. 
employee 
(retired) 
CNIC  N 
PXP46 
Malalai 
Khattak 
F 43 GI (L & R) Swabi  Unk.  Kohat 
Road 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Domestic   None  N 
PXP47 M 16 GI (B) Swabi  Unk.  Kohat 
Road 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Student None  N 
PXP48 M 65 GI (L) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour CNIC  N 
PXP49 M 67 GI (L) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour CNIC  N 
PXP50 M 65 GI (L & R) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Landowner; 
business 
CNIC  N 
PXP51 M 33 GI (L) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
RH / Land  
Pashtun Landowner; 
business 
CNIC  Y 
PXP52 
Fariduddin 
M 67 GI (L) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Daily labour None  Y 
PXP53 M 36 1:1 (B) Unk. Unk.  Kohat 
Road 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Store owner CNIC  Y 
PXP54 M 0 1:1 (B) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Govt. 
employee 
(retired) 
CNIC  Y 
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PXP55 M 0 1:1 (B) Unk. Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun Wholesaler: 
fruit 
CNIC  N 
PXP56 M 35 1:1 (B) Unk. Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Mechanic CNIC  N 
PXP57 M 60 1:1 (B) Unk. NA Kohat 
Road 
GOP: 
Colony  
Pashtun Teacher: 
principal 
Unk. Un
k. 
PXP58 M 64 1:1 (L) Bannu 1966 Kohat 
Road 
GOP: 
Colony  
Pashtun Govt. 
employee 
(retired) 
CNIC  N 
PXP59 M ? 1:1 (L &R) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun Business CNIC  Y 
PXP60 M 60 1:1 (L &R) Bahadur 
Kale  
Origi
n. 
Kohat 
Road 
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Mechanic CNIC  Y 
PXP61 
Muzaffar 
Malikyar 
M 60 GI (L) Mohmand 
Agency  
2006 Canal 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Retired CNIC  Y 
PXP61.B 
Sundoos 
Malikyar  
F 24 GI (L) Mohmand 
Agency  
2006 Canal 
Town  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Student CNIC  Y 
PXP61 F 40 GI (B) Charsadda 1991 Canal 
Town 
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun Daily labour CNIC  Y 
PXP63 F 58 1:1 (B) Shabkadar  1970 Canal 
Town 
Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Unemployed  CNIC  N 
PXP64 F 31 1:1 (B) Nowshera  1996 Canal 
Town 
Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun Doctor  CNIC  N 
PXP65 M 34 1:1 (B) Kohat  1996 Hayatabad  Rented: 
RH  
Pashtun Office  CNIC  N 
PXP66 M 28 1:1 (L & R) Bannu  2007 Saddar Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Office  CNIC  Y 
PXP67 M 32 1:1 (L & R) Peshawar  1967 Cantt Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun Office  CNIC  Y 
PXP68 M 38 1:1 (L & R) Khyber  
Agency 
Origi
n. 
Jamrud  Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun Driver  CNIC  N 
PXP69 M 34 1:1 (L & R) Mardan  Origi
n. 
University 
Town  
Rented: 
UH  
Pashtun  Domestic 
servant  
None  N 
PXP70 
Abdul Sattar 
M 66 GI (L &R) Androon 
Shehr  
Origi
n. 
Androon 
Shehr  
Rented: 
RH 
Hindko Domestic Unk. N 
PXP70.B 
Hafsah Jan 
F 33 GI (L) Androon 
Shehr  
Origi
n. 
Androon 
Shehr  
Rented: 
RH 
Hindko Domestic Unk. N 
PXP70.C 
Ruqaiya 
F 34 GI (L) Androon 
Shehr  
Origi
n. 
Androon 
Shehr  
Rented: 
RH 
Hindko Domestic Unk. N 
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KHP1 M 19 GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1986 Yusuf 
Sahib 
Khan Goth 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Student  CNIC  Y 
KHP2 M 17 GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1986 Yusuf 
Sahib 
Khan Goth 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Student  CNIC  Y 
KHP3 F 30  Balochistan  1960 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Domestic  N N 
KHP3.B M 60 GI (B) Balochistan  1960 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Daily labour  CNIC  N 
KHP4 
Abu Dawud 
M 70 1:1; GI (L & R) Swat  1960 Banaras Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Vegetable cart CNIC  Y 
KHP4.B F 65 GI (L) Swat  1960 Banaras Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Vegetable 
seller 
CNIC  N 
KHP4.C 
Jahanara 
F 34 1:1; GI (L & R) Swat  1960 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP5 M 38 1:1; GI (L &R) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1960 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Property 
dealer 
CNIC  N 
KHP5.B F 65  GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1960 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP6 
Ahmed Bilal 
M 55 GI (L) Balochistan  1963 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Driver  CNIC  N 
KHP7 
Hassan Bilal 
M 53 GI (L) Balochistan  1963 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Driver  CNIC  N 
KHP7.B F 55 GI (L) Balochistan  1963 Liaquataba Owned: Baloch Driver  CNIC  N 
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d UH 
KHP7.C F 16 GI (L) Balochistan  1963 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Student  N N 
KHP7.D F 16 GI (L) Balochistan  1963 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Domestic  N N 
KHP8 M 60 GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1950 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP8.B F 28 GI (L) Kashmir 1970 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Kashmir
i  
Unemployed  CNIC  Y 
KHP8.C F 22 GI (L) Kashmir 1970 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Kashmir
i  
Teacher; 
Government  
CNIC  N 
KHP9 
Aasiya 
F 28 GI (L) Balochistan  Unk. Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch  Seamstress Unk.  Y 
KHP10 F 50 GI (L) Balochistan  1971 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Unk.  Domestic  Unk.  Y 
KHP11 F 19 GI (L) Balochistan  Unk. Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
UH 
Unk.  NA Unk.  Y 
KHP12 
Orzala 
F 30 1:1; GI (L &R) Waziristan  1996 Afghan 
Camp  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP12.B 
Khadijah 
F 32 GI (B & R) Waziristan  1996 Afghan 
Camp  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP13 M 55 1:1 (L) Malir 
Memon 
Goth 
Origi
n. 
Malir 
Memon 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  Landholder; 
trader/busn. 
CNIC  N 
KHP14 M 54 GI (B)  Malir 
Memon 
Goth 
Origi
n. 
Malir 
Memon 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  Driver CNIC N 
KHP15 F 24 1:1; GI (L & R) Malir 
Memon 
Goth 
Origi
n. 
Malir 
Memon 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  Student  CNIC  N 
KHP15.B M 65 1:1; GI (L) Malir 
Memon 
Goth 
Origi
n. 
Malir 
Memon 
Goth  
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  Landholder; 
trader/busn. 
CNIC
; 
Passp
ort  
N 
KHP16 M 55 1:1 (L) Malir 
Memon 
Goth 
Origi
n. 
Malir 
Memon 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Sindhi  Trader CNIC  N 
KHP17 F 45 GI (B) Unk. Unk. Malir 
Memon 
Goth  
Nomad Sindhi  Nomads None  Un
k. 
KHP18 
Sameena 
Haroon 
F 27 1:1; GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
1992 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  School 
director 
CNIC N 
KHP18.B F 25 1:1; GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
1992 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  Teacher  CNIC  N 
KHP18.C M 40 1:1; GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
1992 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
RH  
Sindhi  Unemployed  CNIC N 
KHP19 F 37 GI (B) Balochistan 1991 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Saraiki  Domestic  CNIC Y 
KHP19.B F 19 GI (B) Interior 
Sindh 
1991 Baldia 
Town 
Squatting  Saraiki  Teacher  None  N 
KHP19.C F 45 GI (B) Interior 
Sindh 
1991 Baldia 
Town 
Squatting  Saraiki  Domestic  None  N 
KHP20 F 28 GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
Origi
n. 
Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP20.B F 60 GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
Origi
n. 
Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP20.C F 60 GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
Origi
n. 
Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Baloch Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP21 M 22 GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
2001 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Sindhi  Student  CNIC  N 
KHP21.B F 50 GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
2001 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Sindhi  Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP21.C F 21 GI (L) Interior 
Sindh 
2001 Baldia 
Town 
Owned: 
UH 
Sindhi  Student  CNIC  N 
KHP22 M 13 1:1; GI (L & R) Swat 2009 Afghan 
Camp  
Rented: 
RH 
Pashtun  Student  CNIC  N 
KHP23 M NA 1:1; GI (L & R) Swat  1961 Banaras Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Street Vendor CNIC  Y 
KHP23.B F 32 GI (L) Swat  1961 Banaras Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP24 M 37 GI (L) Swat  2005 Banaras Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Business  CNIC  Y 
KHP25 M 38 GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1971 Banaras Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Daily labour CNIC  N 
KHP25.B F 35 GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1971 Banaras Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP26 F 70 GI (L) Punjab  1971 Banaras Owned: 
UH 
Punjabi Elderly  Unk.  N 
KHP27 F 30 GI (L) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
Unk.  Banaras Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  Unk.  N 
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KHP28 F 20 GI (L) Buner  Unk.  Banaras Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Student  CNIC  Y 
KHP28.B F 20 GI (L) Buner  Unk.  Banaras Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Student  CNIC  Y 
KHP28.C F 35 GI (L) Buner  Unk.  Banaras Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP29 F 28 GI (L) Mardan 1998 Banaras Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic  None  N 
KHP29.B M 65 GI (L) Mardan 1998 Banaras Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Watchman CNIC  N 
KHP30 F 55 GI (B) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1983 Banaras Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Widow; 
domestic 
None  N 
KHP30.B M 55 GI (B) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
Unk.  Banaras Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Domestic None  N 
KHP31 F 18 GI (B) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1983 Banaras Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Student  None  Y 
KHP34 
Ishtiaq 
Mohammad  
M 45 1:1; GI (L) Sindh 
(North 
Karachi 
area) 
Origi
n. 
North 
Karachi 
Owned: 
UH  
Sindhi  Property 
developer; 
middleman 
CNIC  Y 
KHP35 
Omar Tariq 
M 38 1:1; GI (L & R) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
1960 Liaquataba
d 
Owned: 
RH  
Pashtun  Property 
dealer 
CNIC  N 
KHP36 
Maqsood 
M 30 1:1 (B) Interior 
Sindh 
2010 North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Baloch  Factory 
worker 
None  Y 
KHP37 
Rubab 
F 30 1:1 (L) Interior 
Sindh 
1991 North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, Free 
Saraiki  Domestic  Unk.  Y 
KHP38 F 30 GI (L) Multan  1980 North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Saraiki  Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP39 
Tabassum 
Khala 
F 75 1:1; GI (L) Unk. Unk.  North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Urdu 
speaking  
Domestic  CNIC  N 
KHP40 F 28 GI (L) Hyderabad  2010 North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, Free 
Saraiki  Domestic  Unk.  Y 
KHP41 
Shahnaz 
Nabi 
F 23 1:1; GI (L) Punjab  2010 North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Punjabi  Domestic  None  Y 
KHP41.B 
Gul Nabi 
M 65 SS: 1:1 Punjab  1980 North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Punjabi  Trade  CNIC  Y 
KHP42 
Fahmida 
Qazmi 
F 43 1:1; GI (L & R) Kashmir  Unk.  North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Kashmir
i  
Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP43 
Zeenat 
F 33 GI (L) Unk. Origi
n. 
North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, Free 
Baloch  Domestic  None  Y 
KHP44 
Nilofar 
F 60 1:1 (B) Unk. Unk.  North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
Owned: 
UH  
Sindhi  Domestic  CNIC  Y 
KHP45 F 65 GI (L) Unk. Unk.  North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, Free 
Sindhi  Domestic  None  Y 
KHP46 
Bilquis 
F 28 1:1; GI (L & R) Interior 
Sindh  
Unk.  North 
Karachi 
Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Sindhi  Domestic  CNIC Y 
KHP47 M 55 1:1 (B & R) Khyber 
Pakhtunkhw
a 
Unk.  Clifton Squatter: 
UH, 
Rented 
Pashtun  Driver: 
rickshaw 
CNIC N 
KHP48 F 21 1:1; GI (L & R) Punjab  1950 Clifton Rented: 
RH 
Kashmir
i  
Student  CNIC N 
KHP49 M 45 1:1; GI (L & R) Unk. Unk. Lyari  Owned: 
UH 
Urdu 
speaking  
Tailor  CNIC N 
KHP50 
Anwar Khan 
M 35 1:1; GI (L & R) Swabi  1999 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Wholesaler: 
fabric 
CNIC Y 
KHP50.B 
Yusuf Khan 
M 22 1:1; GI (L & R) Swabi  1999 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Wholesaler: 
fabric 
CNIC Y 
KHP51 
Hussain Ali 
M 35 1:1; GI (L & R) Jalalabad 
(Afghanistan
) 
1950 Sohrab 
Goth  
Owned: 
UH 
Pashtun  Wholesaler: 
fabric 
CNIC Y 
KHP52 M 56 1:1 (B) Kashmir  1998 Clifton  Rented: 
UH 
Kashmir  Daily labour CNIC N 
KHP53 M 48 1:1 (B) Swabi  1996 Lyari  Rented: 
UH 
Pashtun  Driver  CNIC N 
Additional Interviews, outside of Pakistan  
 
LN = London 
UR = Unrecorded, i.e. not a full interview  
LNA1 
Rameez Ali  
M 22 1:1 (L & R)  Swabi Unk.  Gulabad Owned: 
RH 
Pashtun Student  NA NA 
KHPUR1 
Shahid 
Haque 
M 33 1:1 (B) Sindh Unk. Saddar Rented: 
RH 
Sindhi NGO Worker CNIC NA 
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Appendix 4: Sample of Questions and Information Looked for during Semi-Structured 
interviews 
Following are the questionnaires used during semi-structured interviews. The interviews were 
not completed using the questionnaires below in a physical format, i.e. respondents never had to 
fill in a form or have me interview them with a clipboard. Rather, the questions were 
remembered by heart and answered in a conversational dialogue. The table below is therefore 
not reflective of a particular order in which questions were asked. In some interviews not all 
questions were asked / answered, as I was keen to allow interviews to take more fluid route. 
During ethnographic participant-observer interactions a structured format was not followed, 
however, these set of questions are a useful indicator of some of the specific research questions 
that I was seeking an answer too. In addition, some questions added after ethnographic work 
and after being told by respondents that these were the crucial questions to ask, i.e. questions 
surrounding police harassment. 
The majority of interviews were conducted n Urdu/ Pashto/Farsi, where necessary a translator 
may have been present.  
Note: additional comments can be found in the table. 
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AFGHAN SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW (2010-2012) 
  
  
Note: Questions to be covered in a semi-structured format and not to be read 
out/filled out as a survey - discussion and examples from the participant should 
be encouraged  
  
REF CATEGORY  QUESTION  AWNSER 
P (B) Profile (Background) 
1 Profile How long have you been living in Pakistan?   
2 Profile: Origin Where are you from in Afghanistan? (Province)   
3 Profile: 
Language 
Which language(s) do you speak at home?   
 
Note on housing: If interviews are conducted in people’s homes, some questions may not 
apply 
H Housing 
1 Housing: 
Current 
Where do you currently live in Peshawar/ 
Karachi?  
 
2 Housing: 
Current 
Social 
Networks 
Do you live with your family? (Who lives with 
you in your home?) 
  
3 Housing: 
Current 
Is it an apartment, pakka makkan, katcha ghar?   
4 Housing: 
Current 
Is the property owned by you or do you pay 
rent? 
  
5 Housing: 
Current 
If you pay rent, who do you pay rent to? Are they 
Afghan or Pakistani? 
  
6 Housing: 
Current 
If you own the property is the lease in your 
name? 
  
7 Housing: 
Current 
Who do you pay your electricity and utilities bills 
to? (Bank, landholder, middleman?) 
  
8 Housing: 
Historic 
Can you tell me a bit about the history of where 
you and your family have lived, any problems 
you encountered/reasons for movement etc. 
  
9 Housing: 
Historic 
When you/your family first came to Pakistan, 
where did you live, i.e. Did you live in Peshawar 
or another city and was it a home/camp? 
  
10 Housing: 
Settlement  
Why did you move from the first location? What 
enabled you to do this? 
  
11 Housing: 
Historic & 
Current  
In cases of homes which are owned: Did you 
build this property yourself/ hire labourers? 
Where did you get the materials, i.e. cement etc., 
and labour for this? 
  
12 Housing: 
(I)NGO/ 
GOP support 
Did you ever get any help from UNHCR, an 
NGO, the GOP, Afghan parties during your 
stay? (Ration cards, tent, quilts, schools, water 
etc.). 
  
13 Housing: Do you have relatives living near you or in your  
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Social 
Networks 
home (i.e. cousins, uncles, parents) 
D Documents 
and Law and 
Order (POR 
cards) 
    
1 Documents: 
Afghan Status 
Do you possess a POR card?   
2 Documents: 
Afghan Status 
Did you get your card at NADRA or through 
another person? 
  
3 Documents: 
Afghan Status 
Do you have an Afghan passport?   
4 Documents: 
Dual ID 
Do you have a CNIC? If so who helped you to 
get it? (Note: sensitive question, only ask if 
relationship with interviewee is strong) 
  
5 Documents: 
Dual ID 
Did you or any family members ever possess a 
NIC (not computerised)? 
  
6 Documents: 
Daily Life 
Was it previously necessary to have 
documentation as an Afghan refugee?  
  
7 Documents: 
Daily Life 
Have you ever been denied access to anything on 
account of your POR card? (Hospital treatment, 
schooling, education). 
  
8 Documents: 
Daily Life 
Prompt discussion on importance of documents 
for daily activities 
  
9 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Can you pass through security check-post with 
ease? 
 
10 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have you or anyone you know even been 
arrested or detained on account of having/not 
having your POR card? If so can you tell me a bit 
about this? 
  
11 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
 
Have you ever had to pay a police bribe? Has this 
ever been related to you being Afghan? 
  
12 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have you or anyone you know ever been 
deported? 
  
13 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Is it common for police to raid / enter this area?   
14 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have the police ever physically or verbally 
abused you / family member? 
 
S (S) Social Networks: Strategies of Self-Survival 
1 Social 
Networks 
When you came to Pakistan did your family 
come with you as well? 
  
2 Social 
Networks: 
Housing 
When you moved did you have (extended) family 
and friends here already? 
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3 Social 
Networks 
In the case of friends being present: Were they 
from the same places as you in Afghanistan? 
  
M Migration Histories & Current Attachment  
1 Migration What were the reasons for moving to Pakistan?   
2 Migration  
Social 
Networks 
Can you tell me a bit about your family's 
experience of moving and settling in Pakistan? 
  
3 Profile Were you born in Pakistan?   
4 Transnational 
Migration  
Do you go back to Afghanistan?   
5 Settlement  Do you think you could permanently settle in 
Afghanistan? Pakistan? Another country? 
  
E Education  
1 Education What types of education are possible in this area 
(madrassa, government schools, private schools, 
universities?) 
  
2 Education Are you/your children studying? If so, where?   
3 Education Are there Afghan schools here? (Details re: fees, 
ages, registration with Afghan Consulate) 
  
4 Education Are there obstacles to accessing Pakistani private 
and government schools? 
  
5 Education Is it difficult to get access to Pakistani 
government schools? 
  
6 Education  Who set up the school and how is it 
administered? 
  
7 Education  Are schools supported by UNHCR/NGOs?   
8 Education  Is it common to get extra classes outside if 
school, such as IELTS or computer classes? If so 
are these registered organisations? 
  
9 Education: 
Social 
Networks 
Has this local community worked to set up a 
school etc.? 
  
10 Education: 
Social 
Networks 
Do children learn at home and informally?   
P (I) Profile: 
Income  
    
1 Profile: 
Income  
Do you/ household members work?    
2 Profile: 
Income  
Where do you work?   
3 Profile: 
Income  
How did you get this job?   
4 Social 
Networks: 
Income 
Do any of your friends or family members work 
with you? 
  
5 Remittances Do you have relatives outside of Pakistan? 
Where are they based? Do they send you 
anything? Do they visit?  
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6 Income What are the main expenses here? And is there 
enough money? (Do you get to eat meat and 
vegetables? What does your diet consist of?) 
  
S (G) 
Social 
Networks     
1 
Social 
Networks 
Do you have good relations with local Pakistani 
communities (e.g. Working together, studying 
together, and living together)? Can you explain 
about your relationship with Pakistanis since you 
have been here? 
 
2 Discrimination 
Do you ever feel discrimination for being Afghan 
by the state / locals?    
F Facilities, Mobility  
1 Mobility  Can you freely move across Pakistan?   
2 
Access to 
water  
Do you have good access to water supplies? 
Discuss.   
3 
Access to 
electricity & 
gas 
Do you have good access to good water/ 
electricity supplies? Discuss. 
 
4 
Access to 
medical 
facilities Do you have good access to health supplies?   
P(O); 
I 
Profile - 
Observations; 
Interview 
Conditions     
  Observations to watch out for/ directly ask, if appropriate 
    No of attendees   
    Location    
    Name   
    Sex   
    Approximate Age   
    Ethnicity    
    Mother Tongue   
    Qabile    
    
POR card holder/ CNIC card holder/ No 
documents   
    Education Level    
    Occupation    
    Family Size   
    Income Level   
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PAKISTANI SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW (2010-2012) 
  
  
Note: Questions to be covered in a semi-structured format and not to be read 
out/filled out as a survey - discussion and examples from the participant should 
be encouraged  
  
REF CATEGORY  QUESTION  AWNSER 
P (B) Profile (Background) 
1 Profile How long have you been living in this city? (if 
applicable) 
  
2 Profile: Origin Where is your home town/village (if applicable)   
3 Profile: 
Language 
Which language(s) do you speak at home?   
 
Note on housing: If interviews are conducted in people’s homes, some questions may not 
apply 
H Housing 
1 Housing: 
Current 
Where do you currently live in Peshawar/ 
Karachi?  
 
2 Housing: 
Current 
Social 
Networks 
Do you live with your family? (Who lives with 
you in your home?) 
  
3 Housing: 
Current 
Is it an apartment, pakka makkan, katcha ghar?   
4 Housing: 
Current 
Is the property owned by you or do you pay 
rent? 
  
5 Housing: 
Current 
If you pay rent, who do you pay rent to?   
6 Housing: 
Current 
If you own the property is the lease in your 
name? 
  
7 Housing: 
Current 
Who do you pay your electricity and utilities bills 
to? (Bank, landholder, middleman?) 
  
8 Housing: 
Historic 
Can you tell me a bit about the history of where 
you and your family have lived, any problems 
you encountered/reasons for movement etc. 
  
9 Housing: 
Historic (IDP 
specific) 
Have you ever lived in an RTV? If so when?   
10 Housing: 
Settlement  
Why did you move from the first location? What 
enabled you to do this? 
  
11 Housing: 
Historic & 
Current  
In cases of homes which are owned: Did you 
build this property yourself/ hire labourers? 
Where did you get the materials, i.e. cement etc., 
and labour for this? 
  
12 Housing: 
(I)NGO/ 
GOP support 
Did you ever get any help from the GOP / 
NGOs / UNCR (IDPs) (Ration cards, tent, 
quilts, schools, water etc.)? 
  
13 Housing: Do you have relatives living near you or in your  
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Social 
Networks 
home (i.e. cousins, uncles, parents) 
D Documents, 
Law and 
Order (CNIC 
card)  
    
1 Documents: 
CNIC  
Do you possess a CNIC card? Or the older NIC 
card? 
  
2 Documents: 
CNIC 
Did you get your card at NADRA or through 
another person? 
  
3 Documents: 
Daily Life 
Was it previously necessary to have 
documentation as a Pakistani citizen? 
  
4 Documents: 
Daily Life 
Have you ever been denied access to anything on 
account of your CNIC card or lack of? 
  
5 Documents:  
Daily Life 
Prompt discussion on importance of documents 
for daily activities 
  
6 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Can you pass through security check-post with 
ease? 
 
10 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have you or anyone you know even been 
arrested or detained on account of having/not 
having your CNIC card? If so can you tell me a 
bit about this? 
  
11 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have you ever had to pay a police bribe? Has this 
ever been related to your ethnicity (*key for 
Pashtuns in Karachi). 
  
12 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have you or anyone you know ever been 
deported? 
  
13 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Is it common for police to raid / enter this area?   
14 Documents: 
Law and 
Order 
Have the police ever physically or verbally 
abused you / family member? 
 
S (S) Social Networks: Strategies of Self-Survival 
1 Social 
Networks 
Do you have family members living nearby? If 
moved to the city, when you moved did your 
family come with you as well? 
  
2 Social 
Networks: 
Housing 
If moved, did you have (extended) family and 
friends here already? 
  
3 Social 
Networks 
If moved, are other people from you original city 
/district also here?  
  
M/S Migration Histories / Sedentarised histories  
1 Migration What were the reasons for moving to the city?   
2 Migration  
Social 
Networks 
Can you tell me a bit about your family's 
experience of moving to Peshawar/ Karachi? 
  
3 Profile Were you born in Pakistan?   
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4 Sedentarised 
life 
If always lived in one area, what are the reasons 
behind this? 
 
E Education  
1 Education What types of education are possible in this area 
(madrassa, government schools, private schools, 
universities?) 
  
2 Education Are you/your children studying? If so, where?   
4 Education Are there obstacles to accessing Pakistani private 
and government schools? 
  
5 Education Is it difficult to get access to education?   
6 Education  Who set up the school and how is it 
administered? 
  
7 Education  Are schools supported by UNHCR/NGOs?   
8 Education  Is it common to get extra classes outside if 
school, such as IELTS or computer classes? If so 
are these registered organisations? 
  
9 Education: 
Social 
Networks 
Has this local community worked to set up a 
school etc.? 
  
10 Education: 
Social 
Networks 
Do children learn at home and informally?   
P (I) Profile: 
Income  
    
1 Profile: 
Income  
Do you/ household members work?    
2 Profile: 
Income  
Where do you work?   
3 Profile: 
Income  
How did you get this job?   
4 Social 
Networks: 
Income 
Do any of your friends or family members work 
with you? 
  
5 Remittances Do you have relatives outside of Pakistan? 
Where are they based? Do they send you 
anything? Do they visit?  
  
6 Income What are the main expenses here? And is there 
enough money? (Do you get to eat meat and 
vegetables? What does your diet consist of?) 
  
S (G) 
Social 
Networks     
1 
Social 
Networks 
Do you have good relations with other 
communities (ethnicities, religious / sectarian 
groups), e.g. working together, studying together, 
living together.  
 
2 Discrimination 
Do you ever feel discrimination on ground of 
ethnicity (*Karachi).   
F Facilities, Mobility  
1 Mobility  Can you freely move across Pakistan?   
2 Access to Do you have good access to water supplies?   
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water  Discuss. 
3 
Access to 
electricity & 
gas 
Do you have good access to good water/ 
electricity supplies? Discuss. 
 
4 
Access to 
medical 
facilities Do you have good access to health supplies?   
P(O); 
I 
Profile - 
Observations; 
Interview 
Conditions     
  Observations to watch out for/ directly ask, if appropriate 
    No of attendees   
    Location    
    Name   
    Sex   
    Approximate Age   
    Ethnicity    
    Mother Tongue   
    Qabile    
    
POR card holder/ CNIC card holder/ No 
documents   
    Education Level    
    Occupation    
    Family Size   
    Income Level   
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Appendix 5: Text of Afghan Management and Repatriation Strategy 2010, SAFRON  
     
Government of Pakistan 
   Ministry of States and Frontier Regions 
     ****** 
 
MANAGEMENT AND REPATRIATION STRATEGY FOR AFGHAN 
REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN FOR THE YEAR 2010-2012 
 
 The strategy for repatriation of Afghan refugees for the years 2007-2009, framed in 
consultation with all the relevant stakeholders, was approved by the Cabinet on 9th May, 2007 
following the recommendations of a Cabinet committee. The targets of the strategy, which 
aimed at complete repatriation of the refuges up the end of 2009 could not be achieved as the 
concerned government departments and provincial governments did not keep up with the given 
timeframe and the security situation in the region deteriorated. UNHCR stressed for a flexible 
and open ended policy as early as 2007, while the Government of Afghanistan also requested for 
review of the targets of repatriation due to nonconductive environment in the region. As a 
consequence there are still 1.7 million registered besides an estimated 1.00 million unregistered 
Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. The issues which continue to overshadow the repatriation 
process include lack of sustainability and recycling, lack of conducive environment and 
absorption capacity in Afghanistan, overall security situation in the region besides the absence of 
required level of international support and funding from the donor agencies. 
 
REVIEW OF STRATEGY 
 
 During a meeting of the Prime Minister with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
in August, 2008, it was agreed that a revised repatriation strategy will go beyond 2009. 
Subsequently, in the 16th Tripartite meeting held in Islamabad on 29th August, 2008 the 
Government of Pakistan announced the Repatriation Strategy 2007-2009, would be reviewed 
beyond 2009. It was also decided that the revised strategy will be on a medium term basis and 
linked with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for the period 2009-2013. 
 
2. In accordance with the announcement of the government and to regulate and manage 
the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in future, a revised Management and repatriation strategy for 
Afghan refugees for the years 2010-2012 has been framed which encompasses all aspects of 
the refugees’ issues including repatriation and reintegration. So far, inputs have been received 
from Ministry of Interior and its departments such as FIA, NADRA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Provincial Governments of NWFP and Punjab besides the Project Director, Afghan 
Refugees Repatriation Cell. This Management Strategy takes into account the legal and illegal 
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. The revised strategy will focus on the following: 
I. Repatriation to and reintegration of refugees in Afghanistan 
II. International support for refugees and repatriation 
III. Host community development 
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IV. Development of refugees affected areas 
V. Addressing security concerns in Pakistan due to refugees presence 
VI. Border Management/crossing to control recycling 
VII. Constitution of a high powered body to address Afghan refugees issues both in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan for durable solutions 
VIII. Joint Bilateral Commission 
IX. Temporary management of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan during the period 
of 2010-2012 
 
I. REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN 
 
 Tripartite agreement regulates the repatriation and management of POR holders. The 
first agreement was made in 2003 for three years and further extended in 2006 upto December, 
2009. The Tripartite agreement envisages that the repatriation of Afghan refugees would be 
“voluntary and gradual and with dignity”. This agreement is also required to be extended upto 
31st December, 2012. 
 
2. The biggest hurdle in the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan refugees has remained the 
non-conducive environment in Afghanistan mainly due to Government of Afghanistan’s lack of 
infrastructural capacity and required level of focus on the returnee issues. But as decided in the 
Brussels Conference, Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is to be implemented up 
to 2013. This envisages a plan for reintegration of returnees inside Afghanistan for a durable 
solution to the problem. Another issue which has not kept the repatriation process at desired 
pace is the security concern of the international community. 
 
3. Repatriation, as a voluntary programme, is regulated by Tripartite agreement, therefore, it 
needs to be linked with ANDS to act as a pull factor. Linking the process with ANDS will 
require taking into account the absorption capacity of Government of Afghanistan and saving 
the returnees from inhuman suffering due to continuation of hostilities and lack of governance 
inside Afghanistan, The Government of Afghanistan (Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation) has 
to update its counterpart in the GOP (Ministry of SAFRON) on the preparation and the yearly 
absorption figures inside Afghanistan. The GOP, as such, must have appropriate level of stakes 
in the ANDS. 
 
4. The Government of Pakistan reserves the right to relocate the Afghan refugees from one 
camp to another or consolidate the camps due to security and administrative concerns. For 
repatriation purpose, Governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR would agree on yearly 
planning figure for repatriation for which GOA and UNHCR would make arrangements for 
reintegration. 
 
5. The refugee camps closures and the yearly repatriation targets will be considered in 
consultation with members of the Tripartite Commission as well as with the Provincial 
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Governments. Presently, the following number of camps are located in different regions of 
Pakistan: 
 
a) Total number of camps 42 
b) Camps in NWFP  29 
c) Camps in Balochistan 12 
d) Camps in Punjab  01 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION 
 
 The support of international community for the management of Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan and their repatriation to Afghanistan is deemed essential. The level of support has 
however varied in the past, mainly depending on the security concerns about the region. The fact 
that Pakistan has served as a host to largest refugee population in the region for the longest 
period of time and that this issue is also linked with overall security situation of the region must 
be highlighted at all international fora. UNHCR and other donor agencies need to attract more 
support not only for the refugees in Pakistan but also for providing appropriate shelters and 
economic incentives within Afghanistan to ensure their dignity in accordance with the 
international norms. The international community may also consider grant of food assistance 
and subsistence allowance for one year to create pull factors in Afghanistan. 
 
2. In addition to the above, a central office in Afghanistan is necessary to ensure 
implementation of a sustainable reintegration plan. Exchange of information with GOP and 
guarantee of international support and UN agencies is also required. Model villages within 
Afghanistan may be established to encourage the refugees to return to their homeland. 
 
III. HOST COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Host fatigue naturally exists in the regions with large concentration of the refugees’ 
population for nearly three decades. In the Brussels Conference 2003, it was decided that the 
Government of Pakistan would be assisted in developing refugee impacted and host 
communities. While the UNHCR has extended some help to the host communities in the past, 
the areas of concern including provision of water, sanitation, forestation, infrastructure, damage 
repair, burden on services etc require much more attention of the international agencies. It is 
imperative that funding for the purpose produce actual results to pacify to the host communities. 
The concerned offices looking after the refugees such as Ministry of SAFFRON/CCAR/CARs 
must be involved in the process to identify the areas which require the most attention for 
development/rehabilitation. 
 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF REFUGEES AFFECTED AREAS 
 
 As decided in the Brussels Conference in 2003, the international community must honor 
its commitment in relation to the regions which served as hosts to the refugee population and 
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suffered land degradation, soil erosion, deforestation, shortage of water and other environmental 
hazards besides damage to the infrastructure and services. While the UNDP/UNHCR are set to 
launch the RAHA initiative, it is again important that the concerned government offices 
particularly the CARs as well as the Provincial Governments are taken on board to address the 
actual issues and to set the priorities for the affected areas’ development/rehabilitation. 
 
V. SECURITY CONCERNS 
 
 Keeping in view the prevailing security situation in the region in general and in Pakistan 
in particular, the Government of Pakistan will be required to strictly monitor certain Afghans. 
This may lead to trials under the law of the land and punitive actions. Information on such 
actions taken will be shared with UNHCR and other stakeholders. The unregistered/criminal 
Afghans will be dealt with strictly under the law. 
 
VI. BORDER MANAGEMENT 
 
 Border management is another essential element of the security concerns arising from 
the illegal influx of Afghan nationals across the border. The border is porous and extends along 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas which are governed under a separate set of laws. The 
camp closure in Tribal areas has led to numerous problems in these areas including the refuges 
integration into the local community. The GOP has the right to address the issue of these illegal 
Afghans in the manner it deems fit. Any legislation required for the purpose may be promulgated 
in consultation with the concerned authorities. 
 
VII.  CONSTITUTION OF A HIGH POWERED BODY TO ADDRESS THE 
AFGHAN REFUGEES PROBLEMS 
  
The lack of coordinated and concerted efforts in the past has proved that any attempt to 
successfully manage the refugees’ problem may not produce the desired results in the absence of 
a high powered body consisting of representatives of all concerned Federal and Provincial 
Government Departments as well as agencies to quickly and efficiently address the problems. 
Such a body would not only monitor the progress of benchmarks but look into unforeseen 
situations. The Committees at the Federal and Provincial levels, working with specific mandates 
and with periodical meetings may be constituted as follows: 
FEDERAL LEVEL 
 Secretary SAFRON   Chairman 
 Secretary Interior   Member 
 Secretary Foreign Affairs 
 Chief Commissioner Afghan Refugees 
 Director General I.B 
 Director General FIA 
 Rep. of NADRA 
 Home Secretary concerned 
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 (NWFP/Punjab/Balochistan/Sindh) 
 Secretary Excise & Taxation- Provincial 
 Rep. of FBR 
 Member Board of Revenue (Provincial) 
 Rep. of FATA Sectt 
 
PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
 Secretary Home/Tribal Affairs Chairman 
 IG/DIG Police    Member 
 Commissioner Afghan Refugees 
 Rep. of CCAR, Islamabad 
 Rep. of FATA Sectt (Not below Addl. Secy) 
 Rep. of I.B 
 Ref of FIA 
 Rep of NADRA 
 Rep. of Excise & Taxation Deptt 
 Rep. of Board of Revenue 
 
 
VIII. JOINT BILATERAL COMMISSION 
 
 As agreed in the consultations for the Tripartite meeting, GoP and GoA will form a high 
level joint commission to oversee the issues/problems faced by Afghans in Pakistan and resolve 
so that their return and reintegration could be timely ensured. The CCAR will represent the GoP 
in the Commission. The GoP will also be given access to all information for smooth settlement 
of returnees in Afghanistan. 
 
XI. TEMPORARY MANAGEMENT OF AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN  
 
 It is understood that owing to the non-conductive environment in Afghanistan, many 
Afghans will not be able to return to their homeland in near future. The proposed high powered 
bodies at the federal and the provincial levels will therefore monitor the planning process and 
implementation of the following steps to manage the refugee population during the period 2010-
2012: 
 
i) Keeping in view the voluntary nature of repatriation and lack of absorption capacity  in 
Afghanistan, the timeframe should be reviewed in consultation with Tripartite 
 Commission parties and extended up till 31st December, 2012. Planning Figures 
 should be set and reviewed each year. 
ii) Unregistered refugees are to be considered as illegal immigrants and need to be 
 deported/dealt with under the law of the land. 
iii) A separate dedicated force to trace the unregistered Afghans be formed as local 
 police has been stretched too much these days to accomplish the important task. 
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iv) The deportation process should be simplified and UNHCR involved to assist their 
 return. 
v) NADRA should launch a special drive to detect and cancel NICs passports etc, 
 fraudulently obtained by refugees and discourages the tendency of obtaining illegal 
 NICs, passports and domicile certificates etc. 
vi) Those refugees who have invested over 5 million in productive business should be 
 allowed to continue their businesses and may be given work permits for a specific 
 period of time. 
vii) Those refugees who have made unproductive investments as in houses should be 
 given reasonable time to dispose off their properties. They should be allowed stay  visa 
for one year. 
viii) If an Afghan or groups of Afghans want to bring investment to Pakistan of over Rs.50 
 million, they may be encouraged to do so. All countries in the world encourage 
 investment. 
ix) The Afghan refugees had a stabilizing affect on labour market in Pakistan. This 
 advantage should be retained. The Government should consider granting renewable 
 visas to one hundred and fifty thousand skilled and unskilled Afghans. The figure 
 comes 0.093% of the Pakistani population and 0.29% of the work force. 
x) Afghan students should be allowed to study and complete their education in  Pakistan. 
They should in fact be encouraged to study here. This may be regarded as a  battle for the hearts 
and minds of future generations of Afghans. 
xi)  Those single women who have lost their bread earners and have no one to support 
 them should be allowed to settle in Pakistan. 
xii) Being an international issue, the Federal Government should involve international 
 agencies UNHCR, IOM and other countries to resettle some Afghan refugees in other 
 countries. 
xiii) Cross border visits of Afghan refugees elders from both countries may be arranged  to 
exchange information and find ways and means for sustainable return. 
xiv) It must be mandatory that all Afghans living in areas other than camps be registered 
 with local police stations. 
xv) All industrial establishments employing Afghan labour should report them for 
 registration. 
xvi) All land lords to report their Afghan tenants to the respective Commissioners for 
 Afghan Refugees and local police stations in the urban and rural areas. Land lords to  rent 
properties to Afghans very sparingly and in genuine cases only to registered  refugees. 
xvii) All businesses run by Afghans like restaurants, shops and vendors etc. to be  registered 
and monitored. 
xviii) All businessmen and other Pakistani citizens to report Afghan employees working 
 with them to the Commissioner, Afghan Refugees and local police stations and such 
 employments must be discouraged. 
xix) The details of the already enrolled Afghan students in Pakistani madrissahs be 
 shared with Ministries of SAFRON ad Interior. However, all madrissahs be advised to 
 discourage enrolment of Afghan students. 
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xx) CCAR, CARs be reorganized and strengthened as their existing capacity to manage  and 
administer the camps and to monitor RAHA initiative is not sufficient. The  UNHCR to 
provide a full time consultant for the purpose. 
xxi) Extension of PoRs to be extended upto 2012 through a notification. 
xxii)  PCM (Proof of Card Modification) to correct and update the cards to continue. The 
 PPV (Population Profiling Verification) which aims to improve and verify information 
about the special needs of registered Afghans would be a joint venture of  Government of 
Pakistan and UNHCR. 
xxiii) ANDS in Afghanistan and VRC in Pakistan will be closely coordinated. 
xxiv) Camp management and camp consolidation will be decided in consultation with 
 Provincial Governments and Provincial CARs. 
xxv) Periodic review will be carried out for identification benchmarks or repatriation. 
xxvi) Increased and effective role and responsibilities of Frontier Corps, Frontier 
 Constabulary, Levies and border force to effectively control cross border  movements. 
xxvii) The record/ database of repatriated Afghans will be provided to FIA immigration 
 check posts to prevent reentry. 
xxviii) After setting a deadline through media campaign, unregistered refugees may be 
 repatriated through the provincial governments, local police/authorities with the 
 assistance of UNHCR. 
xxix) NADRA, in collaboration with UNHCR, may install monitoring system to control cross 
 border movements using the registration database to avoid recycling and illegal 
 immigration. 
 
 
     ******** 
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Appendix 6: Police Harassment, Afghan vs. Pakistani Interview Responses 
The following is a summary of police harassment results as taken from the interviews completed 
in this study. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment experiences, Karachi & Peshawar 
Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment experiences, Karachi & Peshawar 
Total respondents (Afghan & 
Pakistani): 
385 
Nationality & Harassment  Total as a number Total as a % of all Afghans 
interviewed in Karachi and 
Peshawar 
Afghan respondents 230 100.00% 
Harassment  162 70.43% 
No harassment  43 18.70% 
Unknown answer 25 10.87% 
  Total as a number  Total as a % of all 
Pakistanis interviewed in 
Karachi and Peshawar 
Pakistani respondents 155 40.26% 
Harassment  65 41.94% 
No harassment  87 56.13% 
Unknown answer 3 1.94% 
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Table 2: Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment experiences by city 
 
Summary of Afghan & Pakistani police harassment experiences by city 
Peshawar total respondents 
(Afghan & Pakistani): 
194 
  Total as a number  Total as a % of Afghans 
interviewed in Peshawar 
Afghan respondents 117 100.00% 
Harassment  85 72.65% 
No harassment  22 18.80% 
Unknown answer 10 8.55% 
  Total as a number  Total as a % of Pakistanis 
interviewed in Peshawar 
Pakistani respondents 77 100.00% 
Harassment  19 24.68% 
No harassment  56 72.73% 
Unknown answer 2 2.60% 
Karachi total respondents 
(Afghan & Pakistani): 
191 
  Total as a number  Total as a % of Afghans 
interviewed in Karachi 
Afghan respondents 113   
Harassment  77 68.14% 
No harassment  21 18.58% 
Unknown answer 15 13.27% 
  Total as a number  Total as a % of Pakistanis 
interviewed in Karachi 
Pakistani respondents 78 100.00% 
Harassment  46 58.97% 
No harassment  31 39.74% 
Unknown answer 1 1.28% 
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Table 3: Summary of police harassment experiences by Afghan ethnicity, Karachi & Peshawar 
(Afghan Pashtun vs. Non-Pashtun – Other) 
Summary of police harassment experiences by Afghan ethnicity, Karachi & Peshawar 
(Afghan Pashtun vs. Non-Pashtun – Other)  
Total Afghan respondents: 230 
  
Afghan Pashtun respondents: 
 
135 
  Total as a number Total as a % of all Afghan 
Pashtuns interviewed in 
Karachi and Peshawar 
Harassment  108 46.96% 
No harassment  17 12.59% 
Unknown answer  0 00.00% 
 
Afghan Other respondents 91 
  Total as a number Total as a % of all Afghan 
Others interviewed in 
Karachi and Peshawar 
Harassment  51 56.04% 
No harassment  24 26.37% 
Unknown answer 17 18.68% 
  
Ethnicity Unknown 
respondents 
4 
  Total as a number Total as a % of all Ethnicity 
Unknowns interviewed in 
Karachi and Peshawar 
Harassment  1 25.00% 
No harassment  1 25.00% 
Unknown answer 2 50.00% 
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Table 4: Summary of Pakistani Pashtun experiences of police harassment vs. Pakistanis 
non-Pashtuns, Karachi 
Summary of Pakistani Pashtun experiences of police harassment vs. Pakistanis non-
Pashtuns, Karachi 
Total Pakistani respondents: 78 
Pashtun respondents 31 
  Total as a number Total as a % of all Pakistani 
Pashtuns interviewed in 
Karachi 
Harassment  17 54.84% 
No harassment  14 45.16% 
Unknown answer 0 0.00% 
 
Non-Pashtun respondents 45 
  Total as a number Total as a % of all non-
Pashtun Pakistanis 
interviewed in Karachi 
Harassment  14 31.11% 
No harassment  30 66.67% 
Unknown answer 1 2.22% 
Ethnicity Unknown 
respondents:  
2  
  Total as a number Total as a % of all Ethnicity 
Unknowns interviewed in 
Karachi 
Harassment  2 100.00% 
No harassment  0 0.00% 
Unknown answer 0 0.00% 
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Appendix 7: Sample of Legal Aid Cases from SHARP regarding Police Arrests and 
Harassment 
Note: specific dates, names and file numbers have been censored. 
 
February 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder of Afghan Camp, regarding police harassment 
on their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010. 
February 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder of Medina Colony, regarding police 
harassment on their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010. 
February 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder in Nazimabad regarding police harassment on 
their routes to and from work and of shopkeepers. Date of access: 21 October 
2010. 
June 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder of Baloch Goth regarding police harassment on 
their routes to and from work.. Date of access: 21 October 2010. 
June 2008,Police demands of bribes on roads: Al Asif Square. Date of access: 21 October 
2010. 
December 2008, Meeting with Afghan elder and police officer after reports of police 
harassment on their routes to and from work and of shopkeepers. Date of access: 
21 October 2010. 
January 2009, Meeting with Afghan elder of Jamali Goth regarding police harassment on 
their routes to and from work. Date of access: 21 October 2010. 
July 2009, Police demands of bribes by local shopkeepers reported by Afghans. Date of 
access: 9 November 2010. 
October 2009, 28 Afghan POR card holders arressted. Release agreed. Police station 
Sohrab Goth. Date of access: 9 November 2010. 
October 2009. Police raid and arrests of 13 Afghans. Landhi. Date of access: 9 
November 2010. 
October 2009, 9 arrests of Afghans after police raid at Afghan Camp (Jadeed 
Camp).Gulshan-e-Maymar police station. Date of access: 9 November 2010. 
November 2009, Arrest of 14 people. Date of access: 9 November 2010. 
November 2009, Arrest of 6 Afghans, three with POR cards, one with NIC, two with no 
docuemnation. Date of access: 21 October 2010. 
December 2009, Advice case rejected by SHARP as arrestees without POR. Date of 
access: 9 November 2010. 
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Appendix 8: Sample of Unregistered Afghan Deportation Order, Arrested Under 
Foreigners Act 
IN THE COURT OF II ADDL& SESSIONS JUDGE KARACHI WEST 
BEFOERE:-   (Mrs. Romana Siddiqa) 
   S.C. 1065/2009 
The state...v/s... N [redacted] and others..................................accused 
     FIR No. [redacted]./2009 
     U/S: 3/4  / 14-Foreigner’s Act 1946 
     PS: Maripur Karachi 
To, 
 The 
 Superintendent 
 Central Prison / 
 Juvenile Offenders / Women Jail / 
 District Prison Malir 
 Karachi 
 
SUBJECT:-  CONVICTION LETTER 
 WHEREAS the above noted matter is fixed today on 21-12-2009 for supply of copies 
under section 265-C Cr.P.C before me (N.) II Addl. Sessions Judge Karachi West, when all 
accused persons have pleaded their guilt through filing separate applications whereupon show 
cause notices have given to which they replied that they are pleading guilty without any force or 
coercion, I do hereby convict and sentence for a period of undergone and fine of Rs.500/- and 
in case of failure he would be undergone for sentence of period of one week. He is present 
before Court in custody and is remanded back to Prison to undergo the sentence so awarded to 
them u/S 245(2) Cr.PC. however they are entitled to get the benefit u/S 282-B Cr.PC. The 
superintendent of jail is hereby directed to make arrangement of deportation of the accused 
person above named after completion of his sentence through the Home Department, 
Government of Sindh with intimation to this Court. 
 
 
    (Mrs. Romana Siddiqa) 
   IIND. ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE KARACCHI WEST 
 
CONVICTION SLIP:- 
1.   Age about  years. 
2.   Religion:    Islam 
3.   Occupation:     in custody 
4.   Mark of Identification: 
5.   LTI of accused 
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Appendix 9: Sample of Registered Afghan Arrested under Foreigners Act 
 
IN THE COURT OF 2ND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE UBAURO 
CR CASE NO 411/09 
STATE 
V/S 
1. W s/o Hajji W 
2.  Hajji W s/o PG  
by caste Kharot Pathan R/O District [redacted] Afghanistan 
3. FK s/o AS 
by caste Angerkhel Pathan r/o District [redacted] 
Afghanistan..........................................................Accused 
 
     FIR no [cens.] 
     U/S 14 Foreigners Act 
     PS Ubauro. 
Mr Mehmood Sikander Advocate for all accused. 
Mr Abdullah Malik ADPP for State. 
 
O R D E R 
26.11.09. 
  By this order I intend to disposed off above titled case by allowing an application 
u/s 249-A CrPC moved on behalf of all accused who are facing trial before this court. 
 The brief facts of the case are that above named accused were implicated in this case due 
to illegally entering into Sindh without any authorized valid document or visa, during 
interrogation they disclosed that they are Afghan National and living illegally in Pakistan 
     Application in hand was noticed to state through learned ADPP. 
Heard the both parties at length, learned defense council Mr. Mehmood Sikander argued that all 
accused are innocent as they are having valid document refugee card called as POR (Proof of 
Registration) issued by NADRA Government of Pakistan which is valid till 31 December 2009 
entitling them to reside in Pakistan, that there was an argument between the Government of 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and UNHCR which entitle Afghan Refugee to live temporarily in Pakistan. 
He further argued that a circular dated 28.10. 09 regarding status of Afghans refugee has been 
issued by Home Department Sindh wherein directions were made not to [deport?]...  
373 
 
[line missing] 
[A circular is present?] made by NADRA Dated 24.10.09 and photo copy of circular dated 
28.10.09 issued by Home Department Sindh. On other hand learned state council did not appose 
the application. The Court sent copy of circular for verification whether same is genuine 
or otherwise which verified from Home Department wherein they verified such circular to be 
genuine through letter Dated 26.10.09 received by this court through fax.   
 Perused the material placed on record, which suggests that all accused are having their 
POR cards validated their stay in Pakistan till 31.10.09, hence their entrance in Pakistan is not 
illegal therefore the penal law Foreigner Act does not apply upon them and there is no possibility 
of their conviction in this case resultantly application in hand is allowed as prayed all above 
named accused are acquitted in this case u/s 249-A CrPc accused are confined in jail their release 
writ is ordered to be issued and present case stands disposed off accordingly. 
Announced in open court on this 26th day of November 2009. 
 
       Sd/-26.11.2009. 
      (ASGHAR ALI TANWARI) 
      II- CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M UBAURO. 
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Appendix 10: News Stories of the “negative” Afghan Other 
Newspaper, 
Date 
Headline Article Excerpts 
The Nation, 
19 April 1991. 
 
Afghan refugee 
repatriation. 
The Kalashnikov culture and the corresponding 
increase in crimes, the access to drugs, the rise in 
drug addiction and in sabotage activities are all 
linked to refugee presence in the country... Have 
taken over the trucking industry/vegetables markets. 
The News, 22 
November 
2000. 
Mansehra blast scares 
Afghan refugees. 
 
Scared of going outside following allegations that 
the recent bomb blast in the town may have been 
the work of an Afghan refugee. 
 
The News, 
26 June 2005. 
 
Point of return - 
Editorial. 
 
We want to be rid of the much maligned Afghans 
who gave us drugs and guns. There may be a few 
among them who we have befriended during the 
three decades they have been forced to live on our 
soil, on borrowed breathing space in a crowd of the 
disadvantaged. We are hoping that they will soon go 
home not because we sympathise with them, and we 
would have loved to throw them out to save our 
economy if we had the authority to do so.  
Dawn, 
1 August 
2005. 
 
Plan to curb refugees’ 
anti-poll activities. 
 
The interior ministry has convened a meeting on 
Monday to devise a strategy to check involvement 
of Afghan refugees in crimes and terrorist activities. 
The News, 
3 August 
2005. 
 
Afghan refugees to 
be moved from 
Islamabad. 
 
More than 3 million Afghans have been living in the 
country and authorities in the capital believe the 
refugee settlements provide easy shelter to criminals 
such as robbers and even terrorists. 
The News, 2 
September 
2005. 
 
Grand operation 
against illegal 
Afghan immigrants 
likely this month. 
 
Three bombs have exploded in the capital during 
the last five years, claiming 26 lives, the report said... 
According to details of Afghan refugees arrested in 
criminal offences since 1990, as many as 1,025 
Afghan nationals, allegedly involved in heinous 
crimes, including murders, robberies, kidnapping for 
ransom, narcotics and business of illegal arms and 
ammunition, were arrested. They allegedly killed 21 
persons in different sectors of the capital and 
kidnapped nine persons during the aforementioned 
period, the report said. 
 
Hundreds of Afghan nationals were found involved 
in untraceable offences, including killings and 
terrorist activities and supervising underworld 
crimes, said the report. 
 
Inspector General of Police Chaudhary Iftikhar 
Ahmad, when contacted by ‘The News,’ said that 
the police would effectively achieve the target of 
eliminating Afghans, illegally living in the 
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metropolis, without getting any assistance from 
outside. 
The News, 
November 9 
2005. 
 
Afghans refugees 
given deadline to 
leave NWA. 
 
He [GOP official] said the decision [for Afghans to 
leave Pakistan] has been taken in view of 
deteriorating law and order situation and rise in 
terrorist incidents in the tribal region, bordering 
Afghanistan. 
Dawn, 5 July 
2006. 
Timergara blast: 
Afghans quizzed. 
 
Authorities have started probing into the blast that 
killed six soldiers of Dir Scouts on Monday. Dozens 
of Afghans refugees are being interrogated, officials 
said on Tuesday. 
 
Many Afghan refugees were called to the police 
station and were interrogated. 
 
Dawn, 
October 23 
2006. 
 
Time for Afghans to 
go home. 
 
The Darra (Adam Khel) brands of pistols, revolvers, 
shotguns, etc, were easily available across the 
country. But, the Russia-made AK-47 assault rifle, 
Kalashnikov, smuggled into Pakistan by Afghan 
warriors and professional smugglers gave a new 
twist to gun culture here.  
Dawn, 13 
December 
2006. 
Afghan DPs facing 
difficulty in 
enrolment. 
Registration of the refugees would also make it easy 
to identify whether those involved in terrorist acts 
are locals or foreigners. 
The News, 14  
January 2007. 
 
Drive back home. 
 
The local police authorities blame Afghan refugees 
for many of the incidents of terrorism as well as 
crimes like kidnapping, robbery, dacoity and 
murders. "I would say out of all the criminals we 
arrested during the past few months campaign, 70 
per cent were Afghan nationals. 
The News, 
15 January 
2007. 
 
Shaukat sees security 
risk in some refugee 
camps. 
 
The prime minister said Pakistan and Afghanistan 
have agreed during his recent trip to Kabul that 
refugee camps close to the border should be closed. 
“These camps in some cases provide a safe haven to 
elements prejudicial to our security.” 
The Nation, 
16  
January 2007. 
 
 Mr Shaukat Aziz has observed that refugee camps 
are serving as a ‘safe haven’ for terrorists and this 
view is also shared by the Afghan government. 
Despite playing a key role in the ongoing War on 
Terror, Pakistan continues to face criticism for 
providing refuge to those involved in terrorist 
activities but the West has not been able to 
understand that it is the Afghan refugee camps 
which are being used as hideouts by terrorists. It 
might seem to disprove our repeated assurances that 
Pakistan is not providing any support to the alleged 
terrorists, 
The Frontier 
Post, 22 April 
2007 
Pakistan and 
terrorism -  
Pervaiz Iqbal 
When the Afghan refugees streamed across the 
border into Pakistan, they created a number of 
problems for the host country, e.g. there were 
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 Cheema. (Comment). 
 
incidents of encroachment on lands and property, 
overgrazing of fields of the local population, large-
scale deforestation, land erosion, illegal shanty 
towns, massive increase in rent ceilings, introduction 
of drug and Kalashnikov culture, intensification of 
sectarianism, increased competition for transport 
and construction businesses, housing and jobs, and 
incidents of violence, etc. This had put a heavy 
strain on the social services of an already 
underdeveloped NWFP province. More 
importantly, law and order problems increased due 
to beggary, crime and immorality. This was followed 
by a spate of terrorist bomb explosions throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s. The Taliban period 
provided some respite as it was able to control law 
and order in Afghanistan to a considerable extent. 
Dawn, 1 June 
2007. 
 
This Afghan liability. 
 
The easy availability of NICs by illegal means has 
enabled them to acquire property, have jobs and 
start business. Traditionally hospitable to foreign 
Muslims, Pakistanis have never hesitated to 
welcome Afghan DPs despite problems between the 
two governments. However, many Pakistanis feel 
that the Afghan refugees have misused their 
hospitality and it is time they returned home. 
Terrorists cross over into Pakistan and find shelter 
in the refugee camps.  
Dawn, 1 
September 
2008. 
Pakistan wants 
repatriation of 
Afghan refugees 
expedited. 
 
A source in the ministry of states and frontier 
regions said the government had told Afghan 
officials and the UN refugee agency that it was 
becoming impossible for Pakistan to continue to 
host the refugees because Afghan nationals had 
been found involved in recent acts of terrorism in 
the country. 
The Post, 
19 April 2008. 
 
The issue of Afghan 
refugees. 
 
The prevailing violent and criminal culture in 
Pakistan has created security problems. Suicide 
terrorism, sectarian violence and ‘civil war’ in 
various areas have compelled the authorities to say 
that Afghans are to go back to their country... 
Pakistan has announced that all 2.4 million Afghan 
refugees, mostly living in camps, must return home 
by 2009. This and three other camps near the 
Afghan border, which together hold 230,000 
refugees, are scheduled to be closed by the end of 
August.  
The Post, 
5 August 
2008. 
 
Afghan refugees and 
Pakistan. 
 
These refugees caused deep rooted troubles on 
various fronts like shortage of resources, 
competition in labour market, environmental 
degradation, drugs, ethnic imbalances, etc. Some of 
these also got involved in criminal activities, 
smuggling, narco-traffic, and social problems but 
now they have turned into trouble spots for global 
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peace.  
Dawn, 14 
June 2011. 
Afghans, IDPs 
overstaying their 
hospitality. 
The prolonged stay of Afghan refugees and 
internally displaced persons from tribal regions has 
created social and economic problems besides 
posing threat to peace of the district, locals 
complain. 
Dawn, 14 
December 
2011. 
Afghan refugees 
killed Rabbani, says 
Khar. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar on 
Tuesday held Afghan refugees living in Pakistan 
responsible for the assassination of former Afghan 
president Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani. 
Dawn, 1 April 
2012. 
Eradication of 
terrorism remains a 
challenge: IGP. 
About the factors responsible for increase in 
militancy, he [Inspector General of Police 
Mohammad Akbar Khan Hoti] said that presence of 
millions of Afghan refugees and close proximity of 
the province to the tribal belt etc were affecting the 
law and order situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
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Appendix 11: Sample of Recorded Suicides from Poverty in Newspapers Stories  
Newspaper, 
Date 
Headline/ 
Location 
Article Excerpts 
Dawn, 29 July 
2008 
Old man 
commits suicide 
(Sukkur). 
Reports said that Mohammad Hassan Bhutto 
hanged himself with a rope from a ceiling fan and 
died instantly. He was father of seven children and 
was unable to take care of them due to extreme 
poverty and unemployment, area people said. 
The Nation, 7 
October 2008 
 
4 commit suicide 
over poverty 
(Karachi). 
Farhan, 23... was jobless and thriving to get some 
work... 
Sohail, 40... was the father of four and recently lost 
his garments factory job in Korangi Industrial Area.  
Dawn,  14 
September 2009 
Eyewitnesses 
recount scene at 
Karachi 
stampede 
(Karachi). 
Eighteen people were suffocated to death during a 
stampede here on Monday as poverty-stricken 
women battled for a free bag of flour being 
distributed by a philanthropist in Khohri Garden. 
The dead reportedly include a number of children as 
well. 
The Daily Times, 
8 June 2010 
 
Man commits 
suicide due to 
poverty 
(Rawalpindi). 
A man committed suicide due to financial problems, 
police said on Monday. Muhammad Sajid son of 
Muhamamd Hanif, a resident of Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir, threw himself in front of a Lahore-bound 
train near ‘Gawalmandi Pul. 
The News, 22 May 
2011 
 
Father of five 
commits suicide 
over poverty 
(Lahore) 
Police said he was disturbed over poor financial 
conditions as he was unable to run his house. He 
locked himself up in a room and hanged himself to 
death. 
The News, 20 
September 2011 
 
Mother of four 
commits suicide 
over poverty 
(Lahore). 
A 28-year-old woman, mother of four daughters, 
committed suicide in the South Cantt police area on 
Thursday morning. 
Express Tribune, 
27 October 2011 
Suicide: Poverty-
stricken man 
takes own life 
(Haripur). 
A man committed suicide here on Wednesday due 
to poverty, the Kot Najibullah police said. Twenty-
year-old Basheer Ahmed, a resident of Kangra 
Colony, was unemployed and had been facing great 
difficulties supporting his four orphaned siblings, 
police and family sources said. 
The News, 1 
November 2011 
 
Poverty-hit man 
commits suicide 
(Malakand 
Agency). 
A poverty-stricken man committed suicide in 
Shaheed locality of Sakhakot area in Malakand 
Agency on Monday, sources said. The sources said 
that Fazlur Rehman, father of six children, used to 
earn his livelihood by selling ‘Pakoras’ in Sakhakot 
Bazaar. He had been ill for a long time. He 
committed suicide by shooting himself dead. 
The Daily Times, 
17 November 
2011 
Suicide (Karachi). A young man committed suicide reportedly due to 
poverty in Martin Quarters on Wednesday. 
The News, 23 
December 2011 
 
Man commits 
suicide over 
poverty (Lahore). 
A 50-year-old man committed suicide due to 
poverty in the Shadbagh police area on Thursday. 
The deceased was identified as Muhammad Naeem, 
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a resident of Tajpura. He was upset over his 
monetary issues. 
The News, 4 
January 2012 
Man commits 
suicide in Bannu 
(Bannu). 
A man committed suicide due to abject poverty in 
Fazal Shah Mithakhel village in the limits of Mandan 
Police Station here Tuesday, sources said. The 
sources said that 45-year-old Sher Nazeef, father of 
children, entered his room and shot himself dead 
with a pistol. 
Dawn, 15 
February 2012 
Suicide the only 
way to escape 
poverty? 
(Islamabad and 
Karachi) 
[Stories and testimonies of various individuals in 
Islamabad and Karachi who either attempted suicide 
or have been affected by the death of a family 
member, usually related to poverty]. 
The Nation, 3 May 
2012 
Man commits 
suicide due to 
poverty (Lahore). 
According to details, Ghulam Fareed, 26, hailing 
from Mughalpura who was facing problems to feed 
his family due to poverty attempted to commit 
suicide by shooting himself with pistol injuring him 
critically. He was rushed to hospital but could not 
survive. The deceased was pickup driver and father 
of two children. 
The News, 7 May 
2012 
Jobless man 
commits suicide 
(Karachi). 
A jobless man committed suicide in his house in the 
Sharafi Goth police limits on Sunday. 
Pakistan Today, 16 
May 2012 
Poverty-stricken 
couple commits 
suicide in 
Khanewal 
(Khanelwal). 
A poverty-hit couple, also parents of two children 
committed suicide by jumping in front of a moving 
train on Tuesday. Afzal and his wife Fozia of 
Shakargarh area of Sialkot and residing in Khanewal 
were facing financial problems. 
Express Tribune, 
10 June 2012 
One million 
people commit 
suicide every 
year. 
[Discussion regarding the multifaceted causes of 
suicide, psychological and economic, and the 
increased suicide rates in Pakistan]. 
Lahore Times, 10 
June 2012 
 
Poverty stricken 
man hangs 
himself in Tank 
(Tank).  
A thirty years old man hanged himself to death in 
Mamraiz village...According to details one Imam 
Bakhsh s/o Muhammad Bakhsha and father of 
three children committed suicide by hanging himself 
to the roof of their room due to poverty.  
Lahore Times, 12 
June 2012 
 
Poverty stricken 
man, attempting 
for self 
immolation 
expires in Civil 
Hospital Karachi 
(Karachi). 
A Poverty stuck man who attempted to commit 
suicide through self immolation over poor financial 
position and debt, succumbed to his wounds in 
hospital. 
Express Tribune, 
3 July 2012 
Self-immolation: 
Man commits 
suicide 
(Rawalpindi). 
A 45-year-old man attempted self immolation at 
Liaqat Bagh area of the city on Tuesday, police said. 
According to details, Ashfaq Ahmed, resident of 
Gawalmandi area attempted self immolation over 
poverty issue. 
The Nation, 
31 July 2012 
Poverty compels 
father of two to 
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commit suicide. 
The Nation, 30 
August 2012 
Man, woman 
commit suicide 
(Lalmusa) 
Two people including a woman, a mother of five, 
committed suicide by taking pesticide pills while 
doctors saved the life of a man after he attempted 
suicide. All the frustrated persons swallowed 
pesticide pills easily available in the market. The 
reasons behind the suicides were stated to be 
poverty, unemployment and family feuds. 
The News, 1 
October 2012, 
Man commits 
suicide over 
poverty (Lahore). 
Javed Masih, a resident of Ali Husnainabad, was 
depressed as he was unable to run his family due to 
unemployment. 
 
The News, 22 
October 2012 
Two attempt 
suicide 
Two people attempted suicide in separate incidents 
here on Sunday. 
  
A poor widow attempted suicide due to poverty at 
Mohallah Gobindgarh. She was taken to a hospital. 
Azam attempted suicide by cutting his throat at 
Dhulley. He was rushed to a hospital. 
 
Frontier Post, 20 
November  2012  
 
Man commits 
suicide (Mian 
Channu). 
According to details, Ashraf, father of two children, 
hailing from Mohallah Rehmania, tehsil Mian 
Channu of Khanewal district was facing financial 
problems due to low income which led to domestic 
disputes and quarrels. 
Dawn, 22 
November 2012 
Father of 3 hangs 
himself  (Fateh 
Jang). 
A man committed suicide due to poverty at Gharbi 
Mohalla... The deceased was experiencing financial 
hardships because of prolonged unemployment, and 
his wife was the sole bread earner who worked at 
different houses. 
Dawn [Date 
unknown]. 
Poverty-stricken 
widow commits 
suicide (Lahore). 
A widow committed suicide by swallowing 
poisonous pills...The Shahdara Town police said 
Zareena Bibi, mother of two, was perturbed over 
daily expenses and the house rent. 
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Appendix 12: Afghans Getting Caught with CNIC – sample of news stories  
Newspaper, 
Date 
Headline Story Details  
Dawn, 14 
March 2002 
Maliks, staff face 
action for false CNIC 
verification 
Political administration of the Bajaur Agency has 
initiated action against its clerical staff and Maliks of 
the agency for wrongly verifying Afghan refugees as 
Pakistani nationals. 
Dawn, 29 
August 2005 
 
2 more Afghans held 
with fake travel 
papers 
Two Afghan nationals on charges of possessing fake 
travel documents 
The News, 20 
May 2007 
 
Afghan refugees 
holding CNICs 
creating trouble 
 
Majority of Afghan refugees in Balochistan, though 
not having Proof of Registration (PoR) cards but the 
Pakistani Computerised National Identity Cards, are 
reluctant to return to their homeland…[they] are 
creating problems in the repatriation process, an 
official told The News on Saturday. 
Dawn, 1 
June 2007 
 
This Afghan liability 
 
A photograph in yesterday’s Dawn shows a group of 
Pakistanis demonstrating against the illegal issuance 
of national identity cards to a large number of 
Afghan nationals. 
Dawn, 
5 March 2008 
Attempts by 
thousands of aliens to 
get CNIC foiled 
NADRA has foiled 11,396 attempts of obtaining 
computerised identity cards (CNIC) by confirmed 
aliens, their applications have been blocked 
permanently and cases are marked as fraud, 
according to a Nadra spokesman. 
The News 
6 October 2008 
 
Govt to kick out 
Afghan refugees from 
Bajaur 
 
Tribal sources said majority of the Afghan refugees 
during their long stay in Bajaur had purchased lands 
and properly constructed houses. Some of them are 
attached with various businesses and farming and 
have even obtained Computerised National Identity 
Cards (CNICs).  
Dawn, 9 
October 2009 
Refugees urged to 
surrender duplicate 
PoR cards  
 
National Database Registration Authority and the 
UN refugee agency have detected fraud in the 
system of issuing cards for Afghan refugees and 
found that some refugees have managed to obtain 
more than one card.  
 
Nadra and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees have issued the Proof of Registration 
(PoR) card to the Afghans still living in Pakistan for 
identification for giving financial assistance at the 
time of their repatriation.  
 
A UNHCR official said that the refugees with more 
than one card might have got themselves registered 
at different centres and managed to acquire cards 
from more than one centre. But now the data is 
centralised and such errors could be detected easily, 
he added.  
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“Afghan refugees holding more than one card 
cannot defraud the UNHCR in getting double 
benefits by using different cards because during 
repatriation process the refugees are made to pass 
through an Iris machine which readily identifies the 
person having passed through it before,” he said.  
 
It is learnt that Nadra has sorted out names, years of 
birth, provinces and districts of residence of all those 
who have more than one card. The UNHCR has 
urged such Afghans to surrender the fraudulently 
acquired cards to avoid penalty.  
 
Each registered Afghan will be allowed to keep his 
original card.  
 
APP, 20 Feb 
2010  
92,802 Afghan 
refugees issued CNIC 
After implementation of the multi biometric 
technology 85,032 attempts for getting CNICs on 
fake documents were foiled and the applications  
were deferred till verification, the sources said. 
The Daily 
Times,  
1 July 2010 
Over 25,000 Afghan 
nationals have 
CNICs, NA told 
[Rehman] Malik [Interior Minister] says NADRA has 
so far detected over 90,000 cases of fake CNICs.  
Over 25,000 Afghan nationals have obtained 
computerised national identity cards (CNICs) from 
the National Database and Registration Authority on 
fake documents, Interior Minister Rehman Malik 
told the National Assembly on Wednesday. 
 
Responding during the question hour, he said 
NADRA has detected over 90,000 cases of fake 
identity cards so far, which have been blocked. He 
said, "NADRA's employees foil around 100 to 200 
attempts of obtaining computerised identity cards 
daily". 
 
The Nation, 
October 15 
2011 
13,000 ‘aliens’ 
possess Pakistan’s 
CNICs: Malik 
The minister of interior also informed that around 
8,000 cards had been blocked in Balochistan of 
suspect/alien applicants on the basis of reported as 
alien by government agencies, proof of registration 
(PoR) card holder in addition to CNIC holder, fake 
particulars, holder of dual or bogus manual 
NIC/CNIC, fake parentage, old NIC issued to two 
different persons, fake date of birth or addresses, 
fake attesters and fake identifications papers.   
Dawn, 25 
October 2011 
29 held in illegal 
CNICs issuance case 
NADRA vigilant cell held 22 foreigners and seven 
Nadra employees and handed them over to Federal 
Investigation Agency (FIA) in Akhrotabad, 
Balochistan,” Nadra’s spokesman said here on 
Monday. Nadra vigilance cell received information 
that some foreigners mostly Afghan nationals were 
trying to get CNICs in connivance with Nadra 
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employees in Akhrotabad.  
The 
International 
News, 11 June 
2012  
Afghan refugee held 
for possessing Pak 
CNIC 
The sources said the police found a CNIC in the 
possession of Nuzrat Khan. It had been issued to 
him with the name of Mohammad Suleman. The city 
police registered case against Nuzrat Khan under 
sections 419, 420 and 478 of the Pakistan Penal 
Code and Section 14 of the Foreigners’ Act. 
The Nation, 15 
June 2012 
Govt, UN to move 
for Afghan rehab 
 
NADRA has already tracked and abandoned 
thousands of the fake Computerised National 
Identity Cards (CNIC) and has assisted the Federal 
Investigation Agency (FIA) to nab the illegal 
refugees.  
The Express 
Tribune, 22 
September 
2012 
NADRA starts 
crackdown against 
fake CNICs. 
 
NADRA also launched a crackdown against Afghan 
refugees who are living in Pakistan illegally. Over 
200,000 Afghans whose temporary ID cards have 
expired have been directed to leave the country. 
They will be no longer treated as refugees in Pakistan 
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Appendix 13: Identity Cards and Enumeration Practices  
 
Figure 20-32: Identity cards and enumeration techniques (Appendix 13) 
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Details of images 
Images 1 and 2: Upgraded 2010 SCAC POR card, front side and back side. Note registration of 
children under the age of 5 is placed on the back of the card. Also note the card is written in 
English. 
Image 3 and 4: The Republic of Afghanistan Paper ID card introduced by the Communist 
Afghan government (circa 1979). Details include photo identity, name, fathers name, religion, 
date of birth. 
Image 5: Unity of Islamic Resistance, Poverty Card (Da Guryatub Kart). The card was provided to 
some Afghans in Pakistan during the 1980s by resistance parties in Peshawar. It includes a 
picture of the male household head and family details. Each family was provided with a family 
identification number (top right hand of card). 
Image 6-8: Afghan Muhajireeen Passbook as issued by CCAR, Islamabad.  
Image 6: Passbook front page, includes identification number of the family. 
Image 7: Passbook fine print, which includes disclaimer that the passbook does not equal 
Pakistani citizenship. The text states this passbook does not entitle Pakistani citizenship (Is pass 
book seh Pakistan ka sheriyat ka haq nahi hota hai – shehriyat - literally: to be of the “city”). The text 
also outlines that only one passbook will be given to the family head, which will be taken back 
when the family leaves Pakistan. 
Image 8: Inside pages of passbook. note only family heads needed to possess a passbook. Details 
include listing of months rations received, details of family members, date of passbook issue. 
Image 9: GOP 1981 Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan (CCAR: 
Islamabad), Identity Annex. Note arrangements are made by family members and not individuals. 
Images 10-14: Afghan POR card registration and upgrade to SCAC processes in NADRA 
centres (2010-11). 
Images 15-16: Pakistani CNIC card, front and backside. Note how the Pakistani card includes a 
thumb print, and photo on the back side of the card. Note that the card is also written in Urdu.  
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